Quantcast
Channel: Tank Archives
Viewing all 1900 articles
Browse latest View live

Experimental Guns

$
0
0
"To the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Kulik
July 23th, 1940

I report on the status of experimental work on tank and anti-tank armament specified in meeting minutes from June 16th, 1940
  1. Working blueprints of a powerful 76 mm anti-tank gun based on the USV produced by factory #92 are complete and sent to the manufacturing plants, aside from blueprints for the balancing mechanism and the rear of the mount.
  2. Working blueprints for a powerful 76 mm tank gun based on the F-34 were developed and sent to the manufacturing plants.
  3. Working blueprints for an 85 mm tank gun were completed. Forging has been ordered. The dimensions of the existing KV small turret do not allow for the 85 mm tank gun to be installed. A new KV tank turret is required for installation of this gun.
  4. Factory #92 selected the 57 mm caliber for a new powerful anti-tank gun with a caliber of 55-60 mm. A ballistic solution was sent to Artkom on July 20th, 1940, for approval.
    Blueprints for the system are under development.
  5. Factory #92 is working on a draft of a 45 mm paratrooper gun that can be towed by a motorcycle.
  6. Factory #8 is working on installing an 85 mm mod. 1938 gun on a T-34 chassis with the possibility of converting it back into a T-34.
The first three projects were examined at factory #92, approved, and are presented for approval by the Artillery Committee.

Chief of the Artillery Directorate, Major-General of Artillery Savchenko
Military Commissar of the Artillery Directorate, Brigadier Commissar Lyapin"


Nomenclature Confusion

$
0
0
Periodically, one can find information online that the M2 Light Tank, namely the M2A4, was shipped to the USSR as a part of Lend-Lease aid. Indeed, 31 "American light M2A4" tanks show up in the "Report on tanks arriving from England for use by the Red Army as of January 15th, 1942". 


31 American light tanks just arrived at Arkhangelsk by convoy. The British ordered M2A4 tanks, so maybe they pawned a few off to the Soviets. Seems fairly bulletproof, but things aren't always what they seem.

The mistake is corrected in a later document where the 31 tanks that arrived in January are now correctly called "M3 light". The serial numbers also confirm this, since the last M2A4 had a serial number of 30977.


All 31 tanks were sent to the 176th Independent Tank Battalion. 

On German Tank Losses

$
0
0
Aleksey Isayev talked about the peculiar nature of German loss records before, but this time he specifically tackles the losses of tank units.

"The Germans had a habit of not recording the tank as lost until the very last moment, even if it stands right in the middle of Soviet positions, but unburnt, it can be recorded in documents as still recoverable. Who knows, maybe the Russians will go away, we'll pull it out. Later, when the situation was completely hopeless, it was finally written off as an irrecoverable loss. And even then, if the tank is only a charred husk, it can be recorded as "in long-term repairs" in German documents.

Combat Car M1: Armour for American Cavalry

$
0
0
Traditionally, cavalry occupied a very strong position in the American army. As soon as there was an opportunity to obtain its own tanks, the cavalry took it. Since, officially, the cavalry was not allowed to have tanks, the name "combat car" was used, even though these vehicles were actually tanks. The Combat Car M1 and several similar vehicles on its chassis are typical representatives of the small family of interbellum cavalry tanks.


Counterpart of Infantry Tanks

By the late 1920s, the American cavalry branch had many officers who understood what tanks were and why they were important, such as Adna Chaffee Jr. and George Patton. They made such a significant contribution to the development of American tank forces that they were immortalized in the names of tanks.

Patton fought in tanks during WWI. He was one of the first to understand the significant potential of the Christie tanks and promoted the American engineer's designs until the cavalry received the Combat Car T1. Sadly, the American army was starved for funding at the time, and despite his efforts, had to settle for only four of these tanks.

Combat Car T2E1, an attempt to fix up a tank that had no future.

Meanwhile, the military made two tries to stick a tank with questionable potential into the cavalry. One of them was the Combat Car T2, Harry Knox's answer to Christie. He even patented this vehicle, but the design was very suspect. Despite some opinions, he didn't even come close to using Christie's patents. The frightening vehicle looked like a convertible drive armoured car with an engine in the rear. Attempts to make it suitable for service lasted for a year and a half, but nothing came out of it.

Attempts to sell the Light Tank T1E1 to the cavalry under the name Combat Car T3 also failed. This idea was killed off at the discussion stage.

The story of the Combat Car T4 went differently. This tank, built with help from Gladeon Barnes, was the continuation of Christie's ideas. Its modified version, named Combat Car T4E1, satisfied the cavalry branch, and they were ready to buy it.

However, by that time, Harry Knox designed a third tank, far better than its predecessors.

This illustration from the patent shows the initial design of the tank and its suspension.

The starting point for the new tank design was the limit in 7.5 short tons (about 6.8 metric tons) set in the spring of 1933 by the Minister of War. Work on a new tank that met those requirements began on June 3rd, 1933. The first designs were presented on July 10th. Despite the fact that the designs were based on the Light Tank T1E6, this tank was noticeably different. 

According to specifications, the combat car would weigh 14,000 pounds (6300 kg), reach a top speed of 30 mph (48 kph), and have a range of 100 miles (160 km). The armament would consist of one 12.7 and one 7.62 mm machinegun, and the armour would protect from rifle caliber bullets. Knox developed a new suspension with vertical volute springs for this tank. His patent shows the difference between the initial tank and suspension and what was finally built in metal.

The Ordnance Committee inspected and approved these designs and sent them to the Ordnance Department. There, the development of an experimental Combat Car T5 prototype was approved. The weight limit was also increased to 7.5 tons.

Work on the Light Tank T2, designed for the infantry branch, began around the same time. Both tanks were designed in parallel, but the final prototypes differed from one another. The Light Tank T2 kept the suspension from the Light Tank T1E6, which Knox copied from the Vickers Mk.E

As for the cavalry's Combat Car T5, it used another design decision made on the famous British tank. In October of 1933, a decision was made to put its armament into two one-man turrets. It's doubtful that the designers wanted to make a "trench cleaner" like the Vickers Mk.E Type A. More likely, the potential problem of the highly placed driveshaft was already evident at this stage of the design.

Prototype of the Combat Car T5, April of 1934

The experimental Combat Car T5 was ready by April of 1934. The layout of the tank was the same as on the Light Tank T2. Same goes for the engine. Its mass was 5661 kg without armament and ammunition. However, the tank had a strange design decision of its own. For some reason, the turrets were open topped. This decreased the mass a little bit, but added many potential problems.

The tank with its windscreens removed.

In addition to the turrets, the suspension was another difference from the Light Tank T2. The final configuration of the cavalry tank had four road wheels per side in two bogeys. The rear bogey also served as the foundation for the idler. The result was a compact and easy to service design.

The new suspension offered a very smooth ride and behaved well at high speeds. The first trials at the Aberdeen Proving Ground demonstrated the advantages of the cavalry tank's suspension. While the Light Tank T2 had a top speed of 43.4 kph, the Combat Car T5 had a top speed of 68.8 kph with the same engine. The real top speed was more than a third higher than calculated.

Trials continued in August of 1934 in Fort Benning, since the infantry was interested in the tank as well. Soon, the suspension of the cavalry tank migrated to the Light Tank T2, albeit with some changes. Changes were made to the cavalry tank as well: instead of fully metallic tracks, it now used rubber-metallic track links designed by Knox.

Combat Car T5E1, July of 1935

The two-turret layout also interested the infantry, and it was implemented on the Light Tank M2A2. The development of the cavalry tank went in a different direction. The experimental tank was altered to be more like the Combat Car T4E2. Instead of the turrets, the new Combat Car T5E1 received an immobile casemate with machineguns along the sides.

The idea was quickly pegged as questionable. The mobility of fire dropped radically, and the chassis was now overloaded. The casemate also partially overlapped with the engine compartment, which contributed little to creating comfortable working conditions for the crew.

The fuel tanks had to be moved to increase the volume of the fighting compartment.

Another design was later built, designated Combat Car T5E2. Its suspension was changed to that of the Light Tank T2E1. The hull was also redesigned, most noticeably around the engine compartment. The biggest difference was the new two-man turret, which had a lot in common with the turret of the Combat Car T4E1. A Browning M1919 in an AA mount was added to the turret in addition to the two existing machineguns.

The main characteristics, including mass and top speed, were identical to the Light Tank M2A1. Unlike the infantry, which discarded the idea of a two-man turret fairly quickly, the cavalry liked it. The tank was accepted into service as the Combat Car M1 in 1935.

Evolution Without Surprises

As with the Light Tank M2, the Rock Island Arsenal was tasked with the production of the Combat Car M1. Initially, the cavalry ordered more tanks than the infantry: 38 tanks in 1935. The Combat Car T5 prototype kept its number 1, and the first mass production tank received the serial number 2 and registration number U.S.A. W.40101. Only 19 tanks were built in 1936, and 32 in 1937. In total, 90 Combat Cars M1 were built, including the prototype, numbered 1-90 and with registration numbers U.S.A. W.40101-40189.

Mass production Combat Car M1.

Tanks built in 1935-36 had turrets with curved sides. Tanks starting with U.S.A. W.40159 were equipped with a simplified turret. It was shaped like an irregular octagon. Around the same time, the engine compartment was also changed. The complicated rear plate was replaced with a simpler and more practical design.

Robert Tyndal used a late production Combat Car M1 from the 13th Cavalry Regiment as his commander's tank, 1939.

Experiments with the Combat Car T5 continued. In 1935, it became the first American tank to use a diesel engine: an air-cooled 9 cylinder Guiberson T-1020, a tank version of the aircraft A-1020 engine, reduced to 220 hp. The main reason the Americans used a diesel engine was for fuel economy.

The first trials of this tank, indexed Combat Car T5E3, took place at Aberdeen in May of 1936. The idea of a diesel engine was a good one, but had one substantial drawback, namely that it was very difficult to start. Nevertheless, trials continued until September of 1936, and, as a result, production Combat Cars M1 were equipped with diesel engines. Three vehicles received the Guiberson T-1020 engine in total, indexed Combat Car M1E1.

Combat Car M1E2 on trials. The space between bogeys increased and the idler was moved backwards.

Overall, the cavalry was satisfied with its new tanks. They were twice as cheap as the tanks built using Christie's inventions, but had similar mobility. The tanks were roomier than the Combat Car T1, and the two-man turret was much better. The absence of a cannon did not reduce effectiveness, since the penetration of the 37 mm gun was about as high as that of the Browning M2HB.

The cavalry tank had its drawbacks. The first of them was the raised driveshaft leading through the fighting compartment from the engine to the transmission. Lengthwise oscillations were also a big problem. The problem was corrected in 1937. One combat car, indexed Combat Car M1E2, had its idler pulled back by 28 cm, and the rear bogey followed. Trials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds from August 3rd to October 5th showed a noticeable improvement in stability.

Combat Car M1A1E1 with Guiberson T-1020 diesel engines.

The experimental tank was converted back into a regular Combat Car M1, but the results of trials influenced subsequent orders. In 1938, the cavalry received 24 Combat Cars M1A1 with serial numbers 91-114 and WD numbers U.S.A. W.40190-40223. 7 of those vehicles were built with Guiberson T-1020 engines. They received the designation Combat Car M1A1E1. The Combat Car M1A1 had a slightly altered turret hatch shape, which became polygonal.

Mass production Combat Car M2, equipped with a diesel engine. It differs noticeably from its predecessor.

The last mass production variant of the tank, the Combat Car M2, appeared in 1940. Its design was similar to that of the Light Tank M2A4. Some solutions used in the tank later migrated to the Light Tank M3. The hull of the new cavalry tank was largely the same as the Light Tank M2A4.

The observation devices in the turret were redesigned, and later migrated to the Light Tank M3, as did the running gear changes. Since the mass of the tank grew to 11,450 kg, the idler was increased in size and lowered to the ground. As a result, the footprint of the tank increased, as did its longitudinal stability.

The hoses leading to the air filters, characteristic of diesel tanks, are visible.

The first order for the new tank was for an impressive 292 Combat Cars M2. This is explained by the new mobilization program. WWII raged on in Europe, and the USA's involvement was only a matter of time. Modernizations of the Light Tank M2A1 and M2A2 were also planned, turning them into cavalry tanks.

All of these plans were rejected for obvious reasons. Machinegun tanks were completely outdated by 1940, and bulletproof armour left pre-war tanks little chance of survival. Combat in France and Poland was an effective demonstration. The most that the cavalry branch could do was push for the production of 34 Combat Cars M2. The military understood perfectly well that the tank was obsolete.

Some of the Combat Cars M2 were equipped with a Guiberson T-1020 diesel engine.

Cavalry Experiments

The cavalry performed fewer experiments with its tank than the infantry with the Light Tank M2. Nevertheless, they built a few interesting designs. In 1937, the long-suffering Combat Car T5 was converted once more. This time, the suspension was modified. Instead of springs, engineers tried out a rubber torsion bar. This design is different from the usual steel torsion bars, and takes up less space.

At the same time, enlarged idlers were installed. Trials of the tank, indexed Combat Car T5E4, began in early 1938 at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Later, they continued at Fort Knox. The rubber torsion bar worked well, but its reliability was low. The 5 cylinder Guiberson T-570-1 engine was also tested on this tank. Neither novelty made it out of the experimental stage.

Combat Car T5E4 on trials. The bogey with a rubber torsion bar suspension has a noticeably different design.

Arthur Harrington, one of the founders of the Marmon-Harrington company, promoted the idea of a running gear with rubber-metallic tracks since the mid-1930s. Aside from halftracks, this design was also used in export tanks. In 1938, one Combat Car M1A1 was equipped with such a design. Only the suspension remained on this tank, the running gear was borrowed from a halftrack, with some changes. The designers also tried to resolve the issue of the raised driveshaft on this tank, indexed Combat Car M1E3. Neither solution could be practically implemented.

Combat Car M1E3 with rubber-metallic tracks and converted running gear.

A long and sad story of how the cavalry tried to get a convertible drive tank for the third time is the most interesting of the lot. Cancellation of the Combat Car T4E1 did not stop the cavalrymen. Work on a new tank, called Combat Car T6, began. Sadly, no graphical depictions of it remain. Its mass is estimated at 10,800 kg, and the crew consisted of 5 men. The driver was in the center, flanked by two machinegunners.

As with the Combat Car T5, the Combat Car T6 would have two turrets. The 400 hp Wright Whirlwind R-975 would propel the tank at 70.5 kph on wheels and 50.7 kph on tracks.

Work on this monster stopped at the design stage. In November of 1935, the Combat Car T6 was cancelled, since it went 1.5 times over the weight limit and had no advantages over the Combat Car M1.

Combat Car T7, converted from the last mass produced Combat Car M1A1.

A year later, the cavalry took a different route. A decision was made to take a Combat Car M1 and make it into a convertible drive tank. In 1937, the Combat Car T7 project began.

This tank could be considered a mix between the Combat Car T2 and Combat Car M1. Like Knox's fearsome design, it would have three large road wheels per side. Instead of rubber rims, inflatable tires were used. The engine powered the rear pair of wheels, and the front pair turned the tank.

The same tank on wheels.

Development dragged on, and the Combat Car T7 only saw trials in August of 1938. The last Combat Car M1A1, registration number U.S.A. W.40223, was used to build it. The first trials did not inspire confidence. Despite the engine power growing to 268 hp, the mobility did not improve greatly. Only improvements made during the trials increased the top speed to 85 kph on wheels and 56 kph on tracks. However, the convertible drive idea was not very interesting by that time. Work stopped in October of 1939.

Cavalry to Infantry

By 1940, the situation in the US Army changed. The Combat Car M2 became the last cavalry tank. The separation between infantry and cavalry tanks was senseless, especially once you consider their many similarities. The cavalry tanks were reclassified as light tanks. The Combat Car M1 became the Light Tank M1A1, and the Combat Car M2 became the Light Tank M1A2. At the same time, the tank units of cavalry and infantry began their transformation into armoured divisions.

Light Tank M1A1 from the 4th Armoured Division, fall of 1941. The former combat cars lived out the rest of their life as training tanks.

The former cavalry tanks, now light tanks, were used as training vehicles. Much like the Light Tank M2 family, these tanks became desks for students of the American armoured forces. Due to the armour and armament unsuitable for modern war, these tanks were not meant for use outside the USA.

To be fair, one must remember that these tanks were some of the best in their class at the time of inception and grew obsolete alongside their foreign analogues. The former cavalry tanks were used for training until 1942. Unfortunately, none of them survived to this day.

T3 Tracked Light Tractor.

The history of the Combat Car M1 would be incomplete without mentioning other vehicles on its chassis. Back in 1933, when work on the Combat Car T5 was just beginning, an artillery tractor was being designed in parallel. The suspension came from the tank, but the engine was different. The first T3 Tracked Light Tractor received the registration number W.9115. The vehicle was designed to accommodate a driver and a gun crew of six.

Due to the small chassis, the crew had to sit back-to-back. Initially, the artillerymen's feet dangled by the running gear, with a serious risk of being pulled in. Later, the designers added a railing. The driver sat in the front, flanked by fuel tanks, with the instrument panel mounted on the side of the right one. The 3.5 ton tractor was powered by a 95 hp Herculex WXTB engine, which gave it a top speed of 34 kph.

An improved variant of the tractor, indexed T3E1, registration number W.9116, was later sent to trials. The tractor was converted, as the designers realized that six men is a lot for such a small vehicle and reduced the number of passengers to three. Two sat on the rear mudflaps, and one more on top of the left fuel tank, which was reduced in size. A new engine was installed on the improved tractor, a 106 hp Hercules WXRT, as well as an improved gearbox. The T3E1 Tracked Light Tractor reached a top speed of 56 kph, although it would be an interesting question to see how the passengers felt at that speed. Judging by the layout, the odds of being catapulted out of the tractor during motion were high.

As an experiment, tractor with serial number W.9155 was equipped with a 100 hp Herculex WXC-2. The passenger seats were also removed. The T3E2 Tracked Light Tractor reached a speed of 48 kph.

In 1937, the T3E1 Tracked Light Tractor was convered for use by coastal defense. The vehicle, indexed T3E3 Tractor, received the engine from the T3E2 Tracked Light Tractor, protected electrical equipment, and a removable roof for the driver.

The first T3E4 Tracked Light Tractor. The other vehicles were converted in the same way.

In July of 1937, the final version of the vehicle finally reached trials. After some changes, the Tracked Light Tractor finally became what the customers expected of it. The improved version received the index T3E4 Tracked Light Tractor, and earlier vehicles were improved to the same standard. Six vehicles were built in total.

T3E4 Tracked Light Tractor in the Antarctic, East Base on Stonington Island, 1940

Many think that the tractors spent their entire lives at Aberdeen Proving Ground, but that is not the case. In 1939, three T3E4 Tracked Light Tractors were sent to the Antarctic. They were used to carry cargo at Stonington Island (East Base) and the Ross ice shelf (West Base, Little America) along wit the Light Tank M2A2. After the mission was completed, the tractors were abandoned. Two of them remain at Stonington Island to this day.

T18 HMC: Quick Howitzer

$
0
0
The American army began thinking of motorizing their artillery back in WWI. For a long time, attempts were made to build an SPG on the chassis of the light tracked Holt tractor. In parallel, John Walter Christie was working on a similar vehicle. Neither project satisfied the US Army for various reasons. A second attempt at an SPG was made in 1930, but the Howitzer Motor Carriage T1 remained an experiment. The next opportunity to obtain self propelled artillery came a decade later in the form of the Howitzer Motor Carriage T18.


Speedy Secretaire 

The American military began thinking about self propelled artillery once more in the second half of the 1930s. This pause is largely connected with the desire to avoid past mistakes and refrain from designing on SPG on a chassis that was not yet in mass production.

After a long period of searching and backroom dealing, the US Army finally obtained mass production tanks. The infantry was armed with the Light Tank M2 and the cavalry with the Combat Car M1. These quick vehicles armed with machineguns became a symbol of the American re-armament in the late 1930s.

Howitzer Motor Carriage T3, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, January 1940

The idea of building an SPG on a light tank chassis was obvious.The armament of American light tanks, consisting of only one high caliber machinegun and two or three rifle caliber machineguns, seriously limited their usefulness in battle.

The lack of cannons was caused by the fact that the American 37 mm short barreled tank gun was inferior in penetration to the 12.7 mm Browning M2. The development of a more powerful gun in the early 1930s hit a dead end, so the Americans had no other choice. There was still a need for a fighting machine armed with something more serious than a machinegun.

The same vehicle at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where it went through the first round of gunnery trials.

The first attempt to build a light SPG used the Light Tank M2A1 as the chassis. Designed in 1936, it received a 47 mm cannon. The attempt was unsuccessful, as the low penetration of the weapon made the attempt pointless.

The cavalry also wanted their own SPG. On July 27th, 1938, a meeting was held at the HQ of the 7th Cavalry Brigade in Fort Knox, the center of mechanization of American cavalry. The concept of a tank support vehicle was discussed at the meeting. Its armament would consist of a 75 mm Pack Howitzer, the same gun used on the HMC T1. The SPG would ride along with the tanks and destroy targets at close range. As expected, the Combat Car M1 would serve as the chassis.

A 37 mm gun was mounted on top of the howitzer for some trials.

The Technical Ordnance Committee met on March 9th, 1939, and approved the construction of a prototype SPG. The vehicle was indexed Howitzer Motor Carriage T3. It was not build from scratch: Combat Car M1 number 54, U.S.A. W.40153, became the chassis donor. This allowed the unification of the SPG with the tanks it was going to support, as well as simplified production. The HMC T3 was ready for trials in January of 1940. The mass of the SPG grew to 9072 kg.

The base chassis was almost unchanged compared to the Combat Car M1. Most changes were made in the fighting compartment and driver's compartment. The tank lost its turret, but the commander was given the small turret from the Light Tank M2A3. The height of the fighting compartment was increased to give it more volume.

Despite all these changes, the HMC T3 only had enough room for three crewmen. Most of the space was taken up by the M1A1 75 mm howitzer and its railing. Only two men could fit into the prototype that was actually built in metal. However, there was enough room for 61 shells and 3600 rounds. The howitzer, mounted in the right half of the fighting compartment, was aimed by the driver and loaded by the commander. The regular howitzer sight was used to aim it. The result was, in a way, the inverse of the French Char B concept: quick, but with no armour.

The large hatch on the side gave the HMC T3 a resemblance to a secretaire desk.

The one thing that the HMC T3 had no shortage of was hatches. This had to do with the fact that a large amount of gases built up in the cramped fighting compartment, and ventilation had to be supplied somehow. A large two piece hatch was installed above the howitzer, another hatch that flipped down and was held on by chains was put into the right side. It made the vehicle look like a secretaire desk on tracks.

This was not enough for the creators of the HMC T3. In its normal position, the howitzer could not be aimed without turning the entire vehicle. For this reason, the front of the hull had a two-piece hatch that let the howitzer turn 10 degrees to the left and 15 degrees to the right when opened. However, this opened up a huge hole in the front plate, which was very inviting to bullets and shrapnel.

The vehicle on trials at Fort Knox, June 1940

Trials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds began in late January of 1940. The vehicle accelerated up to 72 kph, with mobility at the level of the Combat Car T1. However, while speed was an important factor, it was far from the most important.

The HMC T3 was sent to Fort Bragg, the home of the Department of Field Artillery, on February 13th. The study and trials of the vehicle went on until March 11th. The artillerymen attached a 37 mm M1916 infantry gun to the top of the howitzer to evaluate the ability of the driver/gunner to aim the weapon.

The vehicle was found unsatisfactory, to put it mildly. The gun and its railings took up too much space. It was also hard to aim the howitzer, but the vehicle itself mad an excellent target, as it could not fire on the move. Firing at moving targets also went poorly. The targets could be hit, but 27 seconds passed between a target being sighted and the first shot fired. During initial trials, 11 shots hit the target out of 16. On the second try, only 2 out of 14 shots hit.

Attempts to fire on the move did not result in positive results.

The SPG was nicknamed "Griffith" during trials in 1940.

The overall verdict was as follows: The Howitzer Motor Carriage T3 is unsuitable for use in a support role in mechanized units. The Department of Field Artillery composed its own vision of a suitable vehicle. According to the artillerymen, the SPG would weigh 11.5 short tons (10.43 metric tons), but its mobility had to keep up with cavalry tanks. The crew of the vehicle would number 4, ideally 5, crewmen. The commander and the driver had to perform only one role. The front armour had to protect it from 37 mm guns. The 75 mm howitzer was satisfactory, but its recoil length had to be shortened to 30 cm and rate of fire increased to 10 RPM.

The right side of the HMC T3 contained only air. Lots and lots of air, as the long recoil and sizeable railing left no room for crew here.

The HMC T3 went back to Fort Knox with this harsh evaluation, where it arrived on March 18th, 1940. The vehicle needed repairs after trials at Fort Bragg, which were performed during April. In addition to everything else, the engine had to be swapped out. Mobility trials followed, during which the vehicle traveled 1274 km. In May, the SPG participated in maneuvers of the 3rd Army in Louisiana, where it traveled 1077 km. The vehicle received the name "Griffith" around this time. In the summer, the SPG participated in more gunnery trials.

Overall, the mobility of the Combat Car M1 was retained, although it took longer to speed up. The increase in mass also impacted maneuverability. The location of the howitzer on the right side shifted the center of mass. As for the gun itself, the cavalry made the same conclusions as the artillerymen at Fort Bragg. The vehicle was too cramped and uncomfortable. The hatch that allowed the gun to be aimed horizontally could only be opened from the outside. The placement of the ammunition was poor. On trials, the crew could only fire three shots in 50 seconds.

This photo demonstrates how comfortable it was to work in the HMC T3. It was easier for the commander, not the driver, to aim the gun. The commander served as the loader and turret gunner as well.

The cavalry also deemed the HMC T3 as unsuitable in a support role. The Combat Car M1 chassis was too small for an SPG. It was much more reasonable to build an SPG on the chassis of a medium tank. This proposal was made with the Medium Tank T5E2 in mind, which had the same armament. The creation of a 75 mm SPG was still the priority, but the military's appetites grew, In the verdict on the HMC T3, the desire for a 105 mm howitzer is stated.

Too Late for Trials

After bad luck with the HMC T3, work on a light support SPG stopped for about a year. In that year, the American armoured forces changed considerably. The separation between infantry and cavalry tanks was erased, and the Combat Car M1 became the Light Tank M1A2. The improved Light Tank M2A4 replaced the machinegun armed M2A2 and M2A3. Machinegun tanks gave way to tanks armed with cannons and thicker armour. However, even the Light Tank M2A4 did not stay in production for long. Production of the Light Tank M3, destined to become the most numerous light tank in the American army when it joined WWII, began in March of 1941.

The Americans returned to the idea of building a light SPG in June of 1941. The requirements were largely the same as those formed by the Department of Field Artillery in March of 1940. The only addition was the desire to install a 105 mm howitzer, if possible. However, after studying the Light Tank M3, it became clear that 105 mm is too big for the chassis. There was no alternative to the 75 mm Pack Howitzer M1A1 with such a small fighting compartment.

Model of the Howitzer Motor Carriage T18, December 1941

Even thought the Light Tank M3 was supposed to be the chassis for the new SPG, the first project, titled Howitzer Motor Carriage T17, used a different chassis. The cavalry, who considered its tanks more suitable, got involved. The experimental Combat Car M1E3 served as the chassis for the HMC T17. In addition to a new suspension with a rubber-metallic track, the driveshaft leading from the engine to the gearbox was lowered by 16.5 cm. This noticeably improved the crew conditions.

However, the lower driveshaft was the only advantage of the Combat Car M1E3. The Light Tank M3 was superior in all other ways, and, more importantly, it was already in production. It's not surprising that work on the HMC T17 ended at the draft stage.

The photo shows that initially there was only one hatch in the roof of the fighting compartment.

The Howitzer Motor Carriage T18 project was much more promising. It was designed on the Light Tank M3 chassis and was much more aligned with the requirements of the American military, especially when it came to protection. In October of 1941, the Ordnance Committee approved the production of a wooden model of the HMC T18, and, after its approval, two prototypes from mild steel. The project was given to the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.

The choice of a tire manufacturer might seem strange if one does not know about Firestone's other operations. Much like Goodyear, another tire giant, Firestone worked on building blimps. In addition, it produced rubber-metallic track links for tanks, ammunition, gas masks, and many other things. The contract was no accident. Firestone was not only the builder, but also the developer of the T18.

Experimental prototype of the Howitzer Motor Carriage T18, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, May 1942

The full sized model of the HMC T18 was presented on December 26th, 1941. As with the HCM T3, the chassis remained unchanged. Overall, the layout of the HCM T3 did not change significantly: the 75 mm Pack Howitzer M1A1 was also put in the front of the casemate, shifted to the right.

At the same time, some mistakes were corrected. The small fighting compartment could not fit four men, but a loader was introduced. The Firestone engineers did not reinvent the wheel and took the M1 gun mount from the Medium Tank M3, replacing the 75 mm M2 gun with a howitzer of the same caliber. This resolved all issues with protection of the gun and sights.

After inspection at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, some changes were made to the vehicle. The commission demanded that the number of hatches in the roof be increased to two. The driver's hatch was also modified, and some elements inside the SPG were moved around. This was connected with the fact that the two machineguns in sponsons, like on the Light Tank M2A4 and M3, deleted. They were also present on the full size model of the HMC T18.

You can see that the vehicle is slightly tilted. This is caused by overloading of the front of the SPG.

The experimental HMC T18 ended up at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds on May 7th, 1942. Most of the issues pointed out by the model commission were resolved. The number of hatches in the roof was increased to two, as required. The hatches received special stoppers. In addition to their primary function, they also helped with ventilation of the fighting compartment. Another important requirement, the protection of the SPG from 37 mm gun fire, was also satisfied. The cast casemate had 51 mm of armour in the front and 32 mm along the sides.

The mass of the HCM T18 grew to 13.5 tons. When looking from the side, the vehicle tilts forward because of this. The ammunition capacity was also cut by a third: the small fighting compartment could only fit 42 rounds. The top speed of the SPG was 56 kph; the mobility remained the same as on its base tank.

As the model commission demanded, the number of roof hatches was increased to two.

The issue was that the vehicle's fate was sealed a whole month before it reached trials. In November of 1941, a new light tank was already planned for production. Its biggest changes were the use of two Cadillac engines and an improved hull. After trials, the vehicle was accepted into service as the Light Tank M4, renamed to Light Tank M5 in February of 1942. A better hull design and sloped front armour increased the size of the fighting compartment.

It's not surprising that Firestone was tasked with reworking their SPG to fit the new chassis in December of 1941. Full sized models of the HMC T41 and T47 SPGs were presented in April of 1942. The T42, which managed to fit the howitzer into a turret, was the most suitable for the task of supporting tanks. Because of this, a decision was made in April of 1942 to cancel the HCM T18 program.

A hatch in the rear of the casemate was used for removing the howitzer.

In this case, the American military turned out to be right. The relatively thick armour of the HCM T18 was already vulnerable for enemy tank and anti-tank guns. The cramped fighting compartment made the crew's lives difficult. The T18 also had poor visibility. The replacement of the immobile casemate with an open topped turret solved the issue of ventilation, visibility, and mobility of fire. The 20+ year service life of the HMC T47, which turned into the HMC M8, speaks for itself.

After the cancellation of the HCM T18, the 75 mm Pack Howitzer M1A1 was installed on the M3 halftrack, creating the HCM T30. The T30 first saw combat in November of 1942. Created as a temporary solution, the HCM T30 fought for several years in Africa and Italy.


Cheating at Statistics 19: Time Travelling Tigers

$
0
0
One of the first uses of the IS-85 tank was in the Korsun Pocket. The 13th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, equipped with brand new IS-85s, was sent to block Kampfgruppe Bake (an unusual formation equipped with both Tiger and Panther tanks) from breaking through to the pocket. Forczyk describes this engagement as not particularly favourable to the IS tanks.

"These heavy tanks were committed into action on 15 February and unwisely attacked Kampfgruppe Bake instead of sitting on the defense; the Panthers and Tigers knocked virtually all of them out. Following this incident, the GABTU resolved to upgrade the new IS-series heavy tanks to the 122 mm gun."

Oof, that's quite a mistake for a book published in 2015. The decree titled "On IS tanks" authorized the production of an IS tank armed with a 122 mm gun in September of 1943. By February 15th, these tanks were not only in production, but had already reached the front lines.

However, there's something else fishy in play here. This unit that was destroyed by Tigers and Panthers mysteriously pops up on the very next page to wreak havoc on Kampfgruppe Bake and Frank's attempts to break through to the encircled men. Let's take a look at what actually happened.

The 13th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment was formed only on February 13th, 1944, from the 13th Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment. Like Forczyk says, it was armed with 21 brand new IS tanks. The regiment was attached to the 2nd Tank Army. However, there is a big problem here. There is no mention of a 13th regiment in the journal entry for February 15th. The entry for February 16th reveals why:


"31 SU-76 SPGs will arrive near Medvin (25 of them are meant for the 2nd TA). There will also be the 13th Heavy Tank Regiment there (IS-85) which will be subordinated to the 2nd TA. Put the 13th HTR near Dzhurzhantsy, with the goal of preventing the enemy from reaching Pochepyntsy. When using the 13th HTR, take measures to retain complete secrecy and do not, in any circumstance, leave a knocked out tank for the enemy. For this reason, cover the flanks of the regiment by any means and prepare evacuation and demolition equipment."

On February 15th the tanks simply had not yet arrived on the battlefield, making them quite difficult to destroy. However, maybe the Germans wrote the date down wrong, or these were IS tanks from another unit, or the IS tanks were attacked on the march, anything can happen in war. Let's take a closer look at the next few days.


"The 2nd Tank Army received the 13th Heavy Tank Regiment with IS tanks on February 17th, 1944, and the 8th Heavy Tank Regiment on February 19th.

During its time in the 2nd Tank Army, the 8th HTR did not participate in combat.

On 17-18th of February, 1944, the 13th HTR received the objective of destroying an enemy column that has broken through. Losses were dealt to the enemy: up to 650 soldiers and officers. The regiment did not suffer any losses in materiel or personnel.

19 tanks were in service, 2 tanks were in repairs for technical reasons. One tank had a welding seam on a gearbox connecting link rupture when the tank struck a mine. The the other one had its rotor break."

That's it. Not only did the Panthers and Tigers not knock out "virtually all" of the IS tanks that were sent to defeat them, they did not destroy any. 

Porsche Suspension

$
0
0
"British Embassy, Moscow
British Military Mission in the USSR
Moscow, May 15th, 1944

To: Mr. Lieutenant General Lebedev
Copy: Mr. Chief of the NKO Department of External Affairs

The War Ministry asked me to provide it with brief information on the suspension of the Ferdinand self propelled gun. It is especially interested in the diameter and length of the torsion bars, their position, and the distance between the axles. A diagram with specified sizes would be very valuable, especially if accompanied by a description of the performance of the suspension.

I would be most grateful if you supplied me with the aforementioned data.

M.B. Burrows
Lieutenant General, Head of the British Military Mission in the USSR."


"Suspension of the Self Propelled Gun "Ferdinand"

The suspension of the Ferdinand self propelled gun consists of six bogeys, three per side. All bogeys are identical and interchangeable. The rear bogeys are turned by 180 degrees compared to the front two bogeys on each side.

The distances between the centers of each bogey are equal.

The bogey design is as follows:


  1. Torsion bar tube
  2. Suspension arm
  3. Rubber pad
  4. Torsion bar
  5. Front wheel axle
  6. Rear wheel axle
  7. Front wheel
  8. Rear wheel
  9. Cup
  10. Upper lug
  11. Dry liner
  12. Lower lug

Performance of the suspension

a) Installation of the bogey

Fig. #2. The suspension under static load.

When the bogey is installed on the vehicle, the weight of the vehicle on one bogey causes the suspension arm to turn relative to the center of the front wheel. The axle of the front wheel turns with the suspension arm. The lugs on the axle and the dry lines will twist the torsion bar.

As the suspension arm turns, the rubber pad will eventually hit the torsion bar tube, and further turning of the suspension arm will deform the rubber pad, as well as twist the torsion bar.

b) Elevation of the front road wheel

Fig. #3: The suspension with the front wheel elevated.

When the front wheel drives on top of an obstacle, the torsion bar turns clockwise around the axle attached to the hull of the vehicle. The elevation of the front wheel axle causes the torsion bar tube to rotate around the axle of the rear wheel, which moves to the left.

The turning of the suspension arm causes further deformation of the rubber pad. The lugs and dry liner cause the torsion bar to twist further.

After the rubber ceases to deform, the suspension arm can no longer move relative to its axle as the front wheel elevates, as the right end of the suspension arm is up against the torsion bar tube, and the torsion bar can no longer twist. The suspension begins to act as a rigid system, transferring all shocks to the hull of the vehicle. The torsion bar can twist only as long as the rubber pad can deform.

c) Elevation of the rear wheel

Fig. #4: The suspension with the rear wheel elevated.

When the rear wheel elevates, it turns the torsion bar tube around the axle of the front wheel due to deformation of the rubber pad. The suspension arm, and therefore the front axle and upper lug remain still, impeding the elevation of the lower lug, which it attached to the torsion bar. As a result, the torsion bar twists. After the rubber pad ceases to deform, further elevation of the wheel does not twist the torsion bar. All shocks will be rigidly passed on to the hull of the vehicle."

CAMD RF 38-11355-2704

End of Rearmament

$
0
0
"To the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR
Comrade Beria
January 9th, 1942

Chief designers of factory #92, Major-General of the Technical Forces, comrade Grabin, installed domestic armament in two Matilda and Valentine tanks.

Instead of the English 40 mm gun and 7.92 mm machinegun in the Valentine tank, our 45 mm tank gun and DT machinegun are used.

Instead of the English 40 mm gun and 7.92 mm machinegun in the Matilda tank, our 76 mm tank gun and DT machinegun are used.

Based on personal inspection and review of trials materials, I deem that the re-armament of English tanks is senseless for the following reasons:

1. Valentine tank

The 45 mm gun has almost identical penetration to the English 40 mm gun, therefore it is sensible to use English armament for this tank and save our guns for domestic tanks.

2. Matilda tank

The installation of the 76 mm gun is unsatisfactory. The turret is cramped and uncomfortable. Significant changes have to be made to install the 76 mm gun, and therefore it is also reasonable to leave the existing armament alone.

Currently, English tanks are sufficiently supplied with ammunition. In case of an insufficient amount of shells, it would be more correct to produce them ourselves, rather than install our guns in English tanks, especially since the 40 mm shell is a simple AP-T shell.

Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, Fedorenko."


Party Hard

$
0
0
"To the commander of the 61st Radom Rifle Corps

I report that at 23:00 on May 6th, 1945, American correspondents Captains Robert Ruben, John McVane, Victor Berstein, Richard Hotslet, escorted by Sr. Lieutenant Bruce Feshenden and driver Corporal John Doyle were detailed near Hohenwarthe village while headed across the Elbe.
According to the testimony of those detained, they crossed Elbe near Torgau with General Bradley and were present at a banquet hosted by Marshal Konev, after which they returned to their forces on their own while drunk and decided to make a detour to Berlin.

They spent the night and the morning as guests at positions of a regiment, the number of which they do not know.

On May 6th, they left Berlin to find their forces, but did not know where the crossing was, and ended up in Hohenwarthe where they were detained by the commander of the 629th Order of Suvorov Regiment.

The aforementioned correspondents belong to the following newspapers:
  • Captain Berstein: P.M.
  • Captain Hotslet: "Columbia" radio company
  • Captain Ruben: "Reuters" telegraph agency
  • Captain McVane: State mass media company
Interrogation by Colonel Gruzdev
Translation by Junior Technical Lieutenant Altayev"

Gun Motor Carriage M10

$
0
0
Unlike many tanks, few tank destroyers arrived in the USSR within the Lend Lease program. The Gun Motor Carriage T48, or SU-57, built on the chassis of the M3 halftrack, was the only exception. Initially, they were built by the Americans for a British order, but the British barely used them. The USSR gave them a completely different reception: they were used actively and showed themselves as an effective anti-tank measure. As for tank destroyers on a tank chassis, the only Western vehicle that was accepted into the army was the Gun Motor Carriage M10, known widely under the British nickname "Wolverine".

One Chassis with the M4A2

The story of how the Red Army GBTU found out about the GMC M10 is somewhat comical. The first information about this vehicle came not from an intelligence report, but a letter about the use of M4A2 medium tanks. On March 15th, 1943, Deputy Chief of the Engineering Department of the People's Commissariat of External Trade, Colonel Khryaev, sent a letter to the GBTU. It informed the directorate that the Americans distributed a note regarding the use of the blocking button of the main friction clutch. The M4A2 tank manual had a mistake in it, which led to breakdowns. This is the first letter that mentions a "M-10 tank destroyer".

GMC M10 at the NIIBT proving grounds, September of 1943. The photo shows mounts for applique armour, which was never installed.

By that point, the existence of the GMC M10 was no secret. Major Barayev, an assistant of the military attache in the US, reported about them on March 1st, 1943, but Khryaev's report arrived at GBTU faster. According to Barayev's report, the vehicle was developed to be universal, with the potential to complete objectives usually meant for tanks. For this purpose, it had mounts where additional armour could be attached. This was correct, but in reality, the armour was never attached to production vehicles.

The Americans also shared information about the use of the GMC M10 in combat with the attache's assistant. According to the report, the first 10 tank destroyers were sent to North Aftica in late 1942. Its use in battle showed that the design was good. It was assumed that it would not only be used by tank destroyer units, but by all armoured units in the US Army.

The same vehicle from the front.

In reality, the real combat debut of the GMC M10 was a bit later. These vehicles played a decisive role during the battle at El Guettar on March 23rd, 1943, and proved their superiority to GMC M3 halftrack tank destroyers. The Americans were honest in their assessment of the design. The fact that the GMC M10 was the most numerous American tank destroyer speaks volumes.

The same vehicle from the back.

The GBTU was not particularly interested in these vehicles, even though Barayev wrote that the firepower of the 76 mm gun in the GMC M10 was equal to that of the German 88 mm AA gun. That line in the report was underlined. This is not a coincidence, as the first trials of a captured German Tiger were held in the spring of 1943, and they showed rather alarming results. Soviet tank artillery was almost helpless against it. Means of fighting Tigers were needed urgently.

Another point in the American tank destroyer's favour was that it was built on the same chassis as the Medium Tank M4A2, which began arriving in the USSR since late 1942.

The tarp that was used on the march can be seen in this photo.

The issue of ordering these tank destroyers returned in early June of 1943. According to a report from the People's Commissar of External Trade, A.I. Mikoyan, addressed to Stalin, there were different opinions about buying SPGs. Yakovlev, the head of the GAU, considered buying the GMC T48 to be a priority, while all other vehicles should be acquired only for familiarization. Fedorenko, the head of the GBTU, wanted to purchase a wide spectrum of self propelled artillery, but the GMC M10 was not on his list. Voronot, the commander of artillery, had a separate opinion. He proposed the purchase of 50 "three inch M-10 guns on the chassis of a medium tank". The result was a compromise. A decision was made to order 2 tank destroyers, and a batch of 50 would be ordered depending on the results.

No Worse than Domestic Equivalent

The delivery of the tank destroyers was prompt. On August 3rd, 1943, Khryaev reported that a convoy arrived in the Persian Gulf carrying two "M-10 tank-destroyers". Soon, the vehicles made it to Baku. There their paths diverged. One was sent to the NIIBT proving grounds at Kubinka, the other to the Gorohovets ANIOP. This was logical: NIIBT would test the mobility of the vehicle and ANIOP would test its armament.

However, there was an issue, since no American 76 mm shells were sent to the USSR. As a result, the gunnery trials happened a lot later than the mobility trials.

The stripes visible on the hull are the remains of the "packaging" that the vehicle was wrapped in during its passage across the ocean.

The American tank destroyer arrived at Kubinka in September of 1943. As with the ANIOP, the vehicle arrived without ammunition. The NIIBT proving grounds also reported that the vehicle was missing additional armour, but, as you remember, the Americans didn't have it either.

To start, the proving ground specialists studied the vehicle and composed a detailed technical description. At the same time, the vehicle was serviced. This was not hard, as the vehicle was very similar to the M4A2 medium tank, which the testers were already familiar with. The American oil was replaced with its domestic equivalent.

The fighting compartment. The testers mistakenly wrote down that the commander sits to the left of the gun. In reality, his station was to the right.

The technical description was mostly dedicated to the overall layout of the vehicle. The chassis of the M10 was described very briefly, as it was almost identical to that of the M4A2. The driver's compartment and fighting compartment were also described briefly. The NIIBT staff considered the commander's station to be to the left of the gun, but this was actually the gunner's station. As with American tanks, the commander sat to the right of the gun.

The staff at Kubinka did not spent much time studying the fighting compartment, and focused on other issues. The conclusions made about the crew conditions were mostly positive. However, the open topped turret was not met with enthusiasm, as reports of SU-76M crews being killed were arriving from the front. The NIIBT specialists also studied the visibility of the M10, which was deemed good.

Browning M2HB AA machinegun mount.

The main part of the program was not the study of the design, but mobility trials. According to the plans, the tank destroyer would travel 1000 km, 300 on a highway, 500 on dirt roads, and 200 off-road. Aside from the maximum and average speed, as well as fuel consumption, the mobility on various types of terrain would be investigated.

Visibility and dead zone diagram.

The mobility trials took place from September 24th to October 14th, 1943. Reality almost matched up with projections: out of 1000 km, 302 were spent on the Moscow-Minsk highway, the rest on dirt roads and hills. Trials on the highway coincided with measurements of the top speed. The top speed achieved across four tries was 50 kph, which is a little higher than official data. The average movement speed was 37.5 kph, and the average overall speed was 30 kph. The tank destroyer mostly drove in 5th gear. Fuel expenditure was 158 L per 100 km. To compare, the M4A2 consumed 162 L per 100 km. The driver was well positioned and it was easy to steer the vehicle.

Without spurs, the biggest slope that could be climbed was 22 degrees.

The M10 traveled 660 km on dirt roads, and most of it was done in 4th gear. 32 hours were needed to cross this distance, of which 8 were spent waiting for technical reasons. This was caused by destruction of road wheels, 6 of which were lost during trials. In five cases, the ball bearings were destroyed, in the sixth case, the rubber rim was destroyed. The ball bearings broke because of defective grease nipples, which allowed the grease to leak out and dirt to get into the ball bearings.

Despite the breakdowns, the tank destroyer behaved well on muddy dirt roads. The average movement speed was 20.5 kph, the average overall speed was 16.5 kph. Fuel expenditure was 259 L for 100 km, which was a little higher than on the M4A2 (246 L per 100 km).

Maneuverability was also tested. The tank destroyer was agile, however, it performed poorly during sharp turns, 180 degree turns, and turning at low speeds. This was not a problem unique to the M10, but a characteristic of all tracked vehicles with a double differential turning mechanism.

The final part of the trials program was crossing of hills. Here is where the problems started. The M10 arrived with rubber-metallic T51 tracks. These tracks, as well as the T41 used on the Medium Tank M3, had issues with off-road performance. The smooth track links could not grab the ground. This was critical when it came to climbing hills. The steepest hill that could be climbed was 22 degrees. After that, the tracks did not have enough traction.

Climbing a hill with spurs installed.

American engineers knew about this problem, so the tank destroyer came with special spurs. 11 spurs were installed on each track. This helped, but only partially. The tank destroyer could climb a 24 degree hill and a 28 degree hill. However, when climbing a 31 degree hill, the tank destroyer began helplessly digging at the dirt. There was not enough traction yet again. The maximum tilt was established at 22 degrees, after which the tank destroyed started to slide down. This was done without spurs.

The overall verdict on mobility trials was positive.
  1. The American M10 SPG has good mobility. Its speed is no less than that of the domestic SU-122 and SU-85 SPGs, and is equal to that of the American M4A2 tank.
  2. Crossing obstacles by the M10 SPG with rubber-metallic tracks and no spurs: climb, 22 degrees, descent, 25 degrees, tilt, 22 degrees. This is insufficient. With spurs, the SPG can climb 28 degrees and descend 28 degrees.
  3. The large turret (the turret ring diameter is 1740 mm) allows comfortable placement of the armament and crew.
    A lack of turret roof can be considered a drawback, as it can result in loss of the crew on the battlefield to mortars, shells, bombs, machinegun fire from aircraft, grenades, and bottles with incendiary fluid.
  4. All components of the SPG, aside from the running gear, are sufficiently reliable. The running gear of the SPG is unreliable due to poor design of the grease nipples.
Fighting Compartment Complaints

Gunnery trials of the American tank destroyer took a long time. The delay with ammunition led to the development of the trials program, as well as approval from the Artillery Committee, taking until January 14th, 1944. The issues did not end there. High explosive ammunition was never delivered, so orders were given on February 19th to proceed without them. In addition, the parts and tools kit, as well as documentation for the M7 76 mm gun, were also absent.

The tank destroyer arrived at the Gorohovets ANIOP on February 9th. Due to a lack of tools and documentation, tools had to be produced on location by the proving grounds staff. This added more delays. Meanwhile, the description of the tank destroyer and its gun was being written. As a result, the tank destroyer began trials on March 13th, 1944. Trials continued until April 4th. 360 shots were fired, 25 of them with an increased charge.


M10 tank destroyer at the Gorohovets Proving Grounds, March 1944

Firing was done with M62 armour piercing tracer ammunition. Conclusions were made that were not kind to equal caliber domestic ammunition. It turned out that the American shells were good enough to penetrate 120 mm of armour, while Soviet ammunition of the same caliber could only penetrate 100 mm. This was explained by the superior design of the M62 shell, better choice of materials, and better thermal treatment. The M62 shell could penetrate 120 mm of armour at 500 meters. Precision trials also gave satisfactory results.

Overall view of the M7 gun used in the GMC M10.

Of course, a tank destroyer does not just consist of the gun. ANIOP specialists inspected other parts of the vehicle, as this is where they found issues. Strangely enough, the artillerymen had complaints about the driver's station. According to them, the presence of only one periscope decreased visibility. To be fair, the Medium Tank M4 initially had two periscopes, but combat showed that periscopes in the upper front plate should be removed.

M62 shells after being fired at a 100 mm plate.

The evaluation of the fighting compartment was much more complete. A separate five page report titled "Notes on the issue of servicing the American 3-inch M7 self propelled gun". The first complaint was the absence of a roof. Here, tankers and artillerymen had the same opinions. To be fair, some American M10 crews installed their own roofs on their tank destroyers in 1944-45.

However, that is not the only thing Soviet specialists found deficient. Since there were no hatches in the turret, entering and exiting the fighting compartment was unsatisfactory from the point of view of safety. ANIOP specialists predicted crew losses when leaving the tank destroyer under enemy fire.

This was not the end. Unlike the NIIBT proving grounds, the ANIOP staff placed their crewmen correctly. Their positions were deemed inadequate. For example, the commander had a vertical aiming mechanism flywheel, electric trigger, and a panoramic sight, but he could not aim the weapon horizontally. The gunner had a full set of aiming flywheels, but they were positioned poorly, as they were too close to each other. Even though they were easy to turn, it was difficult to turn both at once. The telescopic sight was placed in such a way that the gunner's chest was right up against the flywheels. It was impossible to aim the gun and look through the sight at the same time.

A diagram of the fighting compartment layout included in the report.

There were also complaints about the loader's station. His position to the right of the gun was fairly deemed poor. There was a proposal that he should be placed to the left. The foldable seats were also found unsatisfactory, as they were hard, uncomfortable, and placed too high up (68 cm). Loading the gun was also inconvenient. The first six shots were in the ready rack in the rear of the turret, the rest were housed in cases in the sponsons. When the ready rack was used, the rate of fire was 10-12 RPM. As soon as those rounds ran out, the rate of fire dropped to 4-6 RPM. 

The results of the trials were mixed. On one hand, the conclusion was that the "American M-7 self propelled gun" passed the trials. On the other hand, the sizeable amount of complaints about the fighting compartment was not easily ignored.

Displaced by Tanks

It was clear that the GMC M10 would be used by the Red Army by late 1943, after the NIIBT trials were concluded. As agreed in June of 1943, the first batch was limited to 50 units. The first vehicles were expected to reach training units in early February of 1944. These were not the only American tank destroyers that began arriving in early 1944. A torrent of GMC T48 came, and the M10 was lost in it. 257 GMC T48s arrived in the USSR from December 14th, 1943, to March 5th, 1944. They received the name SU-57.

Late production GMC M10, NIIBT Proving Grounds, summer of 1944.

As with the first M10s, the new tank destroyers were shipped by the southern route, through Baku. The first vehicles arrived in January, but there were delays when sending them to the training center. Batches of 15, 22, and 5 vehicles arrived at the SPG Training Center in Klyazma (Moscow oblast) in the second half of February. According to photographs, the USSR received mid and late production tank destroyers, which had slightly different turret shapes. One late production vehicle later ended up at the NIIBT Proving Grounds.

A storm of correspondence brewed up regarding a very serious issue. The problem was that the tank destroyers were 80% equipped. Four M10s had no parts and toolkits at all, along with machineguns or optics. There were no company level parts or toolkits at all. Tank destroyer number 40110927 had a smashed clutch case, bell housing, and clutch disk. One other tank destroyer could not drive at all.

Sergeant A.M. Ryazanovskiy from the 37th Independent Tank Regiment with an M10 in the background, 1944. It's possible that this is one of the six vehicles in the last batch. The M10 already has T54E1 track links with improved grousers.

The management of the SPG Training Center sounded the alarm. Soon, a letter signed by the chief of the facility, Major-General of Artillery, N.S. Kasatik was sent to the GBTU about a different issue. The chief reported that the crews that are arriving are very poorly prepared. Some of them saw the tank destroyers for the first time. For example, he 15 drivers and gunners that arrived on March 4th did not know the vehicle at all. The same thing happened with 25 more crews that arrived on March 9th and only learned the SU-76M before that.

There is nothing surprising about that, as no literature was prepared on these vehicles. The chief demanded that officers familiar with the vehicles should be sent immediately to resolve this issue and that the center should be urgently equipped with manuals. The demand for trained officers was a bit much, since the only people familiar with the M10 were specialists from the proving grounds.

The situation slowly improved, but organizational problems delayed the arrival of M10s on the battlefield. It's worth mentioning that only 875 AP shells were available on January 27th, 1944, and no HE shells at all. 5000 shells only arrived in early March. Additional supplies of ammunition were set up a little later. The GBTU USA approved an ammunition loadout for the M10s on April 26th: 27 armour piercing and high explosive shells each per vehicle.

There are very few images of the "American SU-76". In this case, it's a vehicle from the 1223rd Self Propelled Artillery Regiment.

The last 6 vehicles arrived in Baku in late February of 1944, and were sent to Pushkino on March 8th by train #33387. On June 1st, 1944, these tank destroyers were still listed as in reserve. As for the other 44 M10s, they were sent to the 1239th and 1223rd Self Propelled Artillery Regiments. These vehicles were given the index SU-76, which was already taken by the Soviet SPG, and makes studying their experience in combat difficult.

It's known that the 1223rd regiment participated in the liberation of Belarus and the Baltic as a part of the 29th Tank Corps, 5th Guards Tank Army. All additional information is contradictory. According to some data, the M10s were already gone from the regiment by the time they reached the Baltic, other information states that 10 vehicles were still in the regiment on May 1st, 1945, 4 of them functional. Another document, dated February 7th, 1945, indicates that 37 SU-76es were present in the regiment, 18 of them functional. It's hard to say whether these are Soviet SU-76es or their American namesakes. As for the 1239th regiment, it actively participated in the liberation of Poland as a part of the 16th Tank Corps, 2nd Tank Army.

There were no further requests for M10 tank destroyers. It was known that the M4A2(76)W medium tank entered production in the summer of 1944, and the first tanks began arriving in the USSR in September. Carrying practically the same gun, they were superior to an open-topped SPG.

Infantry Tank Mk.I: the First Infantry Tank

$
0
0
There are many tanks in the history of armoured warfare that were simply unlucky. The British Infantry Tank Mk.I is one of them. Even its name was lost when it became the Matilda due to some historian's error, even though that name applies to a completely different vehicle. As Britain's first infantry tank, it was hopelessly obsolete by the start of the war. Even its thick armour was not enough to survive in a war that it was simply not suitable for.


Renault NC, British Style

The British had bad luck with light tanks from the start. The Light Tank Mk.I, created in 1923, quickly turned into the Medium Tank Mk.I, as it was light only in mass. The Light Tank Mk.II met the same fate, and turned into the Medium Tank Mk.II. Attempts to make a classical light tank with a mass between 5 and 7 tons did not work out.

The British military did not rush to build them, either. The infantry support role was given to tankettes, medium tanks would fight enemy tanks, and heavy tanks with about 25 mm of armour would create breakthroughs. The A1E1 Independent was designed for that role, but its development dragged on, and it turned out insanely expensive. There was no place for light tanks in this structure.

When light tanks appeared in the British army, their concept was radically different than light tanks in any other army. The Light Tank Mk.I built in 1929 was effectively an evolution of the Carden-Loyd Mk.VII tankette, and both vehicles even had the same designers. The task of the light tanks was the same as of the tankettes. They were not exceptionally suitable for infantry support, since their armour only protected them from rifle caliber bullets.

The British army remained skeptical about the Vickers Mk.E, a light tank designed for infantry support. This was due to its comparison to the Light Tank Mk.I. With the same armour, the tank was less maneuverable, and it was evaluated as a "trench sweeper". As a result, trials of this bestselling tank in 1930 ended with nothing.

Infantry Tank A11E1, fall of 1936

A radically different tank school was being developed right next to the British in the early 1930s in France. The French had the opposite situation. Despite many problems, they managed to build a small batch of Renault NC light tanks, but enormous issues prevented production of medium tanks. Even though the French military rejected it, the slow and well armoured Renault NC became the subject of imitation in many other countries. Even though only the Japanese bought it, encyclopedias of the time claim that the Renault NC was used by Yugoslavia, Sweden, Poland, and France.

The hype around the tank grew due to information about the NC-2, with two machineguns, and other similar vehicles, even though most of it was just rumour and fiction. Strangely enough, the British military wanted its own Renault NC.

It is fair to associate the development of infantry tanks with Sir Percy Hobart. In 1934, he was appointed as the commander of the tank brigade that gathered up Britain's tanks. He was also the inspector of the Royal Tank Corps, taking control of the development of prospective armoured vehicles.

The requirements for two new tanks of a new type: infantry tanks. Both had to have armour that was 25 mm thick and a top speed of 16 kph. The first tank would be armed with a machinegun, 7.62 or 12.7 mm. Unlike the second, heavier tank (armed with a 2-pounder or 40 mm gun), the first tank would be the primary means of infantry support. This tank would be produced in greater numbers and act as a mobile pillbox that was not afraid of machineguns or cannons.

The same tank after the first changes. Headlights with protective cases were added, as well as a rear view mirror.

Vickers-Armstrongs and Carden-Loyd companies acted as the contractors. Sir John Carden is often called the creator of the new light tank, but that was not the case. Many talented engineers worked in Carden and Loyd's company, including Leslie Little. As the founders, he began his career as an officer in the British army, and then tried his luck in the automotive industry. Little participated in nearly all designs made by the company and was effectively John Carden's right hand. He was the lead engineer on the new tank.

The tank was designed in difficult conditions. Due to the misery defense budget, only 93,750 pounds Sterling were issued for development. Another limiting factor was the cost of the tank: no more than 5,000 pounds Sterling.

Later, the tank received toolboxes and new observation devices.

Carden-Loyd decided to not reinvent the wheel and use the Renault NC concept as much as possible. The first work on the new vehicle, indexed A11, was presented by John Carden in October of 1935. In this draft, the prospective tank was called Matilda, but this is no more than a code name, and it was referred to as A11 in subsequent documents.

In the initial draft, the tank would use a Horstmann suspension, like Vickers-Carden-Loyd's light tanks. The hull and turret were also different. The tank that we know today appeared later. The long and narrow hull, one-man cast turret, two-man crew, rear transmission, all of this was foreign for British light tanks of the era.

The narrow hull reduced the tank's mass as much as possible. At the same time, the A11 had none of the drawbacks that the Renault NC inherited from the Renault FT. Carden-Loyd engineers did not use a large hatch in the front, opting instead for a one-piece hatch in the roof. The hull was also a lot lower than on the Renault NC. The engine compartment was somewhat wider, since the tank used a V-shaped 8-cylinder Ford engine. This 3.62 L engine only output 70 hp, but according to calculations, this was enough to reach the required speed.

The rear mudguards were the last addition to the A11E1.

The new tank ended up being much wider than the French equivalent. This was largely caused by the suspension. Little decided to reuse the suspension from the Dragon, Medium Mk.IV artillery tractor, based on the Vickers Mk.E. These two infantry support tanks were related after all (even if you forget that the same people designed them). The track link design was also similar.

Thanks to a lower center of gravity and wider footprint, the A11 would not be as susceptible to flipping over as the Renault NC.

Self Propelled Pillbox

A tragedy occurred during the development of the A11. Aside from tank building, Sir John Carden was a fan of aircraft, forking Carden Aero Engines Ltd. in 1935. The hobby turned out to be fatal: the talented engineer died in a crash on December 10th, 1935. This meant the death of Carden-Loyd, especially since it already seemed like a lackey of Vickers-Armstrongs. Little moved to Vickers permanently and continued work on the A11 there.

The lubrication chart of the Infantry Tank Mk.I, which illustrates the overall layout.

The concept of an infantry support tank changed by 1936. It was clear that 25 mm was no longer enough to protect from anti-tank cannons. The French increased the armour of their light tanks to 40 mm in 1934. The Renault R 35 and FCM 36 were built with this thick armour. Even thick thickness was insufficient as far as the British were concerned. Finally, the requirement for the A11's armour was increased to 60 mm.

The prototype built for trials in 1936, indexed A11E1, was a very extraordinary vehicle. With a heavy tank's armour, it had the armament of a light tank. The thickening increased its mass to 11 tons. The overweight tank could not accelerate to 16 kph, no matter how much its creators tried. The speed limit for the A11E1 was 12.8 kph. This did not scare off the military. This speed, comparable to that of the Renault FT, was enough to support infantry.

The first mass production Infantry Tank Mk.I (WD number T.3433, registration number MHM 788), equipped with the Fowler Coulter Plough.

Later, that vehicle received the WD number T.1724 and registration number CMM 880. Changes were made to the running gear during trials. The rear road wheels became fully metallic, since rubber rims wore out easily. The tank received toolboxes in the front and headlights in protective cases. Since the roof of the engine compartment was splattered with mud during movement, small mudguards were added to the rear.

The A11E1 was equipped with an experimental mine clearing device in 1937, designed by John Fowler & Co. The company specialized in tractors and plows, so the device looked like a plow. It was even called that: Fowler Coulter Plough.

Chain drive installed on tanks that were equipped with the Fowler Coulter Plough.

A list of required changes and additions was composed after the trials. In April of 1938, more than a year and a half after trials began, the Ministry of War ordered 60 tanks from Vickers Armstrongs and gave it the official title of Infantry Tank Mk.I. Their WD numbers ranged from T.3433 to T.3492. 60 more tanks were ordered in the end of April, with WD numbers from T.5551 to T.5610.

The first production Infantry Tank Mk.I (WD number T.3433, registration number MHM 788) was equipped with the same Folwer Coulter Plough. Even with the plow removed, you could still tell the engineering vehicle apart due to the chain drive in the rear of the tank. The mine plow idea was considered so good buy the army that a decision was made to convert 70 tanks to use it.

Infantry Tank Mk.I from the first production batch in the 4th Royal Tank Regiment. The eyes painted on the turret are a distinctive feature of tanks from this unit.

Mass production Infantry Tanks Mk.I were different from the prototype. The drive sprocket was different, and the front of the hull, formerly assembled from three complex parts, was now one part. The driver's observation device was also changed, and a Mk.IV observation device was added in the hatch. The turret changed noticeably. The "brows" near the roof were became a lot more subtle. Mounts for smoke grenade launchers were added to the sides of the turret.

Holders for fire extinguishers, tow cables, and other instruments appeared on the side. Production tanks were equipped with the No.11 radio set, with an antenna behind the turret and to the right. The protective casings for the headlights were removed. A rear view mirror was added to compensate for the driver's poor visibility.

Production tank with the WD number T.3443 and registration number MHM 798, view from the rear.

The order was increased to 19 more tanks with WD numbers T.8101-T.8119. Tanks from the second and third production batches differed from earlier vehicles. To start, experience showed that the headlights were placed poorly and that it was possible to shoot them off with the machinegun. The headlights were moved to the front of the hull. The location of instruments changed, and the toolboxes increased in size. The driver's observation device was also changed.

A tank from the second production batch. The different driver's observation device, headlight locations, and toolboxes are visible.

The tank's name deserves a separate mention. Thanks to mistakes of some British historian, the Infantry Tank Mk.I is called Matilda or Matilda I. According to the books, this name allegedly appeared due to Sir Hugh Elles, who took up the post of the Chief of Ordnance in the British army. Allegedly, the tank reminded Elles of a toy duck called Matilda.

This was the official name of the tank. The name "Matilda" appeared in 1941 and was applied to a different vehicle.

In reality, that's just a legend. In truth, Sir John Carden really did use the codename "Matilda" in his draft, but the name was not used in reference to the tank after that. In official documents, the name Matilda appeared only in the spring of 1941, and the Infantry Tank Mk.I could not receive a name at that point, as names were given only to tanks that were still in production. The infantry tank was out of production since August of 1940, and by the spring of 1941 it could only be found in training units. The name Matilda I refers to a different tank.

Wrong Battlefield

According to documents, Vickers-Armstrongs delivered 67 Infantry Tanks Mk.I by the start of WWII. 39 tanks were delivered in the fourth quarter of 1939, and 19 more in the first quarter of 1940. The tanks were used by the 4th and 7th Royal Tank Regiments.

These tanks started the tradition of giving each tank a name. This was a way of marking tanks in a way that allowed the viewer to determine its unit without making out the regimental emblem. Tanks from the 4th RTR received names starting with the letter D, and tanks from the 7th RTR received names starting with G. Tankers from the 4th RTR added a unique element to their markings. Their Infantry Tanks Mk.I had eyes on their turrets, a marking unique to this regiment.

Infantry Tank Mk.I in France, late 1939.

The British military cooled their enthusiasm for mobile pillboxes by the start of WWII. It became clearer and clearer that a tank with just machineguns for armament was obsolete, and even thick armour was not particularly helpful. For this reason, there were no further orders for Infantry Tanks Mk.I, and Vickers only worked on existing contracts. It's not impossible for the British Ministry of War to have wanted to cancel production before the contracts ran out, but there was nothing to replace the Infantry Tank Mk.I with at the time.

The infantry tank armed with a 2-pdr gun did not enter production by the time WWII started. The British weren't doing so well with tank production in general. As a result, any tank that was built was good enough. Also, recall that the Infantry Tank Mk.I filled a unique role, as it was used as a mine clearing vehicle. 14 Fowler Coulter Ploughs were ready by January of 1940.

A few tanks received 12.7 mm Vickers machineguns. Since the armoured casing of that machinegun was the same as of the 7.62 mm machinegun, it is not possible to tell these tanks apart. There is also information that the British worked on re-equipping their infantry tanks with the 25 mm Hotchkiss gun (the French worked on the same project with their Renault FTs). In theory, this would have been possible, but was never implemented in practice.

A tank from the second production batch that still has a driver's observation device. France, spring of 1940.

On May 10th, 1940, the Germans began execution of Plan Gelb. The British Expeditionary Force was not sufficiently equipped with tanks at that time. A large part of the tank forces only made it to France after the German offensive began.

The 1st Army Tank Brigade, which the 4th and 7th RTRs belonged to, was already in France at the time of the invasion. As of May of 1940, the 4th RTR had 50 Infantry Tanks Mk.I. The 7th RTR was had a different structure: 27 Infantry Tank Mk.I and 23 Infantry Tank Mk.II. The latter of those tanks received the name Matilda I in the spring of 1941.

Both units had 12 Fowler Coulter Ploughs, but they were never used in their intended role.

A knocked out Infantry Tank Mk.I. According to the caption, the photo was taken in Cambrai.

Both tank regiments were north of the French town of Arras on May 20th, 1940, which was the site of many fierce battles. The regiments were subordinate to the 50th Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Giffard Martel, a key figure in British tank building. The French 3rd Light Mechanized Division, a cavalry unit, was nearby.

One of the best known battles of the campaign began on the next day. The French and British forces were opposed by Erwin Rommel's 7th Tank Division and Theodor Eicke's 3rd SS Division. The SS-men had little contact with the British specifically. They tried to go around the battlefield to hit the enemy in the flank and ran into the French.

The French took some casualties from British anti-tank guns, who mistook their tanks for German ones. The French lost 20 tanks overall, knocking out 9 German tanks (from the 25th regiment of the 7th Tank Division). Eicke lost 100 men killed and 200 captured.

British infantry tanks linked up in two columns. The left column (37 Infantry Tanks Mk.I from the 4th RTR and 7 Infantry Tank Mk.II from the 7th RTR) attacked to the south-west with infantry, going around Arras. General Martel commanded these forces directly. The right column (23 Infantry Tanks Mk.I and 9 Infantry Tank Mk.II, all from the 7th RTR) supported the infantry attack in the south direction.

Initially, the British were successful. The German tanks could do nothing against such thick armour. For almost an hour, the British pushed the Germans back, crushing their AT guns. The SS-men were hit by the right column, and also took losses. 

However, this was not Rommel's first time facing tanks with thick armour. The solution was the same: use 88 mm Flak 18 AA guns from the 23rd AA Battalion. However, these were not the only means against British tanks, as the 105 mm leFH 18 howitzers in the 78th Artillery Regiment were also actively used.

The result was a catastrophe for the British. 47 tanks out of the 76 that participated in the attack were knocked out, and the infantry that they accompanied lost half of their men. The German 7th Tank Division lost 20 tanks, 11 of which were knocked out by the British, as well as a large amount of anti-tank artillery. The Germans achieved strategic victory, since the British and French forces could only insignificantly delay the advance of the 7th Tank Division.

The sad result of the British attack on May 21st, 1940. Tanks from the 4th RTR, destroyed by German artillery.

After Arras, both tank regiments had 2 Infantry Tanks Mk.II and 26 Infantry Tanks Mk.I. On the evening of May 26th, 1940, the British Expeditionary Force received the order to begin evacuation as a part of Operation Dynamo. The 4th and 7th RTRs retreated to Dunkirk, where they took part in covering the evacuating British and French forces. The personnel of both units also evacuated, but their tanks were left in German hands. More than half of all Infantry Tanks Mk.I remained on the fields of France.

The Germans showed little interest towards the British infantry tanks. The tanks were indexed Infanterie Panzerkampfwagen Мк I 747 (e), but they were not even used as training vehicles. Tanks that were collected from the battlefield were sent to warehouses.

12 more Infantry Tanks Mk.I were delivered in the second quarter of 1940. The last two tanks arrived in August. They were not sent to fighting units, since it was obvious that these tanks were not suitable for modern war. The tanks were used for training purposes, but not for long. In 1941, more suitable vehicles appeared in the British army.

Infantry Tank Mk.I from the Polish 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade, England, 1941

There is another myth around the Infantry Tank Mk.I worth mentioning. According to some sources, one Infantry Tank Mk.I was sold to Poland in July of 1939, where it was captured by the Germans. A photo of a tank with turret number 834 is shown as evidence, but that is not the case.

The number 834 was painted by the German trophy team. Later, the tank was stored at a warehouse of captured tanks along the French Char D2, which was also not interesting to the Germans. As for the Poles, they did use the Infantry Tank Mk.I after all. Such a tank was used by Colonel Maczek's 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade. This was in 1940, in Great Britain, where the brigade was evacuated from France. These tanks were used by the Poles for training until 1941.

Three Infantry Tanks Mk.I survive to this day. One of them, WD number T.3447, is from the first production batch. It was found at a shooting range next to Otterburn and restored to working order. Instead of its original engine, it uses a modern Rover car engine The second tank, WD number T.8106, is from the third production batch. It was also found at a shooting range, and one tank had to be assembled from two. A third tank was found at the range, which looks like a late model. Since the vehicle was heavily damaged, it was not restored.

All three tanks are owned by the Bovington Tank Musem.

Kirov Experiments, June 1941

$
0
0
"Report on completion of experimental works on armoured vehicles from May 20th, 1941, to June 20th, 1941

Object 220 (KV-3 base)

As of June 20th, the tank traveled 1979 km in total, 584 km after reassembly. The 850 hp V-2SN engine #2(1193-03) installed on May 30th worked for 27 h. 21 m. During trials, the following defects were discovered:
  1. 3 sets of exhaust collectors burned up over the course of 284 km.
  2. 4 final drive ferodo ribbons burned up. Cause: improper installation and adjustment.
As of June 12th, the existing defects are:
  1. The second road wheel rim on the right cracked and is flaking.
  2. The rims of the 4th and 5th road wheels on the right were bent.
  3. The rims of all road wheels on the left were bent.
  4. The ignition fork is worn out by 2 mm.
  5. The rubber on road wheels 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the right, 5 on the left, is loose.
  6. The right final drive broke down. Upon disassembly, it was discovered that:
    1. The were destroyed: row ball bearings x2, roller bearings x1, conical ball bearings x1.
    2. The leading gear has worn down by 6 mm and shows signs of heat damage.
3 experimental road wheels with increased diameter rubber liner and washers were installed on the left (the rubber is compressed, the ribs of the washers rub against the tracks) and 3 production wheels with wire rings in the middle of the rubber disk were installed on the right. The dry air filters were removed and replaced with experimental Vortox oil filters which have a "mushroom" inside that prevents oil from being carried away into the cylinders. Exhaust collectors with compensators were installed on the engine.

Assembly of Object 220-II with 100 mm of armour began on June 7th. The following work was completed: final drives and torsion bar stoppers were installed. The gearbox, main clutch, side clutches were completed, but not installed. The tank will be ready no sooner than July 10-15th.

Object 150

The tank traveled for 2237 km as of June 19th. 5 engines were replaced during the reported period (see attached table). The following defects were discovered during trials:
  1. Oil leak from the primary gearbox shaft grease retainer.
  2. Gearbox defects:
    1. Teeth from the 3rd and 4th gear and the conical gear from the main shaft were knocked off.
    2. The collar of the 2nd and 4th gear wore down by 4 mm.
  3. The 5th rubber shock absorber on the right and first on the left were destroyed.
  4. The paper fuel filters foul significantly and tear.
An experimental connection of the torsion bar with the suspension arm, hot installation (no grooves). Over 2000 km, no shift in diameter was observed. The gearbox with a casing from recycled aluminium worked for 1671 km without defects of the casing.

Object T-50

A new main clutch was designed, made in one assembly with the fan (with no dampener). It was installed on the tank. The levers and control rods for the main clutch are not ready. The latter are being moved to the right side of the tank, as it is the most free. The tank will be ready for trials by July 1st of this year.

Object KV-3

As of June 20th, the hull and turret have not arrived at the factory. The gun from factory #92 is present. The plan for order #37061 is delayed on all counts. We must sound the alarm on this project. We don't know the pain points of this vehicle and if defects occur during mass production it will be more difficult to correct them.

Object 212

The factory #92 representative received data on the Object relevant to the gun that will be installed in it.

U-7

Vortox air filters were tested on the tank. Trials showed that over 17 hours, the filters caught 8 kg of dust. The commission evaluated that the filter can work for 8-10 hours in highly dusty situations without cleaning. Vortox type air filters are now being installed on production vehicles.

Object 218

The technical project is ready. A model is ready. The GABTU model commission will arrive at the factory on June 25th."

Valentine Improvement

$
0
0
"To the Chief Engineer of TsAKB and TsAKB Chief, Lieutenant-General of the Technical Forces, comrade Grabin

April 18th, 1944

Valentine tanks armed with a 40 mm gun continue arriving from England in the USSR.

The penetration of this gun is low and, as experience shows, it cannot fight against modern German tanks in battle. In addition, the ammunition used with the 40 mm gun does not include a high explosive shell, making these tanks ineffective against infantry.

I ask you to determine the possibility of designing and producing an experimental Valentine tank with an 85 mm S-53 gun.

It is necessary to include a 7.62 mm machinegun with 360 degree range to combat enemy personnel.

GBTU USA Chief, Major-General of the Engineering Tank Service, Alymov."

CAMD RF 38-11369-284

Repair Bill

$
0
0
"Preliminary calculations of capital repairs of the A-34 vehicle

Proposed replacement of mechanisms:
  • V-2 engine: 72,386
  • Electric motors (set): 2610
  • Radiators: 2013
  • Tires: 10,000
  • Ball bearings: 3325
  • Gearbox: 12,000
  • Main friction clutch: 5000
  • Final drives: 4740
  • Tracks: 6612
  • Normalizing parts: 1128
  • Tarp parts: 1275
  • Felt parts: 664
  • Rubber parts: 933
  • Liner: 100
  • Total cost: 122,786
Materials and workforce required to disassemble and reassemble the A-34 for repairs:
  • Fashioned steel: 700
  • Plate steel: 500
  • Ferrous pipes: 200
  • Nonferrous pipes: 120
  • Nonferrous metals: 120
  • Lubrication materials: 152
  • Gasoil: 120
  • Other materials: 268
  • Total: 2180
  • Workforce: 16,000
  • Plant overhead: 64,000
  • Factory overhead: 16,000
  • Factory working cost: 98,180
  • Taxes, fees, and profit: 5,242
  • Total: 103,422
The estimated price for capital repairs of an A-34 vehicle is 226,208.

For the contract, let's take 200,000. After the repairs are complete, the final payment will be made according to calculations and will not exceed the original estimate by more than 50% with a 5.33% interest, so 316,000 rubles."

"History of the T-34 tank" Memorial Museum Complex, Documentary Historical Collection #4

Zhukov and Minefields

$
0
0
There's a very common myth about Zhukov prevalent in popular culture, both Russian and Western, about his unparalleled cruelty and disregard for human life. Historian Aleksey Isayev read a radio lecture dispelling common myths about the commander. I'm not going to transcribe the whole thing, since it's over an hour and a half long, but I will tackle one particularly prevalent myth: the allegation that Zhukov marched his men to their death over minefields. Isayev discusses the myth at 1:33:05.

"There's a very famous story, allegedly coming from Eisenhower, about how if Soviet infantry encountered a minefield, it would advance as though there was no minefield there. This is a retelling over a broken telephone. In reality, Zhukov insisted that regular ordinary infantry should undergo sapper training, because simple mine disarmament, removal of simple minefields, can be performed by a person who has certain combat experience, and the implementation of this in ordinary rifle units, so they would not be stalled in front of minefields waiting for sappers and deal with minefields that they could handle by themselves, moving forward, and not remain in place, vulnerable to artillery attack."

Hummel: Bee with a Long Stinger

$
0
0
German engineers invented the "self propelled gun mount" class of artillery. The first work in this area was done during WWI, but it truly became a mass event 25 years after it ended. The recipe was simple: take a light or medium tank and use its parts to to build a chassis with bulletproof armour. A slightly modified version of a towed gun was installed on that chassis. Thanks to this phenomenon, the mobility of German artillery grew significantly. The Hummel became the post powerful of German "self propelled gun mounts". This SPG earned its position as one of the symbols of German self propelled artillery.

A Union of Competitors

Krupp was the center of medium SPGs in 1942. Work on this type of vehicle began in Hessen before WWII. The results were complicated. The 10.5 cm K. L/52 Selbstfahrlafette, envisioned as a bunker buster, turned into the Pz.Sfl.IVa, nicknamed Dicker Max. The name was no accident. With a mass of 22 tons, the SPG only carried a 180 hp engine. The vehicle, reclassified as a tank destroyer, was not great in terms of mobility. For a number of reasons, mass production of these vehicles, finally renamed Pz.Sfl.IV (10 cm), was cancelled at the end of 1941.

Things were going much better with another SPG that branched off the 10.5 cm K. L/52 Selbstfahrlafette project. It first carried the name Pz.Sfl.IV (leFH 18), but later the name changed to Pz.Sfl.IVb. It had six wheels on leaf springs per side and the same engine as the Pz.Sfl.IVa. However, the mass dropped to 18 tons, which improved mobility.

Two experimental prototypes of the SPG, which was called leFH 18 (Sfl.) starting with August 13th, 1941, were ready by early January of 1942. The result was a good vehicle that was suitable for supporting tanks. However, doubts about the mass production of the SPG began to appear in the spring. The gun caliber was rather small for such a large and expensive chassis, and the fighting compartment was not very roomy. The engine was proprietary, and it could not use parts from more numerous vehicles, like the road wheels and other components.

It's not surprising that OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, Supreme Command of the Land Forces) decided to create a medium "self propelled mount" with a more impressive gun. The 15 cm sFH 15 was chosen as the weapon. The gun itself was good, but its mass of 5 tons seriously limited its mobility on the battlefield.

As you can see, the 15 cm sFH 18 was hardly a feather. Imagine being a part of its crew and having to push it across a field...

Rheinmetall-Borsig was chosen as the developer of the new SPG. Krupp's main competitor in the B.W. project, the arms giant quickly found an alternative to the tender that it lost. The conglomerate opened the Alkett factory (Altmärkische Kettenfabrik) in 1938 in Spandau, a suburb of Berlin. Its main purpose was assembly of tanks and SPGs, and that is where the new SPG was developed.

The first vehicles built here were 32 PzII Ausf B tanks, and later the factory build medium PzIII tanks. Starting in 1940, the main product of the factory was the StuG III. Alkett was the only supplier of this vehicle starting with the StuG III Ausf. B and to the Ausf. F/8. Even the StuG 40 Ausf. G, the most numerous type of armoured vehicle in Germany, was largely built in Spandau. It's no surprise that the OKH chose this factory.

The first Geschützwagen für sFH 18/1, late 1942. The large muzzle brake makes this vehicle easy to identify.

Since production of the PzIII and tanks on its chassis was the priority for Alkett, it was quite reasonable for them to choose this tank as the chassis. In real life, things were not so simple. An idea of further development of the PzIII arose in December of 1941. The installation of the PzIV turret and a 75 mm KwK 40 L/43 gun was planned. The tank would be called PzIII Ausf. K. The project did not make it into metal. It turned out that the running gear would have to be redone to install a turret that could fit more powerful armament. That was the beginning of the end for the PzIII.

As for the PzIV, its upper limit was higher at 25 tons. Even though the PzIII chassis was not out of production, as it was used to build the StuG 40 with the more powerful 7.5 cm StuK 40 cannon, Alkett understood that there is no reasonable alternative to the PzIV.

The resulting design was a hybrid using components from the PzIII and PzIV. The running gear of the Geschützwagen III was the same as on the PzIV. The tank also inherited the Maybach HL 120 TRM engine and its cooling system. The hull "tub" was similar as well. The ZF SSG 77 was taken from the PzIII.

A lack of driver observation hatch was also another unique feature of the experimental Geschützwagen für sFH 18/1.

Since the vehicle would house the large and heavy 149 mm howitzer, there was a lot of work that had to be gone on the layout of the vehicle. The result was a combination of various compromises. The engineers had no other choice but to hide the engine underneath the gun. One can only feel sorry for the repair crews that had to deal with these vehicles. In order to remove the engine, the gun had to be removed first, and then the vehicle had to be partially disassembled.

Servicing the transmission was easier, but still could not be done without a crane. A large plate, which included the driver's cabin, had to be removed. As an aside, the radio operator shared the driver's compartment, but had no observation devices of his own.

Layout of the Geschützwagen III/IV.

Alkett had a good reason for making this decision. This rearrangement of its internals gave the Geschützwagen III a roomy fighting compartment that fit not only the howitzer, but also four crewmen. However, it could only fit 18 rounds of ammunition to go with them.

A well designed cooling system left out the "ears" of the Pz.Sfl.IVa. The mass was also 22 tons, same as the Dicker Max, but with a more powerful engine. The Alkett design also had more components in common with tanks that were already in production than Krupp's vehicles.

SPG from the Steel Mill

The first experimental prototype, called Geschützwagen für sFH 18/1, was built by Alkett towards the end of 1942. The experimental prototype used as many components from the PzIV as possible. One of its distinguishing features was a massive muzzle brake. It was quickly discovered that the muzzle brake was unnecessary, as the stability of the Geschützwagen III/IV was stable enough without it. The muzzle brake also kicked up a large cloud of dust when the gun fired.

Assembly line at Deutsche Eisenwerke AG, Werk Stahlindustie, Duisburg.

As a result of trials, the vehicle was improved. The howitzer lost its muzzle brake, and some changes were made to the running gear. The drive sprocket and final drives were taken from the PzIII instead of the PzIV. Considering that the main product at Alkett was the StuG, this was a logical decision, especially since the gearbox was already taken from the PzIII. The vehicle also "grew" auxiliary elements, such as hooks for the tarp. The driver's cabin received an observation hatch, which improved his visibility on the march.

This photo shows that the engine and its cooling system are located underneath the gun.

The issue of the small ammunition capacity was also solved around this time. Alkett did not reinvent the wheel and designed a munition carrier on the Geschützwagen für sFH 18/1 chassis. The vehicle was called Geschützwagen III für Munition and had the index Sd.Kfz.165, same as the Geschützwagen III.

In practice, this was the same vehicle, but without a howitzer and with a shield where its port used to be. The fighting compartment had racks for ammunition. A series of simple operations could convert the vehicle into a Geschützwagen für sFH 18/1. Thanks to this feature, the number of vehicles produced changes depending on the source. The question of how many munitions carriers were later turned into SPGs remains unanswered.

Geschutzwagen III, spring 1943 production.

Meanwhile, Alkett had better things to do than work on a new SPG by late 1942. The monthly production of the StuG 40 grew up to 100 vehicles in November, and 129 in December, even though production of the StuG 40 Ausf. G began that month. The importance of these vehicles can be seen from the fact that they were also produced at MIAG starting in February of 1943. Alkett was also tasked with production of the StuH 42 with a 105 mm howitzer in March of 1943.

It's not surprising that another contractor was found for production of the Geschützwagen für sFH 18/1. This was the Deutsche Eisenwerke AG, Werk Stahlindustie steel mill in Duisburg. The distance between Duisburg and Hessen was about the same as to Dusseldorf. This was symbolic, as the production of Deutsche Eisenwerke AG united Krupp and Rheinmetall's work.

Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG (DEW) was the supplier of armoured plates for the new SPG. Starting in March of 1943, production of armour was moved to Deutsche Röhrenwerke AG Werk Thyssen.

Geschützwagen III für Munition built on the same chassis.

The first five SPGs were built in February of 1943. At that point, they were called Geschützwagen III. In March, the volume of production reached 26 units, and 49 in April. Starting in May, the Geschützwagen III fur Munition entered production, which decreased the number of SPGs built. In total, 368 SPGs and 96 munitions carriers were built in 1943.

Captured Geschützwagen III at the NIIBT proving grounds.

The complex story of the name of this SPG deserves a special mention. By July 1st, 1943, its name changed to schwere Feldhaubitze 18/1 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen IV, or "heavy 18/1 howitzer on the IV gun vehicle". This title lasted for a month. In early August, the SPG was renamed to G.W.III/IV Hummel für s.FH 18/1 (Sd.Kfz.165). This was the first time the name Hummel (bumblebee) appeared in the SPG's title. However, it only stuck around for a few months. In manual D-653/42, published on October 15th, 1943, the vehicle was named schwere Feldhaubitze 18/1 (Sf) auf GW IV. Even that name did not last long: the SPG was called Geschützwagen III/IV (Sd.Kfz.165) as of November 1st. The name Hummel was no longer used officially, but it remained in practice. In total, the SPG was renamed eight times. The last renaming happened in October of 1944: it became s.Pz.Haub.18/1 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.III/IV (sf) (sd.Kfz.165). 

With such a "simple" name, is it any wonder that the military kept calling it "Hummel"? It's worth a mention that the name "Hummel" appeared in Guderian's reports before it was given to the SPG officially, on May 3rd, 1943. It was also used later. The SPG is called Hummel in a report dated May 3rd, 1944. This information name kept on being used at the highest levels as the most convenient.

The mounts for spare wheels and track links are some of the many field modifications.

The SPG changed more than its index. The first serious change in the design happened in the summer of 1943. The location of the muffler in the rear was not the best place for it, and the muffler was removed. The exhaust pipes were shortened and turned sideways so that the gases did not enter the fighting compartment. The space that freed up was used to carry spare road wheels.

Work on bigger changes began in December of 1943. Alkett finally figured out that the radio operator is bored without observation devices. As a result, a new cabin was designed, this time with a place for the radio operator. Like the driver, he received a hatch with an observation port. Another observation port was added to the right. The driver's visibility dropped somewhat, but since it was already far from ideal, this was not a big issue. The new cabin entered production in February of 1944.

The running gear was also changed somewhat in the spring of 1944. The PzIV Ausf. J went into production with a different idler design, and that design migrated to the SPG. The last changes made to the design were to the air intakes in the sides. Combat experience showed that the intakes were vulnerable, so they were moved up. This improvement was implemented in August of 1944.

The muffler means that the vehicle was built before August of 1943.

289 SPGs and 61 munitions carriers were built in 1944. 48 more were built in 1945. The last s.Pz.Haub.18/1 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.III/IV (sf) (sd.Kfz.165) left the factory in March. The total production run was 705 SPGs and 157 munitions carriers. The vehicles received serial numbers 320001-32813. 50 of the munitions carriers were built at Werk Teplitz-Schönau in Teplice. These vehicles had serial numbers 325001–325050. Production here began in early 1944, but the factory was quickly converted to produce Hornisse (Nashorn) tank destroyers, since it used the same Geschützwagen III/IV chassis.

Long Arm of the Wehrmacht's Tank Divisions

Heavy SPG batteries began forming in May of 1943, which were included in self propelled squadrons. According to TO&E K.St.N.461b issued on January 15th, 1943, the third battery of such a squadron included six Geschützwagen III/IV. The table also included two munitions carriers. Tank divisions also received SPGs. Batteries in SS tank divisions also got them. These vehicles were also sent to the 845th and 536th independent heavy artillery squadrons.

The new driver's cabin was put into production in February of 1944.

Since a battery only had 6 vehicles and 2 munitions carriers, units filled up quickly. During the entire production run, Hummels were sent to 40 different units, and impressive number. It's not surprising that the use of these tanks in combat, starting with July of 1943 during the Battle of Kursk, was widespread, and the SPG ended up as one of the symbols of German tank building. At the start of Operation Citadel, the schwere Feldhaubitze 18/1 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen IV could be found in ten different units.

A captured late production Hummel. Officially, the 366th SAP had two of these SPGs, but vehicles with tactical numbers 41, 52, and 53 are known.

Reviews from the front were contradictory. On one hand, the concept of an artillery squadron with a battery of six Wespe and a battery of six Hummels was correct. The combination of 105 and 149 mm guns was suitable for many objectives during a division's attack or defense. The mechanization of artillery noticeably sped up the time required to bring the gun into position and increased the mobility of artillery.

On the other hand, there were many complaints regarding the mobility. There was an issue with poorly trained drivers, but the SPG itself gathered many complaints. Most of them were about the running gear. The main clutch and idlers often broke. Even though the vehicle's mass was only 22 tons, the suspension was overloaded. There were also many teething troubles, which were highlighted by a lack of spare parts.

The loading process. The right rack contained propellant, and the shells lined the floor of the fighting compartment. As you can see, the fighting compartment had no lack of space.

The foreign equivalent of the Hummel was, at the very least, no better. The American Gun Motor Carriage M12 had no fighting compartment at all and the crew had to stand behind it while firing. The American vehicle was also slower and heavier, and carried only 10 rounds of ammunition. Compared to the GMC M12, Alkett's design was a leader in crew comfort.

Complaints about the Hummel kept coming. The issues with the main clutch didn't go anywhere, and many units complained about the engine being too weak. The same complaints were made about the Wespe. One must remember than an SPG is not a tank, but the tankers often forgot that. Issues with spare parts also never disappeared, which often resulted in vehicles lost for technical reasons. Despite all these complaints, the self propelled gun mount concept itself was proven correct.

There were, however, cases in Italy when the artillerymen demanded their towed guns back. This was due to the difficult terrain, which the Hummel was not suited to. For example, after three weeks of fighting, the battery of the 26th Tank Division had one Hummel left out of six.

The most noticeable conversions were done in the 9th SS Tank Division Hohenstaufen. Notice the anti-grenade net above the fighting compartment.

Often, the cause of the loss of SPGs was that they were used incorrectly. Frontline conversions hint at this phenomenon. For example, 9th SS Tank Division Hohenstaufen altered all of their Hummels in a very noticeable way. A special net was installed above the fighting compartment to prevent grenades from being tossed in. Considering that the official task of the self propelled gun mount was firing indirectly, and not fighting the enemy close up, these conversions raise some questions. Complaints about damage to the recoil mechanisms from bullets and shrapnel also indicate that the Hummels were firing directly at the enemy.

Naturally, the vehicle was not meant for this task. Its large size made a good target, and the thin armour left no chance of survival for the crew. The ammunition that lines the sides was also a problem; the Hummel's detonating ammunition rack made for stunning fireworks.

The only known photo of the Hummel-Wespe to date.

The last version of the SPG is known as the Hummel-Wespe. It appeared due to the cancellation of the Wespe in June of 1944. Discussion of creating the Hummel-Wespe began in October of 1944. The vehicle was initially called le.Pz.Haub, light howitzer on a tank platform, and was a GW III/IV chassis with a  leFH 18/40 howitzer installed. The front of the casemate was changed to accommodate this, and armour for the howitzer was developed. A net was added to the roof to protect the SPG from grenades.

According to plans, 40 of these SPGs would be built in February of 1945, 50 in March, 80 in April, and 250 in total until the end of June. The reality was different: one experimental Hummel-Wespe was built at Alkett in December of 1944. There is also information about nine more vehicles built in January of 1945. The Hummel-Wespe was supposed to be built at Teplice, since Duisburg was heavily bombed.

A Hummel destroyed during street fighting. Berlin, May of 1945

The Hummel was used until the end of the war. German troops used them during street fighting in Berlin. The Germans weren't the only ones using them in battle. The 366th SAP in the 4th Guards Army had two vehicles officially, and that was not the complete list of such trophies. The service life of the SPG did not end with the end of the war. One SPG was given to Romania, and the French sold five Hummels to Syria in the late 1950s. These vehicles were used in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

Despite some drawbacks, the Hummel concept was a correct one. Thanks to these vehicles, tank divisions received much more maneuverable artillery units. After the war, many countries, including the USSR, adopted the concept of high caliber SPGs as a method of reinforcing tank units. The idea of a medium "self propelled gun mount" was also correct. It was developed further into the Waffentrager: an SPG that was as cheap as possible while increasing the mobility of towed artillery.

E-50 and E-75: A Story of Failed Unification

$
0
0
Tanks that could have been built are often discussed within certain circles. Aside from the superheavy Maus and E-100, there are the light and medium E-10 and E-25 tank destroyers. Despite very incomplete data about these vehicles, the overall characteristics are known, including the armament.

Meanwhile, the core of "Panzerwaffe-46" was going to be composed of the medium E-50 tank and heavy E-75 tank, at least in the minds of fans of alternative history. The story with these tanks is a lot more complicated, since work stopped at an early stage, and a good half of the information available on these tanks is divination at best. Let's try to figure out what about the E-50 and E-75 is true and what is blatant misrepresentation.

Aim for Unification

The 6th Department of the Armament Directorate, and Heinrich Kniepkamp personally, tried to design a single platform for two types of tanks since the second half of the 1930s. This was caused by the strange situation where the Grosstraktor and Leichttraktor projects let to the appearance of the B.W. support tank and Z.W. medium tank. Even though the tanks were built for different purposes, their characteristics were very similar.

In early 1937, a reasonable idea of leaving just one of the two similar chassis in mass production came up. The Z.W.38 tank, which Kniepkamp participated in designing, seemed the most promising. This tank, unlike the preceding PzIII Ausf. B-D, was going to have a torsion bar suspension, which was successfully perfected on the Swedish Landsverk L-60 tank.

In Knipkamp's mind, the support tank would be built by putting a B.W. (PzIV) turret on top of a 4.Serie/Z.W. tank. In June of 1937, the military informed Krupp that the 2.Serie/B.W. (PzIV Ausf. B) will be the last batch of PzIV tanks. However, plans and reality rarely coincide. Work on the PzIV dragged on, and the first tank only entered trials in the spring of 1938. As a result, Erich Wolfert, Krupp's lead engineer, managed to keep the PzIV in production. The idea of building the military's main tank and a support tank on one chassis, like the British did with the Medium Tanks Mk.I and Mk.II failed.

Panther II, the first attempt to unify medium and heavy tanks.

The next attempt to create a universal tank platform was made five years later. In April of 1942, Henschel began working on the VK 45.02 (H) tank, also known as the Tiger II. During development, a decision was made to share components with the VK 30.02 (MAN) medium tank. In November of 1942, the VK 45.02 (H) turned into the VK 45.03 (H), which is also know as the Tiger III.

On February 17th, 1943, the minister of armament and ammunition Alber Speer approved the unification of the VK 45.03 (H) and the prospective Panther II tank. This time, the idea was not to build the tanks on one chassis, like with the B.W. and Z.W. The heavy tank would use a suspension with nine pairs of road wheels, the medium tank would use seven pairs. The Tiger III had a longer hull. The engine, transmission, cooling system, and road wheels would be the same.

Meanwhile, the Panther II was delayed, and the VK 45.03 (H) turned back into the VK 45.02 (H). It had nothing to do with the tank that was previously developed under that index. Finally, the VK 45.02 (H) was accepted into service as the Pz. Kpfw. Tiger Ausf. B. As for the Panther II, the project did not progress past a test chassis. The reason for this was that MAN was too busy producing the regular Panther. The decision to use the hull of this tank for the Jagdpanther tank destroyer also played a role.

In May of 1942, Kniepkamp started thinking about a new universal tank chassis. Unlike the Tiger III/Panther II, his idea was closer to what he did five years beforehand. Instead of unifying the parts, the heavy and medium tank would share a chassis. While the Tiger III/Panther II were still in development, this idea was not taken seriously. Nobody was going to work on an even more controversial project in parallel. Kniepkamp had to wait until the spring of 1943 when it became clear that the unification of the Tiger III and Panther II was going nowhere.

Without torsion bars or front transmission

A curious series of events preceded the work on a unified chassis. As we know, the VK 45.02 (H) and VK 45.03 (H) were not the only projects for a new generation of German heavy tank. In early 1942, Porsche K.G. began working on a heavy tank that was indexed Typ 180 or VK 45.02 (P) in March. Like the Henschel competitor, the armour of this tank was sloped.

As for the technical "filling", Porsche was true to himself. Porsche's designers did not share Kniepkamp's love of a front transmission, gasoline engine, or torsion bar suspension. The elements of the Typ 180's suspension, just like its predecessors, were moved out of the hull, and the drive sprocket was in the rear. Porsche's tank had serious issues with the engine. Air cooled diesel engines never reached an acceptable state. The military was also suspicious of the electric transmission. As a result, the Typ 180 was never even built as a prototype, and the turret that was designed by Krupp for this tank was "inherited" by the first 50 Tiger B tanks.

The E-50's chassis. Given a mass limit of 50 tons, only 10 remained for the turret.

It would seem that Kniepkamp's concept won. The Panther and Tiger B were both built according to the traditional German concept, which dated its way back to the interbellum Carden-Loyd tractor. However, the E series program launched by Kniepkamp in April of 1943 (Entwicklung, "development") departed from this concept.

Aside from the air cooled engine and electric transmission, it would appear that the 6th Department's chief developer copied his competitor's ideas. The E series had external suspensions and any kind of spring elements aside from torsion bars. Another feature of the E series was a rear transmission. The only prospective tank that would have had a front transmission was the superheavy E-100, but that had an obvious reason. The E-100 was a reincarnation of the earlier Tiger-Maus project, which had a spring suspension.

Two variants of the E-75. The Adler version was deemed more promising.

There were several reasons for moving the transmission back. The Carden-Loyd layout became complicated to service at a certain point. One can only imagine the headache that German repairmen got when a Tiger's gearbox in the middle of a field. In order to extract it from the tank, one had to take out a good half of its internals. Considering how heavy the turret was, this was no easy task. The Panther and Tiger B had an easier time of it, since there was a removable roof section around the driver's compartment, but the job was still far from easy.

Compared to this, the removal of the gearbox on Soviet medium and heavy tanks was a piece of cake, especially on the T-34 and IS-2. Another advantage of Soviet tanks was that if a shell or mine destroyed the front idler, one could temporarily wrap the track around the front road wheel. The tank partially retained its mobility as a result. On German tanks, where the drive sprocket was in the front, this trick wouldn't work.

Like with Porsche's designs, the suspension of the E-50 and E-75 was outside the hull.

Aside from the E-100, the E series contained the light E-10 tank destroyer which would serve as a replacement for the Jagdpanzer 38(t), a medium E-25 tank destroyer (replacement for the Jagdpanzer IV) and a "unified chassis". The medium E-50 and heavy E-75 tanks would use this chassis.

Krupp and Henschel worked on the E-100, but the suspension was worked on by Adlerwerke. Engineers from Klöckner Humboldt Deutz AG, or Magirus, worked on the E-10. Argus Motoren Gesellschaft m.b.H. worked on the E-25.

As for the E-50 and E-75, this is a more difficult topic. Adlerwerke is often named as their developer, but that is not the case. As with the E-100, this company worked only on the suspension. Information on the "unified chassis" is incomplete, and largely the product of speculation and fantasy.

The Adler suspension used springs instead of torsion bars.

Another little known fact is that the E-50 and E-75 duet was not the only alternative for the Panther and Tiger B. In April of 1944, Vereinigte Apparatebau AG, Rheinmetall-Borsig AG's design bureau, proposed its own suspension. It was essentially a modernized version of Aleksei Surin's suspension, which was used on the AH-IV tankettes, light Praha TNH and LT vz. 38 tanks, as well as a number of other CKD vehicles.

The difference between the two suspensions was that now the paired road wheels were interleaved. The difference between the prospective running gear for the Panther and Tiger B was the distance between the bogeys.

A diagram of the kinematics of the prospective Adlerwerke suspension.

The idea of Adlerwerke's engineers, led by Karl Jenschke, was different. Their design was closed to the suspension that was designed by Porsche KG. The difference was that Porsche's designers used a torsion bar, and Adlerwerke used springs. Jenschke claimed that this suspension was tested at MAN and gave good results.

Prospective Panther suspension by Vereinigte Apparatebau AG

The wheels here were also interleaved. The question of how many wheels there were per bogey has no answer. Most sources copy the sketch made by Jenschke in the spring of 1945, after he was taken prisoner by the Americans. There, he drive single road wheels. However, this decision was suboptimal from the point of view of weight distribution, and Porsche and Vereinigte Apparatebau AG doubled up their road wheels. It's likely that the E-50 and E-75 also had double road wheels.

A new suspension for the Tiger II. There's minimal difference between this variant and the one on the Panther.

According to the concept, the E-50 and E-75 would have nearly identical hulls, distinct only in armour thickness. There are no concrete numbers about what this thickness would have been. The numbers in the names indicated the weight class of the tanks, and since the E-75 would be 1.5 times heavier, the number of bogeys increased to four per side.

The information received by the Americans said that the weight reserve of the E-75 chassis meant that SPGs in the 80 ton class could be built on its chassis. This information gives additional room for speculation. There's no shortage to the vehicles that were "designed' on this chassis, but we must disappoint the "designers": a reserve and its use are two different things. As for the SPG with a 149 mm L/52 gun that is brought up when this project is discussed, its real mention dates back to documents from 1941 and applies to a completely different project, the VK 70.01.

Maybach HL 295, one of the descendants of the E-50 and E-75's engine.

The parameters of the E-50 and E-75's engine are also known. The V-shaped 12 cylinder Maybah HL 234 would be used. It was based on the HL 230, but the HL 234 output 900 hp at 3000 RPM. In order to make the engine more reliable, it could have been lowered to 850 RPM. The HL 234 had a special feature in the form of direct fuel injection. A turbocharger could also be installed, raising the power output to 1000 hp. The Maybach HL 234 R engine could serve as an alternative, but there is no data on it.

The engine would have been connected to a hydraulic 8-speed gearbox with a preselector and a 2-radius turning mechanism. The name of this gearbox was mentioned in the report on the Maybach HL 234: OG 40 12 16 B. A special feature of the E-50 and E-75's transmission was that the gearbox, turning mechanism, and final drives would have been built as a single unit. This saved up to a ton of weight and shortened the time to build the tank by 25%. According to calculations, the top speed of the E-50 was 60 kph and the top speed of the E-75 of 40 kph.

Gunless

While there is some data on the engine, suspension, and hull of the E-50 and E-75, there is no information about the armament. This let the imagination of fans of alternative history run wild. However, if we take into account what little information we have and the overall tendencies of German tank building from the time, it turns out that most of these fantasies have few roots in reality.

One of the long guns that are frequently "mated" with the E series.

For starters, we must disappoint the daydreamers who put the Schmalturm, or "narrow turret" on the E-50. It was initially designed for the Panther II, and its significantly altered version would have been installed on the Panther Ausf. F. Those who put the Tiger B turret atop the E-75 will also be disappointed. Neither turret was going to be used on the E-50 or E-75.

According to information obtained by American intelligence, Krupp was supposed to design a new turret for these tanks. Like the hull, the turret designs for the two tanks would have been identical, with the only difference being the armour thickness and the armament. There is no other information about the unified turret, only that it would have an electric turning mechanism.

The latest "long arm". As with the previous weapon, it was never built in metal.

Let us discuss the topic of guns separately. British intelligence, which received information in a highly distorted state, created the myth that the Germans were developing new super-long tank guns. A typical example of this was the mythical 7.5 cm KwK L/100. There is also mention of an 88 mm gun with a 100-caliber barrel. There are three news about these guns: one good one and two bad.

Let's start with the good one. Research in the Bundesarchiv revealed designs of guns with barrel lengths of up to 130 calibers. This is the end of good news. These guns are labelled as "Pak" in the blueprints, so they were anti-tank guns. The date when these guns were designed is also striking: early 1943, whereas the main activity around the E-50 and E-75 dates to late 1944. Krupp's engineers also designed a 105 mm gun with a 100-caliber barrel, but it was also not a tank gun. In other words, these "grosse Schlange" have nothing to do with the E series tanks.

Installation of the 88 mm KwK 43 L/71 gun into the Schmalturm turret. You can't tell from the diagram, but the factory blueprint shows that in this case, the commander would have to sit on top of the gun breech.

Even if we assume that the aforementioned turrets were installed on the E-50 and E-75, this brings few good news to German tankers. Krupp worked on the installation of the 88 mm KwK 43 L/71 in the Schmalturm turret in November of 1944. It fit, of course, but the turret didn't get any roomier. The turret ring diameter was only 1650, and the gun barely fit, according to the factory diagram. The commander must have sat directly on top of the gun breech. The issue of loading was not discussed. The longer barrel would also have needed a counterweight in the rear of the turret.

Overall, Krupp's design was similar to the work done by TsAKB, led by V.G. Grabin, who managed to shove the 100 mm LB-1 gun into a stock T-34-85 turret. The results were the same as with the Schmalturm and the KwK 43: you can fire it, technically, but the crew was uncomfortable. Considering that this invention didn't move further than paper, the opinion of the German and Soviet militaries about such experiments must have been the same.

Sketch of the Tiger II with a 105 mm KwK L/68 gun. In order to get it to work properly, the gun would have to have two piece ammunition and a second loader. The Germans deemed both of those things unacceptable.

The situation with new armament for the Tiger B was even stranger. In November of 1944, Krupp prepared a draft for installing the 105 mm KwK L/68. As with the new gun for the Panther, the gun fit, barely. However, the one piece round for the 105 mm gun refused to do the same. The only way of shoving it into the turret would be to introduce a two piece round. This worked, and 20 shells could be carried in the turret. The rate of fire dropped drastically. However, this could be solved by adding a second loader.

Having though about this, the 6th Department decided not to build this tank in metal. This prospective gun for prospective tanks could only work in alternative history and in computer games.

Aryan Dead End

Many military history "experts" have the opinion that the Germans had high hopes for the E-50 and E-75. In reality, the Germans had better things to focus on than the E series in early 1945. The development of a unified chassis was in such early stages that it had no chance of mass production. According to the plans of German high command, the Pz.Kpfw. Tiger Ausf. B and Pz.Kpfw. Panther Ausf. G remained the main tanks of the Panzerwaffe. The Panther Ausf. F would have gone into production to replace the Ausf. G at some point in the future. In reality, the Germans were stuck in 1943, trying to polish up the same tanks, which were gradually overtaken by the enemy's designs.

Even if we imagine that the war in Europe lasted past May 9th, 1945, and that the E-50 and E-75 made it into the army, the Germans wouldn't have gained much, especially on the Eastern Front. In the best case scenario, they would have faced the T-44 and IS-3. If we include prospective Soviet tanks, the Germans' future turns grim. The first prototype of the T-54 tank, immune to the 8.8 cm Pak 43 from the front, entered trials in January of 1945. The decision to put either the IS-3 or the even more protected IS-4 into production was made in the spring of 1945. This isn't even including projects like the Object 257

One must note that Soviet tank designers made huge steps forward when it came to protecting their tanks without increasing mass. Their colleagues in Great Britain and the US were behind, but they were catching up quickly. One must recall that there was no shortage of funding in wartime, and new British and American tanks would have arrived much quicker had the war continued. In any case, the E-50 and E-75 were far from Wunderwaffe and would be, at best, no better than their opponents.

T-54 prototype, NIABT proving grounds, Kubinka, March 1945. Immunity to the Pak 43 from the front, a 100 mm D-10T gun, mass of 35.5 tons, and all of this was not just on paper.

More proof that the Germans designed themselves into a dead end comes from the history of the French AMX 45 medium tank. This tank, which later turned into the AMX M4, was a direct descendant of the E series. The French did not use its suspension, but the Maybach 295 engine was a relative of the HL 234. The dimensions of the hull were also similar. German engineers worked on the project. The result was a dead end. Even the engine power had to be decreased from 1000 to 850.

The Germans themselves went down a different road in the early 1950s. The new German medium tank project was much more humble than the massive E-50. The 30 ton tank had a torsion bar suspension, a crew of four, and very thin armour, even by late WWII standards. The concept behind the tank was closer to being a product of the American tank school than the German. Its dimensions were closer to that of the Soviet T-54 and T-10. The 37 ton Standardpanzer, better known as the Leopard 1, was built by the same companies that designed the German wanks of WWII.


Anti-Tiger Manual

$
0
0
I posted a brief manual on dealing with Tiger tanks in my post on anti-tank manuals, but here is an extended version.


"The most vulnerable and easily damaged places of a German T-VI tank and methods of combat against it."

The left side of this sheet of the pamphlet is from the back of the book, where the methods of knocking out the tank are illustrated. "Hit the wheels with an anti-tank grenade, and the tank will stop!"



"The most vulnerable and easily damaged places of a German T-VI tank

All means used to destroy enemy tanks: cannons, anti-tank rifles, high caliber machineguns, anti-tank grenades, and bottles with incendiary fluid can be used against the new T-VI tank.

1. Tank running gear

The front drive sprocket, rear idler, road wheels, and tracks are the most important parts of a tank that enable it to move and are vulnerable to a shell of any caliber. The most vulnerable part of the tank is the drive sprocket.

Open fire with armour piercing or high explosive shells, aim at the drive sprocket, rear idler wheel, or the track. The tank will stop.

Destroy the road wheels with an HE shell, anti-tank grenade, or an anti-tank mine.

You can make a mobile anti-tank mine. Attach 3-4 mines to a board, tie a rope to both ends of the board, place the board in the direction where tanks can go, hide it, then hide yourself. When the tank approaches, pull the board with mines underneath the track in one or the other direction. The explosion will destroy the track and road wheels and bend the floor plate.

Strike the running gear with anti-tank grenades and mines, and the tank will stop." 


"2. Upper and lower side armour of the tank

The lower sides of the tank are partially covered by road wheels. 

Fuel tanks full of gasoline are placed on the right and the left side of the tank, around the location of the rear idler wheel. The engine is placed between the two fuel tanks.

Open fire with 76, 57, and 45 mm guns at the lower side plate with armour piercing or subcaliber ammunition. If you hit the fuel tanks, the tank will catch fire.

Ammunition is located along the sides of the tank, behind the upper side armour.

Open fire with subcaliber shells from 76, 57, and 45 mm guns at the ammunition racks. The tank will catch fire and explode.

3. Rear armour

The engine, fuel tanks, and radiators are located behind the rear armour.

Open fire with subcaliber shells from 76, 57, and 45 mm guns at the rear armour. If the shell hits the engine or fuel tanks, the tank will stop and catch fire.

4. Observation devices

The turret has two openings for firing personal weapons, two vision slits, and the commander's cupola also has five slits. Two observation devices, the driver's and the gunner's, are located on the roof of the front of the tank. A movable driver's vision slit is located in front of the driver.

Open fire from all weapons at observation slits, observation devices, and openings. If you mass your fire against these targets, you will hit the crew.

5. The turret and cupola

The commander's cupola is one of the most important and vulnerable targets.

Open fire with high explosive and armour piercing shells of all calibers and you will disable the cupola. Throw grenades and bottles of incendiary fluid at a damaged cupola. Destroy the crew and light up the tank.

The turret holds the tank commander, turret commander, gunner, and all artillery mechanisms.

Open fire with subcaliber shells from 76, 57, and 45 mm guns at a range of 500 meters or less and you will destroy the crew and the mechanisms.

6. Gun and machineguns

The turret contains a cannon and a coaxial machinegun. There is also a machinegun in a ball mount installed in the front plate for the radio operator. The tank's armament is the main target of artillerymen, anti-tank gunners, and snipers.

Open fire from all weapons at the tank's armament. The tank will cease its fire. Open fire with your anti-tank rifle at the radio operator's machinegun ball mount: you will kill the radio operator and disable the machinegun.


7. Air intakes and tank floor

The air intakes are positioned on top of the hull, behind the turret. In front of the tank, the air intake is between the driver and radio operator's hatches.

Throw bottles of incendiary fluid and anti-tank grenades at the air intakes, you will damage the ventilators and ignite the tank.

An anti-tank mine that explodes underneath the tank will disable it.

8. Under-turret gap

There is a 10 mm gap between the roof of the hull and the bottom of the turret.

Open fire with high caliber machineguns and cannons of all calibers. The turret will jam and the tank will be unable to fire. If you hit the base of the turret with a high explosive shell, you will break through the hull roof and disable the tank."

Then there is a diagram that you've probably seen before, summarizing everything else in the pamphlet.


Location of the ammunition racks and fuel tanks in the Tiger and a diagram were to fire at the suspension. 

A repeat of the previous page and instructions to throw incendiary bottles or anti-tank grenades on the engine deck.

100 mm Tank Gun, First Attempt

$
0
0
"To the director of the Kirov factory, Leningrad, in response to letter #838s sent on January 31st, 1941
CC: GAU UVNA Military Representative at the Kirov factory
NKTM Military Department Chief
March 13th, 1941

Having examined these projects developed at the Kirov factory under its own initiative:
  • 412-1V, 100 mm tank gun, and
  • 412-2V, 107 mm tank gun
the GAU UVNA has come to the conclusion that:
  1. Both guns are equivalent and modern, both in their ballistics and armour penetration.
  2. Out of the two presented variants, the 412-1V is not recommended for production, because:
    1. It is not reasonable to introduce a new caliber into the Red Army. Tank artillery should be based on ammunition available for field artillery.
    2. The 100 mm tank gun based on the B-24 100 mm naval gun only inherited the barrel, shell casing, and propellant. Everything else must be designed anew. Your factory is equipped to produce the B-24 naval gun, but might not be equipped to produce a 100 mm tank gun.
    3. The 100 mm B-24 naval gun lacks an armour piercing shell. It is too early to say that converting the 102 mm armour piercing shell for the 100 mm gun will not cause issues.
  3. The development of a 107 mm tank gun was assigned to the Kirov factory in 107, but the factory declined the contract. Currently, such a gun is being finished by factory #92. The GAU UVNA has no budget for Kirov factory's 107 mm gun and will not pay for it.
    If the Kirov factory wishes to develop this gun at its own expense, the armour piercing shell from the 107 mm M-60 gun must be preserved.
GAU UVNA Chief, Military Engineer 1st Class, Lipin."

Improved Gearbox

$
0
0
"To comrade V.M. Molotov

On the timeline of producing improved T-34 components at the Kirov factory

In connection with the increased production of T-34 tanks and start of their production at the Kirov factory, it is necessary to make decisions regarding starting production with improved components (5-speed gearbox, improved idler, turret with a commander's cupola) before the deadline given by GOKO decree #1879ss (June 5th, 1942).

The most complicated of these components, the gearbox, went through 1700 km trials in June flawlessly in addition to 2000 km of trials last year.


Because of this, we ask you to permit the start of preparations for producing T-34s with the improved gearbox, idler, and turret with commander's cupola at the Kirov factory before the trials are complete in accordance with blueprints and prototypes that are being produced and tried at factory #183.

Any improvements to those components made necessary as a result of trials will be immediately implemented.

We ask you to approve the attached GOKO decree

P. Zernov
Biryukov"

RGASPI 644-2-79

Putting these components into production was important enough that the draft decree was signed by Stalin himself, and not Molotov.
Viewing all 1900 articles
Browse latest View live


<script src="https://jsc.adskeeper.com/r/s/rssing.com.1596347.js" async> </script>