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Comparative Penetration

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"Conclusions

1. As a result of trials of D-25 (122 mm) and D-10 (100 mm) tank guns, the following penetration ranges against the upper front plate of the Panther tank were established:

Gun
Shell
Distance of complete penetration
122 mm D-25
Armour piercing
2000
100 mm D-10
Armour piercing
1200
German 88 mm gun (Ferdinand SPG)
Armour piercing
600
German 75 mm gun (Panther tank)
Armour piercing
No penetration
Notes:
  1. The distance of complete penetration listed for the D-25 is not the maximum distance, as trials over a larger distance were not performed.
  2. The armour piercing shell of the German 88 mm gun (Ferdinand) does not penetrated the upper front plate of the Panther tank: the impact forms a breach and the shell ricochets.
  3. The distance of complete penetration listed for the D-10 is not the maximum distance, the maximum is 1300-1400 meters.
2. The armour piercing shell of the D-25 gun (122 mm) can penetrate an 85 mm thick armour plate at 55 degrees (upper front plate of a Panther tank) from 700 meters further away than the D-10.

3. The penetration of the armour piercing shell of the D-10 gun can be increased to penetrate from 1500-1600 meters (when firing at a Panther's upper front plate) if the muzzle velocity and shell quality are increased.

4. The practical rate of aimed fire of the D-25 obtained during trials (2.5 RPM) is insufficient and is limited by the amount of time it takes to reload the gun with the two piece shell.
The practical rate of fire of the D-10 gun (7.5 RPM) is good due to the one piece shell.

5. When firing at ranges up to 1500 meters with the D-25 and D-10, fire correction is complicated by the amount of gases emitted when firing."


744 Diesel Engine

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"One of the main objectives of project 126-1 is the use of diesel engine 744 designed by factory #185

Main characteristics of the engine:
  1. Number of strokes and type: four-stroke with cylinders positioned 15° from horizontal.
  2. Maximum power: 170-180 hp
  3. RPM at maximum power: 1800 RPM
  4. Number and placement of cylinders: 4 cylinders in a row
  5. Cylinder diameter: 150 mm
  6. Piston travel: 180 mm
  7. Engine volume: 12.7 L
  8. Fuel injection: direct injection
  9. Compression ratio: 16.5-17
  10. Fuel expenditure: 180 g/hp-hour
  11. Fuel: gas-oil
  12. Cooling: water
  13. Lubrication system: pressurized
  14. Starter:
    1. Electrical: 24V, 6-7 hp
    2. Compressed air
  15. Fuel injection system: 
    1. Four-plunger, Bosch type
    2. Special nozzle
  16. Dimensions:
    1. Length: 1255 mm
    2. Height: 710 mm
    3. Width: 1015 mm"

NATI-D Trials

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"Conclusions
  1. The trialed experimental prototype of the "D" tractor demonstrated satisfactory average speed characteristics, good maneuverability, simplicity of service and control, and can cross the required slopes on grassy terrain while towing divisional artillery. The performance and smoothness are a significant improvement over the STZ-5 tractor.
    Tractor "D" can be accepted into service as a transport for divisional artillery.
    In order to increase off-road performance, grousers must be included for tracks.
  2. The "D" tractor is unsuitable for towing corps artillery. If the top speed is reduced, the mass of the tractor is increased to 5.5 tons, and tracks with grousers are installed, the "D" tractor would be able to tow corps artillery weighing up to 8 tons. The required changes can be quickly made to the provided prototype.
  3. All changes to the design requested in conclusions must be implemented in production.
  4. The converted "D" tractor designed for towing corps artillery must be subjected to further trials.
Commission chair:
Engineer-Captain Savelyev
Commission members:
Colonel Lapayev
Lead tractor engineer Popov
Military technician 1st Grade Bochkar"


The NATI-D tractor was later renamed to Ya-11, a precursor to the more widespread Ya-12 tractor.

F-39 95 mm gun

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F-95 tank gun.

The project never moved past the draft stage. The same, however, cannot be said for its towed predecessor.

F-28 95 mm divisional gun.

The gun was created as a part of a program to increase the caliber of divisional artillery from 76 mm to 95 mm (improvement in HE performance from going up to 85 mm was considered insufficient, although there was a later 85 mm divisional gun project). However, after the gun passed preliminary trials, the requirements for divisional artillery increased again to the 107 mm caliber and the project died. More detailed photos of the F-28 are available here.

Czechoslovakian Tank Building: First Steps

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In the late 1930s, Czechoslovakia was the second largest exporter of tanks in the world. A small Eastern European country that only obtained independence in 1918 began to catch up with Great Britain, the world leader in arms exports. Of course, such impressive leaps in only 20 years of independence didn't start with nothing. The first steps were made with inspiration from the British and German tank building schools. This experience resulted in a series of experimental vehicles and the mass produced LT vz. 34 light tank.

Wheels and Tracks

Like Swedish tank building, Czechoslovakian tank building owes its existence and development during the interbellum period to Germany. More specifically, the Treaty of Versailles, which prohibited the Germans from developing or building tanks. As a result of this treaty, many engineers found themselves without a job.

The easiest way to find a new one was to search for a foreign customer, as there was no shortage of them in Europe. Czechoslovakia was one of them. Its army had only seven French Renault FT tanks which were rapidly becoming obsolete.

Overall function of Joseph Vollmer's convertible drive system, illustration from a patent.

Joseph Vollmer, one of the key figures in the Kaiser's tank building industry, continued his work here. Like many engineers of the time, Vollmer was deeply involved with the issue of improving mobility of tanks. The LK-II, Germany's first mass produced tank and one of his creations, was faster than the Renault FT, but even its 16 kph were not what was going to be needed in a new war. Sooner or later, military minds in every country would realize that a tank is not just an infantry support weapon. A tank's speed became a critical parameter.

One of the possible solutions to the speed problem was the convertible drive. It didn't only increase speed, but range as well, and reduced wear on the tracks which had rather short lifespans. Since Germany was forbidden from building tanks, Vollmer decided to cheat. He began developing a convertible drive chassis using the Hanomag Z WD-50 as a base. This vehicle was introduced in 1921 and quickly became popular. For example, the USSR produced it under the name "Kommunar".

Vollmer's design was not simple. A system was attached to the tractor that could transform it into a wheeled or tracked vehicle. The tractor would drive up on a wooden ramp, after which the crew could install wheels or remove them.

Hanomag Z WD-50 as a convertible drive vehicle.

In 1923, the Czechoslovakian Breitfeld-Daněk (Breitfeld, Daněk a spol) company bought a license to produce a number of Hanomag vehicles. The WD-50PS was among them. Vollmer offered his services to Czechoslovakia and piqued their interest. The engineer received 1.3 million kroner for a prototype and documentation.

A year later, the prototype was complete. It was called KH-50: "wheeled-tracked (Kolohousenka) with a 50 hp motor". The same Hanomag WD-50PS tractor was used as its chassis, but the engine was moved to the rear, and the driver was moved forward. The test chassis was sent to trials, and another prototype was built. Laurin a Klement and Tatra companies were introduced to the project around this time. Later, the second prototype was converted into a proper tank.

The KH-50 concept was similar to what the Germans would later build as the Leichttraktor, PzI, and several other tanks. The transformation from a tractor to a tank involved the installation of a turret platform and turret. The turret platform was bolted on, so it was possible to convert it back to a tractor.

 KH-50 during trials.

The KH-50 had a 37 mm Škoda d/27 gun. As an alternative, two vz.24 (Schwarzlose) machineguns could be installed.

After assembly, the first prototype was sent to the 305th Artillery Regiment, where it was tested as an artillery tractor. The vehicle was a lot more maneuverable than the Renault FT. However, as a fully fledged tank, it had some drawbacks. Its top speed on wheels was 35 kph, which was not much more than what regular tracked tanks were able to achieve in those days. On tracks, the top speed of the KH-50 was only 15 kph. This was caused by the fact that the engine was too weak for its mass. A logical conclusion was to increase the engine power.

 KH-50 as a tank.

In 1927, an improved variant of the tank called KH-60 was built. As with its predecessors, one prototype was made into a tractor and the other into a tank. The main difference from its predecessor was a larger engine, the Hanomag 60 PS. The chassis, turret platform, and turret were also redesigned.

The modernization brought improvements: the top speed grew to 18 kph on tracks and 45 kph on wheels. There are rumours that the tank was sold or given to the USSR for trials, but these rumours are not confirmed. However, it is known that one such vehicle with number 13362 was added to the Czechoslovakian army in 1930. As an interesting aside, Aleksey Surin, the future chief engineer of CKD, worked on the KH-60 as his first project.

 KH-60, a modernized variant with a larger engine. A special ramp can be seen in between the wheels that was used to raise or lower the wheels.

The last modernization of tanks from this series happened in 1929, resulting in the KH-70 tank. It had a 70 hp engine, which increased its maximum speed to a respectable 60 kph. However, its mass grew, and it wasn't possible to load the tracks (and especially wheels) indefinitely. For this reason, the Kolohousenka project was gradually shut down.

The convertible drive program later evolved according to the "medium class combined assault vehicle" (Kombinovaný střední útočný, KSU for short) program. Work on it continued until 1935, which led to the creation of Škoda S-III and Tatra T-III tanks. As for light tanks, subsequent work in Czechoslovakia followed a different direction.

From a Tankette to a Light Tank

By 1930, the Czechoslovakian army was still without its own tank. Foreigners helped once more, specifically Britain. Czech companies actively worked together with many European manufacturers in military and civilian matters. Foreign orders breathed a new life into Czechoslovakian tank building.

In 1930, the ČKD company, which included Českomoravská-Kolben и Breitfeld-Daněk, purchased a license to produce Carden-Loyd Mk.VI tankettes. Three tankettes were built in Prague that year. After military trials, it was decided that a thorough redesign was needed. ČKD began developing the P-I vehicle, and Škoda, which absorbed Laurin a Klement in 1929, launched the development of the MU series of tankettes. The military preferred the P-I, which was put into production as "tankette model 1933" (Tančík vz. 33).

 MU-6 tankette, 1932. Reminiscent of a real tank, it set the direction for further development of light tanks.

Meanwhile, Škoda continued working on improved versions of their tankettes. One of those improved vehicles was the MU-6, which began development in 1931. Despite its mass of only 3 tons, it looked like a real tank. Its hull was lengthened to 3.84 meters, and the vehicle received a classic layout with an engine in the rear and transmission in the front. The crew was increased to 4 men, two of which were placed in the turret. A 47 mm Skoda A2 gun was to be used as armament.

This was a proper tank, if not for one "but". The thickness of its armour was only 5.5 mm, so even an ordinary rifle could penetrate it from half a kilometer away. It wasn't surprising the the army rejected the design. The MU-6 was later converted into an SPG, which was also unsuccessful.

Despite that fate, the MU-6 was the first domestically developed light tank. Many solutions used in the design served as a foundation for the majority of Czechoslovakian pre-war tanks. The foundation was set, now what the designers needed was a worthy vision to follow. 

That vision was found in Britain. Naturally, it was the Vickers Mk.E. CKD already picked the Mk.E as a target of imitation in 1929, offering the army a draft of the light YNP tank, inspired by the British vehicle. The military did not pay attention to it, as they were focused on the KSU program.

 Experimental prototype of the P-II tank.

CKD tried again in 1932. Another project was presented to the Military-Technical and Aviation Institute (Vojensky Technicky Letecky Ustav, or VTLU), which was similar to the Vickers Mk.E in its characteristics. The mass was 7.5 tons, the crew consisted of 3 men. The tank was armed with two machineguns and a 47 mm Vickers gun.

VTLU examined the project and made their corrections. The A3 37 mm anti-tank gun, currently under development by Skoda, was used instead of a 47 mm gun. Instead of the bulky vz.24 machineguns, the lighter ZB vz.35 was used. The improved project was approved under the codename P-II (Praha II).

The first P-II with registration number 13.363 began trials in November of 1932. Even though it was a Czechoslovak design, its suspension could be traced back to the Carden-Loyd Mk.VI. This is especially obvious when looking at the reinforcement beam and its attachments. There is nothing bad about this: engineers readily took good ideas from each other.

The influence of the Vickers Mk.E could also be clearly seen in CKD's first light tank. This applied to the overall layout and the concept of an infantry support tank. The armour was also similar: 15 mm in the front and on the sides.

That's where the similarities ended. Even though both tanks had a leaf spring suspension with eight road wheels per side in bogeys, the design of the suspension was different. Aleksey Surin's suspension used a full leaf spring which was attached above the bogeys and acted as a spring for all of them at once. The P-II also had an unsprung road wheels in the rear. Like the Carden-Loyd Mk.VI, the P-II used sledge runners instead of return rollers. However, two rollers were added, one between the runners and one behind them.
The armament on the turret was installed in a very original fashion, but was changed before the tank entered production.

While the suspension of the P-II showed its British roots, its hull and turret had nothing to do with Vickers designs. Even though CKD used a front suspension, they didn't shorten the hull like their British colleagues. The tank ended up with a roomier driving compartment, which had enough room for a driver and a machinegunner, who also operated the radio.

The hull gunner had another task. He was also... the tank commander. Depending on the situation, the commander was either in the hull or in the turret, at the loader's station. This unusual crew layout was used on all Czechoslovakian light tanks.

The small dimensions of the light tank limited the size of the engine compartment. Because of this, the P-II received a 6 L 62 hp linear 4-cylinder engine. It couldn't accelerate the tank past 30 kph, but that was enough for an infantry support tank.

The turret and its armament deserves no less attention than the chassis. It was clearly built with the participation of Skoda engineers and, judging by its shape, could trace its ancestry back to the MU-6. Unlike the previous design, the new turret had a commander's cupola and a turret bustle.

Skoda SU, a late competitor of the P-II.

Trials of the P-II began in late 1932. It was obvious that the tank was a success. The tank was much better than the Renault FT or KH-60. Nevertheless, the military decided to play it safe, remembering the Kolohousenka. In total, the P-II traveled for 3400 km over the proving grounds in Milovice where the tank battalion was based. In February of 1933, negotiations between the army and CKD began over the mass production of the P-II, and a contract for 50 tanks of this type was signed on April 19th, 1933.

Skoda's design looked primitive compared to the P-I. Nevertheless, the Skoda SU became the foundation for Czechoslovakia's most produced pre-war tank.

Meanwhile, Skoda didn't give up on a light tank contract. In 1934, work began on the S-II or Skoda SU light tank. It had a 109 hp V-shaped engine. The chassis was completely different from that of the MU. The transmission was moved to the rear, and the suspension became more like that of the P-II, although the overall function was different.

Despite the more powerful engine, the mobility of the Skoda SU was similar to that of the P-II. The SU also had a more cramped turret with no bustle and a 47 mm Skoda A2 gun with two vz.24 machineguns, both of which were rejected by the army for use in tanks back in the early 1930s.

The S-II was simply unnecessary. However, Skoda did not panic and began reworking the tank to new specifications. Eventually they had their revenge over CKD, but that's a whole different story.

Czechoslovakia's First

The order for 50 tanks didn't mean that the P-II would enter production in its current form. The experimental tank was altered, mostly in the turret and armament. The military didn't like the idea of a gun mantlet that could move in two axes. This system was more vulnerable to enemy fire. Instead, the production turret had a separate mount for the main gun and the coaxial machinegun. The form of the turret also changed. The commander's cupola was improved: it became taller and observation devices were added to the sides, improving visibility.

Production of the P-II at the CKD factory in Liben.

The production of the P-II was organized in Liben, a suburb of Prague. POLDI Hutte from Kladno supplied the armour. This company is connected to delays in shipping the P-II. The quality of the first batch of armour was very low. The problems of quality never went away. The highly hardened armour was brittle and often cracked on impact.

Due to this delay, the first six tanks were only received by the 3rd company of the tank battalion on April 23rd, 1934. Military trials began, which would determine the structure of newly created tank units. As a result of the exercises, the P-II's place in Czechoslovakia's armour system was determined. It was placed in category II (cavalry tank with 15 mm of armour).

It's easiest to spot the differences of the mass produced P-II from its prototype from the top.

On July 13th, 1935, the Czechoslovakian army officially adopted the P-II under the index LT vz. 34 (light tank model 1934). On September 15th, the first tank regiment was formed in Milovice, and six LT vz. 34 tanks were sent there on December 18th with registration numbers 13.496-13.501.

Another 18 tanks with numbers 13.502-13.519 arrived at the 2nd company of the 2nd tank regiment stationed near Olomouc (Moravia) on January 8th, 1936. The next batch of 14 tanks with registration numbers 13.520-13.533 arrived at Milovice to form the 3rd company of the 3rd tank regiment. Later, this regiment was moved to Martin (Slovakia). The last batch of 6 tanks with registration numbers 13.534-13.539 was also sent there.

Vehicles of the 3rd company, 3rd Tank Regiment on parade in Prague.

Due to the growing military potential of Germany and its claims of Czechoslovakian soil, the latter had to quickly grow its army. The LT vz. 34 were reclassified as light reconnaissance tanks in 1937, and units armed with them became subordinate to infantry divisions. Since tank units began receiving superior vehicles, the LT vz. 34 were redistributed in 1938. Almost half (27 tanks) were sent to the 3rd Tank Regiment in Martin.

By the time Germany occupied the Czech Republic, the country's first tank was long obsolete. The LT vz. 34 did not interest the Germans that took trophies back to Germany. A few vehicles were sent to trophy exhibitions, one of these tanks ended up in Vienna. The rest remained in warehouses, although by 1940, there were plans to modernize them.

With all their drawbacks, the LT vz. 34 was superior to the PzII, not to mention the PzI. There was an idea to include them in the Germany army, but it was never realized. It was possible that the reason had to do with the small number of tanks in German hands, only 23. There was little reason to modernize a small number of tanks that could not even outfit a battalion. As a result, the LT vz. 34 remained in warehouses and were eventually scrapped.

 P-II at a trophy exhibition in Vienna.

The fate of the 3rd Tank Regiment was different. After the occupation of the Czech Republic, Slovakia became formally independent and these tanks ended up in its new army. The Slovakian military started out with 18 tanks of this type, later increasing to 21. The army had no illusions about the combat potential of the LT vz. 34. The tanks were kept in reserves and did not participate in combat. On January 1st, 1942, 16 tanks were reclassified as training tanks, and mothballed in mid-1943.

On August 25th, 1944, a group of Slovakian partisans occupied Martin and the Slovakian National Uprising began four days later. The worn out LT vz. 34 took part in it. Some tanks were dug in and fought as immobile bunkers, since their condition prohibited any other use. Slovakian rebels used these tanks until the end of October of 1944.

German tankers used the captured tanks as training aides.

In the fall of 1944, the Germans finally used the LT vz. 34. When German forces took the military base at Martin on September 22nd, 1944, they captured 10 tanks. The tanks were included in the Tatra tank division, where they served briefly. The poor technical condition of the tanks forces the Germans to send them to Pilsen for major repairs. Later, they tried to send the tanks to the Croatians, but this offer of assistance was rejected due to the tanks' poor condition.

The LT vz. 34 is overshadowed by later Czechoslovakian tanks. Nevertheless, this tank was not only the first mass produced tank developed in Czechoslovakia, but the foundation for later work. Developing the design, CKD engineers created the LT vz. 38, which is rightfully considered one of the best light tanks of WWII. This tank also influenced the design of the LT vz. 35, the main pre-war tank of Czechoslovakia. The LT vz. 34 was one of the best tanks in its class at the moment of its creation, inferior to its competitors in mobility alone.

T-34 Prototype Mobility Trials

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"4. Off-road Performance

General off-road performance characteristics of the T-34 tank:
  • Combat mass: 25.6 tons
  • Ground pressure: 0.60 kg/cm²
  • Contact surface length: 5219.3 mm
  • Grouser height: 650 mm
  • Effective power: 19.5 hp/ton
Natural obstacles.
  1. Maximum grade and tilt traversable by the tank at low gears in winter or spring conditions:
    Obstacle
    Ground
    Angle
    Limit
    Grade
    Snow, 1.5 m deep, tank submerged to 400 mm
    15-16°
    At higher grades, the hull sits on the snow and the tracks slip.
    Grade
    Mud with dirt cover, moist, tank submerged to 220 mm
    15-16°
    Tracks slip
    Tilt
    Snow cover up to 1.6 m deep
    15°
    Slipping in the direction of tilt
    Tilt
    Mud with dirt cover, moist after snow melted
    15°
    Slipping in the direction of tilt
    Brief (2-3 meters) grades up to 20° can be navigated by the T-34 in second gear. Traversing grades and tilts in winter and summer conditions is limited by the traction of tracks on terrain, which is insufficient for winter-spring conditions. It is necessary to quickly develop a device to increase traction of tracks and terrain: spurs or winter tracks.
    No cases of slipping or jamming tracks were observed during trials. Consider the track fixation mechanism reliable.
  2. Traverse of difficult terrain:
    Terrain
    Cover depth
    Tank submerged
    Note
    Deep snow
    Up to 1800 mm
    420 mm
    In first gear
    Swamped valley after melted snow
    Up to 430 mm
    360 mm
    In first and second gear
    The mobility of the T-34 on snow is significantly higher than that of the BT-7M tank and can be considered good.
    The mobility of the T-34 on terrain that is swamped after snow melts is satisfactory.
  3. Breaking of trees and movement in the forest:
    1. Individual trees:
      Type of tree
      Diameter (mm)
      Conditions
      Result
      Gear
      Attempts
      Pine
      457
      1
      3
      The tank could not knock over the tree, tracks slipped.
      Pine
      457
      2
      1
      Knocked over.
      Pine
      605
      2
      2
      Knocked over.
      Pine
      879
      3
      1
      Tree broke, the falling tree broke the headlight and floodlight, damaged elevation mechanism gear teeth, bent fenders and mudguards.
      When breaking individual trees, the tank continues moving forward, driving over the roots, trunk, and branches of the tree.
      The maximum thickness of a pine tree that can be knocked over by the tank in second gear is 600-700 mm. In third gear (with a running start) the T-34 can break pine trees up to 900 mm in thickness.
    2. Groups of trees:
      Type
      Number
      Diameters
      Conditions
      Results
      Gear
      Attempts
      Pine
      5
      255-416
      2
      4
      The tank knocked over the group of trees and drove over the felled trees.
      Pine
      7
      309-446
      2
      5
      The tank knocked over the group of trees and drove over the felled trees.
      The T-34 tank can cross tightly growing groups of pine trees with the diameter of 250-450 mm after 4-5 attempts and drives forward over the felled trees.
    3. Movement in the forest:
      The T-34 can drive in first and second gear in areas of medium density with the majority of trees being 200-300 mm thick.
      The T-34 tank has good mobility in the forest, in groups of trees, and against individual trees, greatly surpassing the BT-7M.
      The robustness of the tank is overall sufficient. The weakest parts of the tank, which must be reinforced, are:
      1. Observation devices.
      2. Air intake shield actuator.
      3. L-11 gun elevation mechanism.
        In addition to this, the crew must be protected from trauma when the tank hits a tree by means of removing sharp angles or protruding objects, introduction of soft padding (mostly around the head), and handles for bracing with hands.
Artificial obstacles

MZP (hard to notice obstacle): the tank crosses a 40 meter long MZP at 3rd gear, with the wire wrapping itself around the suspension. The tank retains mobility and, while moving, partially frees itself of the wire.
Denting of rear mudguards is characteristic."

The tank crosses a 1.5 meter deep snow bank.

The tank is driving through a valley made swampy by melting snow.

The tank broke a pine tree 879 mm in diameter at third gear.

The tank is driving over felled trees.

The tank is traversing a group of pine trees 255-416 mm in diameter.

The tank is driving through an oak forest with 200-300 mm diameter trunks.

A hard-to-notice obstacle wrapped itself around the tank's tracks. The tank retains mobility.

RGVA 31811-2-1181
"History of the T-34 tank" Memorial Museum Complex, Documentary Historical Collection #4

Project Management

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"To the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR, comrade Malyshev

NKTP factories are busy with design and production of new experimental prototypes and modernization of existing tanks, both by your orders and on their own initiative.

This work, as a rule, is performed without prior approval of projects by GBTU, who is only given ready prototypes for trials. During trials, many noticeable drawbacks are discovered that lower the combat quality of the vehicles, which could have been discovered by joint inspection of the technical drafts.


This incorrect method of work results in excess correspondence and increased amount of time required to build experimental prototypes, as they are delivered with a large amount of defects and then defects that are discovered in trials are slowly corrected, as it happened with the IS and T-44 tanks.

Modern tanks should be built in a short time with the specifics of wartime crew training in mind, methods of using tanks in modern war, and other issues that are studied by the GBTU.

I consider it imperative that during further work regarding creation of new tanks or modernization of existing ones by the NKTP should discuss with the GBTU all principal technical decisions and orders to develop technical projects, components, and assemblies before the orders are given to factories.

I ask you to respond with your decision regarding the aforementioned issues.

Marshall of the Armoured Forces, Fedorenko
Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, Biryukov."

CAMD RF 38-11355-2243

180 mm Br-21

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"To the People's Commissar of Armament of the USSR, comrade B.L. Vannikov

Reply to letter #125s from January 21st, 1941

The precision trials of the 152 mm Br-19 gun with a friction clutch in the elevation mechanism are scheduled for April of 1941, after which the decision regarding this system will be made.

The 180 mm Br-21 gun was trialed at the ANIOP with 120 shots.

The tactical-technical characteristics of the 180 mm Br-21 gun on the B-4 mount make for a weapon that has insufficient range for a gun and insufficient arc for a howitzer. The objectives that could be given to a 180 mm gun can be resolved by the B-4 or Br-2.

Based on the above information and the availability of a more powerful 210 mm Br-17 gun, the adoption of the 180 mm Br-21 gun on the B-4 mount and, therefore, the continuation of work on it, is unreasonable.

Marshall of the Soviet Union, Kulik."

There is also a note written across the typed page:

"The range is the same as the Br-2 while using twice as much propellant. Did you think about this? You approach the solution of problems formally, but fail to analyze all sides, and sometimes don't know what you're doing and confuse others. Gather all documents regarding trials and report to me. 26.2.41", followed by a signature but no name.

CAMD RF 81-12104-86

World of Tanks History Section: 5th Tank Army in Operation Uranus

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By November of 1942, the 5th Tank Army walked a long and not so successful road. It began in the summer, when the newly formed army was sent to attack the flank and rear of the German forces rushing towards Voronezh. Due to poor reconnaissance and incorrect evaluation of the enemy's goals, our tankers were instead forces to engage the enemy tanks head on and took heavy losses.

After an unsuccessful counterattack, the army was disbanded and only reformed in September of 1942. General Prokofiy Romanenko was appointed as the commander. The army received new units: two tank corps (1st and 26th), six rifle divisions, and one cavalry corps. The Stavka intended the 5th Tank Army to play one of the two key roles in the encirclement of Paulus' 6th Army at Stalingrad. That is why Romanenko was given so much infantry: the rifle divisions were going to fight in the first echelon of the offensive and prepare a clean breakthrough for the mobile units. The cavalry corps was supposed to act as ersatz motorized infantry.

Difficult Preparations

The work ahead was difficult. The condition and level of training of the army did nothing to boost the general's confidence in success. For example, out of the 1st Tank Corps, the only unit with good training and combat experience was the 89th Tank Brigade. Regarding the other two tank brigades and the motorized rifle brigade, the report reads "commanders and drivers are poorly prepared" and "the commander cadre has no experience commanding". It's not surprising that these tank units, equipped with brand new tanks straight from the factory, began losing them even before the offensive began. The 1st Corps had 76 combat ready T-34s on November 3rd, 1941, bu November 19th there were only 57. The other half of the corps' tanks was composed of T-60s; only eight tank in the corps were KVs.

Finally, the Soviet forces managed to let the most important factor of a successful offensive slip through their fingers: secrecy. Documents of the 5th Tank Army often complain that crews cannot prepare adequate camouflage, which led to increased reconnaissance, and later bombing, of Soviet positions. Sadly, there were also cases of deserters surrendering to the enemy. In the 14th Guards Rifle Division, seven such incidents were recorded between November 7th and 14th.

As a result of prisoner interrogations after the offensive began, it became known that the enemy was perfectly aware of the concentration of the tank army and preparations for an offensive. Only the time and direction of the attack were unknown.

The 5th Tank Army had a much more difficult time with intelligence. Due to poor reconnaissance carried out on November 17th, only two days before the attack, army and division HQs did even know the precise shape of the German front line of defense. Because of this, it was decided to forego an artillery barrage, so precious shells did not land on empty land. Instead, a recce in force would be performed before the battle. The commanders hoped to obtain more precise information about the enemy and secure a more favourable position for an offensive by capturing hills along the German front.

Variable Success

On the morning of November 17th, 1942, the artillery of the 5th Tank Army fired on the defending enemy. The recce in force was scheduled to begin at 17:00, but the actual attack by the 14th Guards and 124th Rifle Divisions began several hours later. As a result, it was not possible to reach all planned targets during the day, and fighting continued during the next day.

The enemy, Romanians, treated the tank army attack as the beginning of a large Soviet offensive. They could not hope for a lot of help; all that the trapped 6th Army could send them was constant bombings in groups of 10-50 planes. The German commanders also decided that the threat is not so great. After all, they only knew of Soviet infantry, who only budged the Romanians.

The opinion that they're facing yet another poorly thought out offensive caused the enemy plenty of trouble. At 7:30 on November 189th, the Romanians understood that Soviet artillery was just warming up over the past two days. Katyusha rocket launchers and heavy M-30 howitzer squadrons joined the cannons. The "god of war" did his job, destroying or suppressing most strongholds along the front line and demoralizing the surviving defenders. However, the Romanians still retained combat capability in the flanks, which were not given close attention by artillery, and the rear.

As was mentioned above, the Stavka included many infantry divisions in the tank army to retain the more valuable mobile units for a breakthrough. Even on the dawn of November 19th, it became clear that infantry supported by individual tank brigades and flamethrower tank battalions was stalling. As a result, not for the first time and not for the last, the tank corps were forced to enter the battle before a breakthrough was achieved. They had to clear their own path with armour and fire.

The 5th Tank Army had two tank corps, but there was only enough luck for one. The 26th Tank Corps swept aside the 5th and 14th Infantry Divisions and reached Perelazovskaya station where the Romanian corps HQ was stationed. Tankers reported that "the enemy was overwhelmed and offered very weak resistance, threw down their weapons and surrendered in groups".

The 1st Tank Corps had much less luck. After crossing the front line, its brigades got lost in the steppe. The army's report had no words for this other than "blind kittens". Later, the tankers hit an enemy stronghold in Ust'-Medveditskiy. According to reconnaissance, there weren't supposed to be any significant forces here, so the corps commander, V. Butkov, decided to chase away what he though was a weak screening force.

As a result, the 1st Tank Corps came across a German tank reserve, the 22nd Tank Division. The enemy felt that something was going on, having received aircraft photos of Soviet forces massing at the Don, and deployed it on November 10th. The core of the attacking division was ten PzIV tanks with long-barreled 75 mm gnus, capable of penetrating any Soviet tank up to the KV. Otherwise, the division was made up of old Czech tanks, but even they were enough to fight Soviet light tanks.

The encounter of the 1st Tank Corps with a "weak screening force" became a difficult battle that drew in all three of the corps' brigades, followed by the 47th Guards Rifle Division and elements of the 8th Cavalry Corps. Documents state that the corps lost 17 tanks that evening and night without notable success. Sadly, none of the brigades reported knocked out enemy tanks that day.

Trap Sprung

While the Germans could be satisfied with their success in the 1st TC's sector, the situation in other directions gave little cause for joy. While they stopped one corps, two more, the 26th and 4th, were headed for the German rear nearly unopposed.

The 22nd Tank Division was forced to think about how to disengage with minimum losses instead of delivering a counterattack. The Germans attempted to retreat "British style", but they were unsuccessful. The battle at Ust'-Medveditskiy continued until the middle of November 20th. Soviet tankers reported 13 knocked out tanks and one SPG. It's possible that some of them were knocked out earlier and left on the battlefield.

The remnants of the 22nd Tank Division and Romanian forces took up defenses at the Bolshiye Donshiki village. 5th Tank Army commanders tried to free up their mobile units to arrange a breakthrough in that sector. Only the 26th Tank Corps and, partially, the 8th Cavalry Corps were successful. The 8th Cavalry Corps was engaged in heavy fighting all day on November 21st, where the Germans counterattacked with up to 40 tanks, causing heavy casualties. Bombs rained on our units from the air. The 1st Tank Corps reached Bolshiye Donshiki with its advance guard, but decided to not pick a fight and turned to Lipovskiy settlement. Over three days of fighting, the corps lost three KVs, 19 T-34s, and 11 T-60s.

The 26th Corps remained in Perelazovksaya to wait for the 19th Tank Brigade and count their trophies, but earned a tongue lashing from its superiors and rushed forward much more actively. Colonel Fillipov's advance guard was greatly successful, capturing a crossing of the Don. Soviet forces also tried to take the city of Kalach straight off the march, but the enemy deflected the attack, so the advance guard had to hold the crossing. The main forces of the 26th Tank Corps were occupied around the "Victory of October" and "10 Years of October" farms. The 157th Tank Brigade was unlucky: some of its tanks broke through to the German defenses, but were knocked out and burned up. The brigade commander and brigade political chief burned up in one of them.

The corps broke off so far that their radios no longer allowed them to communicate with the army HQ. Formally, they had three powerful RSB radios, but all of them broke on November 19th when the HQ column of the 26th Tank Corps was mistakenly fired upon by the 1st Tank Corps.

The 8th Tank Corps was still fighting tanks from the 22nd division and the Romanians. Later, army documents showed that the cavalrymen "used their tanks poorly", in part when the flamethrower tank battalion was sent to attack without an artillery barrage or cover, which ended up costing them nine tanks.

On November 23rd, elements of the 1st Tank Corps captured the Chir station with enemy supply and ammunition warehouses, 200 cars, and many other trophies. On the same day, the 26th Tank Corps captured the crossing at Berezovskiy settlement and the city of Kalach. Here, the trophies were just as numerous. Army HQ had to issue a strict order prohibiting overloading trucks used to transport them.

The 5th Tank Army completed its objective of defeating the Romanians and encircling the enemy at Stalingrad. The ring around Paulus snapped shut. However, the army still needed to create a solid front, and the infantry was running late. A part of the reason was the enemy tanks in Bolshiye Donshiki. The 5th Tank Army began its liquidation of this nuisance on November 24th. Cavalrymen of the 8th corps finally got their revenge, scattering a large enemy group that tried to break through Soviet lines. The corps reported that 59 functional German tanks were captured. The Soviet 8th Motorcycle Regiment defeated another group that was trying to break through and retreat. Only one German group managed to escape, but it landed in another encirclement.

The first stage of the 5th Tank Army's offensive at Stalingrad was complete. It was clear that the Germans would strike back, but the Red Armymen earned time for a short break and preparation for battles to come.

Original article by Andrei Ulanov.

Begleitwagen: A Specialist of All Trades

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The mittlerer Traktor (m.Tr., medium tractor), given the more widely known index Neubau Fahrzeug (Nb.Fz., newly designed vehicle) on October 3rd, 1933, began trials in 1933. The tank, an evolution of the Grosstraktor concept (Gr.Tr., large tractor) was supposed to become Germany's medium tank.

However, even as the tank began its trials, it was clear that the German military missed its mark. While the Grosstraktor was overcomplicated over its five years of development by three companies (it's enough to say that it was also amphibious), the Nb.Fz. was in an even bigger hole. The initial project, designed by Rheinmetall (chassis and turret) and Krupp (second turret variant) was supposed to fit into the 15 ton class. As a result, the appetite of the 6th Waffenampt led to a complex and expensive 23 ton tank.

A new tank concept split up tanks into support tanks and tank destroyers. The tank destroyer role was filled with the 10 ton Zugführerwagen (future PzIII). The Z.W. specification was developed in late 1933, even before the first Nb.Fz. was built. As for the Nb.Fz., it's fate was sealed in the fall of 1934. Initially, the new tank was called verbesserten Nb.Fz (improved Nb.Fz.) in documents, but a new index was used in correspondence between Krupp and the 6th Waffenampt starting on November 14th, 1936: B.W. or Begleitwagen, support vehicle.

Wooden model of the Rheinmetall B.W. This is how the tank was supposed to enter production.

It's worth noting that the Germans didn't invent anything new. The separation of tanks into tank destroyers and infantry support tanks is a British invention. In the 1920s, the Vickers company began building Medium Tanks Mk.I and Mk.II in two variants: with a 47 mm gun that fired only armour piercing shells and a 94 mm howitzer with only HE shells. The USSR also had experience with artillery support tanks (D-38, T-26-4, BT-7 Artillery). The T-28 was also an artillery support tank, in a way, but a longer gun was already in development when it was put into production. At that point, the only person to have put a long barreled gun into a medium tank was Eduard Grotte (TG-1), but his tank remained experimental. 37-47 mm guns were enough to fight tanks at the time, and short barreled guns and howitzers were better suited for fighting light fortifications.

For obvious reasons, the production of tanks that supported tank destroyers was planned in very limited numbers. The Germans were the only ones to design the tank from scratch. Other nations built a tank from an existing one. As a result, they ended up with two tanks by the end of the 1930s that had similar mass, armour, and an identical engine, but had completely different purposes. WHo knew that the highly specialized B.W. would outlive the tank it was supposed to support?

According to the initial plan, work on the Begleitwagen was split like with the Nb.Fz. Rheinmetall designed the chassis, Krupp designed the turret and turret platform. This separation of work was standard for German design. PzIII was a Daimler-Benz chassis with a Krupp turret and turret platform, the Tiger and Tiger II were Henschel chassis with Krupp turrets.

Rheinmetall signed contract 4167025/35 on February 25th, 1935, for a new tank that returned to the root of what the Nb.Fz. was supposed to be. It was supposed to weigh 17-18 tons. Its armament consisted of one short 75 mm gun with a coaxial machinegun, another machinegun would be placed in a cupola on the front of the hull, to the right of the driver. The crew consisted of six men: commander, driver, loader, cupola gunner, radio operator, driver.

B.W. experimental chassis, summer of 1938. The spaced armour covering the idler and the muffler on the fender are visible.

Rheinmetall reused many parts from their previous tank. The road wheels and return rollers, suspension, and track links were all from the Nb.Fz. On the other hand, the tank itself was completely original. A tighter layout with a transmission in the front allowed to shorten the hull by more than half a meter. The B.W. hull was also lower than that of the Nb.Fz.

The same vehicle after improvements. The suspension armour was altered.

A special Maybach HL 100 TR engine was used. This V-shaped 10 L 12 cylinder put out 300 hp, even more than its BMW Va aircraft predecessor. This engine was also planned for installation into the Z.W. The central and upper front plates had large hatches in them to make the ZF transmission easier to service, which didn't improve the tank's robustness.

Maybach HL 100 TR used on experimental Begleitwagen tanks.

The turret developed by Krupp had nothing in common with that of the Nb.Fz. One of the tasks given to the designers was maximum parts commonality with the Z.W. turret. The commander's cupola and side hatches were taken from the Z.W. turret, which was also designed by Krupp, and the overall shape of the turret was also similar. Initially, it was supposed to house a 21 caliber long 75 mm gun, but it was finally replaced with a 24 caliber gun, the same one used on the Nb.Fz. Contract #67941/35 for a new turret from mild steel was signed on January 3rd, 1936. It included the machinegun cupola, but that was never built. As for the main turret, it was finished in May of 1936.

The front of the improved Begleitwagen. The large transmission access hatches are visible. This solution made the transmission easier to service, but was not the greatest for shell resistance.

Initially, Rheinmetall was supposed to build two B.W. test chassis from mild steel, but only one was finished by May of 1936. It had neither a main turret nor a machinegun cupola, which were replaced with dummy weights. The exhaust system was altered during trials (the exhaust pipes were moved from the fenders to the rear), and the suspension and its armour were redesigned. All of these modifications were purely academic, since Krupp suddenly became the only participant in the Begleitwagen program on July 21st, 1936.

Even though Krupp was only supposed to work on the turret and turret platform, the arms giant from Hessen couldn't give up on such a juicy contract. Correspondence between Ritter, one of the conglomerate's executives, and the 6th Waffenampt hinted at Krupp's ability to supply more than the turret back in November of 1934. On April 13th, 1935, a month and a half after Rheinmetall began working on the B.W., Krupp proposed its own vision of the tank. The new tank had two variants, which differed in mass (17.2 and 18.5 tons), armour (14-20 mm and 20-30 mm), the amount of wheels (8 or 6 per side) and other details.

Krupp's onslaught was hard to resist, and finally contract #67096/36 was signed on July 13t, 1935, for one B.W. I Kp built from mild steel. On October 14th, 1935, a second contract #67252 was signed for a prototype of the B.W. II Kp. The difference between the two tanks was more subtle than initially proposed. In practice, the only difference was the suspension. The B.W. I used two-wheel bogeys with leaf springs, the B.W. II used three two-wheel bogeys with larger wheels and torsion bars.

B.W. I Kp at Krupp's assembly plant, summer of 1936.

Even though the work on the B.W. I Kp began much later than on the Rheinmetall prototype, the tank was ready on April 30th, 1936, a little earlier than its competitor. The tank was radically altered during assembly. A ball mounted machinegun from the Z.W. was used instead of a cupola. This solution reduced the crew from 6 men to 5, since the radio operator was now tasked with firing the machinegun. The first prototype took the test turret, and like Rheinmetall prototype, the second had to settle for a dummy weight.

Mobility trials began in the summer of 1936, and the first prototype traveled 2043 km by October 3rd. Various changes were made to the design during the trials, which is normal for a prototype. The first days of the trials showed that the 6th Waffenampt was right to let Krupp participate in the B.W. program. The tank achieved an average speed of 25 kph and moved more confidently than not only its competitor, but the Z.W, work on which stalled initially. The B.W. II Kp was not as fortunate. The torsion bar suspension design that Krupp selected was poor. These trials resulted in Krupp engineers becoming leery of torsion bar suspensions in general, even though the specific design they chose was at fault.

Externally, the first B.W. looks very similar to the PzIV Ausf. A. The similarity is misleading. The tank underwent significant changes, both on the inside and the outside, before it entered production.

A contract for the production of 35 1. Serie/B.W. tanks was signed in December of 1936, the tank was green-lit. However, the PzIV Ausf. A was significantly different from its predecessor. The hull and turret were radically changed, the engine and gearbox replaced, the suspension reworked. Nevertheless, the basis of the Begleitwagen concept allowed the production of a vehicle which was never radically altered during production.

The same cannot be said about the PzIII, the first four modifications of which were more like a search for good technical solutions. In practice, the first proper PzIII was the Z.W.38, or PzIII Ausf. E. Even it could not achieve the desired qualities (for example, the 70 kph top speed that bothers the minds of many military history enthusiasts was only attainable for a short time before the suspension fell apart), but at least an acceptable suspension was found. MAN was included in the production of the PzIII Ausf. E, but even put together with Daimler Benz they could only produce 96 tanks. By September 1st, 1939, only 196 PzIII tanks were built. This tank was considered the main tank, even though there were 217 PzIV support tanks built by then.

As for the prototypes, the first tank was sent to a training facility in Metzingen in December of 1936. The second prototype served as a testbed for a new turret platform in the spring of 1938, which later was used on the PzIV Ausf. B (the machinegun was replaced with a pistol port and the "step" in the upper front plate was removed). The B.W. I Kp turret was installed on the second prototype in April of 1938, and remained there until at least November. In 1939, the B.W. II Kp was converted into a bridgelayer. As for the first prototype, it was also involved in more trials. A new suspension was tested in the winter of 1939-40.

B.W. II Kp converted into a bridgelayer, 1939.

In conclusion, it's worth mentioning that Krupp developed another very interesting tank on this chassis, the Rauchwagen (R.W.), or smoke vehicle. This was the same B.W., but with a 105 mm L/16 howitzer in the turret. This tank was first brought up in 1935, while the B.W. was still in development. In addition to the ability to put up smokescreens, the gun could have had superior penetration, as the 7.5 KwK L/24 could only penetrate 25 mm of armour at 700 meters, while French tanks had 40 mm of armour.

According to correspondence, the project reached the practical phase. The first B.W. turret removed from the B.W. I Kp was sent to Krupp in the winter of 1938, and conversion to the new weapon began. In April of 1938, the turret was installed on the B.W. II Kp, which received the PzIV Ausf. B turret platform. According to a report dated November 17th, 1938, the turret was removed from the B.W. II Kp and mounted on a special stand for trials; the tank was sent to be converted to a bridgelayer. This was the end of the "smoke vehicle". The last time it was mentioned was in September of 1939.

Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf. A through C

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In December of 1936, the German military signed a contract with the Krupp conglomerate for a batch of 35 Begleitwagen tanks. This tank was designed to fight as a direct fire support tank, as its name suggests. The tank's main targets were going to be enemy infantry and light fortifications. Ironically, this vehicle became Germany's most numerous medium tank by the start of WWII. Later, the PzIII became more numerous, but only for a short time. By 1943, the Begleitwagen, known as the PzIV, retook the lead. The Pz.Kpfw. IV was the only German pre-war tank that never went through a radical chassis modernization.

Many Small Improvements

The contract didn't mean that the B.W. I Kp would go into production without changes. Trials showed that many small improvements had to be made to the entire design. This is a perfectly normal situation; history knows few cases where a mass production tank did not differ from its prototype. However, the B.W. I Kp had no major differences from the production tank. The overall concept of the tank proved successful and did not require serious changes.

Despite a lack of major changed, 1.Serie/B.W. officially indexed Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. A, retained only 7 components that were completely unchanged. Among them were the radiator, engine compartment bulkhead, brakes, and transmission elements. Everything else had to be changed in one way or another by Krupp engineers.

PzIV Ausf. A, serial number 80113, produced in February of 1938. This is one of the few tanks of this type that received camouflage paint.

Usually, the problem wasn't that the old components were bad, but that new ones were easier to produce. One example is the turret. The B.W. I Kp turret had many riveted connections that were replaced with welds on the production turret. Rivets were left only on the hatch hinges and the commander's cupola. The cupola was replaced with the one from the PzIII Ausf. B, which was also designed by Krupp engineers.

The hull was also slightly changed. It's worth pointing out new observation devices, taken from the PzII Ausf A. The armour was left at the level of the B.W. I Kp and protected only from rifle bullets. The floor was reinforced slightly. Most of the changes to the design were aimed at making the crew's job easier.

There were many more changes inside the tank. Instead of the 10 L Maybach HL 100, mass production tanks used the 10.8 L Maybach HL 108 TR 230 hp engine. The tank also received a ZF SFG 75 gearbox. The new engine raised the maximum speed of the 18 ton tank to 32.5 kph. This wasn't a lot, but enough for a support tank. The running gear was also changed a little. The drive sprockets and idlers were altered.

PzIV Ausf. A turret from the rear, showing pistol ports and the commander's cupola.

The first two PzIV Ausf. A tanks with serial numbers 80101 and 80102 were received by the customer on November 29th, 1937. By December there were already new design changes after specialists from the 6th Waffenampt studied the tanks. In his report, Engineer-Senior Lieutenant Olbrich lists 30 defects, some of which Krupp engineers disagreed with. Nevertheless, the ammunition capacity was reduced from 140 to 122 shells, which required a redesign of the ammunition racks.

Due to various changes, the departure of the first PzIV Ausf. A tanks to the army dragged on. In February, the AA machinegun mount, initially attached to the left side of the turret platform, was removed. The design was inconvenient: you could only fire while standing on the ground, and the range of movement was very limited.

Some tanks had an antenna guard added underneath the gun to move the antenna out of the way.

There is an interesting story with the last few tanks from the 1.Serie/B.W. On January 31st, 1938, the Grusonwerk factory that was building these tanks reported that the subcontractors building hulls, Harkort & Eicken GmbH and Eisen- und Hüttenwerke AG, were behind schedule. Meanwhile, preparations were underway at Magdeburg to begin production of 2.Serie/B.W., or PzIV Ausf. B. The solution was simple: the last five 1.Serie/B.W. tanks were built with 2.Serie/B.W. hulls.

The last tanks built at Grusonwerk had new hulls, but old turret platforms and turrets. For example, tank #80134 had hull #80206. The result was a comical situation where the hull could protect the tank from 20 mm cannons and high caliber machineguns, but the turret could only withstand rifle bullets.

Machinegun, begone!

The Spanish Civil War, where the Germans were actively supporting the rebels, made a series of changes in German tank building. It turned out that 14.5 mm of armour was not enough for modern war. According to the Germans, the main enemies of tanks were high caliber machineguns and autocannons. The fact that both sides actively used 37-45 mm anti-tank artillery slipped by them. Nevertheless, the requirements for tank armour changed in 1937.

 A model of the new turret platform tested on the B.W. II Kp.

In October of 1937, Grusonwerk received a contract to built 42 2.Serie/B.W. tanks (PzIV Ausf. B). The turret platform for this tank was tested on the B.W. II Kp. Due the improvement of the front armour to 30 mm, it was decided that the hull machinegun would be removed. Instead, the radio operator received an observation port and a pistol port to the right, as well as an MP-38 submachinegun. The 6th Waffenampt considered this a small price to pay for thicker front armour. The central front plate was also thickened to 30 mm, the upper and lower parts to 20 mm. The side armour was untouched. The driver received an improved observation device.

The turret changed along with the hull. The removable gun mantlet had to be deleted, and the gun armouring changed slightly. The pistol ports were redesigned and were not more resistant. The tank received a new, significantly more protected, commander's cupola. As with the hull, the thickness of the turret armour was increased to 30 mm.

 PzIV Ausf. B (left) and Ausf. A (right). This photo demonstrates the differences between the modifications.

The changes didn't stop at armour. The Maybach HL 108 TR turned out too weak, and it was replaced by the 265 hp Maybach HL 120 TR, which later became the most numerous German tank engine. Working with the ZF ZZG 76 transmission, the 12 L engine accelerated the tank to 42 kph. The ammunition capacity of the 7.5 KwK L/24 was reduced to 80 shells. This was partially motivated by an aim to "slim down" the tank (the changes increased its mass by half a ton), but there were other reasons. It turned out that shells from the large 40-shell ready rack had a tendency to fall out, which was rather unsafe.

The first PzIV Ausf. B (serial numbers 80201-80242) were received by the customer in May of 1938. Interestingly enough, these tanks used hulls from PzIV Ausf. A tanks. This was the consequence of the aforementioned hull switch. Now the situation was reversed: the turret and turret platform could resist 20 mm guns, but the hull was vulnerable.

In September, another complaint came from Magdeburg that subcontractors are taking their time with the hulls. This time, the contract was changed. Harkort & Eicken GmbH built hulls numbering 80213-80224 and Eisen- und Hüttenwerke AG built hulls 80225–80242. These hulls wren't used on the PzIV Ausf. B. Instead, tanks with serial numbers 80213–80242 received hulls 80301–80330, which were meant for the PzIV Ausf. C. The armour mix-up was avoided, as both modifications had identical armour. The last PzIV Ausf. B tanks were delivered in October of 1938.

The AA machinegun mount, deemed uncomfortable to use, disappeared from the left side. Interestingly, this tank lacks the antenna deflector.

Production of 3.Serie/B.W. (PzIV Ausf. C) tanks could not have happened at all. In early 1937, Heinrich Kniepkamp decided to standardize German medium tanks, leaving just one out of the two. The idea was not without merit: Germany had two medium tanks, similar in characteristics, and differing mostly in armament.

Kniepkamp's plan involved installing the B.W. turret on the 4.Serie/Z.W., the future PzIII Ausf. E. In June of 1937, Krupp was informed that 2.Serie/B.W. would be the last batch of the PzIV. Here is when the excellent plan shattered on harsh reality.

The experimental prototype of the 4.Serie/Z.W. was only sent to Kummersdorf in the spring of 1938. Erich Wolfert, Krupp's chief engineer, raised a protest. The medium tank production quotas would not be met, and it was impossible to wait any further.

As it turned out later, Wolfert was right. The PzIII only passed the tank tanks per month mark in July of 1939, and proper mass production began in October, after the start of the war. In these conditions, the only reasonable option was to keep producing the PzIV. Nevertheless, Krupp managed to get the 3.Serie/B.W. approved much earlier, in October of 1937.

 The PzIV Ausf. C looked very similar to its predecessor.

The PzIV Ausf. C (serial numbers 80301–80440) was similar to its predecessor. The biggest external change was the armour of the coaxial machinegun. Other changes include altered locks on the engine compartment roof and altered ventilation on the turret roof.

New changes were introduced in production. Starting with tank #80331, Ausf. C tanks were equipped with the same commander's cupolas as the PzIII Ausf. E, and starting with tank #80341, a modernized Maybach HL 120 TRM with improved ignition. The 58th turret platform and onward had special visors above the driver's observation devices.

The first PzIV Ausf. C were produced in October of 1938, with 30 tanks receiving 2.Serie/B.W. hulls. The production rate was quick, especially when compared to the PzIII. The last 10 tanks were completed at Grusonwerk in August of 1939, and production of the PzIV paused for a month.

A new type of antenna deflector that was installed on all Ausf. C tanks.

Out of 140 3.Serie/B.W. vehicles, 134 were built as tanks. In February of 1939, Krupp sent 6 chassis (80435–80440) to the 5th Waffenampt, which used them to build Bruckenleger IV bridgelayers (same as what the B.W. II Kp was converted into). The Magirus company made the conversions. Trials showed that the designs were flawed. Later, two chassis (80435 and 80438) were used for experiments. The remaining bridgelayers were converted back to tanks and sent to the army.

These weren't exactly ordinary tanks. Since turret platforms of tanks ##80436, 80437 and 80439 were already used for bridgelaying equipment, they had to be replaced. Since this was already in June-July of 1940, there were no spare 3.Serie/B.W. turret platforms. The result was another hybrid with PzIV Ausf. C turrets and chassis and PzIV Ausf. E turret platforms.

First Time's the Charm

Various changes to improve combat effectiveness and ease the crew's jobs were made to the tanks almost as soon as they entered the army. One of the first changes was the appearance of smoke grenade launchers in August of 1938. They were installed in the rear of the tank. The launchers began appearing on the PzIV Ausf. B as standard equipment, but tanks built earlier only received them in the army.

Another piece of equipment added by the army was a special railing that was installed on the gun. The issue was that there was a serious risk of shooting off your own antenna with cannon or machinegun fire, as it was not always lowered in combat. This issue was known to Krupp even when the first B.W. was undergoing trials, but initially there was no solution for it.

It's worth noting that far from all tanks received this guard. There are photographs of tanks (both in peacetime and in combat) that do not have them. Using prior experience, an improved guard with a complicated, yet effective, shape was introduced on the PzIV Ausf. C. The PzIV met the start of the war in this modification.

PzIV column in Poland, September 1939.

Due to the delays in the Z.W. program, only 51 PzIII tanks were among the units that entered Poland on September 1st, 1939. Out of 211 "support tanks", 198 were in Poland, or almost four times as many as the tank they were supposed to support. It's not surprising that in January of 1939, the structure of a light tank battalion included 8 PzI tanks, 6 PzIVs, and only 3 PzIIIs. The medium tank battalion structure looked even stranger, 5 PzIII and 14 PzIV. Due to a lack of PzIV tanks, their number in light tank battalions was lowered to 3-5 in practice.

Overall, these "support tanks" became the best German tanks in the Polish campaign. Good mobility was combined with the firepower of a 75 mm gun. The idea of increasing the armour to 30 mm was correct.

However, it appears that the Germans did not learn their lesson from the fighting in Poland. It turned out that the Polish army was armed with 37 mm wz.36 anti-tank cannons, a licensed version of the Swedish Bofors Infanterikanon M/34. This gun made its debut in Spain, and by the start of WWII, Poland had about 1000 of them. 30 mm of armour proved no trouble for the gun, and it could be penetrated from over half a kilometer away.

The 6th Waffenampt also underestimated the chances of a tank being hit in the side. A 20 mm autocannon destroyed the PzIV tank commanded by Wiktor IV Albrecht on September 18th, 1939. Sergeant Roman Orlik's TK-S tankette with a 20 mm gun shot the tank in the side, which detonated its ammunition. These cases were far from extraordinary. In total, the Germans lost around 20 PzIVs irreparably.

PzIV Ausf. C destroyed by an ammo rack explosion. Mszczonów, Poland, 1939.

It's worth focusing on the ammunition rack detonation closely. One of the PzIV's main problems was that its ammunition racks were located around the entire perimeter of the fighting compartment. It was difficult to avoid hitting the ammunition. Since most of the tank's shells were of the high explosive variety, the odds of detonation were high. Because of this, the PzIV is the uncontested leader in the gloomy parade of destroyed German tanks. Flying turrets, frequently detached from the hull along with the turret platform, were a common sight.

PzIV Ausf. C on the Eastern Front, summer of 1941.

Despite the widespread use of anti-tank guns by the Poles, the only change made to the PzIV by the Germans was the increase of the side armour to 20 mm on the PzIV Ausf. D. May of 1940 was sobering as it suddenly turned out the the French also have anti-tank guns, thousands of them, and 30 mm of armour was no great obstacle.

In addition, the cannons of German tanks were powerless against the Char B1 bis, and the PzIV clashed with it many times. Even after this experience, the question of improving armour moved to the practical stage only in early 1941.

PzIV Ausf. C with a full set of modernizations, including extra 30 mm of front armour on the middle front plate.

Even then, no deep modernization of the pre-war PzIV was made. Some tanks received additional 30 mm of armour in the central front plate, increasing it to 60 mm, but leaving the front of the turret platform and turret at 30 mm, despite a high percentage of shots hitting those parts. Armoured in this fashion, PzIV tanks were sent first to the Balkans, then the Eastern Front.

After 1941, pre-war production PzIV tanks were sent to training units. Some amount of them ended up in the 21st Tank Division, located in Normandy. That is where they last saw battle. Unfortunately, not a single pre-war "support tank" survived to this day.

PzIV Ausf. C from the 21st Tank Division, 1944. As you can see, this tank did not receive additional armour.

Overall, one can safely say that Krupp made a good tank. Yes, there were some complications in production. However, even at the start of its mass production, the tank had significantly fewer growing pains than other German tanks. Nobody in the 6th Waffenampt could guess that the "niche" tank would end up outliving not only other pre-war tanks, but several tanks that were designed during WWII.

Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf. D through E

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The German army entered WWII with a rather strange system of armament. The PzIII medium tank, which was built as Germany's main tank, ended up being the least numerous in the Wehrmacht. As for the other medium tank, the PzIV, it was designed as a support tank, but ended up outnumbering the PzIII four to one. German industry could only equalize the number of both tanks by the end of 1939. By then, a new version of the support tank was in production, the PzIV Ausf. D, which was in a way a return to the original concept.

The Hull Machinegun Returns

The spring of 1938 was rocky for the PzIV. The 6th Waffenampt wanted to get rid of Krupp's tank from the production lineup. A proposal was made to built a support tank on the PzIII chassis, joining both medium tanks into one.

On one hand, the idea was solid. However, the PzIII wasn't doing so well at the moment, but production of the PzIV went on, if not without hiccups. Krupp's engineers also managed to meet the weight requirements on the first try.

When Erich Wolfert, Krupp's chief engineer, criticized the idea of uniting both tank into one, he was victorious. The 6th Waffenampt had to retreat, since Wolfert was supported not only by the arms giant, but by common sense.

However, the lesson wasn't learned, and the 6th Waffenampt would struggle with the idea of one chassis for two types of tanks for the entire war. This obsession, initiated by Heinrich Ernst Kniepkamp, among others, hit the same walls every time. Seemingly, no lessons were learned.

PzIV Ausf. D in its initial configuration. The tank would look slightly different built in metal.

Meanwhile, the requirements for a support tank kept growing. In early January of 1938, discussions of a fourth modification of the tank began, indexed 4.Serie/B.W.

One of the first requirements was the return of the hull machinegun. Someone in charge finally understood that it's hard to shoot out of a pistol port, let alone hit something. A decision was made to use the Kugelblende 30 ball mount designed for the Z.W.38 (future PzIII Ausf. E). It was much better protected than the ball mount on the PzIV Ausf. A. Due to the return of the hull machinegun, the characteristic step of the turret platform front returned.

Diagram of the inside of the tank.

A meeting was held in Berlin on March 10th, 1938, where Krupp employees and representatives of the 6th Waffenampt discussed the possibility of improving the tank's armour. The sides of the hull, turret platform, and turret were only 14.5 mm thick. It had to be 20 mm thick to protect it from 20 mm cannons at long ranges. In addition, the military wanted the floor to be 10 mm thick, up from 8 mm.

The answer to the new requirements came on April 12th. According to calculations, this thicker armour would increase the tank's mass by 1256 kg to almost 20 tons. Further changes to other elements of the hull followed. The maintenance hatches around the return rollers changed shape, as did the air intakes for the engine compartment. Track links with bigger teeth were designed in late April, and the amount of travel stops for the suspension was increased to five per side (one for each of the front three bogeys, two for the rearmost one).

Mass production PzIV Ausf. D, spring 1940.

Changes were made to the turret as well. First of all, the armour of the gun was changed. The design in use earlier was vulnerable to enemy fire. Bullets or shrapnel that hit in the opening between plates could jam the weapon. The development of new gun armour began in late May of 1938. The new gun mantlet was external, and did its job much better than the old. Its thickness was increased to 35 mm.

The observation ports on the side hatches and sides of the turret were replaced.

A large amount of spare track links hanging off the tank was a common sight.

By the time the contract for 4.Serie/B.W. was signed with Krupp on July 4th, 1938, the vehicle changed noticeably. According to the contract, Grusonwerk, one of Krupp's factories, was supposed to build 200 tanks of this type.

The contract was expanded in October. The SS ordered 48 tanks, indexed 5.Serie/B.W. These tanks weren't any different from the 4.Serie/B.W. These tanks, however, never made it into the SS, as a decision to order StuGs instead was made.

Tanks from the 4th and 5th series received the index PzIV Ausf. D. The tanks received serial numbers in the 80501–80748 range.

Experience from Two Campaigns

Mass production of the PzIV Ausf. D began in October of 1939. Unlike the PzIII, whose production was rushed, there were no bursts in the production of the support tank. 45 tanks were assembled by the end of 1939, and further production was 20-25 tanks a month on average. 129 tanks of this modification were delivered by May 1st, 1940.

Torn off turrets were a common occurrence for the PzIV Ausf. D. France, May 1940.

In March of 1939, it was decided that the Wehrmacht would keep buying these tanks, and tanks from the 6th series would be indexed PzIV Ausf. E. A new contract for 223 tanks of this type was signed in July of 1939. Overall, this tank was supposed to be the same as its predecessor, but some changes began to appear in May.

For starters, the driver's observation device, which hasn't changed since the PzIV Ausf. B, was replaced with the Fahrersehklappe 30. Instead of massive parts that traveled up and down, this device had a 30 mm thick protective shield that could be lowered. It was much better at protecting the observation device, and its design was simpler.

The large ventilation hatch on the roof of the turret disappeared, and a fan was added in its place. A hatch for signal flags replaced the periscopic observation device. The commander's cupola changed shape.

PzIV Ausf. D, April 1940 production, with armour added to the front of the turret platform and the middle front plate.

It became clear that the Ausf. E would not enter production in its current shape and that the Ausf. D needs changes after the Polish campaign of 1939. The problem was that the Poles actively used the Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz. 36 Bofors gun against German tanks. Even though Polish shells weren't of the best quality, they could confidently penetrate German tanks from any angle. Even thickening the front plate to 30 mm didn't help.

An investigation began in the fall of 1939 to determine if it was possible to further load the PzIV with armour, increasing its mass to 21.4 tons. Trials showed that the tank could take it.

The 6th Waffenampt made changes to the 4.Serie/B.W. and 5.Serie/B.W. order on December 18th, 1939. The last 68 tanks were supposed to have hulls with 50 mm of front armour. However, by the start of the French campaign on May 10th, 1940, the PzIV Ausf. D was still produced with 30 mm of front armour.

PzIV Ausf. E from the 20th Tank Division, summer 1941.

The first battles showed that this delay was a mistake. Of course, short barreled 37 mm guns used by a number of French tanks, such as the FCM 36 and Renault R 35, could not penetrate this armour, but they weren't the main opponent of German tanks. The French had good anti-tank artillery, and 30 mm was not a problem for it. Even worse, a number of French tanks carried 47 mm guns.

Losses of PzIV tanks were even worse than in Poland. Out of 279 PzIV tanks present on May 10th, 97, or a third, were lost irreparably. The fighting in May-June showed that the short 75 mm gun is powerless against tanks with shell-proof armour.

It was clear that the issue had to be solved, and fast. Krupp reported that applique armour for the hull and turret platform was produced and tested. The front of the turret platform received an additional 30 mm of armour, raising the overall thickness to 60 mm. The sides were reinforced with another 20 mm of armour. Later, extra armour for the front plate was added, along with carriers on the top and bottom.

The army did not receive a single set of applique armour before the end of the campaign. Supplies started on June 25th, by which point they were no longer needed. Widespread equipment of tanks with added armour began in July. The thickness of the front plate, turret front, and gun mantlet was increased to 50 mm.

Not all PzIV Ausf. E received applique armour.

Another serious modification to the PzIV Ausf. D was made in August of 1940. According to a decision made on June 3rd, the last 68 tanks of 4 and 5.Serie/B.W. would be built with 6.Serie/B.W. turrets and turret platforms. The last vehicles of this type were delivered to the army in October of 1940, after which the PzIV Ausf. E entered production.

Tanks of this type received serial numbers 80801–81006. They can be differentiated from the last 68 PzIV Ausf. D only by serial number. Additional mix-ups were caused by the fact that not all PzIV Ausf. E, not to mention Ausf. D, received applique armour on the front of the turret platform.

PzIV Ausf. D with additional Vorpanzer armour, 1942.

Some tank units attempted to make their own tank armour in early 1941, but orders from the top told them to stop. Nevertheless, another modification known as Vorpanzer appeared. It featured massive applique armour on the front of the turret. PzIV Ausf. D, E, and F tanks were modified in this way. It appears that Vorpanzer tanks were used exclusively by the Großdeutschland tank division. There are claims that these tanks were only used for training, but front line photographs discredit the idea.

For Crossings and Other Purposes

The full volume of 4th, 5th, and 6th series was never completed. Some of the PzIV Ausf. D tanks were used for other purposes. 16 March-April 1940 production tanks were used to make Brückenleger IV b bridgelayers. These vehicles were included in engineering battalions attached to tank divisions. They were used by units who fought in France in May-June of 1940.

Brückenleger IV b. A batch of 16 such vehicles was made in the spring of 1940.

Meanwhile, Krupp built 16 sets of turret platforms and turrets. Later, tanks with numbers 80685, 80686 and 80687 were converted into regular PzIV Ausf D. According to report for May 1941, 13 of 29 PzIVs built were from 4.Serie/B.W. 247 Ausf. D vehicles were used by the military as ordinary tanks. The last tank, 80625 , was used as a test chassis.

Brückenleger IV from the 39th Tank Engineering Battalion, 1941.

The situation with the PzIV Ausf. E was different. Instead of 223 tanks that were to be built initially, 206 were finished, 200 of them as tanks. 4 6.Serie/B.W. chassis were sent to Magirus where they were used to make Brückenleger IV c bridgelayers. Like bridgelayers of earlier series, they were sent to the 39th Tank Engineering Battalion and participated in fighting on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941. 

Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.E 81005 and 81006 had a new suspension.

The fate of the last two tanks of the 6th series, 81005 and 81006, was even more interesting. On December 14th, 1940, the 6th Waffenampt allowed Krupp to develop a new suspension. Its main feature was that the diameter of the road wheels grew to 700 mm, and they had to be interleaved to fit. The width of the track links increased to 422 mm. These tanks were tested actively in 1941-42, after which tank 81005 turned up in the training facility at Wünsdorf. At least one tank was converted to an ammunition carrier for the Karl Gerat 040.

Tauchpanzer IV from the 18th Tank Division.

Finally, a portion of the mass production tanks were converted to rather interesting vehicles. 48 PzIV Ausf. D tanks were converted into Tauchpanzer IV to cross rivers along their floor. Special waterproof tarps were added to the tank, as well as covers for the air intakes. A hose with a buoy was used to supply air to the tank. A small amount of PzIV Ausf. E tanks from the January-March 1940 production were also converted. These tanks were used in June of 1941 in the 18th Tank Division.

In Support of Blitzkrieg

Production of the 7.Serie/B.W., or PzIV Ausf. F, began in April of 1941. This tank was made with experience from the first two years of the war, but it only became the army's main support tank in the fall of 1941. They were a minority of the 441 PzIV concentrated at the Soviet border on June 22nd, 1941. The majority of them were PzIV Ausf. D and E.

By then, tanks of these modifications began to look differently. On February 14th, 1941, the first German tanks arrived at Tripoli, and the Afrika Corps was formed on the 16th. In connection with this, a "tropical" modification for the ventilation system was developed.

In March, a container for personal items was added to the back of the turret. Since it was originally designed for the Afrika Corps, it earned the nickname "Rommel box". It wasn't used on all tanks. On some tanks, it was not installed on the turret, but on the side of the hull. Some units designed their own "Rommel box", whose shape was different from the original.

This was just the start of all possible modifications that were introduced at the division, and sometimes battalion level. The equipment of a PzIV for 1941 alone is a topic worthy of its own sizeable article.

PzIVs in Africa were in their element. 20 tanks were sent in February, 3 of which were lost on the way, and 20 more arrived in April. The only seriously dangerous enemy of the PzIV was the Matilda tank, due to its thick armour. However, the 2-pdr (40 mm) cannons of these tanks could only penetrate the applique front of the PzIV at close range, and these situations were rare.

The result of a PzIV meeting a KV-2, summer 1941.

The conditions of the Eastern Front were different. Only 15 PzIVs were irreparably lost until the end of June, mostly because their enemies were T-26 and BT tanks from a completely different weight class. The chaos of the first few weeks of the war also left its mark. However, 109 tanks, a quarter of the initial amount, were scrap by the end of July. 68 more joined them in August. In total, the Germans lost 348 PzIVs in 1941, over three quarters of their initial amount.

German tankers could squarely point the blame at the 6th Waffenampt, which treated the issue of armour very lightly. The tanks were up-armoured according to experience from September of 1939. The fact that the French had 47 mm L/32 tank and anti-tank guns which, as Soviet trials proved, could penetrate 50 mm of German armour from 400 meters, was ignored.

The characteristics of the 47 mm Canon de 47 Mle.1937, which had a length of 50 calibers, were even more distressing. It could penetrate 57 mm of armour from a kilometer away. The Germans should have assumed that the French weren't the only ones who had more powerful anti-tank artillery than the Poles.

PzIV Ausf. E from the 20th Tank Division, NIIBT proving grounds, August 1941.

The Wehrmacht had to pay with tanks and men for the miscalculation of their leadership. Things went well enough while the main opponents were T-26 and BT tanks, but T-34 and KV-1 tanks armed with 76 mm guns appeared more and more frequently. Some tanks were also only partially up-armoured, which reduced the chances of survival under fire from even 45 mm guns.

The KV-2 also made an appearance. A hit from a 152 mm shell turned the German tank into a heap of scrap. Of course, a penetration from any other shell also had grave consequences. Ammunition detonation was a common occurrence for the PzIV. It's worth noting that the PzIV was powerless against the T-34 and KV-1. Stock armour piercing shells had almost no effect, and Hitler did not allow the use of  7.5 cm Gr.Patr.38 Kw.K. HEAT shells, available in April of 1941, until February of 1942.

The same tank from the front. You can see impacts and the cracked applique armour around the driver's vision port.

In August of 1941, a captured PzIV Ausf. E tank from the 20th Tank Division was delivered to the NIIBT proving grounds at Kubinka. The tank was rather beaten up: there were several hits to the front and the applique armour around the driver's vision port was cracked. Proving grounds employees composed a brief evaluation, estimating the mass of the "Medium Tank T-IV Mod. 1939-40" as 24 tons and its top speed as 50 kph. After preliminary calculations, the following conclusions were made:
  • The armour of the T-IV can be penetrated by artillery of all calibers.
  • The tank's turret, observation hatches, and the radio operator's machinegun mount are vulnerable to high caliber machineguns.
Captured PzIVs became a common occurrence after 1941. Nevertheless, the NIIBT proving grounds didn't attempt to repair the captured tank, nor obtain a functioning specimen.

This is mostly due to the fact that the Soviet military had little interest in the tank. It was treated as an auxiliary to the PzIII, especially since their mass was similar. This is also why the StuG III Ausf. B was not put into working order. Study of the PzIII and Pz38(t) took priority, and it was considered pointless to waste time on secondary tanks. 


Unlike the StuG III, the PzIV's armour was vulnerable to the 45 mm gun.

Trials were held in September of 1942 where the tank was subjected to shots from various guns. First, it was fired at by the DShK machinegun. The side of the turret was not penetrated even at 50 meters, but the side and rear of the hull could be penetrated at 100 meters.

The results of trials against the 45 mm gun were even more interesting. The 50 mm front plate could be penetrated at 50 meters. It's worth noting that the same gun could not penetrate a captured StuG's front. The 40 mm (20+20) thick side armour was penetrated from a distance of 400 meters.

Finally, the PzIV was pitted against the 76 mm F-34 gun installed in the T-34 medium tank. The front plate was penetrated from 500 meters (entrance diameter of the breach was 90 mm, exit diameter 100 mm). The next shot from 800 meters cracked the plate in half. Firing from 800 meters at the side of the tank, she shell penetrated the side armour, blew up inside, and penetrated the other side. An HE shell fired at the side of the tank tore off the turret hatch, the second shot tore off the commander's cupola, and a hit to the engine compartment (20 mm armour) formed a 130x350 mm breach. No more shots were fired, the situation was already clear.

In addition to shooting at the tank, NII-48 specialists performed an analysis of the hull and turret design.

One of the PzIV Ausf. D tanks that was armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 40 cannon and equipped with spaced armour.

The few remaining PzIV Ausf. D and E tanks were modernized in July of 1942. Instead of the stock gun, they were equipped with the long barreled 7.5 cm KwK 40. Starting in May of 1943, spaced armour was added to the hull and turret. By that point, these tanks were taken off the front lines and handed over to training units, including the NSKK.

These tanks were present in tank units located in France. One of them (PzIV Ausf. D, serial number 80732, produced in July of 1940) was captured by the British in the summer of 1944. Today, it can be seen at the Bovington Tank Museum.

Operation Barbarossa

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Directive #21
Plan Barbarossa
Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
December 18th, 1940

The German armed forces must be able to defeat Soviet Russia in a brief campaign before the war against England is complete (plan Barbarossa).
The land forces must use all available units for this goal, except those that are necessary for protecting occupied territories from anything unexpected.

The task of the air force is to allocate such forces for support of the land forces in the Eastern campaign that would guarantee a rapid conclusion of ground operations, and, at the same time, limit damage done to eastern regions of Germany by enemy aviation. This concentration of forces in the east must be limited by the requirement that the theaters of war and our military industrial areas are reliably protected from enemy air raids and that the offensive against England, especially against its sea supply routes, is not weakened.

The main forces of the navy will be directed against England even during the Eastern campaign.

An order for strategic deployment of the armed forces against Soviet Russia will be given as necessary eight weeks before the operation begins. Preparations that require more time should be completed by May 15th, 1941, if they have not been completed already.

It is imperative that no one must predict our intention to attack. Preparatory action by all command channels must take into account the following:
  1. Overall plan: The main Russian forces in the western part of Russia must be destroyed by means of deep and rapid advance of tank spearheads. The retreat of combat-capable forces to the open expanse of Russian territory must be prevented.
    The line from which the Russian air force will be unable to make air raids on the territory of the German Reich must be reached quickly. The final goal of the operation is to create a defensive barrier against the Asian part of Russia along the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. This way, if necessary, the last industrial sector that Russia retains in the Urals can be paralyzed with aircraft.
    During these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will be unable to continue fighting.
    Effective action by the Russian air force must be prevented by powerful attacks in the beginning of the operation.
  2. Likely allies: 
    1. In the war with Soviet Russia, we can count on active participation of Romania and Finland on our flanks.
      Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will coordinate and determine in what capacity the armed forces of both countries will be subordinate to German command at the appropriate time.
    2. The objectives of Romania will be to support the German offensive on the south flank with its best forces, bind the forces of the enemy in regions where German forces are not used, and perform auxiliary duties in the rear echelon.
    3. Finland must cover the concentration and deployment of the German separate north group (elements of the 21st army) coming from Norway, and fight alongside them. In addition, Finland is tasked with taking the Hanko peninsula.
    4. It is possible that Swedish railroads and highway will be available by the start of the operation at the latest for use by the German army group meant for fighting in the north.
  3. Order of Operations:
    1. Land forces: The theater of operations will be split by the Pripyat marshes into the north and south parts. The main attack must be aimed north of the marshes. Concentrate two army groups here.
      The south of those groups, the center of the overall front, is tasked with advancing its especially strong tank and motorized units from Warsaw and north of it and disperse the enemy forces in Belarus. This will create the ability to turn powerful units north in order to cooperate with Army Group North, which advances from East Prussia to Leningrad, defeating the enemy forces in the Baltic. After this urgent task is completed and Leningrad and Kronstadt are taken, the next step is to begin operations to take Moscow as an importance communication and industrial center.
      Only an unexpectedly rapid failure of Russian resistance will make it possible to complete those tasks simultaneously.
      The most important task for the 21st Army during this campaign remains the defense of Norway. Forces outside of that (mountain corps) are to be used in the north, primarily for the defense of Petsamo (Pechenga) and its ore mines, as well as shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean. After that, these forces must move to the Murmansk railroad along with the Finnish forces and paralyze the supply of Murmansk oblast by land.
      Whether or not this operation can be completed by larger German forces (2-3 divisions) from Rovaniemi and south of it depends on Sweden's readiness to provide us with its railroads for troop transport.
      The main forces of the Finnish army will be given the objective of binding as many Russian forces as possible as the north German flank advances, attack to the west or on both sides of Leningrad, and capture the Hanko peninsula.
      Armies fighting to the south of the Pripyat marshes must completely defeat Russian forces deployed in the Ukraine with an encirclement operation and strong flanks before they reach the Dnieper. To accomplish this goal, it is necessary to concentrate the main strike force from Lublin to Kiev, while forces in Romania will create a defensive flank in the lower Prut. The Romanian army is tasked with binding the Russian forces in between them.
      After the battles south and north of the Pripyat marshes are concluded, begin pursuing the enemy and achieve the following goals:
      1. In the south, promptly capture the Donbas, as it is important militarily and economically.
      2. In the north, quickly reach Moscow.
        The capture of this city will result not only in decisive political and economical success, but be the loss of a major railroad hub.
    2. Air Force: their objective is to maximally paralyze and neutralize the actions of the Russian air force and support the land forces in their operations in decisive directions. This will mostly be necessary in the direction of Army Group Center and the main flank of Army Group South. Russian railroads and supply lines must be cut or disabled by capture of key objects nearby (river crossings) by brave action of paratroopers, depending on their value to the operation.
      In order to concentrate all forces against enemy aviation and for support of land forces, do not perform raids on enemy military industrial targets. These raids will be predominately aimed at the Urals towards the end of the maneuver operations.
    3. Navy: In the war against Soviet Russia, the navy is tasked with protecting the coast and preventing the enemy from breaking out of the Baltic Sea. Since the Baltic Fleet will lose its foundation and become helpless after taking Leningrad, avoid large scale operations at sea.
      After the neutralization of the Russian fleet, the goal will be to provide freedom of supply through the Baltic Sea, including supplies to the north flank of the land forces (mine trawling).
  4. All orders given to supreme commanders based on this directive must be firmly founded in the idea that this is a precaution in case Russia changes its politics regarding us. The number of officers involved in preliminary planning must be limited. All other personnel the involvement of which is mandatory must be informed as late as possible, and only in the capacity that will allow them to perform their function individually. Otherwise, there is a risk of serious political and military difficulties as a result of the discovery of our preparations, the timeline of which has not yet been set.
  5. I expect verbal reports from supreme commanders regarding their intentions based on this directive.
    Report to me through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces regarding planned preparations in all armed forces and their progress.
A. Hitler"

KV-3 Turret

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Actual KV-3 turret blueprints laid over the commonly shown drawing.

KV-3 wooden mockup photo. The overhang of the turret is clearly visible.

"Armour protection:
  • Hull:
    • Sides: 90 mm
    • Upper front plate: 120/80 mm
    • Lower front plate: 100 mm
    • Rear: 90 mm
    • Top: 40 mm
    • Floor: 40/30 mm
  • Turret (stamped):
    • Height (with observation cupola): 1,245 mm
    • Sides: 115 mm
    • Slope of the sides: 30°
    • Gun frame armour (stamped) 130 mm
    • Roof: 50 mm
    • Gun mantlet: 115 mm
    • Diameter of the turret ring: 1,670 mm"

T-34 Sketch

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The fact that German soldiers didn't have the best idea of what a T-34 looked like already cropped up on my blog. However, if they were equipped with identification guides like these, that isn't too surprising.


The caption reads "particularly suitable places to attach explosive charges and T-mines on the 32 ton tank". The weight is also incorrect, but prophetic: the mass of the final iteration of the T-34-85 reached 32 tons.

World of Tanks History Section: How Nikolai Simonyak became General Breakthrough

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The name Nikolai Pavlovich Simonyak is closely connected with the Red Army's successes in the Battle of Leningrad. In the winter of 1943, when the blockade was punctured, his 136th Rifle Division was fighting in the main assault, and its actions brought greatest success to the Red Army on January 12th. Here is where N.P. Simonyak earned the nickname "General Breakthrough".

Before the Breakthrough

Way back during the defense of the Hanko peninsula in 1941, Simonyak thoroughly built up a functional staff, a rare occurrence among Red Army commanders in the early war. This was noticeable in how the journals of the 8th Independent Rifle Brigade and then division which Nikolai Pavlovich commanded. Even in the battles of August-September of 1942 that ended poorly for the Red Army, his division, fighting in the 55th Army, probably performed better than any Soviet unit at Leningrad.

In November of 1942, Simonyak's 136th division was taken out of the 55th Army to the front reserve. The troops were busy with training. Everyone understood that a new breakthrough attempt was coming, and there was a lot to do before it could be successful.

One of the greatest difficulties for the Leningrad Front was that its forces had to cross the Neva in order to engage the Germans. It had to be done in such a way that the captured foothold wouldn't end up as another blood-soaked dead end.

General Simonyak and his 136th division had a difficult objective: cross the frozen Neva, which was 600 m wide in their sector. It was incredibly important to prepare the infantry for the crossing in advance. The organization of the crossing would determine success in battle. The preparations were controlled by the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant-General L.A. Govorov. Stavka representative K. Voroshilov visited Simonyak's division at least twice in November and December of 1942. Failures in training could spell grave consequences for the division's commanders.

Difficult in Training, Easy in Battle

Simonyak tirelessly worked to prepare his troops for their task. He carefully put into practice the saying that in war, sweat will save on blood. He demanded that soldiers be able to quickly cover the open space on the river. The commander had to know the enemy's front line of defense precisely. This knowledge allowed him to correctly determine the amount of resources required for the division.

Simonyak also put great effort into bringing another idea to life, one that, in his opinion, would bring success to his troops. It included maximum use of concentrated direct fire from the right shore of the Neva. To do this, intelligence about the enemy shore had to be carefully collected. Artillery had to support the infantry with a rolling barrage, a moving wall of explosions in front of the troops. This is an effective tactic, but one that required precision from artillery and ability to keep up from infantry. Any mistake could be deadly, as it doesn't matter whose shell the shrapnel that's flying at you came from. Soldiers practiced following a rolling barrage before the start of Operation Spark.

A panorama of the German shore of the Neva.

Simonyak and his staff didn't stop there. Infantry units began preparing assault teams who would clear the path for the rest of the infantry. The soldiers were preparing for not only going on the ice first, but doing so before the start of the artillery barrage. Many things depended on the speed, experience, and understanding of their own role by these teams. Even the most powerful and well aimed barrage can't eliminate all enemy strongholds, and these teams had to finish what the artillery started.

Simonyak understood that his commanders will demand precise information about his actions. Even though the 136th division's staff was working flawlessly, the commander decided to organize an observation point right on the riverbank. The general intended to watch the actions of his men personally, and the troops were encouraged by the fact that their commander was at the front lines with them.

N.P. Simonyak was given significant resources for the battle: over 400 guns and mortars, as well as light tanks of the 61st Tank Brigade.

Let us examine the enemy that the 136th Rifle Division was supposed to crush. Two battalions (out of three) of the 401st Grenadier Regiment of the 170th Infantry Division were defending there. The regiment, strongest in its division, counted 1100 men. Even though it was under authorized strength, the amount of firepower and manpower was more than enough to defend its sector, and a lot more than the Red Army units opposite of them had. German artillery was a serious problem for the attackers. If it could open fire during the river crossing, the operation would fail.

Brightest Spark

The operation to break through the blockade, codenamed Spark, began on January 12th, 1943. It was time for Simonyak and his division to test the results of their thorough preparations.

There is a small inconsistency between the actual actions of the troops and the division's documents. Operation Spark is always associated with powerful artillery fire. Simonyak added infantry fire to this. 20 minutes before the barrage ended, mounted machineguns fired four belts worth of ammunition towards the German shore. At the same time, the soldiers were already supposed to be on the ice. Documents say that everything went according to plan. That's the contradiction. Did it have an impact on the events that unfolded? Likely not. It's known that the troops were greatly encouraged, going into battle to the sound of L'Internationale, the anthem of the Soviet Union at the time.

How did Simonyak's attack look through German eyes? Initially, the HQ of the 170th Infantry Division reported nothing about the fate of its 401st regiment, the first to come under attack. Not a single radio message was sent in the morning after Soviet artillery opened fire. Soviet guns dealt significant damage not only to units of the regiment that were on the front lines, but to its reserves too. The German command structure was disorganized, all efforts to establish screening fire went to waste. German artillery almost didn't fire at the Neva.

The result of the battle was resounding success for the 136th Rifle Division. Its soldiers captured a 3 km wide foothold on the left shore of the Neva. Considering that the unit to the right of Simonyak managed to grab onto land as well, the Red Army achieved the impossible. Its troops crossed over half a kilometer of open ground, climbed the steep left bank, and broke through the enemy's front line of defense.

As mentioned above, N.P. Simonyak's division ensured success. Looking at the operation overall, his soldiers played a key role. The foothold they captured was widened. Simonyak's men advanced to join up with the Volkhov Front. Meanwhile, other units poured into the gap they made in the enemy's ranks. The 136th Rifle Division made it further than anyone else and managed to join up with the Volkhovites. It happened on January 18th, 1943, at Worker's Village #5, and became one of the most notable Red Army successes in the North-Western direction. This successful conclusion of Operation Spark was guaranteed by Simonyak's success on January 12th. This was the expected outcome to all the thorough training, skillful actions, and correct approach of the 136th division's commanders. Many of those serving under "General Breakthrough" had successful military careers, and Nikolai Pavlovich himself climbed the chain of command.

Another interesting story is connected with the 136th Rifle Division. It soon became the 63rd Guards, and many commanders and soldiers received distinctions. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front sent a congratulatory telegram to the division HQ that read "Elements of your division, righting in fierce battles to penetrate the enemy blockade of Leningrad, advancing in the front lines of the 67th Army, crossing the Neva river, broke through the enemy's fortified positions... Elements of your division were the first to unite with the Volkhov Front on January 18th, playing the key role in the battles for Leningrad."

In reality, Simonyak's division wasn't the first unit in the Leningrad Front to join up with the Volkohov Front, but that doesn't diminish its incredible contributions. Interestingly enough, the telegram's text was edited, and military council member A.A. Zhdanov changed the first few lines. They sounded much more congratulatory in the original: "Elements of your division... played the key, decisive role in the battles for Leningrad." It's almost as though Zhdanov was sorry for Simonyak's humility.

Nikolai Pavlovich and his division continued to fight in the 55th Army. It was given the objective to advance to Krasniy Bor and fight the Spanish units of the German army. The Kransiy Bor operation was a failure for the Red Army, but not for Simonyak, whose guardsmen carried out their mission and defeated the Spaniards at Krasniy Bor.

Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf. A: Christie, German Style

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The appearance of John Walter Christie's Medium Tank M1931 caused a revolution in tank building worldwide. A new type of tank appeared: the fast tank. Thanks to their speed, these tanks could carry out a number of other tasks in addition to infantry support. Many countries began working on conceptually similar tanks. The PzIII, Germany's main tank in 1940-43 could be considered one of these tanks. What is the history of its creation?


A New Class

In the early 1930s, German engineers worked on two types of tanks in utmost secrecy. One of them, the Grosstraktor (large tractor) was a 16 ton medium tank. The second, the Leichttraktor (light tractor), was a 9 ton tank armed with a 37 mm gun. Similar in concept to the American Light Tank T1, inspiration was also drawn from the British Medium Tank Mk.I. The main purpose of the light German tank was infantry support. The work was done in a tender: one tank was built by Rheinmetall and one by Krupp. The tanks were tested in the USSR at Kazan. After the trials, changes were made to their suspension.

Meanwhile, the late 1920s and early 1930s were a time of change for worldwide tank building. Despite a financial crisis, several iconic vehicles were made. The duet of John Carden and Vivian Loyd joined forces with the arms giant Vickers-Armstrongs Limited, birthing the Carden-Loyd tankette and Vickers Mk.E light tank. Even though the British army skipped over both tanks, they had an enormous influence on tank designs in other countries.

Germany was no exception. In 1931, it purchased a Vickers-Carden-Loyd artillery tractor, which had the same layout as their tanks. Trials showed that a layout with a front transmission has its advantages. Taking the British vehicle as the base, the Germans developed a new tank called the Kleintraktor. It not only became the foundation for the PzI infantry support tank, but defined the concept of the German tank as a whole. According to this concept, the German tank had a gasoline engine positioned in the rear, with a transmission and drive sprockets in the front. The turret was installed on a removable turret platform.

One of Rheinmetall's Leichttraktors received a suspension with coil springs in 1933. This was the first step towards the future PzIII.

The appearance of the Christie tank put the Leichttraktor into an even shakier position. Experiments with it continued until 1933, but it was clear that the time of the "light tractor" is done. Germany took a serious interest in the American tank. According to Peter Chamberlain's information, they tried to get Christie to work for them, offering a sum of one million dollars. The head of the US. Wheel Track Layer Corporation showed them the door. However, this didn't stop Rheinmetall-Borsig AG engineers from making their own version of the Christie suspension. It was tried on one L.Tr. Rhm., but did not move past the experimental stage, at least on this type of tank.

A discussion regarding the Leichttraktor's replacement began in late 1933. According to the first drafts, the 37 mm gun used on the L.Tr. was satisfactory. Full requirements for the new tank appeared later, in January of 1934. On January 27th, the 6th Armament Directorate, responsible for development of armoured vehicles, began the development of a tank armed with a 37 mm gun and weighing about 10 tons. The design was developed in close cooperation with Krupp. The arms giant couldn't wait to get even with Daimler-Benz, who took the contract for La.S. (the future PzI) right out from under their nose. Krupp expected to have their revenge by taking the contract for the new tank.

However, everything did not go according to Krupp's plan. The 6th Armament Directorate considered a competition to be a much better way. In the spring of 1934, an order for the development of a new tank was sent out to four companies: Daimler-Benz, Krupp, MAN, and Rheinmetall-Borsig. The tank was indexed Z.W. (Zugfuhrerwagen), or "platoon commander's vehicle). The index Gefechtskampfwagen 3.7 cm (combat vehicle with 37 mm gun) was also used. Finally, the experimental tank was called Vskfz 619, or "experimental vehicle 619". According to specifications, the 10 ton weight class tank would have a 300 hp Maybach HL 100 TR 10 L engine and a ZF SSG 75 six-speed gearbox. The width of the track links was also set to 326 mm.

This is how Krupp's Z.W. looked like. Only the turret went into production, as the 6th Armament Directorate didn't agree with Krupp's proposal to make the whole tank.

The proposed designs were similar in many ways. Jentz and Doyle only provide the specifications for the Daimler-Benz, MAN, and Rheinmetall-Borsig designs. However, Krupp also finished their design, and even completed a full sized wooden model. According to existing information, the mass of all proposals was about 12 tons, the length was between 5.1 and 5.4 meters, the width was about 2.6 meters, and the height was about 2.4 meters. Sadly, no graphical materials of original designs remain.

Based on examination of the projects, the work on the chassis and the turret was split up. DB and MAN received a contract to build one chassis each, and Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig received a contract to build turrets. Krupp's engineers continued work on the chassis, but they couldn't pull off another B.W. style gambit. That design did not progress further than a wooden model. Soon, MAN left the competition, and DB received a contract for two experimental chassis. At the end of 1934, the tank received the name 3.7 cm Geschütz-Kampfwagen, or fighting machine with 37 mm gun.

On the Way to Production

Experimental prototypes of the Z.W. were completed in August of 1935. By then, the tank was renamed again, into 3.7 cm Geschütz-Panzerwagen, or "armoured vehicle with 37 mm gun". Work on turrets continued, with Krupp finishing not one, but two prototypes.

The dimensions of the Daimler-Benz chassis was slightly different from the initial characteristics of the Z.W. It was 40 cm longer and almost 20 cm wider. As specifications required, it used a 300 hp Maybach HL 100 TR engine and ZF SSG 75 gearbox. Even though the top speed was estimated to be 40 kph, one must not forget about the Christie tank. At the same 12 tons, it had a 343 hp engine. The weight and engine power characteristics are close enough to make one doubt that it was a coincidence.

Rheinmetall-Borsig turret design.

The suspension was another indicator of what the Germans were inspired by when making the tank. As mentioned above, the German take on the Christie suspension was tried out on the Leichttraktor. This suspension migrated to this tank without changing much. The Germans approached the spring suspension in their own way. Unsatisfied with the space the springs took up inside the tank, the Germans put them outside. The length of the spring was also a lot less than on Christie's tanks. The road wheels, five per side, were also smaller. The suspension used on the American Gun Motor Carriage T49 was similar, and that was likely also no coincidence. 

The same turret installed on an experimental Z.W., 1935.

The similarities ended there. The drive sprockets and idlers were completely different, and the layout of the tank had little in common with the "American". The Germans used large diameter idlers and a drive sprocket with teeth rather than bars. The crown was removable. The drive sprockets and transmission were located in the front of the hull, which allowed the size of the fighting compartment to be increased. The track links were a departure from the original requirements and their width was increased to 360 mm.

The hull also had little in common with the American tank. It turned out rather wide. The driving compartment fit not only the driver, but a radio operator/hull gunner. Thanks to the "step" shape of the front of the turret platform and observation devices that pointed sideways, the driver had good visibility. The thickness of the armour ranged from 10 to 14.5 mm and protected from rifle bullets. Experimental Z.W. tanks were made of mild steel.

The second Z.W. was built with a Krupp turret.

Alternative turrets were ready by August of 1935. Both of them were designed to house three people, with the commander sitting in the back and looking through a commander's cupola. Influence from the Nb.Fz. medium tank and La.S. turret could be seen here. The Nb.Fz. shone through the hardest in the Rheinmetall turret. The commander's cupola was taken with no changes, and the hatches on the sides also looked very similar, and also opened backwards. The shape of the turret looked like a larger version of the one developed for the La.S. by Daimler-Benz. The sides and rear of the turret were made from one curved plate, which was not great when it came to ease of production. The gun had an external mantlet.

This turret went on to initial production PzIIIs.

Krupp engineers also based their design on the Nb.Fz. Like Rheinmetall, the commander's cupola and hatches took their influence from there. Krupp was also designing the turret for the B.W. support tank, the future PzIV, and the turrets of these tanks had many similarities. After trials that took up the rest of 1935, it was clear that Krupp's design was superior. A list of 25 improvements was made, but this did not seriously dampen their success.

Small Batch

In April of 1936, the tank finally obtained the index it is known by today. It became Panzerkampfwagen III (3.7 cm), or "armoured fighting vehicle III with a 37 mm gun". At the same time, it was given the index Sd.Kfz.141, or "special purpose vehicle 141". A year later, a batch of 10 tanks was completed, with serial numbers 60101 through 60110.

Mass production PzIII Ausf. A from the 5th Tank Regiment, 3rd Tank Division.

While the layout and shape of the turret and hull remained the same, the first PzIII Ausf. A tanks had a number of differences from the initial Z.W. First of all, this applies to the suspension. The drive sprockets and idlers became smaller in diameter. The design of the suspension, which now had shock absorbers for the road wheels, was also different. The tank received observation hatches, and the driver had a special observation device for battle. The Mayback 100 TR was replaced by the HL 108 TR with a volume of 10.8 Liters and power of 250 hp.

The same tank on exercises.

The turret also underwent changes. The first variant of the gun mantlet was deemed unsatisfactory and had to be changed. The design of the commander's cupola was also changed. The use of the tank revealed that machinegun fire often damaged the antenna. A deflector rail was installed underneath the gun mantlet to move it out of the way.

The changes made to the suspension can be seen here.

The small size of the first batch (10 tanks) can be explained by problems with the suspension. The Germans ran into the same problem as the Soviets did with later versions of the BT tank and then the T-34. The problem is that Christie's suspension was sensitive to increases in mass. The mass of the PzIII Ausf. A was 15 tons, 3 tons (25%) heavier than the Z.W. The result of the increased load was an increase in the oscillations of the hull, and the addition of the shock absorbers didn't help much. These problems were likely discovered during trials, as Daimler-Benz received a contract for Z.W.3 and Z.W.4 tanks with leaf spring suspensions back in 1936.

Tank from the 1st Tank Regiment, 1st Tank Division during fighting in Poland. September 1939.

Despite issues with the suspension, the PzIII Ausf. A not only reached the front lines, but saw action. The reason for this was simple: there were no other medium tanks. Ironically, there were more heavier PzIV "support tanks" produced than PzIIIs. Production of the PzIII only surpassed 10 units per month in July of 1939.

The first mass produced PzIII tanks were put into the 1st Tank Regiment, 1st Tank Division and the 5th Tank Regiment, 3rd Tank Division. These tanks were actively used in exercises and frequently appeared in photographs. Initially, they were painted in three colour camouflage, but were repainted in the 1938 dark gray colour by the start of WWII. The tanks saw combat in 1939 in the same units. They were only taken off the front lines when enough PzIII Ausf E-G tanks were delivered to tank units.

PzIII Ausf. A from a training unit. The tank carries its original 3 colour camouflage.

The tank's service did not end here. These tanks were transferred to training units and spread out among many training facilities. Some tanks had their turrets and turret platforms removed and drove around like this for a few more years. The PzIIIs Ausf. A were finally written off only as they wore out. 

Converted tank. It has a new machinegun mount and a Notek light. Smoke grenade launchers would have been installed in the rear.

Despite its difficult beginning, it's hard to call the Z.W. a failure. Yes, its suspension was poor, and caused a few years of headaches. However, overall, especially as the first German medium tank, the design wasn't bad. It had a sizeable modernization reserve built in. Final production PzIII tanks were 1.5 times heavier than the PzIII Ausf. A, and their front armour was three times as thick.

By 1939 the tank was the best medium tank in the world, and only the appearance of the T-34 spoiled this situation for the Germans. It's worth mentioning that the PzIII was superior to the T-34 in some areas, especially visibility. However, the story of the transformation of the Z.W. from an ugly duckling to one of the best tanks in the world by the start of WWII is worthy of another article.

Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf B-D

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The PzIII, the main German tank for the first half of WWII, was at the same time its most problematic tank. Even though the PzII also had problems with its suspension, it was only seriously redesigned once. The PzIII, on the other hand, used five (!) different types of suspension, all of which went into production. Today, we will focus on the "intermediate" PzIII Ausf. B, C, and D. Even though none of these tanks were made in large numbers, they managed to see battle, and some of them remained on the front lines for a long time.

Insurance Policy


The first experimental Z.W. prototype, indexed Z.W.1, was completed in August of 1935. Sadly, no details on the trials of the Z.W.1 have been found. However, something was clearly wrong with the suspension.

The coil spring suspension that was first tried on the Rheinmetall Leichttraktor had 4 road wheels per side. Trials of the suspension on this tank were likely successful, as the same suspension was used on the Z.W. with five wheels per side. Initially, the Z.W. was designed for the 10 ton weight category. Later, the limit was raised to 12 tons, and the final mass of the Z.W., now indexed PzIII Ausf. A, was 15 tons. The coil spring suspension, sensitive to increase in weight, behaved poorly in these conditions.

First of all, this introduced oscillations, best observed when the tank made a sudden stop. Even the introduction of shock absorbers on the mass produced PzIII Ausf. A didn't help.

PzIII Ausf. B on maneuvers. The round brake access hatches, characteristic of this variant, are visible.

In order to play it safe. the 6th Armament Directorate ordered two extra chassis from Daimler-Benz towards the end of 1935. The first of these was indexed Z.W.3. It had improved cooling system fans, a five-speed gearbox, reinforced brakes, and reinforced turning mechanisms. The idler diameter was increased to 770 mm and the number of road wheels grew from 5 to 8 per side. They were joined into two groups of two bogeys each and the coil springs were replaced with two large leaf springs. The amount of return rollers increased to three per side.

Another novelty was the introduction of the Maybach HL 108 engine. As for the second tank, the Z.W.4, it retained the old engine, but its suspension changed similar to that of the Z.W.3. However, there was one leaf spring, placed in the center. The front and rear bogeys had one half leaf spring each. The Z.W.4 also used track links widened to 380 mm.

The PzIII Ausf. B used leaf springs instead of coil springs, with 8 road wheels per side.

As a result of trials, the Z.W.3 was put into production. Tanks built on this chassis were called PzIII Ausf. B. The index 2./Z.W. Serie, "Z.W. tanks second series", was also used. 15 tanks with serial numbers 60201-60215 were ordered. Eight tanks were ready by November 9th, 1937, two of which were sent to the 5th Tank Regiment in Wünsdorf, and the rest to a training facility in Putlos. Two more tanks ended up in the 1st Tank Regiment on December 6th, 1937.

The remaining five chassis weren't destined to become PzIII Ausf. B. They were used to make Pz.Sfl.III (s.Pak) vehicles, a precursor to the StuG III. Daimler-Benz was supposed to build five more chassis to replace the ones used to make Pz.Sfl.III (s.Pak), but it never happened. Meanwhile, Krupp completed their contract, producing 15 turrets. Five of them lay idly for over two years.

PzIII Ausf. C. The two main differences from its precursor are visible: a new commander's cupola and a redesigned suspension.

Mass production PzIII Ausf. B tanks were different from the experimental Z.W.3. The drive sprockets, idlers, and track links were taken from the PzIII Ausf. A. The same applies to the hull and turret platform.

However, it's easy to tell the PzIII Ausf. B from other early Z.W. tanks due to the round hinged hatches on the front plate for servicing the brakes. The PzIII Ausf. A and all later variants had square hatches without hinges. Both of these solutions were puzzling. Not only did the hatches weaken the front plate, but it was also difficult to service the brakes through them. Crews had to remove over 10 bolts per hatch, which was hardly a cakewalk, as they were positioned in the dirtiest place onthe tank.

The mass production vehicles used the Maybach 108 TR engine. The top speed didn't change, even though the tank's weight increased to 16 tons. The complicated suspension contributed to the weight.

Loading a PzIII Ausf. C, 1939. The tank was modernized: smoke grenade launchers were added to the rear.

The Z.W.4 chassis was also not built in vain. The 6th Armament Directorate didn't think too long before putting it into production. Its mass produced version is known as the PzIII Ausf. C or  3./Z.W. Serie.

Seeing that the round brake maintenance hatches were a bad idea, Daimler-Benz returned to the initial front plate design. As with the second series, the PzIII Ausf. C had the same idler, drive sprocket, and track links as the PzIII Ausf. A. The tanks received improved driver's observation devices, initially designed for the PzII Ausf. A. The shape of the engine compartment roof and rear mudguards changed slightly. Finally, the turret received a new commander's cupola that Krupp designed for the PzIV Ausf. B. It had a 30 mm thick reinforcement ring, which significantly increased protection. However, with 14.5 mm thick regular armour, this improvement was largely psychological.

According to the signed contract, Daimler-Benz began assembling the 3./Z.W. Serie in the fall of 1937. The tank received serial numbers 60301-60315. As for turrets, the situation with them is more interesting. Krupp received a contract for only 4 turrets, the rest was given to Alkett (Altmärkische Kettenfabrik) in Spandau, a suburb of Berlin. This company was formed in 1937 as a tank assembly subsidiary of Rheinmetall-Borsig AG.

Reworked suspension of the PzIII Ausf. D.

Meanwhile, the situation with the 3./Z.W. Serie order changed. Trials showed that the idea of half leaf springs in the front and rear needs more work. The redesign didn't end there, and the result was a whole new tank, the PzIII Ausf. D. Since it was formally a modified PzIII Ausf. C, it was included in the 3./Z.W. Serie contract. PzIII Ausf. C tanks were listed as 3a./Z.W. Serie, and PzIII Ausf. D tanks were listed as 3b./Z.W. Serie. 

The new modification had a longer rear and a new suspension. Instead of half leaf springs, the front and rear bogeys received full leaf springs, as well as shock absorbers. The suspension for the central bogeys also changed. The tank received a new SSG 76 transmission.

PzIII Ausf. D photographed during the Poland campaign.

The orders for 3a./Z.W. Serie and 3b./Z.W. Serie were filled in parallel, and as such, the tanks aren't always differentiated in documents. PzIII Ausf. D tanks received serial numbers in the 60316-60340 range. The production of 3./Z.W. Serie was completed in late November of 1938. However, this was not the end of PzIII Ausf. D production, as Daimler-Benz still had a contract for 4 PzIII Ausf. B tanks to fill, which was eventually changed to 5 PzIII Ausf. D tanks with serial numbers 60221–60225. For a number of reasons,  production lagged behind schedule, and these tanks were only completed in October of 1940. They received turrets from the PzIII Ausf. B.

Pressed into Service

Like the PzIII Ausf. A, tanks from the second and third series were mostly sent to training units. Even when it was clear that war with Poland is coming, more than a third (37 out of 98 PzIIIs) were assigned to the 1st Training Tank Regiment.

Meanwhile, problems with the suspension continued to plague the PzIII with shocking regularity. The replacement of the coil springs didn't help, since that just caused new problems. First of all, the small road wheels had a short lifespan. The problem could be solved by increasing their diameter, but that would require changing the suspension design. The complexity of the suspension was not reduced compared to the PzIII Ausf. A, far from it. In addition, tanks from the 1st and 2nd series had problems with brakes, which could only be solved by a redesign.

The oiling diagram for the PzIII Ausf. D shows how much of the tank's internal space the leaf spring suspension ate up.

The tanks were gradually modernized during service. First of all, smoke grenade launchers were installed in the rear starting on August of 1938. Several tanks received front and rear Notek lights. Two 5 meter tow cables were introduced to replace the stock 10 meter one that tore often.

Despite various modifications, the Germans understood that the characteristics of the tanks will not radically improve. The first three series of Z.W. tanks were obsolete as soon as they entered production, first of all due to their armour. Fighting in Spain showed that a tank needs to have at least 30 mm of armour to protect it from 20 mm autocannons. 14.5 mm of armour protected the tank only from rifle bullets.

Early PzIII tanks knocked out during the Polish campaign. Polish 37 mm armour piercing shells passed through their armour like it wasn't there.

Despite such disappointing conclusions regarding the combat qualities of the PzIII, they weren't spared from participating in combat. The reason was simple: there weren't enough tanks. As of September 1st, 1939, the Wehrmacht's combat units had only 51 PzIII tanks. The backbone of the Panzerwaffe was composed of PzI and PzII tanks, and the most numerous German medium tank was the PzIV, a tank initially intended as a support vehicle.

In this situation, the idea of making the B.W. (PzIV) on the Z.W. chassis that was around between the summers of 1937 and 1938 was preposterous. Daimler-Benz was incapable of making a proper tank over the span of several years, and its dreams of receiving a contract for a support tank were an impossible fantasy.

The comedy of this story is increased by the fact that the PzIII eventually became the support tank, and the PzIV once again became the most common medium tank in the Wehrmacht. History has interesting plot twists.

As of September 1st, 1939, the 1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division had the most PzIIIs (20) out of any unit. The other regiments only had 3 tanks of this type. The result of their use in battle was disappointing. Almost half of the tanks used in the campaign (24) were lost. Tanks were lost both to enemy fire as well as technical breakdowns. Knocked out or broken tanks were often used as parts donors. Large scale use of 37 mm cannons and anti-tank rifles gave these tanks low odds of survival. Polish 7TP tanks and TK-S tankettes armed with 20 mm cannons were worthy enemies of the PzIII.

Most PzIII Ausf. A-D tanks that were reclaimed in the winter of 1940 were sent to training units. Some of them had their turrets and turret platforms removed.

These results were properly understood by the Germans. A program was launched in February of 1940 to replace all PzIII Ausf. A-D tanks with more modern modifications. By the end of the month, 34 early tanks were reclaimed and sent to be repaired. They did not return to the front lines and spent the rest of their lives in training units. Some tanks had their turret platforms removed, which made them easier to drive and allowed them to carry more students.

Broken down and abandoned PzIII Ausf. D with an Ausf. B turret from Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V.40, fall-winter 1941. Looks like passing units took the tank apart for parts.

The story of the PzIII Ausf. B-D could end here, if not for a few "early" tanks that reached the front lines in 1941. These were the PzIII Ausf. D with Ausf. B turrets that were stuck in production since 1937. Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V.40 (40th Tank Battalion for Special Operations) was formed in March of 1940. The battalion's first mission was during the occupation of Norway, where the experimental Nb.Fz. tanks fought. The obsolete early PzIIIs were "banished" here.

On June 22nd, 1941, the battalion was a part of the 36th Army Corps. It fought in the polar regions, but did not show itself well. An attempt to attack Murmansk ended with nothing. The unreliable suspension of the PzIII Ausf. D led to a gradual loss of these tanks over time for technical reasons.

Commander's Long Liver

The fate of other vehicles in the leaf spring PzIII family was different. Their story begins in late October of 1935. The 6th Armament Directorate proposed a commander's vehicle on the Z.W. chassis that would be used to coordinate the actions of regular tanks. This vehicle would carry a powerful radio.

Daimler-Benz took the task of designing the Befehls-Panzerkampfwagen. In October of 1936, its name was changed to Pz.Bef.Wg. (Panzerbefehlswagen), and the indices Sd.Kfz.266, Sd.Kfz.267 and Sd.Kfz.268 were attached to the project. The design work used the PzIII Ausf. D as its foundation and arrived at a discouraging conclusion. Even though the size of the PzIII's fighting compartment was much greater than that of the PzI, the chassis of the current commander's tank, it became clear by 1938 that there was no room to retain the stock armament.

The 37 mm gun and one of the coaxial machineguns were removed. Dummies were installed instead to keep the tank looking like a regular one. The armament was reduced to one machinegun in the turret, which was installed in a ball mount. The tank also lost its rotating turret, since a large frame antenna was added behind it.

Pz.Bef.Wg. Ausf.D1. This tank is noticeably different from the PzIII Ausf. D.

This was not the end of the metamorphosis of the PzIII on its way to becoming a commander's tank. The vehicle, named Pz.Bef.Wg. Ausf.D1, changed noticeably. It received a converted PzIII Ausf. E turret. Aside from dummy armament, it received a hatch for a telescoping antenna in the roof, and a port for the antenna wire was added to the rear of the hull. The shape of the hull itself was changed. The observation ports and hull machinegun were also borrowed from the PzIII Ausf. E, and the brake maintenance hatches that weakened the front plate were removed. The engine compartment roof was also redesigned.

The thickness of the armour of the commander's tank was increased to match the PzIII Ausf. E, so that 20 mm cannons wouldn't be a dangerous enemy. The tank received a second whip antenna.

The suspension was also changed. The drive sprockets from the PzIII Ausf. E were used, as well as new idlers. The suspension was changed slightly. This was necessary since the mass of the tank grew to 18.2 tons. The maximum speed dropped to 39 kph.

The large antenna above the engine deck is the only indication that this is a commander's tank.

Initially, production of the 3c./Z.W. Serie (the name of the Pz.Bef.Wg. Ausf.D1 in some documents) was supposed to start in the fall of 1938. Experimental prototypes were supposed to appear even earlier, but production fell behind schedule for various reasons. The first vehicle of the series with its serial number in the 60341-60370 range was finished by April of 1938. 26 tanks were completed by the end of December of 1938, and the remaining four were finished by March of 1939. 24 of the tanks were of the Sd.Kfz.267 modification, and 6 Sd.Kfz.268. The Wehrmacht had 32 commander's tanks (including the later Pz.Bef.Wg. Ausf.E) at the start of the Polish campaign. 13 of them were lost.

Soviet tankers in front of a Pz.Bef.Wg. Ausf.D1. Judging by the shoulderboards, the photo was taken no earlier than 1943.

Even though about a third of the tanks was lost at the start of WWII, their service turned out to be long. Of course, the suspension had its problems, but the Pz.Bef.Wg. Ausf.D1. wasn't bad as a commander's tank. The key component was the radio, not the suspension, and it usually kept back to the second line. Thanks to this, these tanks survived the French campaign of spring-summer of 1940 and actively participated in the fighting on the Eastern Front. Some tanks survived until 1942, at least. The author's collection includes a photograph of a tank that was abandoned and captured by the Red Army no earlier than 1943.

Tank Corps Manual

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"General Foundations of Using a Tank Corps in Combat (1942)

General foundations of using a tank corps:
  1. The tank corps is the largest tank unit and is used for completing operational objectives.
    The tank corps organizational structure ensures a strike force (3 tank brigades), the ability to fight independently (presence of motorized infantry and artillery), the ability to perform tank combat, and convenience of control.
  2. The strong points of a tank corps in an operation can only be realized if the corps is used as a whole.
    Any picking apart of the corps into brigades for individual fighting deprives it of independence, strength of attack, and it turns into a tank unit for infantry support from an operational level unit. All other elements of the corps lose their combat effectiveness.
    Therefore, it is unreasonable to pick apart the tank corps, even temporarily, and the tank corps must not be used in combat in this way.
  3. The presence of homogeneous independent tank brigades and independent tank battalions solves the issue of reinforcing infantry units in attack or defense.
  4. Operational abilities of the corps: the operational abilities of the corps are defined by the combat ability of its units, specifically:
    1. High mobility on the battlefield.
    2. High artillery and machinegun firepower.
    3. Rapid advance speed: 40-60 km per day.
    4. High endurance in combat: 3-4 days.
    5. Tactical and operational mobility.
    6. Independence of action.
    7. Ability to fight tank battles.
    8. Ability to cooperate with aircraft, paratroopers, and elements acting in the enemy rear.
  5. Ways of using a tank corps: in an offensive operation, the tank corps should be used in the direction of attack by a shock army with the objective of attacking in depth, splitting apart enemy groups, destroying his command structure, encirclement of the enemy's main force with the objective of its destruction, in cooperation with aircraft, paratroopers, and other elements attacking from the front.
    In this case, the tank corps can be used in the following ways:
    1. Sending the corps into a breach in order to exploit it.
    2. Independent breakthrough by the tank corps reinforced with artillery and aircraft, destruction of field fortifications and breakthrough into operative depth.
    3. Using the tank corps during an operation to build up an attack in the main direction.
    4. Using the tank corps to liquidate an enemy counterattack against our main offensive.
      In any case, when the corps is used in an attack situation, it must be equipped, at the very least, with aircraft reconnaissance (no fewer than 6 airplanes), fighter aircraft (one fighter regiment), and bomber aircraft (no less than one bomber division, two sorties per day).
      It is also desirable to send second echelons of armies after the tank corps. In this case, the corps can attack to a depth of 40-50 km, breaking away from their infantry up to 20-25 km.
  6. A tank corps on the defensive creates significant operational depth and makes the defense elastic and resilient against large enemy tank units attempting to break through.
    On the defensive, the tank corps can be used to achieve the following objectives:
    1. Defeat of a main enemy moto-mechanized group that broke through the defensive lines, aid for other units and restoration of the previous positions.
    2. Counterattack in the flank or rear of an attacking enemy group with the goal of encircling and destroying it, with a subsequent offensive.
      In these conditions, the cooperation with artillery, aircraft, and infantry units is the most important command task to solve. In the direction of the corps' attack, it is preferable to subordinate the infantry to the tank corps, ensuring reliable support from fighter and bomber aircraft."
Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War, Vol. 10

Tank Corps on the March

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"March of the Tank Corps in anticipation of battle
  1. The tank corps usually marches along a 8-10 km wide front using two roads, sometimes three. It is preferable to drive the corps along three parallel roads.
    The average speed of the tank corps, depending on the condition of roads and the weather, is 10-15 kph.
    A regular daily norm is 60-80 km per day, a forced march norm is 100-120 km per day.
  2. The march organization should ensure rapid deployment for battle, capture of initiative, and grouping up for a crushing blow against the enemy that was encountered. This can be achieved with well organized ground reconnaissance, sent out both to the front and to the flanks, deployment of a powerful advance guard, and proper formation of the corps on the march.
  3. The HQ sends out advance teams in order to capture advantageous deployment ground, crossings, and in preparation for deployment.
    The advance team consists of one tank company, one or two motorized rifle companies, one mortar platoon and one anti-tank battery platoon.
    The brigades at the front of the corps usually send out two advance teams.
  4. Send reconnaissance groups forward 20-25 km in the direction of the march, arrange for separate recon on the flanks.
  5. Use regular AA guns and massed small arms fire to protect the corps from the air.
    In addition, the corps should be covered by fighter aircraft, no less than one fighter regiment.
  6. The corps formation should be controlled by indicating initial and intermediate lines, through radio signals, and through messengers.
  7. The march formation of the corps depends on:
    1. The objective given to the corps.
    2. The composition of enemy forces and their actions.
    3. The presence of roads.
  8. With three roads available, the corps forms into a strike group and an auxiliary group.
    Depending on the situation, the heavy tank brigade follows along the right or left road.
    The motorized rifle brigade drives along the middle road, and the medium tank brigades drive along the third road (fig. 1).
    If there are only two roads, the corps can be arranged in the following variants (figs. 2 and 3).
  9. The corps HQ marches behind one of the tank brigades moving in the main direction.
March of a T-34 brigade in anticipation of battle

The brigade should be arranged in the following way when anticipating contact with the enemy:
  1. An advance guard consisting of one tank company, one motorized rifle company, one mortar platoon, and one anti-tank gun platoon.
  2. Behind them, in the first echelon, is the first tank platoon with a motorized rifle company riding them. The second echelon consists of the second tank battalion (minus one company), and the third echelon consists of a motorized rifle company and an anti-tank gun platoon.
    The brigade commander and the HQ operational group, as a rule, marches ahead of the first echelon.
  3. The T-60 tank company is used for reconnaissance on the flanks, the reconnaissance reserve (a T-60 tank company) follows the HQ operational group.
  4. Upon encountering the enemy, the advance guard engages and holds the most advantageous line, ensuring the concentration and deployment of the brigade for battle.
    The advance guard acts as a delaying force, engaging from ambushes.
    The brigade commander, upon clarifying the situation, makes the decision to engage, attacking the enemy's main force in two echelons.
    The first echelon consists of the first tank battalion, the second echelon is the second tank battalion (minus one tank company), which attacks shifted to the left or the right, depending on the situation, behind the first tank battalion.
  5. The T-34 company in the advance guard, after its reinforcement with motorized rifle and anti-tank units, is used by the brigade commander as a tank reserve and can be used, depending on the situation, to reinforce the attack on the main enemy group or to repel newly arrive enemy units.
    From the moment that the decision to engage is made, the brigade commander remains at the command center in the advance guard sector, from where he commands the battle.
    The formation of the tank brigade during engagement with the enemy can be as shown in figure 4.
March of a KV brigade in anticipation of battle
  1. The march of the tank brigade in the tank corps, marching along a separate road, must be arranged in such a way that it can quickly deploy, capture the initiative, and attack the enemy while he is still in columns.
  2. It is most reasonable to arrange the brigade in the following way:
    1. Advance guard: T-60 tank company, submachinegunner platoon, and anti-tank platoon.
    2. First echelon: the first tank battalion.
    3. Second echelon: motorized rifle battalion, anti-tank platoon, AA gun platoon.
    4. Third echelon: brigade HQ, command company, medic platoon, AA gun platoon.
    5. Fourth echelon: second tank battalion.
    6. Fifth echelon: technical company and other rear echelon units.
  3. With 10 tanks. a platoon of 76 mm guns, and a platoon of submachinegunners, the advance guard can delay the enemy.
    Under cover from the advance guard, the first echelon can deploy, support the advance guard with fire, and ensure the deployment of the motorized rifle battalion, after which the tank battalion and motorized rifle battalion attack in the indicated direction.
    The second tank battalion deploys and forms the second echelon, necessary for exploitation of success."
Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War, Vol. 10
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