The Last Soviet Heavy Tank Destroyers

September 11, 2016, 10:42 am

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In the days of the Second World War, heavy self propelled guns played an important part on the battlefield. It is not surprising that after the end of the war, heavy SPGs, including tank destroyers, remained a priority for designers from all nations. It's surprising that only a handful of these vehicles were ever built in metal, and none were mass produced. The Soviet Union and its Object 268 was no exception.


Weight Limit

As with heavy tanks, prospective Soviet heavy SPGs were well protected vehicles with long 152 mm guns. The first requirements for these vehicles were ready in 1945, but work began only a year later. They were designed on the chassis of the Object 260 (IS-7) and Object 701 (IS-4) tanks.

The SPG on the IS-4 chassis, indexed Object 715, was meant to use the 152 mm M31 gun developed by factory #172, with identical ballistics to the 152 mm high power Br-2 gun. The same gun was planned fro the Kirov factory's SPG. It is unclear what it was called. Some sources say Object 261, others say Object 263.

Later, factory #172's design bureau designed an even more powerful gun, indexed M48. The design was similar to the M31 and even had a similar muzzle brake, but the muzzle velocity was increased to 1000 m/s. Such a powerful weapon could destroy any enemy tank or pillbox without a problem. The semi-open casemate Object 262 SPG was planned with the same gun.

The main obstacle for these plans was the delays of the IS-7 project and problems with mass production of the IS-4. The last activity on these projects happened in 1947, after which they were put on hold until better days, but those days never came.

152 mm M48 gun installed in a heavy SPG. It is unclear at this moment which vehicle is pictures here.

On February 18th, 1949, decree #701-270ss was issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which cancelled development and production of all heavy tanks that weighed more than 50 tons. Along with the IS-4 and IS-7, SPGs on their chassis ceased to exist.

The same decree ordered ChKZ's SKB-2 and the experimental factory #100 in Chelyabinsk to design a heavy tank weighing less than 50 tons. This project, designated Object 730, resulted in the IS-5 heavy tank. The draft was presented in April of 1949, and ChKZ finished assembly of a prototype by September 14th.

It was logical to develop an SPG on the same chassis, but the designers were in no hurry. They still remembered what happened with the IS-4 and IS-7. Work only began when it was clear that the Object 730 was a success and its acceptance into service was not far off.

Object 116 (SU-152P) on trials. Its 152 mm M53 gun was used by the Kirov factory design bureau for the new SPG.

Literature dedicated to the T-10 and vehicles on its chassis usually puts the start of work on the SPG on July 2nd, 1952, but the real sequence of events is different. SPGs are usually designed with a very specific artillery system in mind. However, the gun that eventually appeared on the Object 268 did not show up in the project until 1.5 years later. However, work on the gun began a lot earlier.

From this point of view, work on the new heavy SPG began in 1946, when factory #172's design bureau began work on the 152 mm M53 gun in parallel with the M31 and M48. This gun with the muzzle velocity of 760 m/s was meant for the Object 116, also known as SU-152P. The gun and the SPG were built in 1948. Trials showed unsatisfactory precision, and the project was shelved. Today, the SU-152P can be seen in Patriot Park. This artillery system, in a slightly altered state, was proposed for the prospective SPG.

Draft of the M53 gun modified for installation in a heavy SPG, 1952.

Work on the new vehicle, initially without any kind of designation, was initially headed by P.P. Isakov. The work was being done by the Special Technological Design Bureau (OKTB) of the Kirov factory in Leningrad. Three variants of the vehicle were developed, two of which were drastically different from the Object 268 that is widely known today. The fact that the design work began before July of 1952 is confirmed by the dates on the drafts of the 2nd and 3rd variants: April 25th, 1952. By that time, the main parameters of the vehicle were already known. One of the requirements was the mass: the new SPG had to weigh less than 50 tons.

SPG on the Object 730 chassis. The first Soviet heavy SPG with a rear fighting compartment was designed by N.F. Shashmurin back in 1944.

Variant #2 of the new SPG had a rear fighting compartment, which allowed the reduction of the hull length of 6675 mm. Since the entire from of the vehicle was taken by the engine and transmission, the driver sat in the fighting compartment, to the right. The driver's visibility with this layout was not great.

These inconveniences were balanced out by the relatively short overhang of the barrel, only 2300 mm. The front of the casemate was 150-180 mm thick, the sides were 90 mm thick. The upper front plate was only 75 mm thick, but sloped at 75 degrees. The vehicle was well protected. The crew consisted of four men. In order to ease the loader's job, shells were stored in a loading drum behind the gun.

Variant #3 with the gun in a rotating turret, April 1952.

The third variant was no less original. This was more of a tank than an SPG, but its armour had to be thinned out due to its heavy and powerful gun.

There was a significant difference between the Object 730 and SU-152 (as it was called in documentation). The turret had to be designed from scratch, and the turret ring increased from 2100 mm in diameter to 2300 mm in order to accommodate the 152 mm gun. The maximum thickness of the turret armour was 200 mm. The ammunition capacity remained at 30 rounds. Most of the ammunition was placed in the turret bustle, which would ease the loader's job.

The new turret made changes to the hull also necessary. The length of the hull increased by 150 mm. The thickness of the upper sides was reduced to 90 mm, and the lower sides to 50 mm. This was done to keep the mass within the 50 ton limit. The upper front plate and rear were reduced to 60 mm and 40 mm respectively. The SPG had no coaxial gun, but it did have a KPV high caliber AA machinegun.

By the summer of 1952, the SPG on the Object 730 chassis project already took its shape. The decree issued by the Council of Ministers on July 2nd approved an already existing project and made some changes to work that was already underway. Around this time, the index "268" appeared on blueprints, and the SPG was named Object 268.

Soviet Jagdtiger

Literature describes five variants of the Object 268, but that is not exactly correct. The two aforementioned variants were designed before the final draft of the tactical-technical requirements was finished, nor did they carry the 268 index.

In reality, there were three variants of the vehicle, two of which were an evolution of previously developed drafts. Both of these variants were ready by December of 1952. The artillery system that was used in these projects was still under development.

According to preliminary calculations, the muzzle velocity of its shells would be 740 m/s. The basis for the project was the M53 gun, mixed with some parts from the M62-T 122 mm tank gun. The overall mass of this system with no official name was 5100 kg.

Variant #4 had thicker armour and a roomier fighting compartment which housed 5 crew members.

The redesigned version of the 2nd variant which was indexed #4 was finished on December 18th, 1952. This design already had the index 268, and the chief designer was listed as Zh.Ya. Kotin himself. Externally, the 4th variant was similar to the 2nd, but the changes were significant.

First of all, the length of the hull was increased to 6900 mm, almost the same as on the Object 730. The length of the barrel overhang was reduced by 150 mm. The sloped rear of the casemate was straightened out, which increased the available size. These changes were necessary, as the new technical requirements were for a crew of 5.

The new crew member was a second loader, positioned behind the commander. The commander received a new cupola with a rangefinder and a machinegun with a curved barrel. The driver's station was redesigned, and he received new observation devices. The loading drum was left alone, but the project authors noted that the increased fighting compartment size meant that an even more powerful gun could be used. In parallel with the increased fighting compartment size, the armour protection was increased. The lower front plate was thickened to 160 mm. The front of the casemate stayed at 180 mm, but 160 mm thick cheeks were positioned at a sharp angle.The mass of the vehicle remained under 50 tons.

On December 10th, 1952, the third variant of the SPG was reworked, earning the index #5. The length of its hull was reduced to the Object 730's length (6925 mm), and the upper sides became curved. The front of the hull also changed somewhat, but its thickness remained the same. The decreased length of the hull was achieved by using the V-12-6 engine, which later migrated to the T-10M. The increased turret ring diameter also made its way over.

The 4 man turret was also redesigned. The commander received a rangefinder, but the curved barrel machinegun was given to the loader. Both reworked projects inherited the KPV AA machinegun.

Variant #5 differed from variant #3 by a series of small changes and a 5 man crew.

Neither of these variants made it past the draft stage. In January of 1953, they were presented to the GBTU Scientific-Technical Committee and Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machinebuilding. After studying them, member of the committee decided that both projects require substantial changes to the hull and cannot be accepted.

The commission approved another, much more reasonable project, which required minimal changes to the chassis. The biggest change was the installation of the more compact V-12-6 engine, which was also used in variant #5.

The redesigned version of the project was presented in June of 1953. The commission was also shown a 1:10 scale model. On August 25th, the Object 268 was approved by Colonel-General A.I. Radzievskiy.

Several sources say that this was the end of the design work, but that was not so. Of course, the acceptance of the Object 730 into service on November 28th, 1953 had an effect on the development, but work continued. N.M. Chisytakov was assigned as the lead engineer on the project, previously working in Nizhniy Tagil as a head of new projects. Work on the Object 140 began under his supervision, but for a number of reasons the engineer left Nizhniy Tagil and moved to Leningrad. The overall management of the project fell to N.V. Kurin, a veteran of the Kirov factory and the author of many SPG designs.

Draft of the final version of the Object 268, June 1954.

There was another reason that development of the Object 268 dragged on that is not accounted for by some researchers. The gun that would be installed on the SPG was still being designed. Meanwhile, the factory #172 staff did not sit still. After their M62 122 mm gun which was used on the Object 752 and Object 777 tanks, the designers from Perm started working on 152 mm guns in early 1954.

Seven years passed since the design of the M53, a modified version of which was going to go into the Object 268, and artillery did not sit still. A new 152 mm gun, indexed M64, became available. Its muzzle velocity was almost the same as on the M53 (750 m/s), but the length of the barrel was much shorter. Since the fighting compartment of the T-10 and Object 268 were positioned in roughly the same place, this was very important. To compare, the modified M53 had an overall length from the center of the casemate to the tip of the muzzle brake of 5845 mm, while the M64's length was 4203 mm. The overhang of this new gun was only 2185 mm.

This was how the vehicle was built in metal. Spring-summer 1957.

Officially, the technical project of the M64 was only inspected by the GAU in August of 1954, but the OKTB received information about this new gun much earlier. The aforementioned thesis that work on the Object 268 ended in the fall of 1953 seems strange when there are blueprints dated late June, 1954.

The blueprints (overall, there were 37 pages of documentation) showed a vehicle that was very similar to the Object 268 that was later built. In concept, the vehicle was reminiscent of the German Jagdtiger, which was made as similar as possible to the Tiger B.

There was a significant difference in that Soviet engineers managed to keep the dimensions of the T-10's hull and its mass. The Object 268 was also slightly lower than the T-10. The design inherited a commander's cupola with a rangefinder. As with the predecessors, the thickness of the sides and rear of the hull had to be reduced, but the sides of the casemate grew to 100 mm. The protection of the casemate from the front was also very impressive: 187 mm. The casemate was widened to the dimensions of the hull and was quite roomy.

Between the Past and Future

Plans for the Object 268 were finalized in March of 1955. The due dates for prototypes were also set then. According to plans, the first prototype was due in the first quarter of 1956, and two more would be build before the 4th quarter. Sadly, work on new generation heavy tanks began around this time. Chisytakov became the head of the Object 278 project, which had a direct impact on the development of the new SPG.

As for factory #172, the new 152 mm M64 was completed in December of 1955. In February of 1956, after a series of factory trials, the gun with serial number 4 was sent to Leningrad, to the Kirov factory.

The vehicle looked very impressive from the front. Surprisingly, it was even lower than the ISU-152.

These delays meant that the first Object 268 was only ready by the fall of 1956. Overall, the vehicle was done to the project documentation, but there were some changes. For example, the curved roof was deleted. Instead, the SPG received a much simpler roof. The machinegun with a curved barrel was also removed, the prototype had its port welded over. The rear of the casemate was also straightened out. This part was also made removable to facilitate installation and removal of the gun.

The crew remained the same, at 5 men. Thanks to the good layout, it was not cramped inside at all, and even a very tall person could work in the SPG. The ammunition capacity of this high caliber gun was 35 rounds. The crew's comfort was also improved by features of the gun. For one, it had a fume extractor, which reduced the amount of gases that ended up in the fighting compartment. The gun also had a loading mechanism, which made the loaders' jobs easier.

Object 268 from the right.

Factory trials began in the fall of 1956, and were completed in the spring of 1957. Overall, the characteristics of the new vehicle were close to calculated ones. The mobility of the Object 268 was similar to that of the T-10, including its top speed.

After these trials, the SPG was sent to Kubinka. Gunnery trials showed that the delays weren't for nothing. The precision of the gun was superior to that of the ML-20S on the ISU-152. The gun was also superior in muzzle velocity, range, and rate of fire.

Alas, none of that mattered. The order for two more prototypes was cancelled and the first prototype was sent to the NIIBT proving grounds museum. Currently, the SPG can be seen in Patriot Park. Recently, the museum staff restored the SPG to working order.

From this angle, you can see that the roof differs from the draft blueprints.

If the Object 268 had come around five years earlier, it would have had a very high chance of being accepted into service. The vehicle was well designed, comfortable for the crew, and well protected. However, by 1957, a whole sequence of events made the mass production of this SPG pointless.

To start, a new generation of heavy tanks was in development since 1955 (Objects 277, 278, 279, and 770), which had very thick armour. Even the M64 gun would not be enough against them. GBTU realized that foreign tank designers are also not sitting still. The prospective SPG was armed with a gun that was already obsolete.

In addition, a modernization program for ISU-152 vehicles began in the mid-1950s that drastically increased their lifespan. Unlike the Object 268 which had not started production, these SPGs were available here and no. Yes, the ML-20S was inferior in all parameters to the M64, but not enough to justify a new SPG.

Finally, the production of the T-10 was ramping up slowly. Loading the Kirov factory and ChTZ with SPGs meant that the already narrow trickle of T-10s would be reduced even further. In addition, factory #172 had yet to master the new gun.

There was another reason, largely the same one that caused the British to cancel their FV215 and FV4005 heavy SPGs. By 1956, work on anti-tank guided missiles had already begun. On May 8th, 1957, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved work on tanks and SPGs armed with guided missiles.

Many people mention "bad Khrushchev", but let's face the truth. An ATGM launcher is much more compact than a gun. Launching a missile is simpler, and it can be controlled in flight. With a similar payload, a missile is more effective. It is not surprising that the Object 268 was the last Soviet heavy assault gun.

Draft of a missile tank destroyer, Object 282T, 1958.

At the same time, work on SPGs on the T-10 chassis did not stop. In 1957, the Kirov factory OKTB began work on a vehicle that was indexed Object 282. It is often called a tank, but in practice, it was a heavy tank destroyer. It was created to be used with 170 mm "Salamandra" anti-tank missiles, but when NII-48 did not manage to complete them, the armament was changed. The final configuration, the Object 282T, could be armed with 152 mm TRS-152 missiles (ammunition capacity of 22) or TRS-132 missiles (ammunition capacity of 30). 

Object 282T at trials, 1959.

The vehicle that was sent to trials in 1959 differed drastically from its predecessors. Despite its impressive ammunition capacity and a 2-3 man crew, the tank was shorter than the T-10. More importantly, its height was only 2100 mm. The front of the tank was redesigned. In addition, the designers moved the fuel tanks forward, separating them from the crew with a 30 mm bulkhead. The tank received a V-12-7 1000 hp engine. Its maximum speed increased to 55 kph.

The result was an unusual vehicle, which was killed by its armament. Trials showed that the Object 282T's Topol control system did not work reliably enough, and the project was cancelled.

The reworked variant, Object 282K, would have looked like this, but it was never built in metal.

In 1959, the Kirov factory OKTB designed an improved vehicle indexed Object 282K. Its mass increased to 46.5 tons, and its height decreased to 1900 mm. The vehicle was equipped with two TRS-132 launchers (20 missiles each), one per side. The rear housed a 152 mm PURS-2 missile launcher with 9 missiles. The fire control system was taken entirely from the Object 282T. Due to poor results with the Object 282T, the Object 282K remained on paper.

This was the end of SPGs on the T-10 chassis.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

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Post-War Production

September 12, 2016, 3:47 pm

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"State Committee of Defense Decree #9488ss
July 9th, 1945
Moscow, Kremlin

1. In order to increase the number of tanks in the Red Army to its authorized strength and create a 3000 tank Stavka reserve, it is necessary to preserve the production levels from June of this year for a term to be determined in the future.
2. Production of heavy ISU-152 SPGs for armament of heavy tank regiments of combined arms armies will be preserved, as their HE performance is much higher than of 122 mm guns.
3. Refill Red Army units to their authorized strength in the following order:
1. Occupational forces (comrades Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovskiy, and Tolbukhin).
2. Border military districts.
3. Internal military districts.
4. Heavy tank regiments in combined arms armies should consist of the following tanks:
1. One battalion of IS-122 or ISU-122 tanks.
2. Two battalions of ISU-152s.
5. Begin the creation of a 3000 tank Stavka reserve only after the rest of the Red Army has been brought up to authorized strength.
6. In order to fill 30 new mechanized divisions, build 7500 additional vehicles:
1. IS: 1320
2. ISU-122: 630
3. T-34 and T-44: 5550
7. In connection with the fact that the military still has up to 5000 working tanks that arrived at the front lines before April 1st, 1945, that still has a reserve of less than 70 engine-hours, as well as 4900 tanks that require medium or major repairs, it is important to retain the production of tank diesel engines at the level of June 1945 until January of 1946.
   Of the 4900 vehicles that require medium or major repairs, 2805 should be repaired and returned to the army, 1000 should be sent to training units, schools, and academies, and 1095 tanks should be retained as a reserve at factories.

Chair of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin."

RGASPI 644-2-514

Nickel-Free Armour

September 13, 2016, 7:03 pm

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"Decree of the State Committee of Defense #1586
RE: trials of the new nickel-free armour for T-34 hulls

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:

1. The People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metals (comrade Tevosyan), People's Commissariat of Tank Production (comrade Malyshev), and GABTU are to be informed that trials of nickel-free armour and cast T-34 turrets from MZ-5 gave satisfactory results, matching the technical requirements for MZ-2 nickel armour.
2. The People's Commissariat of Tank Production (comrade Malyshev) must:
1. Begin production of cast turrets and cast armoured components for T-34 tanks from nickel-free MZ-5 steel instead of MZ-2 steel at factories #112, #183, #178, and Uralmash by May 10th of this year
2. Produce 15 hulls at factory #112 by May 10th of this year from nickel-free MZ-5 steel and perform ballistic trials by May 10th in cooperation with GABTU.
3. In the event of satisfactory welding and trials results, allow the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metals, People's Commissariat of Tank Production, and GABTU to begin using MZ-5 nickel-free steel instead of MZ-2 in production of tank hulls, according to technical requirements.
4. The People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metals (comrade Tevosyan) must provide the necessary amount of low carbon ferrous chrome for production of MZ-5 armoured steel.

Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin"

RGASPI 644-2-50

T-30 Towing Trials

September 14, 2016, 8:02 pm

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"Record of 010 tow hook trials

1. Object under trial

The "010" tank with two front tow hooks. The tow hooks are positioned 120 mm away from the side of the hull, as the same height as the existing production tow hook.


2. Objective of trials

1. Determine the robustness of the front plate when two tow hooks are installed.
2. Determine the convenience of towing an uncontrolled tank with two tow hooks installed.

3. Methodology of trials

1. Brakes were activated on the tank under trial. In addition, another 010 tank was hooked to its rear hook, its brakes also active. The slack between the two tanks was measured in advance.
   The two braked tanks were towed by two more 010 tanks.
   When accelerating rapidly, both two tow cables from the 010 tank and the Komsomolets tractor chain were torn.
   When accelerating gradually, both towing tanks had their tracks slip.
2. When towing a tank with two front tow hooks, it was established that towing (given two tow cables) is possible and more convenient than using one tow hook.

4. Conclusions

During trials of tow hooks, no defects or breakdowns of the front plate were observed, despite several tears of tow cables (both simultaneously) and tow chains."

CAMD RF 38-11355-251

Prospective Death Rays

September 15, 2016, 3:39 pm

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"9. Device for intercepting and jamming foreign radio stations that are broadcasting images. Special Projects Laboratory. A design is in development.

Weapons (Death Rays)

10. Powerful electronic emitters and short wavelength rays. Literature and intelligence has been gathered, theoretical work is underway.

11. Powerful sound waves. Physical-Technical Laboratory and Special Projects Laboratory. Theoretical work is underway. Professor Andreev's device is being finished, which generates short sound waves using quartz."

Via _tezka.

World of Tanks History Section: Crushing the Tarnopol Fortress

September 16, 2016, 11:18 am

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The main purpose of new IS-2 heavy tanks that appeared in the Red Army in 1944 was the destruction of German pillboxes with their 122 mm guns. Fighting enemy tanks was not a priority. However, plans and forecasts rarely work in war. The IS tanks got a chance to test themselves against enemy armour soon after they arrived on the battlefield.

This happened in the spring of 1944, during the Proskurovo-Chernovtsy operation. In addition to their other objectives, the Soviet forces had to surround the German 1st Tank Army. Colonel-General Chernyakhovskiy's 60th Army participated in this task. One of the first targets in its path was Tarnopol (modern day Ternopol). Hitler declared it a Festung: a city-fortress that German forces had to hold until the last man. On April 11th, it was time for the defenders to carry out that order.
Another useless fortress

The 1st and 4th Guards Tank Armies helped Chernyakhovskiy's troops encircle the German garrison in the city by April 24th. The German commanders understood that their Fuhrer's loud words and hysterical orders to hold at any cost could not help in battle against the superior Red Army forces. Attempts to remove the Tarnopol blockade began soon after it was established. Colonel Werner Friebe was tasked with this objective. He collected a combat group from his battered 8th Tank Division, but since he could only muster 24 Panthers and 6 Hummels, nine Tigers from the 507th battalion were temporarily assigned to him. Friebe attacked, but his first attempt petered out after it hit Soviet T-34s, SU-85 tank destroyers, and two anti-tank artillery regiments. The second attempt was tried in mid-April.

This time, the group would act alongside the recently arrived 9th SS Tank Division and several other units, including the 653rd Ferdinand battalion and panzergrenadiers from SS division Hohenstaufen. The Germans' strength lay in their large amount of APCs, which increased the infantry's mobility and protected it from artillery fire.

Soviet commanders realized the possibility of a new German offensive, so Chernyakhovskiy's army received additional forces, the most valuable of which was Lieutenant-General A. Panfilov's 6th Guards Tank Corps. Aside from T-34 brigades, the corps contained the 11th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, equipped with brand new IS-2s.

Only 11 kilometers

The next German offensive was scheduled for April 11th, 1944. As it often happened, the SS and Wehrmacht commanders had a falling out, so the first few days of the offensive were unenthusiastic. Their main success involved the capture of a foothold at the Vyazushka river while Friebe's main forces were fruitlessly bashing against the Soviet defenses to the north. It took two days to agree on how the enemy forces would unite, but nature threw them a wild card. Powerful rains washed away the roads to the foothold, preventing the Germans from moving their forces there.

Two days of battles revealed to the Soviets how the Germans were planning to get through to Tarnopol. Most available artillery was moved closer to the enemy foothold and T-34s were positioned behind the infantry. IS tanks were left in reserve.

By April 14th, the Germans finally assembled their tank spearhead. Artillery and several waves of bombers worked over the Soviet defenders. This dealt significant damage to the 135th Rifle Division which was in the path of the breakthrough, and their anti-tank units could not stop the enemy. The Germans broke through to the positions of the 339th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, which was almost entirely lost.

T-34s from the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade helped slow down the enemy's tanks, but 76 mm guns of the T-34s could do little against Tigers, Panthers, and Ferdinands. By the evening of April 15th, 9 tanks were left in the brigade out of the initial 30. Only 11 kilometers separated Friebe from Tarnopol.

By the way, there were no longer any Germans in Tarnopol. The city's commandant, Major General von Naidorf, decided to collect the remainder of the garrison and break through towards his relief when he heard that help was coming. They managed to get to the Zagrebelye village where they were finally pinned down. The little scrap of land that the Germans held was constantly pounded by bombs and artillery. Pauses between barrages were used by Soviet troops to attack again. Von Naidorf died on April 15th, and Colonel von Schenfeld took command. He led the remaining 1500 Germans to try and break through westward on the night of April 16th. Only 55 made it through to their own.

Time for large calibers

Friebe did not yet know on the morning of April 16th that there was no one left to save. He thought that one more decisive blow and the defenses would fall apart. Half an hour before noon, after an artillery barrage and bombing runs, the German forces moved out. This is when the 122 mm guns of the IS tanks made themselves known.

The breakthrough regiment was well prepared to deflect the German attack. The defenses were built in two echelons. One platoon (two tanks) was sent to cover the road to Tarnopol. 600 meters from the IS-2s, the remaining T-34s dug in. Open terrain spread out in front of the defenders, and German tanks showed up like targets at a range. Gunners calmly let the enemy approach, and a heavy shell put an end to the tank. A maximum of two rounds was needed for a Tiger or a Panther.

From documents regarding this battle:

"Guards Lieutenant Yudovin's crew burned up a heavy German tank from 1400 meters, and a second tank from 1200 meters. Guards Lieutenant Vovk's tank burned up two German tanks from 1200-1500 meters."

"Guards Junior Lieutenant Pankov's crew burned up one enemy tank from 1400 meters and three tanks from 1200 meters."

"Gunner Guards Sergeant Maskoryants burned up 4 German tanks with his sight set to 14."

It took a while for the Germans to understand the full extent of the problem. After the attempt to push through the Soviet defenses through the shortest route (along the highway) failed, attempts were made to attack from various directions. They tried to feel out a weak spot or try to go around tanks and infantry. IS tanks did not let them: they did not stop at firing from a standstill, but manevered and deflected one attack after another. During the battle, the commanders even sent a part of the tanks to destroy the group of escapees from Tarnopol that tried to get through the forest past their positions.

As a result of the fierce fighting, the 11th Guards Heavy Tanks Regiment reported 29 knocked out tanks.

On the next day, Friebe attempted another attack. He already knew that the Festung in Tarnopol was no longer there, but there was still hope to save at least a portion of the forces that were breaking out of the encirclement. This attempt cost Friebe another few tanks. Over two days of battles, the IS tanks knocked out 37 tanks, having lost 4 tanks burned and 5 knocked out. Personnel losses consisted of 14 dead and 4 wounded. On the morning of April 16th, 13 Tigers were listed in Friebe's group. Two days later, there were only six. Total losses added up to 50-60 tanks.

IS tanks at Tarnopol did not fight in their designated role, but their effectiveness against the best German tanks at the time impressed Soviet commanders, and soon additional instructions on how to use the new tanks were published. They stated that IS-2 regiments must be kept as an anti-tank reserve and be introduced into battle in a decisive direction. Several months later, this tactic worked wonderfully on the Sandomierz foothold.

Original article by Andrei Ulanov.

TACAM T-60: SPG, Transylvanian Style

September 17, 2016, 8:46 am

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Romania joined WWII with a very marginal tank force, both in numbers and capability. The first battles on the Eastern front showed that their tanks were incapable of engaging Soviet medium tanks, let along heavy ones. The Romanian army was in desperate need of new more powerful anti-tank means. In a very short amount of time, they could only be built on captured platforms.

Romania only have one tank unit in the summer of 1941: the 1st Tank Division. It consisted of the 1st and 2nd Tank Regiments, reinforced by two regiments of motorized infantry, a motorized artillery regiment, a recon battalion, and a sapper battalion. The 1st Tank Regiment was equipped with Czechoslovakian S-II-aR (an export variant of the LT vz. 35), 126 of which were purchased in 1938-1939. These tanks served in the Romanian army under the index R-2. The 2nd Tank Regiment consisted of French Renault R35 tanks. In August-September of 1939, 41 tanks were received from France. 34 more tanks arrived from Poland: these were tanks from the Polish 21st Battalion that crossed the Romanian border on September 18-19th, 1939. If the R-2s could at least fight Soviet light tanks, the R35s with their short barreled guns were helpless against any armoured opponent.

Romanian tankers took significant losses in the first battles at Odessa. The higher ups understood that something had to be done, or the kingdom will be quickly left without an armoured force. The Prime Minister and de facto dictator Ion Antonescu brashly ordered the development of a domestic T-34 equivalent, but this idea was completely incompatible with the capabilities of Romanian industry. It was much more realistic to produce an improvised vehicle like the German Marder series of tank destroyers: the installation of a gun with acceptable armour piercing performance on the chassis of an obsolete light tank.

Captured gun, captured chassis

In late 1941 and early 1942, the Romanians captured over 150 Soviet 76.2 mm model 1936 guns (F-22). Despite being classified as field guns, the gun had excellent armour piercing characteristics, which were fully exploited by the Wehrmacht. The Germans used PzII and Pz38(t) tanks to create tank destroyers. The Romanians picked another platform: the T-60 Soviet tank. This vehicle was available in significant amounts and had decent off-road performance. The GAZ-202 engine on the T-60 was a copy of the American Dodge FH2 engine, which was very common in Europe. Spare parts could be found in Germany and in Romania.

The design of the tank destroyer was headed by engineer Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Giulai, who already had experience with tank design (he participated in a modernization project for the R35). Work was done at the Leonid factory in Bucharest. In 1942, 23 T-60 tanks arrived at the factory for conversion, and 11 more in the start of the next year.

In January of 1943, the first prototype of the tank destroyer was ready. It was named Tun Anti Car cu Afet Mobil T-60 (anti-tank gun on a self propelled T-60 chassis), or TACAM T-60 for short. 34 tank destroyers of this type were built in total: 17 were finished before June of 1943, and 17 more in the second half of the year.

Design

The chassis of two types of T-60 were used: early and late, which had improved armour (these tanks are called T-60A in Western publications). The welded hull had a varied armour thickness. The front was 15-20 mm thick (the T-60 had up to 35 mm), 15 mm sides, and 13 mm rear (the T-60 had 25 mm). The floor and roof were 10 mm thick. The front of the vehicle had the combined driver and transmission compartment. The driver's station was shifted to the left, and his head and upper body were inside an armoured casemate. During conversion into an SPG, the casemate was modified by welding the driver's hatch shut.

The TACAM T-60 had a casemate that was open from the top and rear.

Behind the driver and transmission compartment was the joint engine and fighting compartment. During conversion, the turret and turret platform was removed. Instead, an immobile casemate, open from the top and rear, was installed. It was also built from secondary parts: 15 mm thick armoured plates obtained by disassembling captured BT-7s. The crew and equipment could be protected from the weather by a tarp that could be stretched over a frame.

The casemate housed the 76.2 mm F-22 gun and seats for two crewmen: the commander (also working as a gunner) and loader. The lower part of the mount was replaced with a steel plate, produced at the Concordia factory in Ploesti and processed by the Astra and Lemetr companies. The Romanians moved the aiming mechanisms to one side of the gun, the same thing the Germans did when converting the F-22 into the Pak 36(r). Thanks to this modification, the gun only needed one gunner, not two. The vertical range of the gun was -5 to +8 degrees, and the horizontal range was 32 degrees to each side. Auxiliary armament consisted of a 7.92 mm ZB vz. 37 (ZB53) machinegun carried inside the casemate.

The ammunition capacity of the tank destroyer consisted of 44 rounds. Along with captured shells, armour piercing shells "Kostinescu" shells were used. At a mass of 6.6 kg and muzzle velocity of 751 m/s, these shells could penetrate 72 mm at 30 degrees from a range of 1000 meters, and thus were dangerous for T-34s.

The engine (70 hp GAZ-202) was not changed, only the radiator was reshaped to make more room for ammunition. The engine roof with an air intake was replaced with a metal mesh. The suspension had to be reinforced, as the vehicle's mass grew from 6.5 to 9 tons, plus it had to bear the recoil of a powerful 3 inch gun. The torsion bars were reinforced, and new road wheels were used, produced in Romania based on the Soviet design. Even though relatively few TACAMs were made, three companies produced these wheels: Industria Sirmei in Turda, IAR in Brasov, and Concordia in Ploesti. The vehicle was also equipped with a brake that locked the wheels when it was time to fire.

Use in combat

TACAM T-60 tank destroyers were presented to the public during a parade in Bucharest on May 19th, 1943. In June, these vehicles were sent to the Mechanized Training Center (Centrului de instructie Mecanizat) and the 1st Tank Regiment, where they were used to train crews. By the end of 1943, two tank destroyer companies (Compania de Vânători de tancuri) were equipped with these tank destroyers: the 61st in the 1st Tank Regiment (16 vehicles) and 62nd in the 2nd Tank Regiment (18 vehicles).

TACAM T-60 tank destroyer on parade in Bucharest, May 10th, 1943.

The TACAM T-60 first saw combat in 1944, when two batteries with 14 tank destroyers in total were added to the Kantemir battle group, and improvised unit made from elements of the 1st Tank Division to defend Northern Transnistria. Aside from tank destroyers, this group contained 30 PzIV tanks, 2 PzIIIs, and 10 StuGs, as well as a company each of R-2 and R-35 light tanks. The specifics of the participation of TACAM T-60s is unclear, but it was likely a difficult fight. By the time that battle group Kantemir was transferred to North Bessarabia on March 28th, 1944, only seven vehicles of this type remained.

Knocked out TACAM T-60.

In April of 1944, the remainder of Kantemir group was reintroduced into the 1st Tank Division. After reorganization, a tank destroyer battalion was made, consisting of a battery of TACAM T-60s and a battery of German assault guns. A battery consisted of 10 SPGs (three platoons of three each and one commander's vehicle), one reconnaissance armoured car, one light commander's car, and 14 supply trucks.

TACAM T-60 on the march with a Hungarian Turan tank.

On April 7th, 1944, the Cojocaru battle group was formed from units of the 8th Motorized Cavalry Division. The group included the 12th Motorized Regiment, 3rd Motorized Artillery Regiment, three independent infantry battalions, and three TACAM T-60 tank destroyers from the 62nd company. This unit fought until June 30th, 1944, at which point it was returned to its "home" division.

Little is known about the subsequent fate of TACAM T-60 tank destroyers. Romanian sources briefly mention their participation in the defense of Bessarabia in August of 1944. There is no mention of these vehicles after Romania switched sides on August 23rd, 1944. It is likely that these vehicle were returned to the USSR, as the chassis and guns came from there. At the very least, one TACAM T-60 was tested in Kubinka.

TACAM T-60 during trials in Kubinka.

Like the German Marder tank destroyers, the TACAM T-60 was a typical improvisation. Their drawbacks consisted of a tall silhouette, weak armour, and an open casemate. These "hybrids" were also very late. Useful in 1942, they were archaic by 1944.

Original article by Andrei Haruk.

Narev Foothold

September 19, 2016, 5:11 pm

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"Conclusions regarding the combat actions of the 80th Guards Idritsa Order of the Red Banner Heavy Tank Regiment from October 4th to 25th, 1944, in battles for the Narev Foothold

1. In battles at the Narev Foothold, the 80th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment was used in both attack and defense, In defense, the regiment was used for combat with enemy tanks, deflecting their counterattacks. Heavy tanks from the regiment cooperated with tanks from the 17th Tank Brigade. IS-122 tanks fired at enemy heavy tanks from 2 km away, and T-34s fired at closer, less important targets.When our heavy tanks appeared at the foothold, enemy tank actions became more careful. Counterattacks became more thoroughly planned and better synchronized with artillery. In part, the enemy would move his heavy tanks as close as possible to our positions at night and begin counterattacks with medium tanks at dawn, supported by guns of the forward heavy tanks.
   Lately, counterattacks in regions where the enemy knows we have heavy tanks are performed very carefully, even meekly, even when Tiger and Panther tanks are present. Heavy enemy tanks and SPGs fire from great distances and from cover, trying to not expose themselves to IS-2 fire.
2. In defense, the regiment formed itself into a line along a 600 meter front. Experience showed that the range and firepower of the guns could make the regiment effective over a wide front. Actions of our heavy tanks in ambush directly from the front line drastically increased the robustness of the defenses and quickly drained the enemy of enthusiasm in trying to push back our units and attain success.
3. The regiment lost 6 IS-122 tanks during defensive battle. This is explained with the following reasons:
1. The regiment was thrown into battle right off the march, without a chance to perform reconnaissance of terrain and the enemy, without even knowing the overall situation on the foothold. According to the corps commander, tanks took up initial positions at night, and immediately deflected an enemy counterattack.
2. The enemy has a numerical advantage in tanks and SPGs, and there is powerful artillery and mortar fire on our tank positions.
   Losses of tanks were compensated by significant losses to enemy tanks and failure of enemy plans to take the foothold.
4. During the offensive, the regiment was used to support infantry. The main objective of the tanks was to fight enemy tanks and SPGs, strongholds, deflect enemy tank attacks, and protect the flank of the advancing division.
   Skilfully organized and executed cooperation with infantry and within the regiment, correct use of terrain, skillful combination of fire and movement, and excellent knowledge of the capability of heavy tanks in combat gave excellent results for the regiment during the offensive.
   No matter what, heavy tanks must be accompanied with constant tactical, combat, and special reconnaissance, before and during the battle. Without it, heavy tanks cannot complete their objectives and will take losses.
5. Since the enemy, as a rule, reveals his tanks and SPGs with fire only when our forces advance, and the main task of the IS-122 is to fight them, it is necessary to aim to use tank regiments in cooperation with medium tanks and SPGs.

Commander of the 65th Army Armoured and Motorized Forces, Colonel Novak

Chief of Staff of the 65th Army Armoured and Motorized Forces, Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Burdakov"

Via Pamyat Naroda

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Anti-Tank Rifles in 1943

September 20, 2016, 7:37 pm

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"Is there a reason to keep anti-tank rifle companies in infantry regiments?

Combat experience shows that keeping an anti-tank rifle company in an infantry regiment as a permanent unit is not sensible for the following reasons:

1. The summer battles of 1941 are characterized by new types of tanks from the enemy's side. These tanks have thick armour and powerful guns up to 88 mm in caliber. These vehicles include the Ferdinand SPG and Tiger and Panther tanks. Light tanks, armoured cars, and tankettes are used as an exception. The anti-tank rifle is only effective against the Ferdinand and Tiger at a range of 150 meters and closer. Such a close distance allows the enemy to destroy infantry, machinegun nests, dugouts and bunkers at close range, ensuring maximum effectiveness. This situation requires a light weapon that could reliably destroy tanks and SPGs at 600-700 meters. The anti-tank rifle does not meet these requirements.
   
2. As a rule, few tanks and SPGs (5-6 vehicles per company) participate in a counterattack. More often, tanks follow infantry and suppress strongholds that prevent its advance. In these cases, enemy infantry can destroy anti-tank rifle teams. In this case, the anti-tank riflemen are forced to fight enemy infantry, take heavy losses, and cannot perform their direct task as the anti-tank rifles cannot destroy tanks at a range of over 150 meters.
   For example, in battles for height 161.8 1.5 km north-east of Teploye, on October 31st, 1943, at 05:30, after an artillery barrage, the enemy attacked from the Boyevoy settlement with a battalion of infantry and 8 tanks and 4 SPGs. AT guns and riflemen opened fire. Only Captain Navoykov's 76 mm field artillery battery managed to destroy a Ferdinand with a subcaliber round. Anti-tank rifles did not destroy a single tank.
   In battle for Stolbchee village in Bolkhov region from July 19th to July 23rd, 1943, during the time of strong tank attacks when up to 100 enemy tanks would attack at once, all measures weer used including anti-tank rifles. The weight of combat against enemy tanks rested solely on the shoulders of regimental and divisional artillery. Anti-tank rifles knocked out two tankettes and destroyed two armoured cars. Over 5 days, 45 anti-tank rifles were lost.
3. Using the anti-tank rifles to shoot at enemy positions is not possible, as the rifle was made to fight enemy tanks and performed a specialized task. The sights on an anti-tank rifle do not allow to shoot at a small target 600-700 meters away and cannot be used to hit a small target directly.
   The anti-tank rifle cannot be considered an effective weapon against enemy positions.
   From June of 1943 to January of 1944, anti-tank rifles destroyed:
1. 2 light tanks
2. 2 armoured cars
3. 3 light cars
4. 12 fortified positions
   In only five days of battles between July 19th and July 23rd at Stolbchee 45 rifles and crews were lost.

Conclusions:

1. It is not sensible to keep anti-tank rifle units in infantry regiments and an independent anti-tank rifle squadron in divisions.
2. Anti-tank rifles are obsolete as a weapon. It is necessary to create a new weapon (artillery) that can destroy enemy tanks at a range of at least 400 meters.

Commander of the 108th Infantry Division, Guards Colonel Teremov

HQ Chief of the 108th Infantry Division, Colonel Lozovskiy"

Via kris-reid.

BL-39 Trials

September 21, 2016, 5:35 pm

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"June 23rd, 1942
Scientific Research AA Proving Grounds of the GAU

Report on experiment #982

Subject of the experiment: proving grounds trials of the BL-39 203 mm corps howitzer designed by factory #172.

Goal of the trials:

1. Testing the ballistic characteristics of the system.
2. Determining the range, precision, and angle of deviation.
3. Determining the combat, service, and usage characteristics of the system.
4. Comparison of the the required and actual tactical-technical characteristics.
5. Determining the convenience of disassembly and assembly of the system and limber with typical instruments.

Trials were performed by a commission appointed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General-Colonel of Artillery comrade Boronov, on March 25th, 1942 by order #74331s under the supervision of the proving grounds chief, Brigade Commander comrade Berezin.

Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Polyakov was in charge of the trials.

Trials were held between April 25th and June 15th, 1942.

Main conclusions:

The 203 mm BL-39 corps howitzer failed proving grounds trials.

The biggest drawbacks of the howitzer are:

1. It is very heavy (even for corps artillery).
2. The recoil brake design is unsatisfactory and broke down during use.
3. The elevation mechanism parts are insufficiently robust.
4. The suspension is complicated and the off-road performance is low.
5. The suspension design is unsatisfactory, which leads to great effort being expended on transforming the system from travel mode to combat mode and back, as well as fortifying the system on a given position."

CAMD RF 81-12038-55

U-19 Order

September 22, 2016, 5:52 pm

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"To the Chief of the GAU
CC: Chief of the GABTU
RE: U-19 SPG

In April of this year, under orders from Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production comrade Kotin, the special design bureau of the Uralmash factory designed a 203 mm B-4 SPG on the KV tank chassis. Work by the Uralmash SKB was completed with working blueprints with copies.

I include the overall blueprints and an explanatory memo for this project.

Chief Engineer Umnyagin
SKB Chief Designer Gorlitskiy
August 12th, 1942"

CAMD RF 81-12038-117

World of Tanks History Section: The British Devil and His Brothers

September 23, 2016, 1:15 pm

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No one could have guessed on September 15th, 1916 that many military theory books would become obsolete in an instant. The first tank entered its baptism by fire, and an unnamed German's cry "The devil is coming!" announced the coming of the new god of war.

French and German tanks came after British ones, but the "rhombus" was the first of the first. Nine tanks belonged to this family. Some of them made it in time for the war, others remained prototoypes. Episodes collected in this article will briefly describe the "rhomboid" family.

Mark I: Overshadowed by the Somme

September 15th, 1916: the day when the first tanks entered their baptism by fire. This effective attack is well known: a foggy morning on the river Somme, the German shock from seeing steel beasts coming out of the gloom, the cry "The devil is coming!" Few mention how the Mark Is fought after, even though in some battles, their effectiveness was even greater than during their debut.

On September 25th and 26th, near Guedecoura and Le Sara, 13 Mark I tanks set out to battle. Even though 12 of them did not reach the enemy, only one Mark I Female was enough to clear out the enemy trenches in less than an hour and capture 370 German soldiers. In another battle, three tanks went into a frontal attack. One was knocked out by German artillery, and two became bogged down, but even the presence of tanks was enough to cause the Germans to surrender. Such was the extent of the tank terror that blossomed among the Kaiser's troops.

To be fair, the tanks only had an overwhelming effect on the Germans for a few weeks after their debut. Soon after, the enemy was no longer afraid of them, and design flaws damaged the tanks' reputation in the eyes of the British themselves.

Mark II and Mark III: Log instead of a tail

Only 100 Mark II and Mark III tanks were built, 100 fewer than the first model. Because of this, they are often referred to as a limited, transitional model, but the "twos" and "threes" had some unique features.

The Mark II got rid of the famous wheeled tail, allegedly necessary to help the tank cross trenches. Legend has it that the tail fell off one tank in battle, but the crew kept driving. It turned out that the rear wheels had no practical value. This shortened the tank by two meters with no damage to the performance. Instead of a tail, the rear of the tank now carried a toolbox. The exhaust pipes which were on the roof of the Mark Is were also moved to the rear.

The Mark III was an attempt to thicken the front armour with applique plates. Even though openings for their mounting were made, the extra armour was never installed. However, the Mark III was the first to carry an unditching beam, affixed to the roof. It was used as a means of freeing a bogged down tank. This measure was surprisingly useful and was used by all tanks in the future.

Mark IV: The first thousand

An order for the Mark IV was drafted in September of 1916, almost immediately after the debut of the "rhombus" at the Somme. The Mark IV had several major changes in its design.

First, the armour was strengthened, so rifle and machinegun fire was no longer a threat to the tank. The sloped shape of the gun sponsons made them stop scraping the ground when the tank was tilted. They were also equipped with special rails that allowed the sponsons to be retracted when the tank was transported via railroad. Unfortunately, the design was fragile. Sometimes in battle the mounting brackets would break and the sponson would slide into the hull, crushing tankers. The fuel tanks were moved to the rear to reduce the chance of fire.

Mark IV tanks arrived in France and entered service by May of 1917. The new tank proved itself well in battle. The armoured giants effortlessly formed wide breaches in barbed wire, bringing infantry forward with them. One tank demonstrated its strength in November of 1917 by breaking though a 1.5 meter tall wall, driving through a fruit orchard, crushing trees, and then demolishing the corner of a house when turning.

The range of a Mark IV tank was still only 100-112 km, but compared to the Mark I, it was a serious step forward.

The Mark IV was a popular design, and over a thousand tanks of this type were built.

Mark IV in battle for Cambrai

In the summer of 1917, the British Tank Corps staff had the idea of a PR tank attack. The tanks would be sent into battle in perfect conditions to show themselves, achieving unparalleled success. The terrain in the north-east of France, near Cambrai, seemed suitable. The plow of war has not yet worked over the landscape, and the ground was dry and firm.

The Mark IV tanks were tasked with penetrating the German Hindenburg defensive line. This was initially planned as a local raid, but grew into a fully fledged offensive.

The tanks were transferred to Lieutenant General Sir Julian Bing's 3rd Army in complete secrecy. The roar of their engines was hidden in machinegun fire. Over a million liters of gasoline and oil and half a million shells were needed for the tanks. All of this was delivered to the close rear in a timely manner.

The beginning of the attack on November 20th, 1917, was reminiscent of a heroic epic. The commander of the Tank Corps, General Hugh Ellis, sat in the head Mark IV and led the other 500 tanks. Tanks tore through barbed wire like a hot knife through butter, covering mile after mile. Hundreds of German POWs marched into the British rear. Then things took a turn for the worst.

The infantry, Highlanders from the 51st Division, was bogged down in battle near Flesquières, at the tip of a hilly escarpment, and fell behind the tanks. The Germans pulled up fresh reserves and opened fire from behind the hills. Mark IV tanks that were attempting to crest revealed their weakly protected floors and burned even from machineguns. The British spearhead shattered, and 10 days later the Germans took back their territory, with interest.

Mark V: The first real tank engine

In late 1917, work on new "rhombus" tanks stalled. In part, this was the fault of weapon manufacturers who feared that tanks will make their rifles, machineguns, and cannons obsolete, and so took every opportunity to impede tank production. However, even the will of "gun barons" could not stop the development of armoured vehicles, and in December of 1917, the Mark V, otherwise known as the "Ricardo tank" was ready for production.

Experience at the front showed that tanks need a more powerful engine that was capable of working through constantly changing load, and one that was simple enough for repairs on the front lines. Engineers could not expect to be allowed to use hardened steel or aluminium: aircraft manufacturers claimed those resources. The first person to develop a real tank engine was Henry Ricardo. His engine fully satisfied the requirements of the military. That and the new Wilson gearbox significantly simplified the driver's life.

More novelties on the Mark V include the light telegraph, which replaced signal flags. From May 1918 to the end of the war, the British army received 400 Mark Vs: 200 each of cannon "males" and machinegun "females".

On April 24th, 1918, the first tank duel came to pass: a Mark V against a German A7V. The battle proved that machinegun tanks are only good against infantry. As a result, some of the tanks had the machinegun in one sponson replaced with a cannon. These asymmetric tanks were jokingly called "hermaphrodites" by the soldiers.

Mark V at Passchendaele: Are tanks afraid of mud?

Early morning on July 31st, 1917, the British army attacked at Ypres in the direction of the French city of Passchendaele.

The terrain in their way was covered in swamps and groves. Even in peacetime, wooden roads would need to be put down for the tanks. Now, when the canal system was destroyed by artillery, even that would not help. The Tank Corps warned that the tanks could not pass through this muck. Nature played a cruel trick on the attackers with strong rains, but no one was going to cancel the attack.

All tanks stopped by mid day. Many of them sank to the sponsons, so even the unditching beams would not help. The Germans did not hesitate to open fire at any stuck tanks. Infantry that followed the Mark IVs and Vs also hopelessly sank in mud. The Germans pulled up Fahrpanzers to fire at the British. German aircraft circled above the battlefield, trying to hit tanks from small heights. A commander from one of the tanks removed a machinegun and started firing at enemy planes.

The British attack on Passchendaele failed, but documents show that the Germans were still afraid of the tanks as they thought they were armed with flamethrowers, a horror for infantry.

Surviving tanks were in repairs until August of 1917.

Mark V in the Hundred Days Offensive

The final stage of the Great War was the Entente's Hundred Days Offensive, from August to November of 1918. It began at Amiens, where the allies decided to return an important transport artery. This was the greatest offensive operation of the First World War that tanks participated in.

The entire tank corps was at the front line. Aside from novelties (Mk.A Whippet medium tanks), 334 Mark V "rhombuses" were ready. On August 8th, 1918, the tanks moved out. Even though cooperation with infantry was still poor enough to force some tank commanders to ride alongside their tanks on horseback, the overwhelming density of 23 "Marks" per kilometer of front compensated for any drawbacks.

The tanks drove at German positions behind the rolling artillery barrage. The German trenches sank in smoke and fog, which impeded anti-tank artillery. Realizing their advantage, British tankers left their vehicles and gestured to the Germans to surrender. German artillery tried to cut off infantry from the tanks by pelting them with "blue cross" sneezing gas, but the barrage did not have an effect.

A quarter of the British tanks were lost on the first day of the offensive, but most of them were combat losses. Only 5% of the tanks were lost to breakdowns. Despite all the attackers' problems, the Germans could not hold. The Hundred Days Offensive ended on November 11th, 1918, by the signing of the Armistice of Compiègne and the surrender of Germany.

Mark VII, the last Anglo-American.

The sixth and seventh modifications of the design did not reach mass production. The Americans decided to assist with the next variant. They entered the war as a part of the Entente in 1917, immediately became interested in tanks, and decided to buy 600 Mark VIes for their own army. After thinking it over, the order was cancelled, but the Americans offered their assistance in developing a new tank. As a result, the Mark VIII did not have time to fight in WWI, as only five tanks were finished by its end. After the end of hostilities, production of the Mark VIII moved entirely to the United States.

The tank looked different from its predecessors due to its suspension. The tracks still wrapped around the hull, but the elongated rear of the tank made it look more like a water droplet than a rhombus. The Americans were a literal breath of fresh air for the tankers: they placed the 338 hp Liberty engine in the rear of the tank, separating it with a bulkhead. The Mark VIII did away with the division between "males" and "females". All sponsons of these tanks carried 57 mm guns, and machinegun armament was placed in a turret on the roof. Plus, machineguns could also be installed in ball mounts on the doors.

Until 1930, the Mark VIII was the only American heavy tank. It never saw combat, and the Americans rarely even sent it out for exercises. When WWII broke out, 90 of these tanks were given to the Canadian army. They were used for training purposes.

Mark IX: A rhombus for infantry

In addition to technical issues, poor coordination with infantry plagued the first tanks in battle. It wasn't that the soldiers didn't know how to fight alongside tanks, but that the tankers were relatively safe behind their armour while the infantry was vulnerable to bullets and shrapnel.

Military engineers reacted to this need by making a personnel carrier. Sponsons were removed, leaving only machineguns in the front and rear. This freed up space for 30 soldiers or 10 tons of cargo to be sheltered by armour. The transporter's crew consisted of four men, and the driver's station was modified to match European right side driving rules. A fan and a tank of drinking water was installed inside for increased comfort. Sadly, the neighbouring scalding hot engine negated those benefits.

Only a handful of Mark IXs existed by the end of the war. One of them managed to reach the Western Front in 1918, where it served as a medical transport. Soldiers nicknamed this rare vehicle "pig".

Original article by Yuri Bakhurin.

L-60: Scandinavian Tank Revolution

September 25, 2016, 1:45 pm

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Having fought its last war in 1814, Sweden ended up one of the few European countries that avoided participating in either World War. Nevertheless, the Swedes always paid careful attention to their army's weapons. Despite its neutrality, Sweden often preferred weapons of German origin. This applied to tanks as well. Even the Strv fm/21, the first Swedish tanks, were really German LK.IIs. Ten of these tanks were built at AB Landsverk in Landskrona, which became the Swedish tank development center for decades to come. The Landsverk L-60 was born here, some elements of which were a real revolution for tank development in the 1930s.

In search of a customer

Sweden's neutral status, its developed industry, and well maintained connections were very useful for the Germans. The Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from developing new types of weapons and military vehicles. However, this prohibition did not stop the Germans from secretly re-launching tank development programs in 1925. They also did not miss out on the opportunity to develop tanks in other countries.

German engineer Otto Merker began working at Landsverk in 1929. Two years before that, Merker was working as an engineer at Maschinenfabrik Esslingen AG, and designed a tractor that the German military was very interested in. Taking a tractor as a foundation for his design, Merker ended up with a chassis that was appropriate for a convertible drive tank. Building the tank was his reason for coming to Landsverk. By that time, the company was under the control of Gutehoffnungshütte, Aktienverein für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb (GHH) from Oberhausen. Only a few dozen kilometers separated Oberhausen and Hessen, the capital of Krupp's empire.

By coincidence, Krupp owned about a third of the stock of Bofors, a Swedish arms company. As for GHH, it was directly connected to the MAN conglomerate, another German tank development powerhouse.

The Landsverk 60 project initially looked like this. Blueprint S.128, October 22nd, 1931.

The result of Merker's work was the Strv M/31 (Landsverk L-10), the first domestically designed Swedish tank. However, a careful look at the tank reveals its origins. To start, the Strv M/31 used the Maybach DSO 8 engine, the same engine as was later chosen for the Rheinmetall B.W. (Begleitwagen) support tank project. The 37 mm Bofors gun also drew its origins from Germany. Take a close look at the turret. Similarities to the Leichttraktor Krupp and Leichttraktor Rheinmetall are evident.

Meanwhile, the L-10 did not entirely satisfy the Swedes. A simplified variant of the convertible drive Landsverk L-30 (Strv fm/31), this tank had a complicated suspension, and was not exactly cheap. Three units were built, and further work stalled. The financial crisis that raged on in Europe hit Sweden fairly strongly. Unemployment in 1933 hit 25%. The only hope for the Swedish tank industry was in exports. Design work at Landsverk sped up, and the Swedes "drew" many tanks. The hero of this article started out on one of these blueprints.

The index Landsverk 60 was first used in the end of October of 1931. Blueprint S.128 showed a two-man scout tank armed with a 20 mm automatic Madsen gun and a coaxial machinegun of the same brand. The 100 hp Mayback OS-5 was used as the powerplant. The result was a decent alternative to the German Kleinetraktor, otherwise known as the La.S, which was currently being designed by Krupp. Even though the Swedish tank turned out a lot better, the Germans paid little interest to the project.

The Landsverk 61 was a further development of the idea. Blueprint S-138, November 1st, 1932. The technical characteristics of this tank were obtained by Red Army intelligence.

The Landsverk 60 project was shelved, but not for long. A year later, in early November of 1932, an improved version of the tank was designed, indexed Landsverk 61. The mass grew to 5.5 tons, as did the size. The turret was more reminiscent of the Landsverk L-10 turret, but it still only housed one person and the Landsverk 60's armament. The transmission was moved to the front of the hull. Clearly, this move was inspired by information about trials of the Kleinetraktor on the Carden-Loyd chassis.

Even though this tank, like its predecessor, remained in paper, its fate was more fortunate. The Landsverk 61 project was actively marketed abroad, and it was noticed by Soviet intelligence in 1934. According to reports, Soviet specialists considered this tank useful as a reconnaissance vehicle and partially as a tank destroyer. The firepower of the 20 mm Madsen gun was sufficient for most tanks of the time.

Ireland was also interested in the tank. Its military considered the Landsverk 61 suitable for its defense doctrine, which called for a light vehicle with an automatic cannon and at least 20 hp/ton.

This was the next stage of the Landsverk 60's evolution. This was the variant that the Irish ordered.

In January of 1934, a new variant of the Landsverk 60 was ready. Blueprint S-162 showed a vehicle that was a reworked Landsverk 100 scout tank. The length of the hull grew to 4100 mm, and its width to 1930 mm. The turret became a two-seater, while maintaining its original armament. The engine also changed. Merker decided to use the V-shaped 8 cylinder 160 hp Büssing -NAG L8V-G engine. This was the variant that Ireland noticed, signing an agreement for delivery of two tanks of this type in May of 1934. However, this was only the beginning.

First torsion bars

The agreement between Landsverk and the Irish defense ministry to produce two prototypes of the tank, indexed Landsverk L-60, did not mean that work on the tank was done. Merker continued the design process. It is also worth remembering who stood behind the Swedish company. The ample use of German components implies that the tank doubled as a test lab.

One of the technical solutions first used on the L-60 forever cemented its place in the history of tank development.

One of the several parents by Karl Rabe for a torsion bar suspension.

In the early 1930s, Karl Rabe, the right hand of Ferdinand Porsche, began development of a radically new automotive suspension. Instead of leaf or coil springs, the design used torsion bars. Technologically, the torsion bar is more complicated than a spring, but the design saves a lot of space. By 1933, Rabe perfected his suspension. It was proposed to test it on the La.S, but the proposal never reached implementation.

 Cutaway of the reworked L-60. You can see that little remains from the previous iteration.

A completely different fate awaited the torsion bar suspension in Sweden. In 1934, Merker redesigned the L-60 to use a torsion bar suspension. The hull had to be lengthened by half a meter, which only improved the vehicle. The extra length was added to the engine compartment, which was initially very small, small enough to cause overheating issues. The tank received Landsverk L-10 type road wheels and idlers, but the drive sprockets became different. The idler was lowered, which increased the contact surface.

Assembly of the L-60 for Ireland, 1935.

As a result, the only parts that remained from the original were the turret, engine, and overall layout. The cost of these changes was that the Landsverk L-60 prototype was only ready a year later. Both of the Irish L-60s were finished by August of 1935. The 7 ton tank could achieve a speed of 45 kph. The power to weight ratio was even higher than required: 22.8 hp/ton. The armament was also good for its time.

The workings of the suspension can be seen in this photograph.

That August, the vehicle was demonstrated to a commission headed by Major A.T. Lawlor, head of the Irish armoured corps. The Irish delegation was pleased, aside from one not so minor detail. During the demonstration, an error by the driver caused a fire in the engine, which spread to the entire vehicle. The tank burned to a crisp, and Landsverk had to foot the bill for a replacement.

 Mobility demonstration, August 1935.

The Swedes knew that Ireland could not afford many tanks and kept looking for more customers. In the fall of 1935, a Swiss delegation arrived to observe the tank trials. An order for six L-60s and the lighter L-120 loomed on the horizon, but it was not to be. Having tried out the Swedish tank, the Swiss chose another vehicle, the Czechoslovakian LTH, sighing a contract with CKD on April 17th, 1936. The LTH was perhaps not as technologically progressive, but it was a better fit.

Swiss commission testing the first L-60, fall of 1935.

As for the tank they tested, it finally arrived in Ireland in November of 1935. The second tank took another year. No orders followed for a very simple reason: Ireland's defense budget was quite small.

Both of Ireland's Landsverk L-60 on maneuvers.

The tanks received designations L-601 and L-602. They were assigned to the 2nd Armoured Sqadron with a Vickers Medium Tank Mk.C. Unlike the clumsy British tank, the quick Swedish vehicles were beloved by Irish tankers. The L-60s remained in the Irish army until 1953, when they were demobilized due to wear and a lack of parts. Both tanks were preserved until present time.

From Vienna to Budapest

In December of 1936, the Swedes received another order for an experimental tank. This time the customer was Austria. The slightly redesigned tank received the index Landsverk L-60Ö (Österrike, or Austria). Overall, the vehicle changed little, and its length only grew by 6 cm. The design of the drive sprocket was changed: it became a lot easier to take off the crown. The armament was also changed, incorporating the Austrian 8 mm caliber. By that time, Otto Merker left Sweden, and Wilhelm Buchegger (another German) became Landsverk's chief engineer.

 Landsverk L-60Ö on trials, April 1937. The Poles also tried out the tank. This photo shows the different drive sprocket.

The Landsverk L-60Ö was ready by late March of 1937, but the Austrians rejected the tank. It didn't take long for a new client to show up. A Polish delegation was greeted in Landskrona on April 21st. The Poles were interested in a wide spectrum of Swedish armoured vehicles. Aside from the L-60, they had their eyes on the lighter L-120, and the L-135 artillery tractor. The Poles tested tanks over the course of a week, but a deal was not reached.

Poland was already producing the 7TP, a Polish variant of the Vickers Mk.E. Overall, the Polish and Swedish tanks were equal, so the decision to reject a foreign tank in favour of a domestic one is reasonable. Interestingly enough, the Poles already built a 7TP with a Bofors turret and a 37 mm gun from that same company. In 1937 that turret was put into mass production, surpassing the L-60 in firepower.

Converted Landsverk L-60Ö. This variant was sent to Hungary.

Third time was the charm for the Swedes. Hungary became interested in their tank. Talk of an order began in October of 1936, when the Hungarians were offered, in addition to the L-60, the L-62 SPAAG and L-181 armoured car. The armoured car was rejected, but the history of the L-62 is worth its own article. As for the L-60, it was sent to Hungary after the Poles tested it.

Here, the Swedish tank was tested against the Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf. A and the Hungarian convertible driver Straussler V-4. The German light tank fell out of the competition early, and Straussler's design proved too complicated. Another advantage of the L-60 was that its engine, produced in Germany, was easily available. The Swedish tank was chosen, and it was adopted into service as the 38M Toldi. An improved version of the tank began production in April of 1940 at the Ganz and MAVAG factories in Budapest.

Domestic Success

As odd as it sounds, the Swedish army was among the last to express interest in the new tank. At the time, the Swedish government was seriously considering the Vickers Mk.E, especially since Landsverk's domestic production stalled in the early 30s, and the tanks they did make were of questionable quality. Price was also a major factor.

Interest in the tank was first shown when the first sample was sent to Ireland. On April 7th, 1936, a Swedish military commission headed by Captain Eric Gillner, the head of artillery development, visited Landsverk. The commission was shown technical documentation. The military was interested in the torsion bar suspension, but treated the 20 mm autocannon skeptically, considering the 37 mm Bofors gun, used on the L-180 and L-181 amoured cars, more suitable for a tank. The idea of using a domestic engine if the tank would be used by the Swedish army was also born.

On July 17-20th, a demonstration of mobility was made with the second L-60 built for Ireland. The tank was compared with the L-10, making a trip from Landskrona to Halmstad and back. Off-road trials were also performed. The tank surprised the observers by its performance on and off the road, as well as its optics. However, the commission remarked that the suspension needs improvements.

Landsverk L-60 chassis #61, August 1937

In July of 1936, the Swedish army finally issued an order for two experimental tanks. The first, serial number 61, was only a chassis. The second, #62, was a complete tank.

Tank #62 will be featured in the next article on Swedish tanks. However, here it's worth mentioning that it was built with a 20 mm Madsen gun, and not a 37 mm Bofors gun. A whole journey dealt with the armament of this tank. Alternative armaments were also explored, like the 20 mm Solothurn anti-tank rifle and an experimental Bofors 37 mm autocannon. In April of 1937, design work began, which were inconclusive. Both the Solothurn and Bofors guns took up too much space in the turret, making the use of a coaxial machinegun impossible. Work on this topic ceased.

Both tanks were ready by August of 1937. Trials were performed from August 9th to 18th. As specified in the requirements, instead of Büssing-NAG L8V-G engines they used domestically produced 142 hp Scania-Vabis typ 1664 engines. The length of the hull grew to 4.8 meters. The mass of chassis #61 was 6100 kg, and the mass of tank #62 was 8215 kg.

As the result of trials, a decision was made on September 10th, 1937, to order 15 tanks for the army. These tanks received a factory index L-60S and army index Strv m/38. A list of additions and changes for chassis #61 was also made. By 1938, the chassis became a full tank with a new turret, featuring a full bustle and a 37 mm Bofors m/38 tank gun. It had a coaxial ksp 8 mm m/36 strv machinegun, a Swedish variant of the American Browning M1917A1. The turret, like tank #62, received a cupola with many observation devices. After additional trials, tank #61 became the first tank from a series, shipments from which began on August 25th, 1938.

Converted tank #61, the first mass produced Strv m/38.

At the time of its creation, the Strv m/38 was one of the best tanks in its class. Of course, by 1938, 13 mm of armour was clearly insufficient, but experience from the Spanish Civil War was just being processed by designers. The Swedish tank had high performance and smooth travel provided by the torsion bar suspension and a good gun, capable of fighting most tanks of the time. The ideas that founded this tank allowed further development, but more about that in a later article.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

A German View of Teploye: Tanks

September 26, 2016, 3:28 pm

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"103rd Artillery Regiment, 4th Tank Division
1st Squadron, Squadron commander

Tactical experience of artillery in offensive and defensive battles south of the city of Orel from July 5th, 1943, to August 18th, 1943

1. Overall tactical experience

1. The battles were characterized as very fierce, with a large amount of vehicles. Both sides used powerful aircraft and tank units, and the Russians had especially powerful artillery. Neither side achieved decisive success on the offensive.

However, on the defensive, both sides managed to achieved significant success. Just as the offensive actions of the division before July 11th led to a sudden and unexpected decrease of our infantry's fighting ability, the Russians, despite their notable advantage in tank, infantry, and artillery units, took heavy losses. The cause of this, in my opinion, is because neither side had in their possession decisive offensive weapons.

At the moment, neither the PzIV with the long gun or the T-34 demonstrates an advantage over the other.
The only weapon that could be used to achieve anything was the Tiger tank, but it was not available in sufficient amounts to achieve anything but local success.

2. The Russians achieved success in not in front of tank divisions, but in front of infantry divisions. It appears that the tank defenses available were too weak to resist Russian tank attacks. Individual elements of our division, especially tanks and tank destroyers, should have been distributed evenly along the front of an infantry division such that it can prevent the breakthrough of a powerful tank unit. Our division was never put into battle all at once.

3. Rarely was a Russian tank attack stopped by towed AT guns, but more often by tank destroyers, tanks, and assault guns, even if there were more enemy tanks. Tanks, assault guns, and self propelled tank destroyers are the only effective weapons against tanks. Towed AT guns are too sensitive to enemy artillery and aircraft, and are not mobile enough to achieve decisive success. Requests to use the three aforementioned types of armoured vehicles were especially persistent during tank attacks.

4. As hard as it is to consider currently used tanks decisive weapons, it is imperative that tanks, or even better, self propelled guns, must accompany every offensive if it will have any chance of success. During the support of infantry regiments that our squadron supported it was observed that any offensive choked up if only 2-3 enemy tanks appeared at a range of 2-3 kilometers and suppressed the offensive with their wonderful guns before a towed AT gun could do anything. Self propelled guns are the only effective countermeasure and must be used in every offensive.

5. It follows that an SPG must be the foundation of front line defenses. It is not enough to use SPGs as a mobile reserve in the rear in order to counter enemy penetrations. Several SPGs on the rear slopes of hills directly behind the front line of defense could stall the offensive of tanks and infantry, as any Russian tank or infantry unit that crested a hill would come under fire.
Thanks to this tactic, even a small amount of guns achieved high effectiveness. In cases when there were no SPGs on the front lines, the enemy almost always achieved a breakthrough that could be only liquidated with great difficulty by counterattacks, since the Russians used the same tactics of anti-tank defense: let tanks crest hills and then knocked them out. These events took place almost every day starting on July 11th. This shows that the SPG can be both a decisive means of attack and a decisive means of defense against any enemy.
The commanders' fears that if they put assault guns in the defense they won't have any reserves led to tanks immediately being pulled back as soon as a penetration was liquidated.
In battles of the 8th tank destroyer battalion in Glinki, the consequence of tanks retreating after every attack was that the Russians repeated their assault after several hours, tanks broke through several times and were thrown back, but after a few days the battalion was completely destroyed. Instead, it would have been enough to have several SPGs on the front lines to prevent the enemy's breakthrough immediately.

6. The Russians used a very reasonable defenses system that our offensive broke against at Teploye on July 11th and at height 265 near Brusivets on July 29th. The front line of the enemy's defenses was on the front side of a hill. It consisted of only false positions or at the most, weak screens and forward posts. Artillery observers were positioned on the top of the hills in strongholds, protected from all sides. These observation posts were positioned 200-300 meters from each other. The real first line of defense was on the reverse slope. This line contained buried or mobile T-34 tanks. Our infantry came under fire from a large distance and took heavy losses.
The attack reached the top of the hill with such difficulty, but even our powerful tank attack was unsuccessful and stopped right before the front line of the enemy defenses. A short counterattack threw our tanks back behind the hill. Our choice of positions on forward slopes did not prove itself beneficial. They could be seen from a long way away and were shot at upon by accurately firing T-34s from 2-3 kilometers. If the enemy could achieve a penetration, which was always costly for our infantry, the latter had insignificant reserves, especially anti-tank ones. As a result, our tank unit served as a "firefighter" for a long period of time. The conclusions are as follows:

1. Our infantry divisions in the first line of defense must have powerful assault gun squadrons to avoid defeat.
2. As in the previous world war, the defenders have an advantage over the attackers."

CAMD RF 500-12480-137

Second Five Year Plan

September 27, 2016, 7:52 pm

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"To the Chief of the Scientific-Technical Directorate of the GAU, comrade Zheleznyakov

February 10th, 1934

For the benefit of the 1st Department of the Scientific-Technical Directorate, I provide a list of armament necessary for tanks, armoured cars, railroad fighting vehicles, and APCs according to the Second Five Year Plan Tank Armament system.

1. Main Tanks
1. Reconnaissance tank. Armament: 1 machinegun
2. Combined arms tank. Armament:
1. 1 45 mm gun and 1 machinegun
2. 2 machineguns and a flamethrower
3. 1 76 mm gun and 1 machinegun
   Tanks will be produced in all three variants.
3. Operational tank. Armament:
1. 1 45 mm gun and 3 machineguns
2. 1 76 mm gun and 3 machineguns
   Tanks will be produced in both variants.
4. Tactical Reserve tank. Armament: 1 76 mm gun and 3 machineguns
5. Powerful special purpose tank. Armament:
1. 1 76 mm gun, 2 45 mm guns, 5 machineguns
2. 1 152 mm gun, 1 45 mm gun, 6 machineguns
2. Special tanks
1. Advance chemical tank. Armament: 1 machinegun
2. Combined arms chemical tank. Armament: 1 machinegun.

---

T-46 Teletank

September 28, 2016, 7:59 pm

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"Order #003 from the Chief of Armament and Technical Supplies of the RKKA
June 2nd, 1936

In order to ensure the timely production of the T-46 telemechanical tank this year, I order that:

1. The Chief of the RKKA Technical Directorate, Divisional Engineer comrade Bordovskiy, must manage technical assistance and cooperation from the Kirov factory and Voroshilov factory in Leningrad, as well as the Leningrad branch of the Budyonniy Military Communication Academy in the development of prototypes.
   For this, send Military Engineer 1st Class comrade Belov, and Military Engineer 2nd Class comrade Saharov to Leningrad on June 1st, instructing comrade Belov to manage technical aid during design and production of the prototypes.
2. The chief of the Budyonniy Military Communication Academy, Divisional Engineer comrade Polischuk must send four military engineers to the Voroshilov and Kirov factories on June 1st, including comrades Markov and Kosovich for technical assistance to the aforementioned factories during the design and assembly process, working under the general direction of comrade Belov.
3. The Chief of the Red Army Chemical Directorate, Corps Engineer Friedman, must issue and send to the Voroshilov and Kirov factories one KS-25 chemical device each to arm the T-46 teletanks no later than June 10th of this year.
4. Red Army ABTU Chief comrade Bokis should propose to regional engineers of Leningrad factories that they should assist comrade Belov in his objective to begin production of the T-46 tank as soon as possible.

Chief of Armament and Technical Supplies of the RKKA, Army Commander 2nd Grade, Khalepskiy"

V. Lehn Collection

Horsing Around

September 29, 2016, 3:37 pm

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"A soldier who has been disciplined in the past was appointed as a watchman. Before he took his post, he drank wine, and took his post in an intoxicated state. The controlling patrol took notice of this soldier's behaviour, as he was loudly asking horses for the password."

World of Tanks History Section: Sagopshin Tank Battle, Prokhorovka in the Caucasus

September 30, 2016, 10:13 am

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The Wehrmacht offensive towards the Caucasus in 1942 had two goals. The secondary was to cut the line of Lend-Lease supplies, but the primary goal was to reach the local oil supply. At the time, Caucasian wells accounted for 70% of the USSR's oil. It's not hard to imagine what a loss of these wells would mean for the USSR, which was already doing poorly in 1942, or what a godsend it would be for the fuel-starved German army.

On September 2nd, 1942, the Germans crossed the Terek river and wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses. Fierce battles were fought around Malgobek. This village and others nearby cut off the Germans from the Alkhanchurtskaya Valley, from where the precious oil was a stone's throw away. The Germans picked the Sagopshin settlement (modern day Sagopshi), just south of Malgobek, to deliver their decisive strike. The elite 5th SS Motorized Division "Viking" was chosen to attack here.


Anti-Tank Gorge

The 5th division mobilized serious resources for the attack on Sagopshin: "Westland" and "Nordland" motorized regiments, a tank battalion, elements of a tank destroyer squadron, artillery. Even though the Germans were battered from prior battles and were running low on shells, they still outnumbered the defenders in both tanks and men.

Viking's tank battalion counted 48 tanks, mostly long-barreled PzIIIs (34 tanks). There were also nine PzIVs and five PzIIs. In addition, the enemy had around 10 StuG assault guns.

The Soviet 52nd Tank Brigade commanded by Major V. Filippov had only 30 tanks to oppose them: 2 T-34s, 5 KV-1s, 13 light T-60s and 8 M3 Stuarts. A battalion of motorized infantry and Major F. Dolinskiy's 863rd Tank Destroyer Regiment also participated in the battle. However, good defensive positions and skill of the commanders were on our side.

Filippov and Dolinskiy developed the battle plan together. They decided to defend the stretch between Terskiy and Sunzhenskiy escarpments. Three anti-tank lines were built. Each consisted of a tank ambush, anti-tank guns on the flank, and submachinegunners. The first line, with three ambushes, was designed to disperse the German battering ram and deliver maximum losses. This line contained Stuarts, and, most likely, both T-34s. The second line contained KV tanks and 76 mm guns. The last line was meant to finish off whatever forces broke through the first two. The trap was set.

When the SS-men flowed through the bottleneck, they sprung the trap. What happened next went down in history as the most fierce tank battle during the fighting at Malgobek. Modern researcher T. Matiev called it "the Caucasian Prokhorovka".

Slaughter in the Valley

On September 28th, 1942, the Germans were preparing to attack when they were struck by Soviet artillery and mortars. Sadly, the damage was more emotional than physical. Soviet documents go on to say that the enemy "in a force of 120 tanks, supported by submachinegunners and powerful artillery and mortar fire attacked from Ozerniy sector with two columns of three echelons each". The numbers are exaggerated, and only about 50 tanks participated in the attack.

The Germans attacked in the fog, counting on it to save them from Soviet fire. However, when the fog lifted the SS saw that they walked into a trap. The defenders' mortars and cannons fired at a range of 700-800 meters, and machineguns swept off the tank riders. Then the storm of steel hit the German infantry, which was advancing a few hundred meters behind the tanks.

The Viking tankers didn't notice that their infantry support was cut off. They decided to advance right up to the Soviet positions. Already on the first line, six enemy tanks burned up. A shell hit the tank of Sturmbahnfuhrer (Major) Mulenkamp. "The first hit came right behind the turret. The engine caught fire, the turret lifted up a bit. The back of my chair was torn to shreds, and I lay, thrown against the gun breech, yelling "Everyone out of the tank!"" Mulenkamp survived, but his gunner did not.

The German tanks engaged in a duel with Soviet tanks. Tankers of the 52nd brigade knocked out the tanks of the 1st and 3rd company commanders, leaving the SS-men without command. Soviet howitzers and Katyushas that were positioned in Sagopshin and Malgobek joined the tanks and AT guns. Ground attack aircraft appeared in the sky.

The Germans claim that the tank battalion and tank destroyer squadron was hit by a counterattack of over 80 Soviet tanks. Considering that Filippov's brigade only had 30 tanks, this is inaccurate. Nevertheless, the actions of our tankers and pilots resulted in fearsome losses. "When I arrived at the HQ of the 1st battalion of the Westland regiment, I saw the battalion commander, Sturmbahnfuhrer von Halden, completely lost while trying to figure out his casualties. I will never forget that moment" recalls Mulenkamp.

A battle of two Majors

In the second half of the day, regrouping after the Soviet counterattack, the Germans attacked again. By this point, the Viking tank battalion lost about a third of its tanks, and Mulenkamp was knocked out once more after moving to a different tank.

The battle reignited and separated itself into several separate clashes. According to documents of the 52nd Tank Brigade, German tanks broke through to the headquarters and Filippov entered the fray in his own tank, knocking out 5 enemies.

The situation was still dire, so Filippov sent in his reserve, a company of seven tanks that attacked the flank and knocked out several tanks. Mulenkamp himself spoke highly of the maneuver. "Here I saw that Russian T-34s got around us and were driving a wedge between the tank battalion and Westland regiment. Someone spectacular was commanding the Russian tanks." At that point, the SS commander had his third tank of the day knocked out under him.

The commander of the anti-tank artillery regiment, Dolinskiy, also personally stepped in to replace a gun crew that was killed in battle. The Major knocked out two tanks. Senior Lieutenant P. Dym's battery also performed well, knocking out several German cars, a German battery, and a few tanks (the documents say 17, but that is unlikely). Soviet infantry clashed with German, anti-tank riflemen fired at SPGs and armoured halftracks. Taking heavy losses but still unable to break through, the Germans retreated and built defensive positions in the lowlands by Sagopsin until the night.

Flugel's breakthrough: the dud trump card

On September 28th, the Germans were not satisfied with a frontal attack. About ten tanks commanded by Obersturmfuhrer G. Flugel with tank riders circled around the Soviet defenders and aimed to go around Sagopshin from the north. This group moved out before the battle in the valley even started. Flags accidentally left by Soviet sappers let them navigate the minefield.

Thankfully for our soldiers, the group came across Soviet tanks positioned on the slopes of the gorge. The battle was fought at a stone's throw, some 50 meters. The Germans insist that they knocked out two T-34s, but since all T-34s were fighting in the valley, this is a mistake and these would have been T-60s or Stuarts. By the second half of the day, Flugel's group blocked the Sagopshin-Nizhniye Achaluki road. Flugel decided to cement his success and send three tanks to the left, but this attempt failed. The Germans retreated and took up defenses at the road.

Flugel's group waited for reinforcements in the afternoon, unaware that Viking's forces took heavy losses in the valley and were stuck there. Soviet aircraft appeared in the sky. The Germans managed to trick our pilots, having removed air identification flags and waving their hands in greeting to the Soviet pilots. The result was unfortunate: Soviet airplanes, and then artillery, hit Sagopshin, which was held by our forces.

However, soon Flugel was attacked by German aircraft that did not recognize their own tanks. A Soviet howitzer barrage followed. The SS commander ordered his tanks and infantry to take cover in an anti-tank ditch. By already knew of Viking's sad fate, so he planned to wait until darkness and retreat. A sudden order to take up defensive positions came at night, so Flugel only sent back three tanks with wounded. The Germans managed to capture several groups of Soviet infantrymen, who were unaware of this daring penetration. On the next day, Flugel was forced to fight his way back to his own lines with heavy losses.

The battle on September 28th at Sagopshin took about 10 hours. According to Soviet data, the enemy lost 54 tanks, 23 of which burned. Filippov's losses were 10 tanks, half of which were irreparable. German documents confirm that their losses in armour were greater than the Soviets'. On September 29th and 30th, they were forced to attack with mostly infantry.

Sagopshin decided the fate of the battle for Malgobek, which, in turn, put an end to the German "oil campaign" in the Caucasus. The precious oil fields were even closer to them than Moscow was in the winter of 1941.

Original article by Stanislav Chernikov.

Toldi: The Hungarian Light Knight

October 1, 2016, 9:56 am

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Sometimes fairly good designs of military hardware don't reach their true potential because they appeared in the wrong time or in the wrong place. Light tanks, widely in use on all theaters of WWII, disappeared rather quickly from the Eastern Front, freeing up the space for their heavier brothers. The Hungarian Toldi tank, the first mass produced tank for the country, was one of them.
Illegal Precursor to Hungarian Tank Design

The consequences of the First World War were disastrous for Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon of 1920 which cost Hungary 72% of its territory, 64% of its population, and its access to the sea was seen as a national disgrace. The state of mourning declared after the treaty was signed was one of the longest in world history: state flags remained at half mast until 1938 when Hungary returned some of its lost territory after the First Vienna Award.  Some schoolchildren begin the day with singing the national anthem, while Hungarian students began with reading a prayer for the reunification of their country.

Considering the treaty unfair, Hungarians tried to get around it, at least in the military sense. Since the army was limited to 35,000 men and forbidden from having armoured vehicles ("production or import to Hungary of armoured cars, tanks, or any analogous vehicles suitable for use in warfare are forbidden"), Hungary had no tanks. In 1920, Hungary bought 14 light LK.II tanks from its fellow in suffering, Germany, who was also barred from having tanks. Entente representatives discovered this purchase and attempted to confiscate them, but the tanks were disassembled and well hidden.

In 1928, Hungary was able to buy two tankettes from Britain, but the first real breakthrough happened thanks to improving relations with a victorious country, Italy. In 1927, the two countries signed a treaty on "Friendship, Cooperation, and Exchange", and Italy began shipments of arms to Hungary. This was already a violation of the Treaty of Trianon, as importing weapons into Hungary was forbidden by Article V, and could only be produced domestically. The tank embargo was broken in 1931: Hungary bought five Fiat 3000Bs. 150 Italian CV 3/33 and CV 3/35 tankettes were shipped to Hungary between 1934 and 1936.

Call of the Varangian

Meanwhile, Europe was steadily moving towards another large war. In 1938, Hungary openly rejected the Treaty of Trianon, declaring a modernization program for its armed forces. Resources were reserved for the creation of a fully fledged armoured force.

Since Hungary possessed a developed industry, it was decided to produce tanks domestically. The inventor Nicholas Straussler offered his new V-4 tank in 1937. The light convertible drive tank had an original suspension and was a further development of the V-3, which was developed in 1934-35 and received some interest from Japan and Britain.

Hungarian light convertible drive V-4 tank.

In 1937, Hungary announced the comparative trials of three light tanks: the V-4, a PzI Ausf. A bought in 1934, and the Swedish Landsverk L-60 which arrived in March. The V-4, with its 40 mm gun (against a 20 mm gun on the "Swede" and machinegun on the "German") as well as a good reputation with the military regarding its performance had decent chances for victory.

Swedish L-60 tank.

However, the "Swede" won in the competition. The L-60 was simpler, and yet sufficiently progressive. Its chassis was the first to have an individual torsion bar suspension, the front armour was sloped, and the L-60 design had more room for further modernization. Straussler moved to Britain and worked with the Allies during WWII. His input into the victory over the Axis includes the Duplex Drive amphibious system used by American, British, and Canadian forces during the Normandy landings.

The L-60 was taken as the basis for the first mass produced tank. The licensed version of the Swedish tank was named "Toldi" after the medieval hero Miklós Toldi, an analogue to a Western knight. The commission that performed comparative trials recommended several changes to the tank's design. Mostly the suspension and hull were left the same, but the drive sprocket changed somewhat. Slight changes were also made to the turret, but the armament was changed completely.

The Swedish tank used the 20 mm Madsen gun. This gun was satisfactory to the Hungarians, but the manufacturer demanded too much money for a license. In addition, the Danuvia factory in Budapest was not ready to produce it on short notice.

Solothurn S18-100 20 mm heavy semiautomatic anti-tank rifle. Practical rate of fire: 15-20 RPM, fed by 5 (used in the Toldi tank) or 10 round magazines. Range: 1500 meters. Penetration at 90 degrees: 35 mm at 100 meters, 27 mm at 300 meters.

Hungarian designers proposed either the 25 mm Bofors autocannon (also Swedish) or the domestic Gebauer gun. 37 and 40 mm guns were discussed, but they would require significant reworking of the turret. In the end, the tank was armed with a 20 mm anti-tank rifle designed by the Swiss Solothurn company, produced in Hungary under license. Technically the rifle was resigned by Rheinmetall, but since the Treaty of Versailles tied Germany's hands, the forbidden weapon was produced at a Swiss subsidiary. The Solothurn rifle was also used by the Finnish army during the Winter War. 

The ammunition racks of the Toldi held 208 anti-tank rifle rounds and 2400 rounds in belts for the 8 mm machinegun. Another AA machinegun could be mounted on the turret on a special mount. Optics for observation devices and sights was shipped from Germany.

The 8.5 ton Toldi was equipped with a German 155 hp gasoline Busing-NAG engine The five-gear planetary gearbox gave the tank a decent speed of 50 kph. The 253 Liter capacity of its fuel tanks was enough to travel 220 km on a highway.

Hungarian light 38.M "Toldi I" tank from the 2nd Hungarian Tank Division crossing a river in Poland.

The three man crew worked in sufficiently comfortable conditions. The fighting and driving compartments were well ventilated. The commander's workspace to the right of the turret was equipped with a cupola that had seven observation devices. To his left, the gunner observed the battlefield through a periscopic sight. The driver navigated by using slits in a small armoured cockpit to the left of the tank's axis.

Production

Production was held up due to a conflict between the MAVAG and Ganz factories and the General Staff of the Hungarian army. Having received an order for the first batch of tanks in late December of 1937, the factories rejected it based on the low price offered by the military. In addition, Hungary lacked many components for production, and they had to be bought abroad. By February of 1939 an agreement was reached, and the order for 80 vehicles was evenly split between the two factories. The first tanks of this batch were built in April of 1940, and the last was finished in March of 1941.

Hungarian light 38.M "Toldi I" tank crossing a bridge on the Eastern Front.

The tanks of the next series were called Toldi II and differed from their predecessors by the use of only Hungarian components. The modernized tanks also had new radio stations and a thicker gun mantlet. There was a time when purely Hungarian tanks were built alongside tanks that used German components. The only noticeable difference between the Toldi I and the Toldi II was the difference in radio antennas, but after tanks from the first series were re-equipped with new radios, even that distinction disappeared.

In total, 110 tanks of this type were made. 80 of them were seriously converted. Since a heavy anti-tank rifle seemed outdated as the main gun of a tank in the 1940s, the Hungarians instead installed the 40 mm 42.M gun with an ammunition capacity of 55 shells. The new gun was shortened variant of the 41.M gun designed for the Turan medium tank. The armour of the tank was increased. The turret changed: a box for equipment was added on the back. The mass of this tank indexed Toldi IIA grew to 9.35 tons.

Prototype of the 38.M Toldi IIA tank. This vehicle is a Toldi II tank with thicker armour and a 40 mm 42.M gun.

Several tanks were experimentally equipped with 5 mm thick spaced armour on the sides and the turret.

The last modification of the light tank was the Toldi III. This tank had even thicker armour (the gun mantlet and driver's cockpit were 35 mm thick), the turret bustle was widened, and the ammunition capacity was increased to 87 shells. No more than 12 tanks of this type were built.

Toldi III tank. The numbers indicate the armour thickness in those places.

Use in Combat

The first Toldi tanks saw battle in April of 1941. Four months after the signing of a pact of eternal friendship with Yugoslavia, Hungary took part in an invasion of the country. Two motorized and one cavalry brigade of the Hungarian army had a company of 18 light tanks each.

Hungarian tank column. The first tank is a 38.M Toldi I, followed by an Italian L3/35 tankette.

81 Toldi tanks as a part of an independent mobile corps (along with Hungarian Csaba armoured cars and Italian tankettes) took part in Operation Barbarossa. 14 new tanks were sent to the Eastern Front later, in October of 1941. Two tanks from this batch did not survive the railroad journey and were immediately sent back to the factory on the same train. The Eastern Front showed that the light tank, decent for the late 1930s, rapidly became obsolete. The Solothurn could deal with the armour of BT and T-26 tanks, but it was useless against heavy and medium tanks. Thanks to its good radio station, the Toldi could still be used for reconnaissance. To be fair, a 20 mm gun was also used on the German PzII and the Soviet T-60 light tanks.

Hungarian Toldi I tank without armament towed by a German Bussing-NAG truck along a Soviet village street.

The main problem with the Hungarian tank was the poor reliability of its engine and transmission, especially in the conditions of the Eastern Front. Tanks got stuck in the mud, engines broke. Things were bad enough that the Hungarian repair units could not manage to fix the issues fast enough and had to call civilian technicians to the front lines. When the armoured corps returned to Hungary in November of 1941, it turned out that most of the vehicles (37 our of 65) that needed repairs were in that condition because of breakdowns, and not from combat. 17 tanks of this type took part in the 1942 campaign in the USSR. Only 3 returned to Hungary in 1943.

Knocked out Toldi I tank. The vehicle has been stripped for parts.

Toldi tanks of all types were actively used to repel the Soviet offensives in the country. By June of 1944 there were still 129 of them: 66 Toldi I, 63 Toldi II and Toldi IIA. They could only resist Soviet T-34-85s and IS-2s in the most fantastical conditions, and almost all were lost in 1944 and 1945. To be fair, the end of the age of light tanks did not only touch Hungary.

Knocked out Toldi I tank from the 2nd Tank Division, defeated at Budapest. The upper front plate was penetrated by a 57 mm or 76 mm shell. The railroad car in the background carries a Hungarian 41.M Turan II medium tank.

For its time, the light Toldi was one of the best tanks in its class. It remained a good light tank for a long time: the L-60 was still in use by various armies for decades (until the mid 1950s in Sweden, early 1960s in Ireland, and by the Dominican Republic until the early 2000s). In addition, the platform had a large modernization reserve. The Swedish Strv.74 medium tank built in 1957-60 was, in a way, its continuous modernization. The progressive torsion bar suspension is still used in the best tanks worldwide today.

The Toldi was unlucky. Hungary did not have the time or the resources for a deeper modernization, and the Eastern Front, oversaturated with tanks and anti-tank guns, left no niche for a successful deployment.

Original article by Aleksandr Sirota

A German View of Teploye: Artillery

October 3, 2016, 4:34 pm

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Part 1: Tanks

" 2. Tactical artillery experience

1. Enemy artillery

Unlike previous experience, this time we could not observe Russian fire control. The Russians fired precisely. A shift towards larger calibers, 122 mm and 152 mm, was noticed. Enemy action against our artillery was insufficient. If the Russians discovered our battery, they fired too few shells to destroy it. On the other hand, in many cases, the concentrated fire of mortars, light and medium batteries, and rocket artillery could weaken the advance of our motorized infantry at its initial positions and during the attack that it lacked the strength for a penetration.
Before an attack, the enemy began powerful screening fire in front of his positions that dealt heavy losses. Our forces first saw the strength of Russian artillery. Counterbattery fire, which, according to all rules from the First World War, is the key to any successful offensive against a prepared enemy, was never sufficient. The use of dive bombers against enemy artillery never gave any visible results. Russian airplanes attacked our batteries and dealt losses, but the result was only a temporary cessation of fire and not long-term disablement. Since artillery correction pilots rarely were assigned to the division and our artillery instrument reconnaissance was taken from the division and assigned to another division right before the offensive, the 4th Tank Division was left without reconnaissance measures and could not undertake anything against a dangerous enemy of motorized infantry. Counterbattery fire from the corps level never influenced the success of our division. This did not happen even in cases when we attacked in the sector of an infantry corps that, according to the local conditions, had an instrument reconnaissance squadron. The thesis that counterbattery fire should be handled at the divisional level if it needs to be precisely timed and able to follow the offensive has once again proven itself a necessity in effective combat with enemy artillery in general.

The Russians always begin their offensive with sudden, concentrated fire by all artillery and mortars that lasts from half an hour to an hour, as well as powerful strikes from the air. This barrage targets the front observation posts, initial positions, our reserves, HQs, etc. The battlefield became coated in smoke and dust, all lines of communication were broken, aimed fire became impossible and enemy infantry, following a curtain of fire, reached its first successes. The actual results of this fire were not as high as the hit to morale, but they should not be underestimated. By order of the regimental commander, screening fire began in front of likely enemy attack positions until aimed fire could be established again. This principle proved itself. Aside from practical results, it improved the morale of our troops (motorized infantry and artillery) and did not let the feeling of helplessness take hold.

2. Our artillery

a) Tactical trials of self propelled guns

The squadron had two batteries of 6 light field howitzers on the PzII chassis and one battery of 6 heavy field howitzers on the PzIV chassis. In addition, it had PzIII artillery observer tanks and 3 SdKfz 250/3 halftracks nicknamed "goats". These weapons proved themselves during offensive and defensive combat. The mix of calibers (105 and 150 mm at a ratio of 2:1) was in accordance to tactical requirements. The use of the 150 mm caliber as tank support artillery in order to match the power of 75 and 88 mm guns is undesirable at the time, if only due to the question of ammunition supply.

Currently, we must strive for cooperation between small caliber guns firing directly and indirect artillery firing at area targets. Since direct hits rarely happen, this artillery must be significantly more powerful in its caliber and fragmentation power.

The main conclusions from the SPG squadron's experience in all battles is as follows:

In motorized divisions of all types, attention should be focused on mobile batteries, acting behind armour protection and capable of providing concentrate fire while on the move, mobile observation posts, and improved radio communication.

We cannot make peace with the fact that artillery, the importance of which has been proven in recent battles, must settle for equipment and tactics that remain more or less at the level of 1918 and only improved insignificantly in firing technique.

As a consequence of a lack of manuals, the main principles of tactical use of SPGs to support tank attacks was worked out practically. This experience, in the squadron's opinion, must be used as the foundation of a tactics manual. The correctness of firing on the move could not be checked, as there was not a single instance of a successful tank penetration of enemy defenses, despite large concentrations of our tank forces in battles on July 8-10th in the Teploye sector. As a result, our squadron received the same objectives as other artillery squadrons: support of limited attacks and defense of our own positions. The mobility advantages of self propelled guns during rapid tank or infantry attacks could not be demonstrated. As a result, the task that self propelled guns were made to carry out cannot be carried out, and will not be carried out on the Eastern Front until a tank that is suitable for solving operational issues is introduced.

However, the opinion that artillery of this type is unnecessary is incorrect, because:

1. On other fronts, for example when defending against enemy penetrations, or during counterattacks with tanks, the situation may play out differently.
2. The advantages of widespread and invincible self propelled artillery were decisive in prior battles with a large number of tanks in the east. While other squadrons in the regiment took heavy losses, the self propelled gun squadron did not suffer thanks to its armour and the ability to quickly escape concentrated fire, despite the instructions that SPGs must take up fixed positions depending on the situation.
3. In critical moments when the enemy was advancing and the batteries were covered by fire,only armoured self propelled guns could provide fire support.
4. In the defense, the mobility of self propelled artillery lets it be put into battle suddenly, like Russian rocket artillery on self propelled mounts. The whole squadron, all 18 guns, can be transferred to an objective secretly or openly, perform their fire mission, change their positions quickly, before the enemy can perform counterbattery fire, and also act like migrating batteries.
   The possibilities listed in paragraph 4 could not be realized in practice due to a constant crisis state where the squadron was forced to keep its weapons ready to fire at all times.
5. Mobile SPGs can defend themselves against infantry and armour penetrations. This can be decisive in the east. 4th battery took heavy fire north-east of Znamenskoye (50 km north-west of Orel) from 8 tanks that penetrated to the right of the positions. Since enemy tanks were visible on open terrain, the battery opened fire from 1500 meters with contact fused HE and HEAT rounds. Thanks to rapid fire from self propelled guns, enemy tanks turned back and went in another direction. Hits were not obtained by either side.
6. Placement of 2-3 batteries in a narrow sector in order to achieve high concentration of fire is possible due to the invulnerability of SPGs. As experience showed, the concentration of fire can be reached as quickly and perfectly as with any stationary position.
7. Rapid re-armament and further development of self propelled artillery would give a significant advantage over the enemy and makes instrumental reconnaissance and counterbattery fire an impossible task.
8. The advantages of armoured mobile artillery observers were also demonstrated during infantry support on the offensive and defensive. Armour protects the observation posts from fire of all types aside from anti-tank guns and tank guns. The periscope allows observation from cover, without moving the tank out to a high place where it serves as a target for AT guns (the current 1.3 meter long periscope could be improved if lengthened to 2 meters). When enemy tanks or AT guns or the overall situation forces us to use tanks for observation, the observer and his assistant exited the tank, picked an observation point, laid a telephone line and used the 30 Watt radio telephone. During an offensive and on the defense, stationary observation points (with telephones or radios) are also necessary. Mobile and stationary observation points complement each other.
   However, advantages of mobile armoured observation posts include the ability of the commander to personally be present in dangerous situations and constantly have a line of communication with infantry commanders to constantly coordinate artillery objectives with the intent of the infantry commander.
   The squadron commander had no fixed command post. Depending on the situation, he was with the infantry regiment commander, battalion commander, company commander, at an observation post of the battery commander or within infantry ranks, controlling artillery fire by radio. This manner of control turned out to be sensible in offensive and defensive battles. It gives the squadron commander the ability to personally observe the situation at various points of the battle and give correct orders. On the other hand, battery commanders stayed in one place, while powerful fire often forces tanks to move to a different place, and AT gun fire forces observers to exit tanks and take up prepared observation positions. Forward units were assigned special dismounted observers. The lack of new type K radio stations was a disadvantage, so direct communication through the 30 Watt radio in the tank was not possible.

b) Technical evaluation of new vehicles

1. Overall evaluation

Despite all pessimistic opinions about the quality of SPGs, it turned out that, despite the lack of possibility over 6 weeks to even once carefully inspect the vehicles, the self propelled squadron turned out to be one of the most battle-ready units in the regiment.

2. Out of the 105 mm Wespe guns, 5 or even 6, rarely 4, guns were ready for battle. The 4th battery (Wespe) were sadly taken out of the squadron from July 17th to August 3rd and attached as an army reserve to a group operating near Karachev. That battery was left without any technical supervision. Despite that fact, 5 guns, aside from small, easily corrected problems, remained suitable for use in battle. The sixth gun hit a mine on the first day of battle and is still not repaired. The departure of 4th battery decreased the squadron's firepower by one third.

The required support of an infantry regiment, necessary in the defense of offense, count hardly be performed by observers from only two batteries. Since there was a shortage of ammunition for heavy guns, all observers wanted to service the light gun battery.

Picking apart the self propelled gun squadron is undesirable, both from a tactical and a technical point of view.

The tactical drawback of Wespe type SPGs is in their slow off-road speed and rapid overheating in hot weather. Nonstop support of tank attacks is very difficult. In addition, the ammunition capacity of the PzII chassis (32 rounds) is low. A more suitable chassis is the PzIV chassis. Twice as much ammunition could be carried by them.

3. The 150 mm Hummel howitzer proved itself worse. Since two barrels burst for an unknown reason, the battery was only left with 4 guns on July 22nd (the chassis remained undamaged). 

Due to weak final drives, these guns often broke down during off-road driving or while driving during short periods of muddy roads. The six-gun battery often only had 2 or 3 guns in service.

The amount of ammunition available (20) is insufficient. The Panther tank is a more suitable chassis for heavy field howitzers.

4. Armoured 150 mm ammunition carriers on the Hummel chassis were only delivered towards the end of the fighting and could not be tested in practice.

5. Artillery observer tanks on the PzIII chassis did not prove themselves technically, as they appear to be old PzIII tanks built from spare parts. They broke down one after another, and by the end of the fighting, the squadron had 2 half-working tanks out of 9. They were used as a place for radio stations for observation posts, while mobile observers used light 250/3 halftracks. So the valuable radio did not go to waste, they were removed from the two tanks and put on a "15" car, which was further used as a radio vehicle by observers. This replacement proved itself well. The PzIV tank can also be proposed as a chassis for artillery observation vehicles. In many cases, observers picked the light 250/3 halftrack due to its speed and mobility, but there are cases when observer positions can only hold out from well protected tanks. Motorized infantry should have three 250/3 halftracks per battery, due to its excellent 30 Watt radio without which reliable fire control is impossible, and the advantage of having a mobile artillery observation post."

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