Reindeer Raid

July 26, 2016, 6:55 pm

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"To the Chief of Staff of the Karelian Front

The attachment is a proposition from a cadet of the 82nd Reserve Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment comrade Butakov for using deer transport for a deep raid of military units into the north-western part of Finland for your study and use of certain suggestions on using reindeer transport.

Attachment: 17 pages."

Now, using reindeer for transport isn't all that unusual in and of itself, but 17 pages of notes gives you a hint regarding the scope of cadet's daring plan. Here's an excerpt:

"Transport from the Yamalo-Nenetskiy and Hanta-Manskiyskiy okrugs will move along the 65 degrees north latitude line, with a slight deviation to the south, passing Arkhangelsk from the south. Transport will be assembled east of Nurmic (Finland) near Onega Bay. 250,000 reindeer will be assembled in this manner. This amount of reindeer will have the following size of pasture will be needed: the Naryan-Mara reindeer station gives consumption of one reindeer per day as 3.3 ar or 330 square meters. For 250,000 reindeer, 825 hectares of pasture per day will be needed. I do not have data regarding pastures of the European north, but I am inclined to think that reserves of lichen in the north-western part of the USSR will be able to supply 250,000 reindeer for a long time."

That's right, 250,000 reindeer and 200,000 men, with the assistance of a British amphibious landing force. To give you some indication of the feasibility of this plan, the aforementioned Yamalo-Nenetskiy okrug already gave up 10,000 trained reindeer to the army, leaving only the breeding males, females, and juveniles.

Via kris-reid.

---

Soviet Intel on British Tanks

July 27, 2016, 3:17 pm

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"British Tanks (modern)

British classification:

1. Light tanks: for reconnaissance and communications
2. Infantry tanks: used in army tank battalions. Used for supporting infantry.
3. Cruiser tanks: used in tank division. Used for independent action.

	Light Tank Mk VIB	Light Tank MkVII	Infantry Tank MkI	Infantry Tank MkII Matilda	Infantry Tank MkIII Valentine	Infantry Tank MkIV Churchill	Cruiser MkIV main type	Cruiser MkI three turret	Cruiser MkII one turret
Mass (tons)	5-6	7	12	25 or 32	16	38-40	14-16	12-14	12-14
Crew	3	3	3	4	3	5	4	4-5	3
Armour (mm)	12-16	Up to 16	Up to 60-65	Up to 75-80	60	75	Up to 30	16	Up to 20
Armament	12.7 mm MG 7.62 mm MG Smoke launcher	40 mm gun 7.62 mm MG 2 smoke  launchers	12.7 mm MG 7.62 mm MG Smoke launcher	40 mm gun 7.62 mm MG 2 smoke  launchers	40 mm gun 7.62 mm MG 2 smoke  launchers	40 mm gun 2 MGs, one high caliber	40 mm gun 7.62 mm MG 2 smoke launchers	37 or 40 mm gun 2 MGs	37 or 40 mm gun 1 MG, possibly 2
Engine	-	160 hp Meadows gasoline	85 hp	2 diesels 95 hp each	131 hp diesel	360 hp gasoline	180 or 340 hp gasoline	180 or 250 hp gasoline	180 or 250 hp gasoline
Speed (kph)	~50	Up to 64	-	30-35	25-26	~35-38	Up to 84	30-35	30-35
Range (km)	-	200	-	-	114	-	-	-	-
Communications	Radio	Radio	Radio	Radio and intercom	Radio and intercom	Radio and intercom	Radio and intercom	Radio	Radio

"

CAMD RF 38-11355-298

Gun vs Tree

July 28, 2016, 3:01 pm

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"To the Deputy People's Commissar of Armament, comrade Mirzakhanov
CC: factory #8 director, Major-General of the Artillery Engineering Service, comrade Fratkin

During trials of the SU-100 at Uralmash, two 100 mm 52-PS-412U guns mod. 1944 ##A1966 and 2506 were damaged by impact on tree trunks and require repair at the factory.

The elevation mechanism cover bolts of gun #A1966 were torn off, the turning mechanism was bent, and the elevation mechanism works unevenly.

The travel lock on gun #2506 was bent, and the elevation mechanism works unevenly.

The guns were removed and are now at the Uralmash factory.

I ask you to order the director of factory #8 to repair the guns, paid for by GBTU. Present the bill to the financial department of the Armoured and Motorized Forces, Moscow, Red Square #2, NKO building.

GBTU USA Chief, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, Alymov
Chief of the 2nd Department of the GBTU USA, Engineer-Colonel Kupriyanov"

CAMD RF 38-11369-53

World of Tanks History Section: 100 Years of Tanks

July 29, 2016, 5:30 pm

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1916. For many months, endless trench warfare raged on along the fronts of the First World War. Attacks into a storm of enemy shells and bullets, thousands of dead men to push the enemy back hundreds of meters. Day after day, week after week. The way out of this dead end was coming. A new, never before seen weapon, a demon of technological warfare, was already coming to life within British arsenals. Its name was "tank".

In order to bring this fighting machine to life, four technical inventions were necessary, as well as one condition to bring them together. Here they are.

Linked Tracks

To this day, it is not known who invented linked tracks. Some assign this honour to the French inventor d'Herman, who presented a "new type of cart" to the public in 1713, which traveled on a chain of logs. Others point to a British inventor named Edgeworth, who connected two cart wheels with a linked chain some 50 years later. However, he never patented his invention. Whoever this mysterious pioneer of the linked track was, his invention took hold and the new type of movement remained in use.

From the beginning of the 19th century, dozens of engineers independently created their own types of tracks and improved their design. Long before tanks, tracks conquered the world, reaching the Antarctic with Robert Scott.

There were many tracked vehicles on the battlefield of WWI aside from tanks. Aside from vehicles built in metal, there were paper projects, some on the brink of insanity. For example the Russian army planned to equip the Ilya Muromets heavy bomber with a tracked landing gear. The theory was that this way, it could take off from any surface.

D'Herman's roller suspension (1713)

R. Edgeworth's tracked suspension, 1770

J. Heathcote's steam tracked tractor, 1832

J. Cale's tracked cart design with perpendicular rollers to allow for turning.

Antarctic explorer William Lashley in front of a motorized tracked sled used in Robert Scott's expedition (November 1911)

Russian "Ilya Muromets" heavy bomber. This giant was to be equipped with tracks so it could take off from any terrain.

Tracks opened up the potential of regular wheels which was hidden for thousands of years, giving them unseen off-road performance. However, they would never have taken off without an engine.

Engine

The engine also did not suddenly appear, but evolved over the centuries, in several directions. The first steam turbines were known during the ancient times and in the Middle Ages. In the 18th century, Scotsman John Watt patented the steam engine. Its power output was very humble, only 10 hp, but it was enough to change the world.

Engineers tried to equip rail-less vehicles as well as railroad locomotives with steam engines. In the later half of the 19th century, steam tractors appeared in armed forces all over the world. However, their faults were obvious: the amount of required fuel and a massive boiler made the vehicles very large. Soon, another novelty appeared: the internal combustion engine. Many talented inventors developed it to perfection over the course of more than a century.

An ancient steam turbine invented by Hero of Alexandria (~10-75 AD)

A sketch of James Watt's steam engine (1769)

Nicolas-Joseph Cugnot's steam carriage (1769)

Trevithick's Pen-y-Darren steam locomotive sketch (1804)

Rudolph Diesel (1858-1913), the inventor of the diesel engine.

The Wright Brothers' 4-cylinder engine (serial number #17) used in 1910.

In parallel, chemists worked on ideal fuel for this new engine. Alcohol or turpentine could have been the solution, but breakthrough in petrochemicals forced them out. Russian scientist D.I. Mendeleev complained about gasoline: "You might as well heat your house by burning money!", it won out. In 1885, German engineers G. Daimler and W. Maybach created the carburetor gasoline engine. Sevel years later, R. Diesel immortalized his name with an engine of his own. The age of steam was coming to an end, and the heart of the tank was born. However, it had to be protected from enemy shells and bullets.

Armour

Advances in machinery spurred breakthroughs in metallurgy. Armoured steel appeared, first finding its home in fortifications and in the navy. In 1856, Russian mechanic V.S. Pyatov created the first mechanism for rolling armour. A year later, Belgian military engineer A. Brilyamon offered to equip the Antwerpen fortress with armoured artillery turrets. These turrets later appeared in fortifications of many countries.

Local wars of the 19th century demonstrated that defenses must be constantly improved, otherwise a well armed enemy can quickly penetrated it. Bunkers made from concrete and armour became commonplace. In 1885-1887, engineers H. Gruson and M. Schumann created the first mobile artillery turret: the 5,3 cm L/24 Fahrpanzer. Initially, the military protested: "Anything that moves can't be fortifications!" The Fahrpanzer might appear to be the precursor of a tank, but it was not, since it wasn't self propelled.

Ironclad "USS Monitor", the first ironclad of the American navy.

Alfred Krupp (1812-1887), the king of military metallurgy of his time

Steel rolling plant of the Dnieper Metallurgy Factory, early 20th century

Armoured fortress turret, late 19th century

Sketch of the 5,3 cm L/24 Fahrpanzer mobile turret

Belgian Minerva armoured car, fall of 1914. Armour enters the First World War.

The three aforementioned elements could not have come together into a tank if not for the success of armament engineers.

Armament

High quality steel that was produced in enormous amounts in the 19th century opened a new frontier for armament engineers. Rifled barrels, recoil brakes, breech loading, every innovation improved cannons further. In 1893, shots from the Maxim Gun echoed through the Old World. Military conservatives treated this novelty coolly, as they did not approve of wasting ammunition and the fact that the machinegun was vulnerable to artillery. However, 600 rounds per minute became a weighty argument in favour of the new weapons. All leading powers began to purchase or produce machineguns.

A little later, when armoured cars bristled with machineguns and even cannons, little interest was paid to them. If anyone offered the idea of a tank during the turn of the century, they would be laughed out of the room.

A plaque on the first gun made from P.M. Obukhov's steel, which made 4017 shots during trials

Coastal defense gun at Susisaari island (Finland), late 19th century

A patent for Richard J. Gatling's gun, the precursor of machineguns (1865)

Hiram Maxim demonstrating his machinegun

An American coastal defense gun on a railroad carrier, 1916

German soldiers with a horse carrying a Maxim gun, WWI

In order for these four technical achievements to combine into a tank, designers had to have an inspiration. Sadly, it came to pass.

The Fifth Element

Trench warfare gave birth to the tank. The opponents hardened their defenses to the point where one or two machineguns could stop the attack of a whole regiment. "Battalion after battalion attacked only to show that a frontal attack on wire and machineguns only leads to losses ... and a handful of medals for the survivors" wrote a contemporary. In 1916, ten Vickers machineguns fired about one million rounds over the course of one battle.

And what happened on the narrow line between enemy trenches? Bulging, ruined terrain, multi-meter craters, both flooded and dry, overlapping each other. This "moon landscape" was tough even for an infantryman to cross. Add an endless amount of wire, trenches, mines... a tank had to appear under these conditions.

As it often happens, the debut of new weapons was described not by military theorists, but by science fiction writers. The clearest prediction was made by Herbert Welles in 1903.

Original article available here.

T-30: Simplicity Itself

July 30, 2016, 2:34 pm

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75 year passed on Sunday July 17th 2016 since the decision to produce the T-30 small tank. This tank remained in obscurity for a number of reasons. Born at a time of difficult for its country, it was overshadows by its "older brother", the T-40, and "younger brother", the T-60. In addition, the tank was indexed T-60 for some time, complicating the process of figuring out what tank is mentioned in reports. Lost among almost 6000 "real" T-60s, this tank played an important role on the battlefield in the fall and winter of 1941.

The First T-60

Right after the start of the Great Patriotic War, tank production plans in the Soviet Union were revised. Heavy KV-4 and KV-5 tanks were shelved, even though work continued until August of 1941. Plans regarding the KV-3 also changed: it was now going to be produced in Chelyabinsk instead of Leningrad.

The new amphibious T-40 reconnaissance tank was not that lucky. According to USSR SNK decree issued on June 25th, 1941, Ordzhonikidze factory #37 (Moscow) was ordered to stop producing semi-armoured T-20 Komsomolets tractors and T-40 tanks. Instead, it would start producing T-50 tanks within two months, with the hulls coming from the Ordzhonikidze factory in Podolsk. About 50 factories in Moscow and its surroundings would be involved in the production of components for the T-50 tank.

Factory management took this request seriously and began working on allocating a new building. There was also talk of future reconnaissance tanks on the T-135 chassis (the occasional name of the T-50 at factory #174). At the same time, it was quickly obvious that factory #37 is unsuitable for producing the T-50. Making reconnaissance tanks and tractors with automotive components is one thing, but the production of a 14 ton tank is completely different. In addition, factory #174, the main producer of the T-50 was also having trouble.

Factory #37's management treated this information like bad news from the front. In strict secrecy, the factory design bureau began work on a simplified T-40. On one July evening, a letter written by engineer N.A. Astrov and military representative at factory #37 V.P. Akunin was deposited into the mailbox at the Kremlin's Nikolsky gates. The letter, addressed to Stalin himself, explained that it was impossible to produce the T-50 at factory #37 and instead proposed production of a small tank on the T-40 chassis, which would be produced in much larger volumes. In addition, letting the factory's production facilities sit there at such a difficult time would be almost criminal.

The letter made it to Stalin on the same day, and intrigued him. The next morning, the deputy chair of the Council of Commissars V.A. Malyshev (he was also the People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding) arrived at the factory, tasked by Stalin with curating the project. After studying the situation and hearing out the proposal, Malyshev wrote to Molotov on July 14th, approving of the new tank's production. The chief of GABTU, Lieutenant-General Ya.N. Fedorenko, was also in agreement. With permission from deputy chair of the SNK N.A. Voznesenskiy, Molotov approved teh cancellation of the T-50 at factory #37.

On July 17th, 1941, Molotov signed GKO decree #179ss "On the production of light T-60 tanks at factory #37". 1600 tanks were expected before the end of December, and the first 150 tanks were expected in August. The same decree cancelled the production of the T-20 Komsomolets tractor.

Three days later, GKO decree #222ss "On production of 10,000 light tanks" was released, according to which factory #37 had to produce 3500 tanks. The Kuybyshev factory in Kolomna was added as a supplier of hulls to the Ordzhonikidze factory in Podolsk. Around this time, factory #37's design bureau began working on a simplified hull for the T-60, which resulted in the T-60 that we know. This was a complicated situation where two tanks, both indexed T-60, were in production at the same time. Both were based on the T-40, had the same turret ring diameter, but differed in most other ways.

An improvement for the front tow hook was developed for the T-40, but only implemented on the T-30.

Understanding the drawbacks of this situation, the design bureau separated the projects by their blueprints. The "first" T-60 received the index 030, and the "simplified" T-60 was indexed 060. In order to avoid duplicating work, compatible parts were used from 030. In addition, many parts migrated unchanged from the T-40, with blueprint index 010.

In the end, in order to prevent confusion, the T-60 with the index 030 was renamed to T-30. This index first appears in correspondence in late July. Officially, this index is first used in GABTU documents on August 31st, 1941. The first tank to receive it had the serial number #13766. The first official T-30 tanks were received by Rotmistrov's 8th Tank Brigade (21 T-40s and 11 T-30s).

Stockpiles

By the end of July, the T-30 was completely formed. This tank looked like the T-40, but without amphibious equipment or the bay for it. The thickness of the armour increased to 20 mm, and it became homogeneous instead of cemented. There were now two tow hooks, since the central hook on the T-40 frequently broke. The armament also changed. At first, it was supposed to be the same as on the T-40: a DShK machinegun and a DT machinegun. The plans had to be changed, as factories producing the DShK (in part, factory #507 in Lopasnya, modern Chekhov) could only produce a few hundred machineguns per month.

On July 23rd, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense Marshall Kulik called for an urgent meeting to discuss the T-60's armament. The situation called for a replacement of the DShK, and an alternative was quickly found in the modified 20 mm ShVAK aircraft gun.

Experimental installation of the TNSh on T-40 tank #11726.

GKO decree #289ss "On the armament of the T-60 tank" was released on July 26th, equipping it with the 20 mm ShVAK autocannon developed by OKB-15 (in September it was indexed TNSh/ShVAK mod. 1941). The decree was signed before any gun existed in metal: the first one was installed on a T-40 tank and tested between August 7th and 10th. The penetration was similar to that of the DShK, but the range of complete penetration increased. The tank with the first TNSh is still "alive" and can be seen on display at Patriot Park. It also served as a testbed for the dual towing hooks.

Loading of T-30 tanks belonging to the 5th Tank Brigade, renamed to 42nd Tank Brigade. As you can see, some tanks lack amphibious equipment, but some can still swim. Naro-Fominsk, September 1941.

This was all theory, but practice was different. The Podolsk Ordzhonikidze factory already had a stock of T-40 hulls and turrets. Since T-60 production was behind schedule, both for organizational and technical reasons, the factory first simply stated making T-40 hulls out of homogeneous armour. It's worth mentioning that using homogeneous armour was discussed since July 14th, when the T-30 didn't exist yet. Due to thickening of some plates, the protection of the hull remained the same.

In order to preserve amphibious qualities, it was decided that the engine compartment bulkhead and other non-critical parts would be removed. Tanks with homogeneous hulls were still amphibious. The factory could just as easily make T-30 hulls, but there was a problem: a lack of 20 mm plates. The same problem plagued other factories that provided KhTZ and GAZ with T-60 hulls.

These tanks had the old tow hook.

The T-30 also had problems with armament. Despite orders, the production of guns and ammunition was delayed. It wasn't only an issue of arming factory #37's tanks: even the first T-60s in Kharkov and Gorky had issues. Meanwhile, factory #37 reached an agreement with factory #507 about shipping 300 DShK machineguns by October 1st, 1941. By September 1st, factory #37 had 289 DShK machineguns.

T-30 tanks from the 1st Tank Brigade, which also received some tanks without amphibious capability. One can easily distinguish early T-30s from T-40s by the singular headlight.

As a result, early T-30s were almost indistinguishable from the T-40. Formally, the tarp was not carried on the T-30 like it was on the T-40, as it would impact its already decreased buoyancy. Realistically, telling the two tanks apart by just the tarp is likely impossible.

Not all September T-30s could swim. In late August, the Podolsk factory shipped 25 hulls without amphibious equipment, but the bay for the propeller and rudder remained. The factory also "forgot" the opening for the external starter mechanism on these tanks. These tanks were named T-40S in post-war documents, and later by historians, but this index never existed. Formally, these tanks were indexed T-40 in the army and T-30 in factory #37 documentation. They were produced in September of 1941, and they were sent to, at least, the 1st and 5th (renamed to 42nd) Tank Brigades. Most T-30 tanks remained amphibious.

Knocked out T-30 near Moscow, with the new hull but still with a DShK as the main gun.

The T-30 approached its intended form in early October of 1941. By then, Kuybyskev factory in Kolomna began shipping hulls with thickened armour and without the rear bay. It's easy to distinguish these tanks by the lack of rake, which became unnecessary as the tank could no longer swim. Instead of one tow hook on the front, two were used, one on each side. The fuel tank access hatches were simplified and the rear tow hook was lowered. As the technical specifications required, the thickness of the armour was increased from 13 mm to 20 mm.

Another T-30 with the new hull and a DShK. The rear bay was missing from the thicker hull.

The T-30 only approached its intended form by the end of its production in Moscow. By then, 20 mm TNSh guns became available in necessary amounts, and the stockpile of DShKs ran out. Only 63 T-30 tanks were armed with the TNSh at factory #37. In total, 200 tanks were build in September (of those 3 had cracks and were used for training) and 140 in October.

The only known photograph of a Moscow produced T-30 with a TNSh gun.

T-30 tanks were used in 10 tank brigades, with the 27th brigade receiving them last. 10 tanks were used in the 151st and 152nd Motorized Infantry Brigades, and 25 more T-30s were used to make M-8 rocket artillery platforms.

In Evacuation

Some sources say that 335 T-30s were produced, but this number only includes tanks built in Moscow, as well as chassis used to make M-8s. However, the production of T-30s didn't end here. They were produced at two factories evacuated in the fall of 1941.

On October 9th, 1941, GKO decree #752ss "On evacuation of factories #37, KIM, Podolsk, and tank production in Kolomna", ordering the evacuation of these factories to Sverdlovsk. The Sverdlovsk Rail Car Repair Factory grounds would be their new base of operations. At the same time, the Ordzhonikidze factory in Podolsk was also evacuated to Sverdlovsk. The main supplier of hulls and turrets for factory #37 moved to the territory of the Metallist factory. The factory was expected to produce 50 hulls and turrets in November, 200 in December, begin producing 12 units per day by January, and finish setup of equipment by January 20th.

Training exercises with T-38 and T-30 tanks, winter of 1942. These are likely some of the first T-30 tanks produced in Sverdlovsk.

Factory #37 was supposed to begin production of T-60 tanks, but the reality was different. 187 T-40 and T-60 hulls were brought to Sverdlovsk, and the 45 T-60 hulls from that amount were really not 060 hulls, but T-30 hulls.

Since the amphibious equipment was not available, the factory began converting the hulls. At the same time, work on producing T-30 hulls with 20 mm of armour and no rear bay began. Existing hulls with thicker armour were used up first. 22 tanks were assembled in December, 20 of which were accepted. Problems with supplies of TNSh guns led to five tanks being armed with DShK machineguns. The first tanks built in Sverdlovsk drove in a parade through city streets. Due to a mix-up with indices it is often written that these are T-60s, but they were really T-30s.

About half of all T-30s built in Sverdlovsk looked like this.

Tanks built in Sverdlovsk differed from the ones made in Moscow. The biggest difference was in the cast spoked road wheels. They were developed back in August of 1941 by enlarging the Komsomolets tractor road wheels. These wheels were first tested on the 060, but there was not enough time to put them on the T-30. They were first used on T-30 tanks at the new factory.

The plate edges and welding seams on Ural T-30s were rougher. The numbering system also changed. Early T-30s had four digit registration numbers. For example, one tank in Patriot Park has the serial number 3025, meaning that it was built in early January of 1942. Unlike Moscow T-30s, some of which had radios, all Sverdlovsk T-30s were released without them.

T-30 with additional armour from the 90th Tank Regiment, knocked out by Finns in battle on August 2nd or 3rd, 1944.

In total, 200 T-30 tanks were built in Sverdlovsk between December 1941 and February 1942. Of those, 101 received additional armour in the front according to GABTU's requirements for more armour. These tanks were the last to see battle. The 90th Tank Regiment that fought in Karelia in 1944 had these tanks. Finnish footage dated early August 1944 shows some of these knocked out tanks.

The second factory to produce the T-30 was the Kuybyshev factory. In October of 1941, according to GKO decree #752ss, it began partial evacuation to the 1st of May Kirov Machinebuilding Factory (Kirov). November and December were spent on organizing the factory at it new grounds. The new factory received the name "Kuybyshev factory #38". Its first director was E.Ye. Rubinchik, who headed the Kolomna factory before the war. M.N. Schukin was the chief designer at the factory.

Cast turret for the T-30 and T-60 developed by M.N. Schukin.

Even before the evacuation, a new cat turret was developed under Schukin's supervision. The turret could be installed on the T-30 or the T-60, and was easier to produce. The mass of the turret was 311 kg (the welded turret weighed 203 kg), and the thickness of its armour was 22-24 mm. The experimental turret was tested against the DShK, and was impenetrable from 100 meters.

By September 29th, 14 cast turrets were made. Orders were given to install them on hulls and send them to factory #37. The orders were confirmed in a memo on October 7th, but it is not known what happened after. In October, factory #37 was evacuated to Sverdlovsk and there is no information about T-30 tanks with cast turrets produced at the new location. It is likely that these tanks remained in Kolomna and were shipped to Kirov from there.

Production of hulls and turrets was organized at factory #38 starting in December, but the new factory had enough production power to build complete tanks. It's worth mentioning that several dozen hulls and turrets built in Kolomna were still at the factory. A decision was made to produce T-60 tanks at factory #38, with a quota of 200 tanks in February.

The only known photograph of a T-30 built at factory #38. The picture was taken in late July of 1942. This was the last shipment of T-60s from Kirov, but not the last shipment of T-30s.

For a number of reasons, production at factory #38 was delayed. As a result, only 4 tanks were accepted in January out of 200, and these were T-30s and not T-60s. 060 tanks became the main production of the factory in February, but there were still some 030s. All tanks produced by the factory were recorded as T-60s, so the only way to establish the type of tank is to look at the serial numbers (T-30s built at factory #38 had 2### serial numbers). 

Less than 10 T-30s were shipped in February. Later, T-30s are occasionally encountered, and one can confidently set the number of T-30 tanks built in Kirov at 50. The last tank with serial number 2096 left the factory on October 12th, 1942. Externally, the Kirov tanks resembled the late Moscow produced ones. Factory #38 quickly began production of stamped road wheels. These are the wheels used on the T-30 which appears on the photograph from the summer of 1942.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

T-60: A Small Tank in a Big War

July 31, 2016, 12:49 pm

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The history of the T-60 tank is atypical for Soviet tank building. The tank was accepted into service before even the first blueprint was prepared, and thousand of units were ordered immediately at three factories. Even though the final results were a lot more humble, more than 5500 completed vehicles is a very impressive number. Remaining in production for just under a year, from September 1941 to July 1942, the T-60 became the most numerous small tank in history. These vehicles appeared on the front lines during the most heated part of the Battle for Moscow, and made a noticeable contribution to the war during its most difficult point. On July 20th, 2016, the T-60 turned 75 years old.

Simpler, Lower, Thicker

On July 17th, 1941, State Committee of Defense decree #179ss "On production of light T-60 tanks at factory #37" was signed. Instead of the planned T-50, the factory would produce a simplified version of the T-40 amphibious reconnaissance tank. N.A. Astrov and V.P. Okunev's idea was approved at the very top, since the T-50 would not be available before October at best, and factory #37's equipment was not appropriate for producing such a heavy tank.

Meanwhile, making the T-60 from the T-40 was also far from simple. The problem was that the Ordzhonikidze factory in Podolsk produced rather complex hulls and turrets. The biggest problem was with the turret, which had a complicated shape. A large amount of rejected parts was one of the reasons why the T-40's production was behind schedule, and moving to homogeneous armour in mid-July only partially mitigated the problem.

Meanwhile, on July 20th, 1941, decree #222ss "On producing 10,000 light tanks" was signed. According to the decree, one of the main producers of the T-60 was KhTZ (Kharkov), with a quota of 3500 tanks. Another 3000 would be build at the Molotov GAZ factory, the main supplier of engines, gearboxes, road wheels, and other components for the T-40. Even with homogeneous armour, the T-40 was unsuitable for this kind of mass production, and its design had to be simplified.

On July 23rd, NKSM order #360ss was issued, according to which factory #37 was to design a simplified T-60 hull and turret. Only two days later, a technical meeting was held at factory #37 to discuss the design of the T-60 tank on the basis of the T-40 and its production at GAZ and KhTZ. However, real work on a simplified T-40 began earlier. The earliest drafts are dated July 22nd, even before the order was given. Astrov's design bureau set a world record in designing their tank: the final blueprints were ready on July 28th, so all documentation on the tank was developed in less than a week. This is confirmed by the dates on blueprints.

One of blueprints for the 060. The first date is July 22nd, 1941.

A problem arose during the design. According to the GKO decree, two tanks with the index T-60 were developed at factory #37. The problem was solved by giving the new tank the index 060, which is also periodically used in correspondence. There was also an attempt to assign the index T-70 to the 060, and even though this index is applied only a few times, it is enough to confuse any researcher. The tank is also called "T-60 with simplified hull", T-60M, or simply T-60. The last of these finally took hold by the fall of 1941, but even in 1942 some factories still occasionally refer to it as T-70 or T-60M.

Despite the fact that a series of components was identical on the T-40, T-30, and T-60, the "simplified" variant was a new tank. Since there was no longer a requirement for the tank to be amphibious, the hull of the T-60 was completely redesigned, lowering the height of the tank from 1905 mm to 1735 mm, a record low for mass produced tanks of WWII. The armour was also different compared to the T-40. The hull was shaped like a wedge, and the sides were made of two halves to aid production.  As requested by the technical specifications, the front armour was increased to 20 mm and the side armour was increased to 15 mm. Overall, the mass grew slightly to 5800 kg. The turret was also simplified. It now had a polygonal shape, which noticeably eased production. The thickness of the front armour was 20 mm, the sides were 15 mm thick.

Experimental TNSh gun, tested in a T-40.

The last item that needed work was the armament. Here, the story of the T-60 repeats what happened with the T-30. Initially, the DShK was supposed to remain as the main gun, but it turned out that factory #507 could not supply enough of them. As a result, an alternative was found: the converted 20 mm ShVAK aircraft gun. The tank version of the gun, indexed TNSh, was accepted into service before a prototype was built.

The solution of the armament issue delayed the delivery of documentation on the T-60 to its producers.

Victims of Delays

The deadlines set by GKO decree #222ss were too harsh. The plans were to send out documentation on the 060 by July 27th. In reality, documentation for installation of the armament was not finished by then, and the blueprints were only sent out on July 28th. KhTZ received the first blueprints on July 28th, but did not receive most of them until August 10th.

Meanwhile, the Ordzhonikidze factory in Podolsk produced a hull of the experimental tank by mid-August. Assembly of the first 060 began at factory #37 on August 17th, 1941. The turret was taken from the T-40, with the stock DShK machinegun. The machinegun never installed, however. The experimental tank used cast road wheels with spokes. Factory #37 developed them as an alternative to Molotov GAZ stamped and welded wheels.

Experimental T-60, Gorkiy, 1942.

By late August, the experimental T-60 was completed. Astrov and Okunev personally drove it from Moscow to Gorkiy, where the tank became the prototype for all production at the factory. This stunt created the myth that allegedly Astrov and Okunev remained in Gorkiy. This is not correct, as both of them returned to factory #37, which was just starting production of T-30 tanks. No one in their right mind would have robbed the factory of its chief designer and senior military representative at such a crucial time.

Meanwhile, the situation at KhTZ was difficult. As of August 16th, the factory still had no technical conditions for QA and no requirements for a parts and instruments kit. Despite a delay in blueprints, the factory began preparations for production in early August. A meeting was held between KhTZ and KhEMZ (Kharkov Electro-Mechanical Factory), spreading the required workload between the factories.

The main problems were the supply of hulls and turrets. Subcontractors involved in the production of hulls were, for various reasons, delayed production. One of the reasons was the need to redesign the turret to use the TNSh. As a result, documentation on turrets was completed by the end of August.

In addition, the hull and turret manufacturers were loaded with other orders. A series of problems led to the quotas for August not being met. The first experimental 060 hull was assembled at the Voroshilovgrad October Revolution factory only by the end of the month.

As you can see by the lower left part of the blueprint, some components were shared between the KhTZ-16 armoured tractor and the T-60.

The problem was that the factory proposed the KhTZ-16 armoured tractor on its own initiative, built in cooperation with NATI on the SKhTZ-NATI tractor. Its production was approved on the same day as the production of the T-60 by GKO decree #219ss. The problem with the KhTZ-16 was the same: too many chassis, not enough hulls. For obvious reasons, KhTZ gave preference to their own design. The factory management also entertained the thought that they would be freed from the T-60, but Malyshev himself arrived at the factory to bust some heads, after which work on producing the T-60 suddenly sped up.

T-60 hulls captured by the Germans in Kramatorsk which never reached KhTZ.

Despite Malyshev's measures, production of parts was behind schedule. A series of KhTZ plants continued working on parts for the armoured tractor. On September 10th, KhTZ received the first two sets of hulls and turets from the Krasniy Kotelshik factory (Taganrog). On September 13th, 1941, almost a month after the scheduled start of production, the first T-60 was assembled using a hull and turret from the Voroshilovgrad factory. At that moment, the factory had 12 sets of hulls and turrets from three different subcontractors. However, only seven tanks were assembled and sent out in September, which equaled the amount of available engines.

On September 17th, partial evacuation of KhTZ began. Some of its equipment was moved to Krasnoarmeysk, a suburb of Stalingrad. The story of T-60 tanks produced at factory #264 is worthy of its own article. As for Kharkov T-60s, their fate is unclear. Two tanks were delivered to the 71st Independent Tank Battalion, but it is unknown where the others went.

Tanks, not Trucks

Molotov GAZ encountered the same issue as KhTZ. Delays with subcontractors receiving T-60 documentation meant that the production quotas were not met. Even though the Vyksa Particle Size Reduction Equipment Factory (DRO) assembled an experimental hull in mid-August to prepare for production, mass production was still a pipe dream. According to GABTU representatives, real supplies from contractors to GAZ could not be expected earlier than September 1st. Meanwhile, the factory continued preparations for the new tank. The factory design bureau, like their KhTZ colleagues, made their changes to a significant portion of received documentation.

Molotov GAZ production T-60 from fall 1941 to the winter of 1942.

The factory also had production problems. As of August 1941, in addition to the T-60, the factory was producing a whole spectrum of wheeled vehicles. MS-1 hulls were sent to the Vyksa DRO factory to be converted into BA-20 armoured cars, GAZ-07 chassis were sent to the Izhor factory for BA-10M armoured cars. The factory was also the sole producer of 1.5 ton trucks, which were worth their weight in gold at the front, and GAZ was still responsible for them. In addition, production of the GAZ-64 reconnaissance car and GAZ-61 command car began in August, with the latter using the same engine as the T-40 and T-60. The GAZ-61-461 truck was developed on the chassis of the GAZ-61, which was adopted as the main prime mover for the 57 mm ZiS-2 gun after the cancellation of the T-20 Komsomolets.

After the factory lost its GAZ-11 engine production plant in late 1940 (the space was used to produce M-105 aircraft engines), production of these vital engines was only restarted by the mid-summer. In addition to everything else, GAZ was responsible for a large amount of components for small tanks. 

Due to a lack of supplies, most tanks built during the early war had no headlights.

Production at GAZ stalled due to a lack of hulls. By mid-September, the Murom factory began only 4 sets of hulls and turrets, not having finished a single one. The Novokramatorsk factory began 32 sets, but also hadn't completed any. The Vyksa DRO factory began 6 sets, having completed two. The first hull arrived on the 17th, and the first tank was assembled on that day.

A new assembly plant was dedicated to the T-60, plant #5. As with KhTZ, involvement from the top was necessary to get production off the ground. In early September, factory director I.K. Loskutov was summoned to the Central Committee of the VKP(b) for a meeting. At the meeting, chaired by G.K. Malenkov, GABTU demanded that directors of tank producing factories accelerate the start of production. This was fully applicable to Loskutov. From that moment on, GAZ began shifting its priorities from trucks to tanks.

T-60 tanks from the 33rd Tank Brigade on parade, November 7th, 1941.

Real mass production of the T-60 at GAZ only began in October of 1941. In the middle of the month, Astrov and Okunev moved to the factory from factory #37. Astrov became the assistant chief designer, and Okunev the senior military representative. Over the first five days, 5 tanks were completed instead of the required 15. By October 20th, 69 T-60 tanks were accepted.

On October 20th, a telegram from Stalin arrived at the factory, demanding increase of T-60 production to 10 tanks a day. Malyshev arrived in Gorkiy to study the situation, and his energetic management helped to improve production significantly. Despite other issue, GAZ managed to not only meet the October quota, but surpass it.

The cost of T-60 production was high. By late October, production of cars at GAZ was almost paralyzed. GAZ-61-73 and GAZ-61-416 were removed from production, since they used the much needed engine. Production of GAZ-64s stopped, and GAZ-AA and GAZ-AAA production dropped drastically.

The evacuation of factory #37 to Sverdlovsk added to the confusion. Seeing the disaster with hulls and turrets, the factory management offered to send some T-30 hulls and turrets. In addition, 9 T-30s in need of repairs were sent to GAZ. The exact amount of T-30 hulls and turrets is unknown, but 47 sets were still at the factory as of the summer of 1942. The hulls were never used, but a few dozen T-60s with conical turrets were produced. These tanks could be found in the 33rd Independent Tank Brigade, whose vehicles showed up in photos of the November 7th parade in Red Square. Some amount of cast road wheels were also sent from factory #37.

T-60 tanks with T-30 turrets.

Due to problems with using the tank in the winter, more development had to be done at the factory. Longer and wider track links were developed, as well as removable spurs for the tracks. A reworked suspension was also proposed, reducing the size of the wheels and increasing their number to 8 per side in order to even out the ground pressure.

The GAZ design bureau also designed a spring suspension in case there were problems with supplies of torsion bars. In case of problems with rubber, the idea of using wooden liners instead of tires was explored. The radio station on the tank had to be removed. As a result, the T-60 was the only Soviet wartime tank where no radios were installed at all. Other electrical equipment had to be simplified.

Despite the fact that GAZ couldn't carry out decree #222ss, the titanic effort at the factory managed to kickstart full scale production of these necessary tanks. Only 3 tanks were accepted in September, then 215 in October. In all of 1941, GAZ produced 1314 tanks. Of those, 137 were chassis mounting the M-8 rocket artillery system. GAZ turned from a subcontractor to one of the largest tank manufacturers in the USSR and the world.

Soon after Astrov's arrival in the design bureau, GAZ became a leading developer in the field of small and light tanks. Further work on the 060 continued in Gorkiy. As for factory #37, it lost the status of the chief developer and producer of the tank as a result of the evacuation.

Knocked out T-60 tanks, November-December 1941. One of them is equipped with cast spoked road wheels. Molotov GAZ released only a few of those tanks.

The creation and production of the T-60 was a necessity. The firepower of the 20 mm gun was only enough to fight lightly armoured targets, and the armour could protect it from, at best, high caliber machineguns. Of course, a tank like this is better than no tank at all. The T-60 was fine as an infantry support tank or a reconnaissance tank. Small, agile, and quiet, this tank played its own role in battle from late 1941 to early 1943. On the Leningrad Front and in Karelia, these tanks served until the fall of 1944.

See detailed photos of a T-60 produced at factory #37 here.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

High Caliber

August 1, 2016, 3:11 pm

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"To the Deputy Chair of the Council of People's Commissars, comrade L.P. Beria

RE: 122 mm HEAT and 152 mm AP-T rounds

I report that in accordance with GOKO decree #3187ss, GAU tested a 122 mm HEAT shell with a V-229 fuse developed by NKV on May 5-7th and a 152 mm AP-T shell with a MD-5 fuse on May 9-10th.

Trials of the 122 mm HEAT shell were performed with the mod. 1938 howitzer and showed the following results:

1. Stock propellant charge #4 can be used to fire the HEAT shell.
2. At a 30 degree angle, the shell penetrates a 100 mm plate (K~=2400) 70% of the time (out of 10 trials) and at a 0 degree angle, the shell penetrates 100% of the time (out of 4 trials).
3. Firing at terrain at 1000 meters shows flawless work of the V-229 fuse (7 trials).
4. The precision of the shell when fired at a target 1000 meters away is acceptable: mean deviation of 0.32 m vertically and 0.18 m horizontally.
5. During trials, the ballistic cap fell off once, which indicates that it is held on insufficiently well.

Trials of the 152 mm AP-T shells were performed with the mod. 1937 gun-howitzer and showed the following results:

1. The full stock propellant charge less one bundle of cordite can be used, which achieves a muzzle velocity of 600 m/s.
2. The shell penetrates 125 mm of composite armour at an angle of 30 degrees at 1000 meters. The robustness of the hull is satisfactory (4 trials).
3. The robustness of the bursting charge after firing at 125 mm armour at normal is satisfactory (2 trials).
4. When testing the bursting charge against a 125 mm plate at normal (2 trials) and angled at 30 degrees (2 trials), 3 shells exploded after passing through the plate, one failed to explode (the shell penetrated the armour but no explosion was observed, the shell was found intact without explosive filler).

I conclude that the 122 mm HEAT shell for the mod. 1938 howitzer and the AP-T shell for the mod. 1937 gun-howitzer must be swiftly put into production, during which the NKV must pay close attention to attachment of ballistic caps on the 122 mm HEAT shell and ensure that the fuse reliably ensures that the 152 mm shells explode past the armour.

Chief of the Red Army GAU, Colonel-General of Artillery, Yakovlev

May 10th, 1943"

RGASPI 644-2-17

Fuel for Foreign Tanks

August 2, 2016, 3:56 pm

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"To armoured forces chiefs and armoured centers

American tanks in service with the Red Army use aircraft gasoline:

1. The M3 Medium Tank uses 91 octane gasoline.
2. The M3 Light Tank uses 80 octane gasoline.

When using these tanks, use the following types of domestic gasoline in its pure form or with addition of tetraethyl lead (product R-9).

• For the M3 Medium Tank:
• B-78 + 1 cm³ of R-9 per kilogram of gasoline
• B-74 + 2 cm³ of R-9 per kilogram of gasoline
• B-70 + 3 cm³ of R-9 per kilogram of gasoline
• If R-9 is not available, it is acceptable to use pure B-78
• For the M3 Light Tank
• Pure B-78
• B-70 + 1 cm³ of R-9 per kilogram of gasoline
• If B-78 is not available, it is acceptable to use pure B-74

Note: product R-9 is an extremely poisonous substance and acts on the skin both in liquid and gaseous form.

During use of American M3 Medium and M3 Light tanks, note the following:

1. If the engine overheats and the ignition is off, the engine, as a rule, keeps working. It is necessary to let the engine work for 3-5 minutes at 800-900 RPM, then reduce it to 400-500 RPM and let it work for another 2-3 minutes, and only then turn off the ignition.
2. When starting the engine avoid fuel seepage, this will make the engine difficult to start.
3. Do not allow fuel to enter the intake valves during start. This fuel can ignite if the engine backfires, and the gasoline dissolves the durite hoses and eats through them quickly, especially on the M3 Light.
4. Do not turn off the engine on the M3 Light when the tank on a 15-20 degree incline, as the tank only has one carburetor and this makes it difficult to start when the tank is tilted."

CAMD RF 202-50-1

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400 mm KV-1

August 3, 2016, 7:33 pm

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Remember this project to install a 400 mm mortar on a KV-1S tank? Turns out that GABTU received it, but their reaction wasn't exactly positive.

"To director of factory #92, comrade Elyan

In response to letter #202/4571

RE: 400 mm self propelled mortar

Here are the characteristics of KV tanks you requested:

• KV-1 tank mod. 1941:
• Total mass: 46,000 kg
• Mass of the turret with gun and ammunition: 7277 kg
• KV-1 tank mod. 1942
• Total mass: 48,500-50,000 kg
• Mass of the turret with gun and ammunition (75 mm welded): 7770 kg
• Mass of the turret with gun and ammunition (110 mm cast): 8700 kg
• KV-1S tank
• Total mass: 42,500 kg
• Mass of the turret with gun and ammunition: 7204 kg

KV-1 tank ground contact surface: 4400 x 700 mm

KV-1S tank ground contact surface: 4400 x 650 mm

Experience when using KV tanks showed that a 50 ton tank overloads the engine and suspension and they break down. This forced the design of the KV-1S tank weighing 42.5 tons. Its engine power, layout, and hull robustness are insignificantly changed compared to the KV-1.

We cannot tell you if the suspension can take 100 tons of recoil, as there is no experience in using guns that cause such a load. A lack of characteristics for this design makes it impossible to determine if it is reasonable to install it into a tank.

GABTU Chief, Colonel-General Afonin

BTU 4th Department Chief, Engineer-Colonel Nevarskov."

CAMD RF 38-11355-697

Russian PIAT

August 4, 2016, 7:17 pm

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While Soviet attempts to make a Panzerfaust may have not gone well, there was also an attempt at a domestic PIAT. The name rolls off the tongue almost as easily as Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank: Silent Projector of Bottles and Grenades.

The projector consists of a 950 mm pipe with a spring inside. The spring is wound by grasping two handles next to the muzzle and pulling backwards, and is fired by an "ordinary trigger mechanism". The bottle or grenade being thrown is positioned unprotected above the pipe. The projector is equipped with a sight that has three rather optimistic settings: 50, 75, and 100 meters. In order to stabilize the projector, a monopod is provided. 

The design is signed by Military Technician 1st Class Dugil. 

Via kris_reid.

World of Tanks History Section: Nina Bondar

August 5, 2016, 3:14 pm

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Flying was all the rage among Soviet youth in the few years preceding the Great Patriotic War. "Komsomol, to the skies!" the slogans called. Among the many young men and women who answered the call was a citizen of the city of Biysk named Nina Ilyinichna Bondar. In the late 1930s, while still in school, she joined and aero club and learned to fly the light U-2 biplane.

A month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, Nina came to the Biysk military commissariat and volunteered to join the Red Army. It was hard to refuse an officer's daughter, and one who could fly a plane at that. The young woman was directed to the Moscow Anti-Air Defense, where her familiar U-2 became a weapon of war. However, history clipped her wings.


From Pilot to Tanker

Nina came under fire during a reconnaissance flight and was heavily wounded in both legs. The doctor's verdict was clear: unsuitable for flight. She was offered several other positions in the army, as a medic or MP, for example, but none of those options suited her. Nina decided to fight for her right to be at the front lines, which is what many did in those days who were not sent to the front for one reason or another but considered it cowardly to sit still behind someone's back.

There is a theory that her request was granted because she appeared to be a man: her letter was signed "Private N.I. Bondar". Nevertheless, the was sent to the Saratov Armour Academy. Upon completion, Bondar became the commander of a T-34 tank in the 237th Tank Brigade. Years later, she recalled that she loved to personally drive the tank, a rare trait among tank commanders.

Bondar's brigade fought near Oboyan at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. Here, on the south flank, the battles were particularly fierce, and the Soviets hung on by a thread, as the main German offensives were towards Prokhorovka and Oboyan. Nina was among the Soviet tankers who stood against Panthers and Tigers. Later, in the offensive phase of the battle, the 31st Tank Corps that contained Bondar's brigade began an offensive on Kharkov. The Corps deflected a powerful German counterattack from Akhtyrka to Bogodukhov.

In September of 1943, the brigade was moved to reserves for replenishing. Nina Bondar and her unit had to prepare for liberation of the Ukraine.

Ukraine to Prague

The Red Army undertook a whole series of offensives in right-shore Ukraine. The first operation for Bondar was the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Offensive, directed to destroy a German group that threatened the flank and rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Many years later, reminiscing about these battles, Bondar said laconically "it was difficult". Here, Soviet soldiers fought SS division Wiking, panzergrenadiers from the Walloon Legion, and experienced German army units. The operation resulted in the Korsun Pocket, nicknamed "little Stalingrad" by the Germans. For six days they tried to break through from the inside and outside, but fruitlessly.

Nina Ilyinichna Bondar earned her first award during the Carpathia-Uzhgorod offensive. It was already fall of 1944. Battles were fought over the Dukla pass. Four T-34s, among which was Nina's, burst into the pass and engaged in battle. With fire from their cannons and machineguns, the tanks dispersed German infantry, preventing them from taking up defenses in five settlements. Nina Bondar was wounded in the arm, but did not leave the battlefield. In addition, when the company commander was killed, she replaced him for four hours of fierce battle. Her tank destroyed four German guns, three MG nests, and up to 80 soldiers and officers. For courage and skilled action, Lieutenant Nina Bondar was rewarded with the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class. After the war, a book was written about her in Slovakia, and a monument was erected at Dukla pass: a T-34 bearing her tactical number.

Interestingly enough, NIna Ilyinichna treats her score with scepticism. In one interview, she said: "The history of the brigade says: in battle for Vinnitsa, Bondar's crew knocked out one PzIII tank, one six-barrelled mortar, killed 50 fascists. That last one is odd, who counted them? Destroyed a gun, I can see that, but the people? We killed them and moved on. Even before, I did not like these numbers. I don't know how many tanks my crew knocked out, not even approximately. It happened that I'd return to base, they would tell me "Nina, you blew up a tank!" I don't know when, I shot a lot, Sometimes they don't blow up right away, maybe a little bit later."

During her service in the tank forces, Nina was wounded four times. Twice her tank brewed up. She recalled that experienced tankers could leave their vehicles quickly in that event, but after one such case she wore her helmet nonstop for a whole year: her hair burned off.

The war ended while Nina Bondar was in Prague. Her brigade was sent there after the Berlin Offensive Operation. In June of 1945, she participated in the victory parade on Red Square. A year later, she demobilized and returned to her birthplace. Many years later, having gone through the toughest battles, she said this of war: "Do I regret fighting where it was most difficult? No. I will repeat: we knew what we were dying for."

Original article available here.

17-Pounder: Britain's Long Arm

August 6, 2016, 11:50 am

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The development of anti-tank artillery followed more or less the same process in many countries. This resulted in the USSR creating a 100 mm BS-3 gun in 1944 and the Germans with the 88 mm Pak 43 gun, a weapon with excellent characteristics that forced Soviet tank designers to rethink their requirements for armour protection. However, the British arrived at the best solution, creating the Ordnance Quick-Firing 17-pounder, which had the most balanced characteristics. You can familiarize yourself with the gun in detail by viewing these photos and read about its creation and trials in the Soviet Union here.

With Room to Spare

The fact that the 40 mm 2-pounder gun, adopted in 1935, wouldn't last long on the battlefield was obvious by 1938. The arsenal at Woolwich (ROF Woolwich) began developing a new gun with a caliber of 57 mm. The first barrels for the Ordnance QF 6-pounder were ready in 1940, but the development of the gun dragged on until the year later, and mass production only started in 1942. This delay (both for the tank and anti-tank versions) led to these guns only being used in the battle for El-Alamein that same year.

Meanwhile, in 1941, before the trials of the Ordnance QF 6-pounder, an idea was raised that the new gun won't last long on the battlefield either. To be fair, the 6-pounder turned out to be a great gun, with the 50 caliber version having similar penetration characteristics to the Soviet ZiS-2. Nevertheless, the idea of beginning work on a replacement for the 6-pounder was approved. The Ordnance Committee also learned that the Germans were working on a 75 mm gun capable of penetrating 80 mm of armour at 1800 meters. This was the Pak 40, which appeared on the front line in the spring of 1942 and compensated for the thicker armour of Soviet tanks.

17/25-pdr in Africa, winter-spring of 1943.

On May 15th, 1941, the Ordnance Committee began work on the new anti-tank gun. According to the requirements, the gun had to penetrate 120-150 mm of armour at 730 meters. The 3 inch caliber (76.2 mm) was chosen. This caliber  has been in use by a British AA gun developed in 1914, but the 17-pounder had no connection to that gun.

The mass of the shell was 17 pounds (7.7 kg), which gave the gun its name. The muzzle velocity was set at 823 m/s, more than the AA gun. The final figure was even greater: 908 m/s for the AP shell and 1200 m/s for subcaliber ammunition. This high muzzle velocity was attained with a 55 caliber barrel and a very large casing.

OQF 17-pdr Mk.I, the most numerous variant, at the Gorohovets proving grounds.

Two experimental OQF 17-pdr guns were ready by September of 1942. Two versions of the gun were submitted for trials. The first, Mk.I, was a towed gun. The second, Mk.II, was designed as a tank gun. Both guns showed themselves well during trials, but there one small problem. There were no plans to begin production for a mount until 1943. Meanwhile, the Germans were unwilling to wait. On November 20th, 1942, Tiger tanks from the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion were sent to Tunisia.

Same gun, from the front.

The solution to the mount was simple. The first 100 17-pdr anti-tank guns were put on mounts from 25-pdr guns. This hybrid, dubbed 17/25-pdr gun, made its debut in February of 1943. To maintain secrecy, they were codenamed "Pheasant". The main modification, 17-pdr Mk.I, entered full production in 1943. The new mount lowered its height to 1600 mm, which is very low for such a powerful weapon. To compare, the BS-3 was 1800 mm tall, and the Pak 43 was 2 meters tall.

Trying Out New Toys

Unlike the 2-pdr and 6-pdr, supplied by Britain to the USSR, the Red Army did not use 17-pdr guns. Nevertheless, at least two guns with serial numbers #1926 and #5593 were tried at the Gorohovets proving grounds in Mulino. According to correspondence, GAU first found out about the guns in early 1944. By February 14th, a trials program was composed and sent to the proving grounds. Gun #1926 arrived on April 6th, 1944.

Its trials had to be postponed until the fall. The gun arrived not only without a limber, but without any shells, 254 of which arrived on August 31st. In addition, it seems that no sight was provided with the gun, as only one sight is listed (#5515) and it arrived with gun #5593 in October. As a result, trials began on September 8th and concluded on November 10th. 136 shots were made during that time, 15 of them with an increased propellant load. The gun was also towed for 40 kilometers during trials.

The gun is showings its maximum gun depression.

Trials achieved a muzzle velocity that we would expect, 908.7 m/s. Interestingly enough, the British manual was translated incorrectly, and the muzzle velocity was listed as 3000 fps (914.4 m/s). Based on this fact, the conclusion that the data in the manual is incorrect was made. The original manual published in 1943 lists the muzzle velocity as 2980 fps (908.3 m/s). The shells with increased propellant had a muzzle velocity of 930 m/s. It's worth noting that the gun only arrived with regular armour piercing ammunition, while the British were already using subcaliber ammunition with higher penetration.

Rear view, trails deployed.

Precision trials were made at a range of 1000 m. Trials showed that the British gun had superior precision to the Soviet 76 mm AA gun mod. 1938. A rate of fire of 8 RPM was achieved during trials. Only 3 shots from the fired 7 hit the target, but the mechanical accuracy was not the issue. Since the gun arrived without a sight, an attempt was made to equip it with an optical sight from a 2-pdr gun. That sight malfunctioned, and the trial had to be done using backup iron sights, which were not suitable at a range of one kilometer.

The trial record admits that the testers were untrained and that the real rate of fire could be as high as 8-10 RPM. When shooting at a moving target, 4 shots out of 5 hit at 500 meters. At 1000 m, 2 shots hit.

17-pdr gun in travel position, attached to a Studebaker US6 truck.

No trials of maximum penetration were made. Penetration was only tested against multiple plates positioned at a straight angle and at 30 degrees. A 100 mm thick plate could be penetrated from 1800 meters when flat, and from a kilometer when angled. A 90 mm thick plate could be penetrated from 2 kilometers, or from 1200 meters at 30 degrees. A 76 mm thick plate could be penetrated from 2200 m. This was higher than the 85 mm S-53 gun, and about the same as the BS-3 with BR-412 ammunition. The German 8.8 cm Pak 43/41 had better penetration, but it was much larger and almost twice as heavy.

During trials, the automatic mechanisms worked flawlessly. The ability to regulate the recoil length using special markings on the front cover of the mount was commended. It turned out that the indicator was positioned inconveniently and could be covered up by the gun shield, the design of which was also judged to be good. The spaced armour design reliably protected the crew from rifle caliber bullets.

The gunner's station. The flywheel handles were made from metal, which caused discomfort in the winter.

However, the 17-pdr gun had its drawbacks. The effort to fire the gun was as high as 20-30 kg, which was very high. The effort to open the breech was as high as 15-20 kg, also high. The testers also did not like the fact that the flywheel handles were made from metal, which resulted in discomfort when using them in the cold. The work of the trigger mechanism was also found unsatisfactory, as the levers snagged on each other and impacted when the gun was brought back from recoil. A sizeable drawback was the presence of a muzzle brake. After firing, it kicked up a cloud of dust, made the crew's job more difficult, and revealed the position of the gun. However, muzzle brakes were installed on most medium and heavy AT guns, so this problem was common.

Low Mobility

The trials didn't end there. No matter how well a gun can shoot, other characteristics are important as well. Unlike heavier artillery, anti-tank guns fire directly at their target, and have to be moved often.

The gun shield, composed of two 6 mm thick plates.

An issue arose even before this procedure. Gun #1926 arrived with a dent on the inner side of the left trail. The dent was relatively small (30 cm long, 5-7 mm deep), but after 20 shots the trail started to deform and a crack appeared. After firing trials, the trail was so deformed that it could no longer lock in travel position. Deformation of the spades was also recorded. The right trail did not deform, so this was most likely a manufacturing defect, but this incident was recorded as proof of an insufficiently robust mount.

If the problems with the mount were unclear, then another problem was quite obvious. The mass of the OQF 17-pdr Mk.I was 2862 kg, and the crew consisted of only 7 men. It's worth mentioning that the Soviet BS-3 weighs 3650 kg with a crew of 6. The author's personal experience in pushing the gun along even asphalt suggests that 7-8 people are ideal for this task, one of which hangs off the barrel as a counterweight. However, the Germans managed to outdo everyone, with their 4.5 ton Pak 43 and an 8 man crew. It's nearly impossible to push around such a heavy gun on the battlefield, and it's no wonder that these guns were frequently left behind due to a lack of things that could tow them away.

Gun shield from the back.

It took between 40 seconds and one minute to bring the British gun into fighting position, and about the same amount of time to bring it back to the travel position. It took 10-13 second to turn it 90 degrees, and 30-40 seconds to turn it 180 degrees. The biggest trial was pushing the gun over a field covered in 20-30 cm of snow. The gun was pushed barrel forward with joined trails. It took almost 3 minutes to travel 100 meters.

Muzzle brake.

It can't be said that this torment of the gun was an attempt to discredit the British gun. These situations happened very often at the front, and not only on the Eastern front. If the Allies didn't have to push guns through snow as often, mud was still a common occurrence. The verdict of the Gorohovets testing crew seems fair when you consider this fact.

"It is impossible to transport the gun over 500 meters off-road with only the crew's strength. The 7 man crew can push the gun over only 100 meters on even terrain. Transport by hand is also difficult due to a lack of comfortable handles.

...

The penetration, stability, and precision of the 17-pdr gun made it a powerful anti-tank gun that matches modern requirements.

However, the weight for this caliber is high (2862 kg), the coefficient of metal use is low (112), and there are many other drawbacks, noted in section 3 of these conclusions."

It's difficult to consider these conclusions sensational or unfair to the 17-pdr. The issue of excess weight was not sudden, and the Germans were the first to encounter it, not the British. The Pak 40 which inspired to British to make their own powerful AT gun could only be moved across the battlefield with great difficulty. This was one of the few reasons for the development of self propelled gun mounts on light tank chassis. The aforementioned towed Pak 43 made its debut alongside vehicles which carried the same weapon.

Deformed trail after firing trials.

The British were perfectly aware of the fact that the gun was too heavy to push around the battlefield. The simultaneous development of the tank and towed versions of the gun was no accident. Of the seven modifications of the Ordnance Quick-Firing 17-pounder, five were for tanks or tank destroyers. This highlights the fact that the British tried to compensate for the weight of the gun with a self propelled chassis. However, the towed version persevered, as it was still much easier and cheaper than a tank destroyer. Its mass, penetration, and size put the British gun above its foreign analogues, and these are much more important factors than the speed at which its crew could push it around.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

Tanks at Lake Hasan: Tactics

August 8, 2016, 3:37 pm

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"

1. In battles for the Socialist Motherland, our tankers fearlessly and bravely went into battle, demonstrating bravery, courage, tenacity, and dedication to the Party and Motherland until their death. There was not one case where tankers faltered in battle. Crews that were trapped in a hopeless situation fired upon the enemy until their end, struck the samurai down with their fire, and died in their burning or knocked out tank, but did not surrender.
2. In battle for Zaozernaya hill, the tanks showed their power and high combat quality. The Japanese fear of our tanks was demonstrated in the fact that all enemy firepower was directed against them: all artillery fired at tanks, all AT guns, all infantry, and finally, samurai charges at tanks by tank destroyer teams. The Japanese hated and feared tanks, opened artillery fire at individual tankers the moment they saw anyone in blue overalls.
   
3. Tanks enabled infantry to move forward and take Zaozernaya hill. Coming close to the front lines of defense, the crews opened fire at concentrations of the enemy, crushed enemy strongholds with their guns and their tracks. As a result of effort by all types of forces, Zaozernaya was taken, the Japanese samurai were exterminated, and driven off from Soviet land, despite difficult terrain that was nearly inaccessible for tanks, tactically difficult for us due to the shape of the front and presence of commanding heights in the enemy's hands.
4. The terrain around Zaozernaya hill is difficult and does not allow for massed tank attacks. The terrain caused the following:
1. Tanks could not hit the enemy front line at the same time to suppress their strongholds.
2. Tanks did not penetrate into the depth of enemy defenses and did not achieve their objectives, only reaching the front lines and achieving shallow penetration by some tanks.
3. Tanks took heavy losses in personnel and materiel.
5. On August 6th and 7th, the following were lost:
1. Killed:
1. 3rd Tank Battalion: 14
2. 2nd Tank Battalion: 22
3. RB: 4
4. BBO: 4
5. Total: 44
2. Wounded:
1. 3rd Tank Battalion: 25
2. 2nd Tank Battalion: 23
3. RB: 9
4. BBO: 2
5. Brigade command: 3
6. Total: 62
   In total, 106 men were out of action during the tank attack, out of 342 men and 112 tanks participating in the attack. This is 30% of the men which participated in the tank attack, 41.7% of which were killed and 58.3% of which were wounded. 13% of all soldiers and commanders participating in the attack were killed and 17.5% wounded.
   25 commanders were killed or wounded, 16 tank commanders, 27 drivers, 31 gunners. Most of those killed were commanders: 41 men. The large loss in commanders is explained by the fact that the commanders are always ahead of their subordinates, and the fact that the enemy concentrates fire on commanders' vehicles, which have noticeable antennas.
6. Materiel losses: 49 tanks lost (8 burned), 43% of all tanks participated in the attack. 18 tanks were repaired on the battlefield, the rest either required factory repairs or were written off. 36% of tanks were repaired in the field, 64% required repairs at the factory, or 22% of all tanks that participated in the attack. 8 tanks were destroyed by white phosphorous shells or shells hitting the fuel tank, or were burned by Japanese tank destroyer teams.
   Out of all tanks participating in the attack, 17 tanks were stuck in ravines from the 3rd TB, 18 from the 2nd TB, and 9 from the RB, in addition some tanks were stuck in ravines or swamps but later freed by their own crews.
7. All knocked out tanks were hit with direct fire by anti-tank guns. Only two cases of negligible damage were noticed from indirect fire. The conclusion is that indirect fire at tanks is ineffective. Japanese tank destroyer teams jumped at individual tanks that approached Japanese trenches, and even then most of the Japanese teams were destroyed by fire from other tanks.
8. The Japanese picked a region for provocation that did not allow for massed usage of our vehicles, especially tanks. If the terrain good, even in this unfavourable tactical situation, our tanks could have combed through the entire depth of their defenses and no anti-tank measures could have stopped us.
9. Actions of the tank units during the entire operation showed that the terrain was mostly impassable for tanks and it was unreasonable to send two entire tank battalions and one RB company. Another method of using tanks was necessary, and this conclusion should have been made as a result of analyzing prior actions by the 32nd and 40th TB. It is more reasonable to apply tanks in small groups up to a platoon in close contact with infantry, use the rest as mobile batteries withe fire correction from infantry.
10. Even in these conditions, the high percentage of losses can be explained by a lack of cooperation between infantry, artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The organization of cooperation was unsatisfactory. Combat action showed that the organization of cooperation is the key element to success in battle and has to be one of the most important elements of preparation. Organizational failures included:
1. The enemy's artillery positions were not scouted out before the attack, and, partially, the anti-tank guns were not scouted by all possible means: aircraft photos, observation, nighttime searches, recce in force, and tank reconnaissance.
2. Tanks were not assigned to regiments in time, and as a result, tank commanders only had a few hours to work with infantry commanders our of three days of preparation.
3. Artillery was spread out and artillery support of tanks was weak. As a result, the enemy's defenses were not suppressed during the battle.
4. Infantry commanders, without reconnaissance data, could not give concrete objectives to tanks, and tank commanders could not precisely establish artillery support objectives, and even if they did, it was not recorded or checked how many artillery squadrons were used to support tank attacks.
5. Organization of the attack was done independently by infantry, artillery, and tank commanders, without consulting each other.
11. Organization of attacks in tank units also had drawbacks:
1. Tank attacks could not have been sudden, as the initial positions were within sight of the enemy.
2. Despite reconnaissance missions, the terrain was insufficiently evaluated, difficult places were not discovered and attack routes bypassing difficult terrain were not marked.
3. Tank battalions and companies did not organize their own tank reconnaissance 300-400 meters in front of the main echelon that would have discovered enemy AT guns and obstacles and directed the rest of the tanks.
4. Tank units did not organize cannon tank groups that could suppress enemy AT guns and cover other tanks on the way to their objectives.
5. No precise control within the battalion was organized, no observation over the battalion during the battle was organized, the result was an uncontrollable mass of tanks that was not evened out to attack at the same time. The very nature of objectives given had an imprecise character.
12. Insufficient organization of cooperation is explained by insufficient tactical training of the tank commanders. Tankers did not practice the basics of combined arms warfare. No combined arms exercises of the mechanized brigade with infantry was done. The brigade was only taught independent action in the enemy rear and on the flanks. No training of the tank brigade and some infantry division was done, field manuals and instructions for organization of the battle and control were not mastered. More time should be spent on tactics in general.
13. Tank crews did not practice close combat during their training. The close combat manual is also insufficient. The BUMM part 1 manual does not meet requirements. Tank crews were unprepared to drive in difficult conditions with closed hatches, they were not trained enough in observing and evaluating terrain through optical devices. It is also necessary to train commanders and political staff to be able to replace tank crews.
14. Artillery did not concentrate fire on the front line and the flanks when tanks closed in within AT gun range. Smoke shells were not used and enemy AT guns were not blinded.
15. A mismatch between authorized and actual strength in men and tanks, as well as transport trucks, leads to a decreased combat potential of the unit, as the assigned supplies are not retrieved by the brigade. It must be necessary to revise the cadres of the brigades and organize them in such a way that they can handle their allotted supplies. In order to raise combat preparedness, tank units in border areas must always have authorized materiel and staff on hand, without any excursions or ad-hoc formations using tank units.
16. The enormous importance of sappers in mechanized brigades was revealed. They ensure that the brigade can match, performing reconnaissance and building paths, built crossings for tanks under enemy fire, supplied the brigade with food, saved men during floods, built pontoon bridges and rafts when the brigade exited a flooded region, loaded knocked out tanks on ships to evacuate them to factories.
17. In conclusion, the following must be done to correct deficiencies:
1. Tank commanders must learn to organize attacks and control of their unit in cooperation with other types of forces in accordance with the field manuals.
2. Crews and units must learn to fight in close quarters along with infantry and independently, in difficult terrain.
3. Practice cooperation between tanks during the attack, keep up communication with infantry and artillery.
4. Work in issues of engineering support of the attack.
5. Introduce a system of combined arms exercises with infantry, artillery, and aircraft."

RGVA 35083-1-108-112

Tanks at Lake Hasan: Technical Improvements

August 9, 2016, 3:04 pm

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"Independent complaints and suggestions by commanders and soldiers after the battle.

1. On improving tank designs
1. Have identical looking tanks, either antennas on all of them or none of them, otherwise the enemy aims to knock out commanders' tanks first.
2. Redesign the T-26 suspension, as the tracks slip off often. Increase the size of the track teeth, increase the diameter of the road wheels, affix the rubber tires. Reduce the tank's ground pressure by widening the tracks. Convert the ventilator to move the air parallel to the tank, with ventilation in the turret to avoid concentration of gases and reduce heat. Add observation slits with triplex glass in the rear of the turret and in the turret roof.
3. Set the front of the tank hull at an angle, improve the effective armour, improve its quality. Make the turret aerodynamic. Make the floor of the tank thicker.
4. Make reverse grilles for the oil radiator so it cannot be destroyed by a bayonet or a pickax.
5. Introduce a side hatch near the driver for crew evacuation.
6. Add pistol ports next to the driver and a machinegun for the driver.
7. Increase the gun depression angle, as it was not always possible to fire while hull down.
8. The turret mounting is insufficient. There were cases where turrets fell off. Improve the turret mount.
9. Angle the vertical armour.
10. Strengthen and improve the hatch latches.
11. The tank needs to have a set amount of hand grenades.
    
2. On supply issues
1. Have special armoured tractors with automatic towing hooks or a hatch near the tow hook, as well as 200-300 meters of cable, sturdy and light enough to evacuate a tank from the battlefield.
2. Each tank should have 5 liters of drinking water.
3. Each tank should have a special tank first aid kit.
4. Tank battalions should have armoured ambulances, and the brigade medical company should have armoured halftracks. Introduce two medics and one medical instructor into every tank company. Have no less than three thermoses with up to 10 liters of water each in the battalion medical units.
5. The tanker's shoes are unsuitable for their work conditions, replace them with boots.
3. Other suggestions
1. Have water tanks and chemical company compressors on tracks, introduce a shower into the chemical company.
2. Traffic wardens should have light and fast halftracks like the M-1 pickup. Increase the amount of traffic wardens to 60, as the existing amount does not satisfy requirements, especially at night.
3. SU-12 SPGs could not accompany the tank attack as they were on wheels. It is necessary to have artillery tanks on tracks. Each battalion should have 6-8 artillery tanks. Introduce an artillery squadron of self propelled howitzers.
4. Tanks should be equipped with intercoms and camouflage nets.
5. It is necessary to enlarge the commander's platoon in order to mechanize the following: the brigade commander, the brigade commissar, the chief of staff, the political chief, unit chiefs, and introduce HQ tanks. The old cadre of 5 tanks is not enough to command the brigade in battle.

RGVA 35083-1-108-112

Komsomolets Replacement

August 10, 2016, 5:42 pm

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"Tactical-Technical Specifications for an artillery tractor

1. Purpose of the artillery tractor:
   The purpose the artillery tractor is to tow anti-tank guns weighing 2.0 to 3.0 tons and simultaneously transporting the gun crew and a portion of the ammunition.
2. Characteristics of the artillery tractor:
1. Type: fast, semi-armoured, tracked.
2. Mass in working condition: 5000 kg
3. Weight capacity of the platform: 1000 kg
4. Personnel capacity on the platform: 7
5. Normal mass of a towed gun: 2500 kg
6. Speed:
1. Maximum speed on good roads: 50 kph
2. Average on dirt road with load and towed gun: 25-28 kph"

CAMD RF 81-12086-260

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Night Driving

August 11, 2016, 3:41 pm

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"To the Chief of the 3rd Department of the GABTU BTU, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Ivanov

Research into night vision devices based on passive IR started in about 1927-28. Until 1940, only the Red Army NIIST worked on this subject, but in 1940 BTU began to test night vision devices to drive cars at night on the suggestion of "Svetlana" factory staff.

As a result, spectacle-shaped night vision devices were produces and tested at the "Svetlana" factory and GABTU proving grounds.


As a result of the trials, the following was determined:

1. The device can be used for driving during a dark night when there is no fog, dust, or snow.
2. The device shows vertical items well, such as people, posts, large rocks, telegraph poles, etc, but it is impossible to see the road, which makes it hard to orient and drive confidently.

I consider it necessary to report that IR devices will not attain higher effectiveness. In order to finally resolve the issue, I think it is reasonable to order a device with the attached specifications to put any questions to the test. After that, we can finally summarize our opinions about the feasibility of using night vision devices to drive cars.

Assistant Chief of the 3rd Department of the GABTU BTU, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel Dorofeev."

CAMD RF 18-11355-650 

PzKpfw I: Panzerwaffe's First

August 13, 2016, 6:36 am

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German generals often call PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II tanks "training" tanks in their memoirs. This is true in some way, as many converted PzKpfw I tanks were used to train crews. However, during the development of these tanks, there wasn't a word uttered about training as their main function. The Wehrmacht's first tanks were created as typical light tanks of the early 1930s, which mostly had machinegun armament. With this design, the Germans aimed towards the ideal concept of a German tank, setting the foundation for all subsequent vehicles of the Third Reich. The first member in the family that would become the weapons of blitzkrieg was the PzKpfw I Ausf. A.

British Style

The Reichswehr, the new post-war German armed forces, envisioned a tank in the 15 ton class. In early 1928, it was obvious that a light tank was needed in addition to the medium tank. The initial Kleinetraktor (small tractor) concept envisioned a 6 ton tank with a 60 hp engine, reaching a speed of up to 40 kph and armed with a 37 mm cannon. However, in May of 1928 it became clear that 60 hp is not enough to reach the required mobility. At a meeting on May 26th, the requirements were corrected, and its name changed from Kleinetraktor to Leichttraktor.

It's worth mentioning that Krupp, one of the creators of the Kleinetraktor concept, was working on other fighting vehicles. In October of 1927, Krupp began work on the self propelled gun mount known as teh Motorlafette. Later, this name changed to L.S.K. (leichte Selbstfahrkanone, light self-propelled cannon). Overall, the design was similar to the Kleiner Sturmwagen that Krupp's engineers developed during WWI. The engine was in the rear, unlike the Kleinetraktor. The fighting and driving compartments were in the front. The driver was shifted to the right, and a 37 mm or 75 mm gun was placed behind him.

The L.S.K. concept was discussed for a year and a half, and Krupp finally received a contract for two prototypes. The Germans paid 10,500 marks for the development and 132,000 marks for production of the two prototypes. A year later, the total grew to almost 170,000 marks. Even though the project started about six months before the Leichttraktor, both tanks reached trials at about the same time. The L.S.K.'s mass grew from 4.5 tons to 5.3 tons, and the tank weighed almost 7.9 tons with armour and armament. Krupp's design was plagued by the same problems as the Leichttraktor, especially the suspension. After 84 km of driving, the vehicle was returned to the factory, where the suspension was replaced. This didn't help much.

leichte Selbstfahrkanone, 1930. The future of the Kleinetraktor can be seen in its outline.

Despite its sad fate, the L.S.K. played its role in the history of German tank production. The concept of a self propelled chassis with a rear engine was later taken as the foundation for the Kleinetraktor. The first mention of this vehicle was made on February 14th, 1930, but it's likely that its story began a lot earlier. According to initial specifications, the vehicle would weigh 3 tons and be equipped with the same 60 hp engine. The vehicle would be armed with a 20 mm automatic cannon. The word "tractor" was included in the title not only out of secrecy: even though a reconnaissance tank was the main variant, other variants included a munitions carrier and an artillery tractor.

An interesting detail: before the Leichttraktor or the L.S.K. reached trials, the 6th Waffenampt already proposed buying the British Carden-Loyd tractor. Heinrich Kniepkamp already suspected something.

Modernized L.S.K. with a new suspension.

All of 1930 was spent debating the specifications of the Kleinetraktor. By 1931, the mass of the proposed vehicle grew to 3.5 tons. Krupp asked for 38,000 marks for development of the Kleinetraktor, plus 2400 marks for the wooden model. 5007 marks were needed for the suspension, later growing to 8066 marks. It was proposed that 20 Kleinetraktors would be ordered from April of 1933 to March of 1938 at 50,000 marks per unit.

The model Kleinetraktor that was presented on June 2nd, 1931, differed noticeably from the PzKpfw I we know today. The engine and transmission were in the front, the drive sprockets were in the back. The overall length was 3460 mm, width was 1820 mm, and the 60 hp engine would achieve a speed of 45 kph. Since there was no room for a turret, the 20 mm gun was mounted in a removable casemate. The crew consisted of three people: the driver to the left, the commander/gunner on the right, and the loader behind him.

The suspension consisted of 10 road wheels per side, similar to the one on the modified Leichttraktor. Rubber-metallic tracks were rejected, and fully metallic ones were used. On June 2nd, Rheinmetall entered the competition, developing its own 20 mm gun casemate. In addition, on Kniepkamp's request, Krupp started working on a suspension with four road wheels per side. However, it didn't last long.

VAE 393 tractor, purchased in the fall of 1931. Trials of this vehicle confirmed once again that the layout of this British vehicle was the most optimal for the next generation of German tanks.

Trials of the L.S.K. at Kummerdorf and Leichttraktor at TEKO demonstrated the deficiencies of rear drive sprockets. The idea with a front mounted engine was also found lacking. On September 18th, Kniepkamp put an end to  three years of work by Krupp and other companies. Development of new tanks was based on the Carden-Loyd tractor, which was aimed at foreign markets since 1929. The vehicle was constantly modified, and was available as both a tractor and a truck with a truck bed. Later, John Carden and Vivian Loyd's brainchild will become a light tank, the last generation of which, the Light Tank Mk.VI, will be the backbone of the British tank forces at the start of WWII.

Exporting these tractors was a costly move for the British. Their work became the foundation for the second generation of German tanks, and Italian tanks were also based on British designs. As a result, soon the British ended up fighting that which they had a hand in creating.

Going their Own Way

The 6th Waffenampt acted through third parties in order to avoid suspicion. On November 10th, 1931, the Aug. Nowack A.G. company in Bautzen ordered a tractor from Vickers-Armstrong Limited. A second one was ordered on September 12th, 1932, and a third on October 11th. The purchased tractors had the numbers VAE 393, VAE 406, and VAE 407. The first arrived at Kummersdorf in January of 1932. Trials showed that Kniepkamp was right, and the British design was much more suitable as a basis for new tanks than domestic designs. The suspension of the tractors was the same as that of the VCK 1931 amphibious tank. A similar tractor, purchased around this time by the USSR, was used as a foundation for the T-33 tank, the analogue to the VCL 1931.

Kleinetraktor after a redesign. Despite the British layout, one can still detect an influence of the leichte Selbstfahrkanone.

It is incorrect to call the new tank a copy. Only the overall layout, part of the suspension, and "skeletal" track link design were used.

The specifications for the Kleinetraktor were approved on September 18th, 1931. Krupp itself initiated the development. According to the new requirements, the suspension consisted of 4 500 mm road wheels, with a fifth doubling as an idler. The suspension with halved leaf springs resembled the Carden-Loyd design, but was not a complete copy. Later, the road wheel diameter was increased to 530 mm and the length of the track to 7 meters (140 links).

Kleinetraktor on trials.

On December 21st, Krupp signed contracts to produce an experimental Kleinetraktor (30,700 marks) and a new suspension (13,000 marks). Later, in May of 1932, the price grew to 43,700 marks. Constant changes led to the deadline slipping from June 30th, 1932. The first display of the Kleinetraktor with serial number 8000 happened only on July 29th, 1932.

Externally, the tank looked like a smaller L.S.K. with some British technology mixed in. The "hump" above the engine compartment was removed thanks to the Krupp M 301 engine, also used in the L2 H 43 light army truck and artillery tractor (also known as the Krupp Protze). Its requirements were for 60 hp, but in reality it put out about 52-54 hp. In addition, the vehicle turned out heavier than expected. Nevertheless, the Kleinetraktor reached a speed of 42 kph during trials. At Wundsdorf, the German "tractor" showed its advantages over the Carden-Loyd design. Sure, the chassis needed work, but this was a resounding success compared to the Leichttraktor.

A Kleinetraktor from the pilot batch.

Initially, the Kleinetraktor was a multipurpose vehicle. The same chassis would be used to make a forward observer post, artillery tractor, and munitions carrier. However, Oswald Lutz, head of motorization in the Reichswehr, immediately began talking about at least five Kleinetraktors with armament. This happened on October 12th, 1932. Soon, the other variants of the tracked chassis disappeared, and the tank became its main purpose.

Interestingly, Lutz did not wish to have the casemate variant with an autocannon in his army. This version was designed on June 22nd, 1932, before the construction of a prototype.On June 28th, the idea of arming the Kleinetraktor with two machineguns in a rotating turret was raised. That is the armament that Lutz wanted.

Kleinetraktor with a 20 mm automatic gun in a fixed casemate. This concept did not move past paper.

In reality, vehicles numbered 8001-8005 never received any armament at all. This was more of a chassis pilot batch, built between July and August of 1933 at a cost of 37,800 marks per unit. These vehicles differed from the "small tractor". As a result of trials, the idler was enlarged, covers for the air intakes were installed above the engine compartment. The vehicle had a more powerful Krupp M 302 engine, which could produce 56 hp normally, or 60 hp at 2600 RPM.

The experimental prototype was made from mild steel, but the first armoured hull went through trials in June of 1933. The hull was penetrated twice by heavy 7.9 mm bullets. As a result, the thickness of the armour was increased from 8 mm to 13 mm.

The batch of chassis was used as a test bench to try various technical solutions. The Porsche K.G. torsion bar suspension was supposed to be tested out on this tank, but for a series of reasons this never happened. The first tank with a torsion bar suspension was the Lansverk L-60.

An early production Landwirtschaftliche Schlepper. Most vehicles from this batch were never armed and were used for training purposes.

The fate of the Kleinetraktor was decided before even the first vehicle left the factory. In April of 1933, General Lutz decided that the mass production of these fighting vehicles would begin on April 1st, 1934. Later, it was decided that other companies would be involved aside from Krupp: Rheinmetall-Borsig, MAN, Henschel, Daimler-Benz, and Grusonwerk (a subsidiary of Krupp). For obvious reasons, Krupp would have the lion's share of the budget, announcing that it was ready to sign a contract for 150 tanks of the first series. In this announcement, the name that affixed itself to the tank was coined: Landwirtschaftliche Schlepper (agricultural tractor).

Later, Krupp reduced its share of the order to 135 1.Serie/La.S vehicles. The other participants were generously offered 3 La.S. each. The first vehicles were expected in December of 1933, but in reality, the first La.S. was only sent to Meppen on January 20th, 1934. 1.Serie/La.S built by Krupp had serial numbers 8011-8145, Grusonwerk built 8401-8403, MAN built 8501-8503, Rheinmetall 8601-8603, Henschel 8701-8703, and Daimler-Benz 8801-8803.

These vehicles differed from the pilot Kleinetraktor batch. Their length reached 4 meters, their mass was 4 tons. The suspension was redesigned, and the engine was upgraded to the 60 hp Krupp M 305. The maximum speed of the tank was 37.5 kph.

Despite accompanying issues, 1.Serie/La.S was the first instance of a mass produced German tank that was shared between several manufacturers.

20 1.Serie/La.S received Krupp turrets and turret platforms, but not for long.

While Krupp held onto their monopoly in the chassis business, things weren't going as well for them when it came to armament. Initially, the version with the 20 mm autocannon was gradually pushed into the background starting in October of 1932. This variant became the victim of the insistence of the military to jam a third crewman into the La.S.

As for the variant with a single man turret and two machineguns, Krupp started out well. On November 18th, 1932, a wooden model of the turret and turret platform was presented, but in March of 1933, Daimler-Benz joined in on development. In the end, the military preferred their turret and turret platform.

The decision seemed logical. The diameter of Krupp's turret was significantly smaller, and their turret platform was far from the latest and greatest. Its sides were placed at a straight angle, which reduced the chance of ricochet, and the driver's hatch was very strange. This didn't stop Krupp from building 20 sets of turrets and turret platforms, which were used by 20 1.Serie/La.S tanks for some time.

Daimler-Benz turret and turret platform, accepted into production.

The Daimler-Benz design was significantly different from Krupp's proposal. Instead of a simple shape, the turret platform was composed of an octagon with sloped sides. Six of the eight faces had observation ports, which improved visibility. On top was a rather roomy turret, also generously equipped with observation ports. The engine compartment roof was also different. The height of the engine compartment increased, and its roof became sloped. Not only was the volume of the new engine compartment greater, but its protection from enemy fire was improved. It's not surprising that the military preferred this design.

Mass Production

Due to the various transformations that happened to the La.S., the production of the first batch was delayed. This also impacted the second series, which was planned as a fully fledged tank and not just a chassis. The initial order for 150 2.Serie/La.S. only grew.

The Nazi rise to power played its role here, but there were other reasons for this growth. The military discovered that the industry was ready to give them something which resembled a modern tank. In January of 1934, the order increased to 200 tanks, and grew further to 300 tanks in the middle of July. On July 12th, plans changed again, leading to a grandiose increase in production. The military demanded a whole thousand La.S.

The idea of producing the tank in Hessen was rejected. Krupp moved its tank production to its Grusonwerk factory in Magdeburg. According to the final form of the agreement, Grusonwork would built 205 tanks with serial numbers 9001-9205, 27 with numbers 9207-9233, and 81 with 9235-9315. MAN received an order for 160 2.Serie/La.S. tanks, serial numbers 9501-9660. Rheinmetall had a contract for 150 2.Serie/La.S. numbered from 10001-10150, and finally Daimler-Benz was responsible for 115 tanks, 10301-10415. Daimler-Benz ended up with the biggest piece of the pie, since the turrets and turret plaforms were only built there.

2.Serie/La.S. on parade. The tanks carry a three colour camouflage used by the Panzerwaffe from 1935 to 1938.

In general, the design of the 2.Serie/La.S. was the same as the previous series. One of the main new features was a reinforces front road wheel, which carried more weight after a turret was installed. Almost nothing was left from the initial Kleinetraktor concept. The 3 ton tank with a 20 mm autocannon in a fixed casemate and 3 crewmen became a 5.4 ton two-man tank armed with two MG-13 machineguns.

Any discussions about a training designation for the La.S. are wishful thinking. In reality, the Germans ended up with a modern light infantry support tank, which was reliably protected from rifle caliber bullets. At the same time, the British built similar tanks, which had inferior armament and armour. All La.S. tanks were equipped with radios, a rarity for the time. It is doubtful that training tanks would carry such expensive equipment.

3.Serie/La.S. tank. The tank has minimal differences compared to its predecessor.

An order for an additional 150 3.Serie/La.S. tanks was made in August of 1935. Grusonwerk received a contract for two tanks with serial numbers 9206 and 9234, plus 35 tanks with numbers 9316-9350. MAN received a contract for 40 tanks, 9661-9700. Rheinmetall and Daimler-Benz received 20 tanks each, 9911-9930 and 10416-10435 respectively. Finally, Henschel received a contract for 35 2.Serie/La.S. numbered 10151-10185.

By then, the La.S. received the designation M.G. Panzerwagen and index Vs.Kfz.617 (experimental vehicle 617). This designation didn't hold for long and was replaced with the name M.G. Kampfwagen in October of 1935 and M.G. Panzerkampfwagen in November. The tanks from the third series lost an unnecessary observation device in the rear right side and gained reinforcement plates on the sides. All road wheels were reinforced.

4.Serie/La.S. from the 3rd Tank Regiment on exercises.

The last production batch was the 4.Serie/La.S. 175 tanks were ordered, but MAN was not among the manufacturers this time. Grusonwerk received a contract for 40 tanks, 9366-9405. Rheinmetall was to produce 30 tanks with serial numbers 9931-9960. Henschel ended up with the biggest contract: 64 tanks with serial numbers 10436-10476. Tanks from the fourth series had a widened transmission access hatch and a reinforced transmission.

The real total amount of tanks in series 2-4 was smaller than expected: 1075 units instead of over 1300.

In April of 1936, these tanks received their final designation: PzKpfw I (MG) with index SdKfz 101 (special vehicle 101). 2.Serie/La.S.- 4.Serie/La.S. tanks are known as PzKpfw I Ausf. A. During use in combat, their design underwent a large number of changes. By the start of WWII, the tanks received a converted air intake above the engine deck, a smoke grenade launcher, and the suspension was modernized. You can familiarize yourself with a modernized PzKpfw I Ausf. A from the second series in this photoshoot from the Arsenalen museum.

Modernized PzKpfw I Ausf. A with a smoke grenade launcher.

Even though the La.S. was superior to its predecessors, the tank had its problems. Since the initial weight was surpassed by nearly 50%, the 60 hp engine was not enough. This later led to a modification equipped with a more powerful engine.

The PzKpfw I Ausf. A had plenty of technical problems, which it not surprising, as any first attempt is going to have its growing pains. The first of them was the armament. The first signs that machinegun-only armament was obsolete were seen in Spain, when the German tanks turned out to be powerless against Republican T-26es, and anti-tank guns left them little chances of survival. The same results were seen in the Polish campaign in 1939.

Despite all that, a large number of PzI Ausf. A tanks were still in use by the Afrika Corps in 1941, although most tanks of this modification were used for training and did not have turrets or turret platforms. Examples of this conversion can be seen as early as 1937.

Leichte (Funk) Panzerwagen from the 3rd Tank Regiment.

The only special vehicle on the PzKpfw I Ausf. A chassis deserves a mention. In March of 1934, the issue of a commander's vehicle on the 2.Serie/La.S. was raised, as regular tanks only had radio receivers. This tank, named leichte (Funk) Panzerwagen had an immobile casemate instead of a turret, which housed radio equipment. 18 of these vehicles were made.

The author thanks Hilary L. Doyle for the provided illustrations.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

German from Iberia

August 14, 2016, 9:12 pm

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The Spanish Civil War began on July 17th, 1936. By the end of the month, the rebels gained the support of Italy and Germany, who promised, among other things, supplies of military hardware. In mid-August, Italian L3/35 tankettes arrived in Spain. German tanks arrived much later: 32 PzKpfw I Ausf. A tanks and one command vehicle were received in October of 1936. At approximately the same time, the first Soviet T-26es arrived in Spain and became the main opponents of the rebel tanks. As for the "Spanish" PzKpfw I Ausf. A, one of them became a Soviet trophy and was run through a whole spectrum of trials. What did the Soviet testers discover and what conclusions did they make?

Unsuitable for Tank Combat

Unlike the Condor Legion, where German planes were crewed exclusively by German crews, participation of German tankers in Spain was limited. Specialists under the command of Wilhelm Josef Ritter von Thoma mostly acted as instructors. Of course, they participated in combat, but their main task was to train Spanish tank crews and service the tanks. The first time that German tanks saw battle was on October 30th, 1936.

The first report on the combat use of PzKpfw I Ausf. A tanks was prepared by von Thoma by the end of November of 1936. By that moment, the tanks fought only with infantry, who fired on them with small arms. Soviet tanks were mentioned in the report, but briefly. Mostly the report discussed the resistance of the PzKpfw I Ausf. A to small arms, and even here, there was much left to be desired.

PzKpfw I Ausf. A re-armed with an Italian 20 mm Breda gun. The turret had to be altered in order to fit it.

First of all, problems arose from the multiple observation devices. They provided good visibility, but at the same time became a prime target for Republican bullets. There were cases of bullets or fragments penetrating through the slits and wounding the crews. The bullets were partially blocked by armoured glass, but even it was useless against 6.5 mm bullets, very popular at the time. Republican infantry could fire at the observation devices at point blank range, and the armoured glass, expected to resist only shrapnel, could not hold.

The crews were also wounded from secondary projectiles. Impacts against rivets led to them breaking, with the inner rivet head flying off and wounding the crew. These cases, however, were rather rare.

Spanish PzKpfw I in Madrid on May 19th, 1939. Interestingly, the tank in the background has Soviet DT machineguns in the turret instead of German MG.13s.

The same problems plagued the turret. Enemy fire concentrated on the vision and armament ports. There was a case where a bullet penetrated the slit between the gun mantlet and the turret, wounding the commander in the head. The opening for the sight was also a tempting target for enemy sharpshooters, and there were cases of the sight being destroyed. Fire was also aimed at the base of the turret, which made it jam. During combat, 23 machineguns were disabled by enemy fire. Another drawback, which was also noticed by Soviet tankers, was a lack of gun elevation. In city battles, this is very important.

On some tanks, a flamethrower was installed in place of the right machinegun.

Captured PzKpfw I Ausf. A. The missing observation device on the right side of the turret is noticeable.

In late October of 1936, the first Soviet T-26 tanks began appearing on Spanish soil. On October 29th, they joined the battles for Madrid, upsetting Franco's offensive. The first clashes between T-26 and PzI tanks occurred by the end of November. German tankers omit the results of these clashes in their reports, but Soviet reports mention the destruction of 12 German and Italian tanks. From December 15th to December 20th, another ten tanks are claimed. The main character of this article ended up in Republican hands around this time: PzKpfw I Ausf. A serial number 10184, produced by Henschel as a part of the 3rd series of the La.S.

Same vehicle, left.

Von Thoma's report prepared on December 6th, 1936, contains no information on losses at all, creating the impression that German tankers, unlike their Soviet colleagues, preferred to evade this sensitive topic. Nevertheless, a document with the descriptive title "Experience in combat between German machinegun tanks and Soviet gun tanks" perfectly summarizes the crux of the issue that German tankers faced in Spain.

Even the introduction of the report pulls no punches: tanks with cannons have an obvious advantage over tanks with machineguns. Knowing that the Republicans were using T-26 tanks, the Germans supplied armour piercing bullets for their PzIs. This didn't help much: while the T-26 could be penetrated at a range of 120-150 meters, the bullets were completely useless at a range of over 200 meters, while the 45 mm gun of the T-26 could destroy a PzI from a range of a kilometer or more. Italian 20 mm Breda 35 autocannons were installed in a few tanks, but this was not a widespread phenomenon.

Despite the fact that machinegun tanks are unquestionably inferior to gun tanks, the PzKpfw I remained the main type of German vehicle that fought in Spain. In total, 102 regular tanks were shipped, half of which were Ausf. A variants, plus four command tanks. The report was definitely noticed at the top, and production of the PzKpfw I ceased in May of 1937. Around this time, the PzKpfw II, with a 20 mm gun, entered production.

From Spain to Moscow

German tanks were first studied by Soviet specialists in Spain. They noticed that a large amount of armoured plates on the PzI were positioned at an angle, improving protection against rifle bullets. According to trials performed against knocked out tanks, an armour piercing bullet could penetrate the PzI at a range of 250 meters or less. The engine, powerful for such a small tank, was also of interest, as was the machinegun trigger mechanism.

The tank was painted in the standard three-colour camouflage used by the Wehrmacht until 1938.

Overall, the evaluation was not favourable for the German tank. This was mostly because the "tankette", as the PzI was often called, had only machineguns for armament. The weak armament drastically reduced the tank's value on the battlefield. It's worth noting that the purpose of the tank was comparable to the T-26, and production of that tank with only machineguns stopped in 1933. By the end of 1936, the only Soviet tanks being produced with only machineguns were the T-38 amphibious scout tanks.

The overall conclusions of the Soviet specialists are similar to that of von Thoma. The PzI had no chances when it went up against the T-26. Attempts to close in to effective range resulted in unpleasant consequences for the German crews. Even the higher speed compared to the T-26 could not save them.

From the rear, it can be seen that the turret also lacks one observation device.

A tank with the serial number 10184 was sent to the USSR for further study. By March of 1937, the captured vehicle ended up at the Scientific-Experimental Auto-Armoured Proving Grounds at Kubinka. According to the tank's instruments, the tank traveled 3426 km before reaching the proving grounds. No repairs were made, the tank was only oiled and tuned.

According to correspondence, the tank's missing track was replaced by a track from a "Carden-Loyd tank". The PzI's track links were similar to those used on this tractor, purchased by the USSR in the 1930s, which is not surprising. It is most likely that the captured tank's tracks came from this tractor. The tracks weren't 100% compatible and didn't fit well into the drive sprocket. As a result, the tank veered to the right.

In addition, two observation devices from the turret, the machineguns, and ammunition racks were missing.

Diagram of the tank with dimensions.

The tank, titled "Tank #1", was thoroughly inspected by the proving grounds staff. All properties of the tank were tested, including ease of access to its components. The specialists remarked on the tank's armour and large amount of observation devices, which gave good visibility.

The tank's positive sides included ease of crew entry. The commander's station, doubling as the gunner and loader, was deemed comfortable. The seat could be adjusted vertically and had seatbelts, which reduced the risk of falling off on uneven terrain. The turret traverse flywheel handles were also placed well. The specialists also noticed the bulletproof glass which protected the vision slits.

This hatch was used by the crew to enter the tank.

There were also a number of significant drawbacks. Access to the transmission was convenient, but the same could not be said for the engine. However, this was only a drawback when it was time for maintenance, there were more pressing issues in battle. The tank's hatches were not watertight and did not prevent liquids from seeping through, which made the tank vulnerable to Molotov cocktails. This was confirmed during trials.

This weakness was also seen in the engine compartment. The upper rear plate had two openings for ventilation, covered with a mesh. They turned out to be very vulnerable, as they were placed right next to the oil and fuel tanks. These meshes did nothing to stop enemy bullets. Modernized PzI tanks had their meshes replaced with armoured covers as a result of the experience in Spain.

Trial by Snow

Study of the tank's design was only a portion of the trial schedule. The German tank was also scheduled to run a 150 km long course, 40 of which were on a highway, 90 on a dirt road, and the rest off-road, over snow. The function of the suspension compared to the T-38 was studied closely. Presumably, if trials were successful, the same system would be used on that tank. A similar layout was already in use on the T-33 experimental tank and briefly mass produced T-41 tank, after which it was rejected. Shock absorbers on the PzI improved the suspension, but it was still deemed obsolete for 1937.

Commander's station.

The overall volume of trials was greater than scheduled, growing to 210 km. Instead of 40 km on a snowy highway, the tank drove for 100. A maximum speed of 39.96 kph was achieved, a little higher than expected. The average speed of the tank was 25 kph, and the fuel consumption was 31.2 kg for 100 km. The tank was easy to drive and did not require great effort to be applied to the levers or pedals. The engine proved itself reliable and easy to start. 

There were also some problems. The brake drums overheated, and the ventilator that was supposed to cool them could not manage its job on long treks.

One of the trials included a measurement of towing capacity, which reached 2 tons in 1st gear.

PzKpfwI Ausf. A during mobility trials, March of 1937.

Trials continued on dirt roads, on which the tank traveled 70 km. These events took place in early March, and the roads were covered in 20-30 cm of snow. The average speed of the tank was 9-10 kph, with fuel consumption of 53.3 kg for 100 km.

Climbing a grade during trials.

The final step was driving off the road, which lasted for 40 km. The depth of the snow was 30-40 cm, and the tank could not achieve a speed of over 6-7 kph here. Serious problems also arose. First, a track pin broke on the left track due to wear. The right track, the one that was not replaced, slipped off twice. The test crew blamed the idler and track design. These conclusions were correct: the same problems would be found on the American Light Tank M3 where the tracks also often slipped off the idler.

Off-road trials included passage over a 0.8 and 0.7 meter tall obstacle. In the first case, the tank could not cross it, in the second, it was possible to cross if the tank was traveling at a speed of over 9 kph.

Attempts to climb a 0.8 m tall wall proved fruitless.

The tank could successfully drive over a felled tree, even though this was not initially included in the trials program. The tank wasn't out of the woods just yet: it was used to fell trees. 200-300 mm trunks were no problem, but a 380 mm diameter pine tree proved an impassable obstacle. This exercise in forestry did not affect the tank's technical condition.

Trials on grades were next. The first one, a 14 degree slope, was passed with no problems. A second one at 24 degrees, could only be passed while moving diagonally. Driving straight up was not possible due to insufficient traction. Trials of driving through snowed over bushes and young trees followed. The tank passed the first stage where the snow was 40 cm deep, but the engine stalled while trying to cross the second stage, where the snow was 50-60 cm deep. This was an excessive test, and almost any tank would get stuck here.

The test crew concluded that the suspension of the PzKpfw I Ausf. A had a series of drawbacks. The design of the idler and track was cause for complaints. The German use of a front drive sprocket did not solve the problem of tracks slipping off. The track tension mechanism was also poor: its travel was short and the design was weak. There were also some complaints about the front road wheel, which weathered heavy shocks that led to the shock absorber mount breaking. The military's interest in the tank's suspension waned.

The right track slipped off twice during driving in the snow. This was caused by the design of the idler.

Five years prior to these events, trials of the Rheinmetall and Krupp Leichttraktors were performed at the TEKO proving grounds at Kazan. Despite the fact that the tanks suffered from a series of technical defects, they were a source of various technical solutions later used on Soviet tanks. The situation with the PzKpfw I was the opposite. Nothing interested Soviet specialists, aside from the thickness and angle of the armour. Compared to this newcomer from Spain, even the Leichttraktor was more interesting. The only benefit of this exercise was familiarization with a foreign tank. The German tank was added to Soviet tank reference books under the index "T-1".

After trials, the tank remained at the proving grounds. According to the list of proving grounds possessions as of April 1st, 1941, the "T-1 German" tank with serial number 10184 and engine #9057 was not running, but externally functional. It placed into the proving grounds museum. After the start of the war, Balkenkreuz insignia were added to the tank, and it was included in a reference book on German tanks prepared on September 11th, 1941. After that, the trail of the captured tank disappears.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

Iron Discipline

August 15, 2016, 10:38 am

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"Translated from German
2nd Tank Army HQ
April 19th, 1942

Daily Army Orders #22

Transfer orders

Transfer orders between types of forces and units purely out of personal interest reached unacceptably high levels.
I ask units to strictly check all such requests and consider if they reflect the interests of the army. Decline any requests for transfers that are unfounded and arise from personal gain for specific individuals. Only elevate requests for further review if it is clear that the transfer is in the interest of the armed forces.
Voluntary transfers into active units are exempt from this order.


Losses of train cars as a result of fires

The military railroad directorate reports of repeated instances where train cars were used by military units and burned up because fires were not extinguished. It is imperative that when leaving a train car, all fires must be put out in order to avoid losses of precious equipment.

Losses of cars

• What unit had car #702767 in January of 1942? Report to the HQ of the 2nd Tank Army, auto transport department.
• On March 28th, 1942, in Roslav, next to the technical officer's post, a captured Russian 1.5 ton Ford truck #475675 with tactical number 07540A/4, loaded with spare parts and personal belongings, was stolen.
  Report any information to the HQ of the 53rd Army Corps.

Lost

On March 31st, 1942, a bag was stolen from Lieutenant Pont's of 7th Company, 18th Tank Regiment from car #261266 in Zhizdre. The bag was filled with personal belongings, collection of army orders, old orders and receipts, six awards for tank battles, and "All-Army News". 

Report any information to the 2nd Squadron of the 18th Tank Regiment.

Found

1. A wallet with 34 marks was found in Sloboda on March 26th, 1942. Pick it up at the office of the 331st Infantry Regiment.
2. A bag was found on the Zhizdra-Lyudinovo highway containing letters for Obergefreiter Franz Szuki, field post #39049. Pick it up at the 339th Infantry Division's quartermaster's office.
3. A personal identification mark #90 of the 1st company of the reserve battalion of the 63rd Infantry Regiment was found. Pick it up at the 2nd Tank Army HQ, 2nd department.

Missing

1. A murdered NCO was found behind a house in Kasminka (17 km east of Bolkhov) on January 8th, 1942. His height is 175-180 cm, slender, oval face with wide cheekbones, light hair with a reddish tint, wedding ring on his right hand. Send relevant information to the 25th Motorized Division through the 53rd Army Corps.
2. Gefreiter Babel went missing on March 9th, 1942 (when the Russians burst into Pechenkinko). born 1909. Personal identification mark: 3rd battery, 4th Light Reserve Artillery Squadron (motorized) #452. Report to field agency #30099B.
3. Where is Obergefreiter Herbert Saltz, 1st company, 15th Motorized Regiment? Born on October 28th, 1919 in Bad Wildungen, personal identification mark 1st company, 15th Reserve Motorized Battalion #177. Transferred on April 1st from his unit to Orel, lightly wounded medical center #703, and has not returned to his place of service. Report to #02355B.
4. What unit buried jager Peter Kune in early October of 1941? Born on February 26th, 1923, personal identification mark #72, 1st company, 156th Reserve Motorized Battalion. Presumably, Peter Kune died on September 30th at Oltara. Report to #25139A.
5. Since December 22nd, 1941, the following members of 5th company, 18th Tank Regiment have gone missing:
1. NCO Helmut Kort, born on February 11th, 1917, personal identification mark #118 2nd company 2nd TR.
2. Obersoldat Gunther Schtichling, born on April 15th, 1923, personal identification mark #1-5144, 4th company of the reserve tank battalion.
3. Soldat Adolf Wener, born on June 7th, 1921, personal identification mark #4-15, 2nd company of the reserve tank battalion.
   Report to #00912.
6. On April 4th, 1942, Obergefreiter Werner Gustav has gone missing, 6th company, 519th Infantry Regiment, born on June 6th, 1919 in Berlin, personal identification mark of the reserve bicycle squadron (9th Reserve Reconnaissance Group) #27. Last seen in Mitrokhin and Anninna.
   Report to #06026C.

Acting Tank Army HQ Chief, Colonel and HQ Chief [signature]

Captured near Khmelevo (50 km south of Bryansk) in late May of 1942

Translated by Military Translator, Technician-Intendant 1st Grade, Revina."

Via gistory.

TsKB-50 Aerosan Trials

August 16, 2016, 7:27 pm

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"Central Committee of the VKP(b) decree II23/174 issued on December 10th, 1940, states that:

1. TsKB-50: In accordance with the tactical-technical characteristics approved by the Committee of Defense of the SNK on December 11th, 1940, an experimental armoured aerosan must be developed, similar to the Tunguska sleds.
2. NKVD factory #5:
1. Assemble a full sized model in parallel with the design process, due on December 25th, 1940.
2. Assemble a prototype by January 25th, 1941.

The assigned due dates for the model and prototype were met.

The experimental armoured aerosan consists of a Tunguska style two-skid sled 7.7 meters in length, 1.9 meters wide, with 0.4 meter wide skids (in the middle). The skis are wooden and the lower part is covered by 2 mm thick stainless steel. The skids are connected with a welded frame made from thin aircraft pipes. The frame cross-section resembled an arc with 400 mm clearance.

1. The armoured aerosan hull can be split into three main parts:
1. The armoured cabin with a T-40 type turret that contains the crew, armament, ammunition, and equipment. The hull and turret armour is 7 mm thick, the roof is 5 mm thick.
2. The engine compartment. The sides are 7 mm thick and the roof is 5 mm thick.
3. The front armoured compartment for fuel tanks and unarmored compartment for instruments and equipment.
2. The propeller and engine group of the armoured aerosan consists of the M-103-A motor positioned in the rear section of the hull, covered by an armoured cap.
   Water and oil radiators are installed under the motor for cooling.
3. The armament of the armoured aerosan consists of an MP-6 23 mm gun with a coaxial DT machinegun and a TMFP sight.
   The aerosan is also equipped with a PPD submachinegun to fire from the hatches (the horizontal traverse of the main gun is 280 degrees).
4. The ammunition capacity of the aerosan is 308 shells for the MP-6 gun, 1890 rounds for the DT machinegun, 568 rounds for the PPD, and 20 hand grenades.
5. The aerosan is controlled by the driver using brake levers and the steering wheel etc, positioned in the front of the cabin.
6. Communication and observation: the aerosan is equipped with a KRSTB radio. Observation is performed through Izhor factory observation devices. The cabin and turret have five pistol ports for firing the PPD.
7. The electrical equipment of the aerosan is done in the one-wire layout.
   Electric devices are powered by batteries, which are charged by a generator attached to the M-103-A engine.

During the draft process and subsequent review of the project and the model building, several changes compared to the initial requirements were approved:

1. Increased armour for the fuel tank.
2. Crew of two instead of three.
3. Mass of 4.7 tons as opposed to 3.5 tons in the requirements.

The aerosan prototype was presented to the Approval Commission after factory trials, performed at a temperature of -25 to -27 degrees.

The prototype was presented with the following deviations:

1. The mass was 5360 kg instead of 4700 kg, approved by the Model Commission.
2. Instead of a combat ready MP-6 gun, a used one was sent by OKB-16.
3. The TMFP sight is absent (not sent by the People's Commissariat of Armament).
4. 37 magazines for the MP-6 are absent.

As a result of official trials carried out between February 10th and February 18th at various temperatures, the need to increase the cooling surface of the water radiator and a series of other changes were requested. Factory #5 began working on the requested changes on February 18th, 1941, with a deadline of February 23rd, 1941. After completion of work, factory trials resumed on February 24th. Trials were completed by March 3rd.

During the final factory trials on March 3rd, the aerosan traveled 60 km at an outside temperature of +3 degrees. 

• Total engine runtime: 2 hours
• Temperature range: normal
• Fuel pressure: normal
• Oil pressure: normal

During March 3rd trials, the aerosan could start without assistance from 2000-2200 RPM.

Official trials continued on March 4th. During official trials, the motor worked nonstop for 3 hours and 35 minutes. Travel distance: 140 km.

Speeds with a 2.8 meter diameter propeller:

1. February 18th trials: 44 kph at 2350 RPM, air temperature of -7 degrees.
2. March 4th trials, air temperature between -1 and +1 degrees:
1. At 1700 RPM: 45 kph
2. At 2000 RPM: 65 kph
   The speed at 2400 RPM was not recorded as the aerosan left the measurement strip.

The aerosan engine worked the following amount during all trials:

• February 16th: 100 km, nonstop work, 3 hours 35 mins
• February 26th: 45 km, nonstop work, 1 hour 30 mins
• March 3rd: 60 km, nonstop work, 2 hours
• March 4th: 140 km, nonstop work, 3 hours 35 mins

Further off-road trials will be performed on March 6th, 1941.

NKVD Factory #5 Chief, Intendant 2nd Class, Lokshin

Chief of TsKB-50, Engineer Ponomarev:

CAMD RF 38-11386-94