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Wonder Weapons

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Colonel Kurt Stressner was captured by the Red Army on January 12th, 1945. His interrogation deals with many interesting topics, but one section is probably the most interesting:

"Presence of new weapons and chemical substances

I don't know anything about new weapons, either through official channels or personally. It's possible to redesign the V-2 so that it could be used to strike targets on the front lines precisely. The V-1 is shaped like a plane and is aimed at the target along a horizontal trajectory, and hits the target very imprecisely. They say that it hits 2-3 km from the target. The V-2 has a vertical trajectory and hits 500-1000 m from the target. Time consuming calculations are required. The V-2 can strike tall objects in an area 3-4 square kilometers in size. Both of these weapons can only be used against cities, that is why they cannot be used on the Eastern Front. They say that there is also a type of weapon being developed that is based on decay of atoms. This kind of weapon is desirable, but unlikely.

The use of chemical weapons on German soil is impossible due to the small spaces on which the battles take place."


Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf. F: Pocket Tiger

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Coming up with tank ratings is a hobby of many tank experts, as well as people who consider themselves as such. As a rule, the creators try to determine the best tank. While some kind of systematic approach was developed over the years, picking out the worst tanks is usually more complicated. Often, creators of lists of the worst tanks make their choices according to no set system and end up naming a number of tanks that didn't earn such a shameful label.

If we consider the tank's characteristics, the time of its appearance on the battlefield, and combat effectiveness, then one of the worst tanks of WWII was the German Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf. F. Conceptually similar to the British Infantry Tank Mk.I, it entered service in the middle of the war, with very questionable characteristics.

Assault baby

The French military is often fairly criticized that they spent the time between wars preparing for the past one. However, we must remember that other countries had plenty of commanders who assumed that the battles of the upcoming war would be similar to WWI. The German army had its share of these commanders. Their number includes General Walther von Brauchitsch, who was appointed to the post of the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht land forces on February 4th, 1938.

It's hard to call von Brauchitsch a dead-set conservative, but some of his decisions raise questions. The hero of this article appeared due to his order, given on November 28th, 1938. The cause of this order was that the Germans were preparing not only for a maneuver war, but for an assault on well prepared fortifications and deeply echeloned defenses. France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia were among Germany's neighbours who had such defenses. AA guns and specialized SPGs would be used to destroy them. One of the, the Pz.Sfl.IVa, was even built in metal and fought, albeit as a tank destroyer.

Full sized model of the VK 18.01. The turret still lacks its tin "collar".

The use of AA artillery and special SPGs was reasonable, but von Brauchitsch also ordered the creation of heavy tank companies, designed to combat enemy lines of defense. Tanks with maximum possible protection were needed for this purpose.

The idea of creating a tank with shellproof armour was not so bad. The problem lay in the tanks that In 6 (Inspekteur für Heeresmotorisierung, Motorized Forces, Inspectorate) wanted. The first, the VK 65.01, was more or less suitable for its task. With a mass of 65 tons, it would have up to 80 mm of armour, and be armed with a 105 mm (later 75 mm) gun.

The second tank only raises questions. The 6th Department of the Armament Directorate received an order for a tank... analogous to the light PzI: a tank with a two man crew and two machineguns for armament. The protection of this tank was limited by only one parameter: the 18 ton load limit of pontoon bridges.

The experimental VK 18.01. The tank differed from the production tank in several ways, including the design of the track links.

Krupp, the developer of the PzI, was pushed away from the development of new tanks. In its refusal to follow the specifications designed by Heinrich Kniepkamp, the company gave up any chances on influencing the further development of the La.S. In late 1938, work on the light tank that would be later called PzI Ausf. C was given to Krauss-Maffei. At that point, the tank, still called VK 6.01, was in the design stage, where the shape of the tank was drastically changing. Naturally, the contract for a "small heavily armoured tank" was given to Krauss-Maffei as well. As per tradition, the turret design was left to Daimler-Benz AG Werk 40 in Marienfelde (south Berlin).

The fact that Krauss-Maffei received an order did not mean that work on the VK 18.01 (tracked vehicle, 18 tons, 1st design) would start immediately. As it was already mentioned, the company's main project was the VK 6.01, which was late. The biggest cause was the redesign of the suspension.

Around this time, MAN received a similar order: three-man tank with maximum possible protection. The 6th Department, having thought it over, decided to link the projects. This did not mean that the two companies would build identical tanks. However, the similar tasks led to the idea that it would be possible to use the same components on both tanks.

Commander's station, who also doubled as the gunner and loader. Unlike the regular PzI, it was quite roomy.

A meeting with representatives of both companies was held on November 19th, 1939. An agreement was reached to join forces, using Krauss-Maffei's suspension designs. This is logical, since there was significant progress in the VK 6.01 and work was reaching its end. Of course, only the concept would be used, since a tank at three times the mass would not be able to use the light tank's suspension as is. Both heavily armoured tanks received a layout with five road wheels per side, a reworked suspension, and the Maybach HL 45 150 hp engine from the VK 6.01.

Krauss-Maffei was tasked with developing the new suspension and track links. MAN was not left without work: it had to design the drive sprockets, final drives, and transmission. The tank used the ZF SSG 47 gearbox. Each company would build 4 experimental chassis, with Krauss-Maffei building 8 suspensions for itself and MAN, and MAN building 8 transmissions and drive sprockets.

The driver's station was also better thought out.

On December 29th, 1939, In 6 approved the building of a pilot batch of the VK 18.01. Krauss-Maffei would build 30 chassis and Daimler-Benz would build 30 turrets. Turret platforms were not included in the contract, since the hull was built whole.

The new Daimler-Benz turret was significantly different from prior designs. It had straight sides, which were, for some reason, covered by a complicated sloped plate. The reason for this design is not clear.

All observation devices were placed in the roof, in order to strengthen the sides. The thickness of the sides of the turret and the front was 80 mm, and the rear was 60 mm thick. The armour protected reliably from the 50 mm Pak 38. Even though Krupp did not participate in the tender, it still received work. A contract for 30 sets of armour plates was signed on February 3rd, 1940. As for the experimental prototype of the VK 18.01, it was built from mild steel.

A second variant of the VK 18.01, which was never built in metal and yet existed in mass production according to some historians, is worth mentioning. The VK 18.02, dated July 9th, 1949, was the same VK 18.01, but with a new gearbox. Instead of the SSG 47, it used the 8-speed semiautomatic Maybach SRG 15319 gearbox and LG 45 R turning mechanism. The work on this tank did not proceed past the design stage, and pass production tanks retained the SSG 47 gearbox.

Without a target

According to plans approved in April of 1940, the first tank from the pilot batch would be completed in December of 1940, and the last in March of 1941. Krupp would supply the first sets of armour in November of 1940. In reality, Krupp only produced on set of armour for the hull and two for the turrets in 1940. All of these components were made from mild steel, to be used in the prototype. Krauss-Maffei assembled the experimental tank by June 17th, 1940.

PzI Ausf. F serial number 15329, the last tank of the pilot batch.

Amusingly, by the time the tank entered trials, there were no longer any targets for it to fight. The Maginot line and other echeloned defenses were defeated without shellproof tanks. By that point, it was clear that a tank had to have not just armour, but also mobility. The French, who put their bet on armour lost the war. The Char B1, Renault D2Renault R 35, and other tanks with good protection, but poor mobility, could not protect France.

Additionally, the experience in France showed that crossing the 30 ton mark was undesirable. The VK 65.01 fell victim to this restriction, and it was cancelled in October of 1940. The VK 18.01 also should have been cancelled, but, since its mass was less than 30 tons, this was not done. The Third Reich's bureaucratic machine did not notice this tank, which Germany no longer needed.

The same tank with its hatches open. They look small, but actually allowed comfortable entry into the tank.

Krupp was very late with its armour. Nevertheless, delivery of plates for the pilot batch was completed by September 30th, 1931. As for Krauss-Maffei, its organization was even worse. The company was still busy with its other light tank, the VK 6.01. Meanwhile, the contract for the first batch of VK 18.01 tanks was on the horizon. In 6 proposed 100 tanks, with production starting in late 1941.

Subsequent events showed that the Inspectorate was home to boundless optimists: the first pilot VK 18.01 left Munich in March of 1942. These tanks were distinct from the prototype in several ways. For starters, the tank was equipped with the Fu 2 radio. After trials of the prototype, the track pitch was reduced from 160 to 130 mm. The front of the hull was slightly changed, and the side hatches became smaller. Protective railings for the machineguns were added to the gun mantlet, and spare track links and a smoke grenade launcher was added to the rear.

Unlike the prototype, the production tanks were equipped with radios.

Production continued unevenly. The tanks received serial numbers 15301-15330. 12 were built in May, then there was a 2 month lull, after which the tanks were delivered in small batches until December of 1942.

To battle, anywhere at all

Initially, the PzI Ausf. F was assigned to a very niche, but appropriate role. The 66th Special Purpose Tank Battalion was formed on May 30th, 1942. This unit was created for a very specific purpose: for an assault on Malta, planned as a part of Operation Hercules. Five PzI Ausf. F tanks were included in the 1st company, which also included five PzII Ausf. J and twelve PzIV with tropical equipment. THe company was commanded by Oberleutnant Betke. The second company from the battalion was even more exotic, as it included captured KV-1, KV-2, and T-34 tanks.

The battalion never participated in the assault, as the operation was cancelled. This was just the beginning of the battalion's misadventures.

One of the tanks from the 66th Special Purpose Tank Battalion.

A decision was made on July 27th to split the battalion in half. The first company was sent to Leningrad, and not just anywhere, but to the Mga region, home to swampy terrain that was inappropriate for such tanks. The company was subordinated to the 12th Tank Division, and the number of PzI Ausf. F tanks increased to 7. The battalion did not sit still for long, as the Sinyavino operation began in late August of 1942.

Inspection of the tanks that arrived at Mga. The man in a black uniform with his back to the photographer is Oberleutnant Betke, the commander of the 1st company of the 66th Special Purpose Tank Battalion.

By September 10th, when the tanks saw their first battle, six of the seven tanks were in working order. That day the tanks attacked Tortolovo, and the result was not as expected. Betke was fatally wounded and died on the 12th. Two PzI Ausf. F tanks were destroyed, two got stuck in the swamp. One of the tanks was evacuated by September 24th. Two days later, another tank was lost on the march. Later, one tank was sent for repairs.

PzI Ausf. F on the Volkov Front. Wide tracks gave it decent mobility in the mud.

It's hard to say that the PzI Ausf. F was completely useless. Thanks to its wide tracks and sturdy floor, it could act as a mine trawler. On October 2nd, 1942, the company was permanently included in the 12th Tank Division, and became the 8th company of the 29th Tank Regiment. As of December 1942, five of the unit's PzI Ausf. F were still in working order. Five more arrived on January 23rd. In February, 3 tanks were lost in battle, and two more were written off in April. As of May, 4 tanks were included in the 2nd battalion's HQ, and one more was in the 8th company. The last mention of these tanks is dated July 10th.

Arrival of the 2nd Police Tank Company. Towards the end of its career, the PzI Ausf. F was mostly used for punishment operations.

The next unit to receive the PzI Ausf. F was the 2nd battalion of the 1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division. It received 8 tanks of the type, as well as two PzI Ausf. C, a very questionable combination. However, the 1st Tank Division was quartered in Greece at the time, and was not expecting to get into any fights. In November, the division was sent to Kiev, where it faced elements of the Soviet 3rd Guards Tank Army. Here, the armour of the PzI Ausf. F did not help it much: only one tank remained functional by November 20th. Later, one tank was returned into service, and one burned up. Between December 10th and 21st, the tank was removed from the front, and only one PzI Ausf. F remained in the 1st Tank Regiment by the end.

PzI Ausf. F with serial number 150329 from the 2nd Police Tank Company, captured in Belarus. Seen here at the GBTU proving grounds, fall of 1944.

Six more tanks fought in the 221st Tank Company, which, like the 66th Tank Battalion, had a very heterogeneous composition. These tanks were used in anti-partisan operations in Belarus in the summer of 1943. As of March 11th, 1944, the company still had 5 PzI Ausf. F tanks, 4 of them functional. Most likely it's one of these tanks that can be seen near the Kalemegdan castle in Belgrade.

Due to the regiment's emblem, the tank was nicknamed "Bear" in the USSR.

The anti-partisan squads received the rest of the PzI Ausf. F. On May 17th, 1943, five of these tanks (some coming in from repairs, others from different units) arrived in the 2nd Police Tank Company, replacing their captured Panzerkampfwagen 35R (f). The company was added to the 4th SS Police Regiment, which operated in Belarus since August of 1943. The regiment and company ended up in the sector of the 4th Army in June of 1944. Here, they suffered the fate of the other units from the group under the assault of the 1st Baltic Front. Remnants of the 2nd tank company arrived in Vienna in August of 1944.

The tank arrived in decent condition.

PzI Ausf. F with serial number 150329, produced in November of 1942, was among the tanks abandoned by the 2nd Police Tank Company. According to documents, it arrived at the GBTU proving grounds in the end of the summer of 1944. Interestingly enough, it is referred to as the "Bear" tank. This happened because of the regimental bear emblem on the front and rear. The tank did not undergo trials, and only a technical description was composed.

Suspension diagram composed by GBTU specialists.

The tank did end up attracting the specialists' attention later, in the fall of 1945. Its suspension was rather unique, and the proving grounds were studying torsion bar suspensions of various kinds. The tank's suspension was included in the study.

Suspension of the PzI Ausf. F, from the album of illustrations of torsion bar suspensions prepared by the NIABT proving grounds in 1945.

As you probably noticed, the only function that the PzI Ausf. F was decent at was fighting partisans, due to its powerful armour and robust suspension, which was resistant to mines. However, the PzI Ausf. F was built for a completely different purpose. By the time the tank reached the front lines, its combat effectiveness was nearing zero.

One may compare this tank to the similar Infantry Tank Mk.I, but its concept was created in the mid-1930s. The German "light tank with heavy armour" was designed at a time when it was clear that machinegun-only tanks were not needed. It was also unclear what these tanks would do with the fortifications they were designed to assault. The PzI Ausf. F can be considered a tank that was designed well, but to completely asinine specifications.

Small, But Fierce

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One of the distinguishing characteristics of German tank building in WWII was an aim to use up obsolete vehicles, including those which used to be the backbone of the German tank force. If a German tank became obsolete, that didn't mean that it would be scrapped. Some tanks were sent to training units, other were modernized. Obsolete tanks, especially light ones, were often converted to SPGs or engineering vehicles. This was the fate that awaited the PzI, Germany's first mass produced tank, which was already obsolete at the start of WWII.


Minor mechanization of infantry artillery

German infantry units were armed with a wide variety of artillery by the end of the 1930s. Aside from anti-tank guns and mortars, the infantry had howitzers and so called "infantry guns" (Infanteriegeschütz). The parameters of these cannons (barrel length, high elevation angles) made them closer to howitzers, but, formally, they were listed as regimental artillery.

German infantry used two types of infantry guns: the light 7.5 cm leIG 18 and heavy 15 cm sIG 33. The heavy gun was the most interesting, as nothing of the sort was used by any other military. Some of its characteristics were similar to those of a mortar, which was not surprising. The main objective of the sIG 33 was combat with enemy fortifications. Initially, the gun was towed with horses, but later a version that could be towed by artillery tractors appeared. It is easy to distinguish between the two: the motorized version has rubber rims on its wheels, which increased its top speed.

Captured 15 cm sIG 33 on trials in the USSR, 1942.

The sIG 33 was very good at its job. Its biggest drawback was a very large weight for an infantry gun: 1786 kg. This was partially compensated by use of tractors, including halftracks, but it was unlikely that the enemy would let a tractor drive around the battlefield unimpeded. The seven man crew could barely push around the gun on their own. In addition, heavy infantry guns sometimes had to fire at point blank range. Such experience was gained in Poland in the fall of 1939.

The logical solution of mechanizing the sIG 33 appeared by early 1940. To be fair, this was not the first attempt of making this gun self propelled. The sIG 33 was built under license in the USSR under the name NM. The USSR was the first to come up with the idea of using the gun in an SPG. The oscillating part of the NM was installed in the SU-5, an SPG built using T-26 components. The resulting vehicle was indexed SU-5-3. For a number of reasons, it was not mass produced.

In Germany, the same story took a different turn

15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B without the casemate. You can see that the gun is attached to reinforcement brackets welded to the fenders. The fact that the gun hangs above the driver is also visible.

In early 1940, Alkett (Altmärkische Kettenfabrik) from Spandau received an order to develop an SPG on the PzI Ausf. B chassis. The choice of factory was not a coincidence: Alkett was as subsidiary of the Rheinmetall-Borsig AG conglomerate, the developer and producer of the sIG 33.

It was also logical to use the PzI Ausf. B as a chassis. After the campaign in Poland, there was a large number of these tanks in need of repairs. In the same campaign, it became clear that a tank with only machineguns for armament is unsuitable for modern war. The more powerful engine and longer contact surface than on the PzI Ausf. A allowed the PzI Ausf. B to serve as a chassis for an SPG. As for the PzI Ausf. A, they were converted into munitions carriers (51 units were built). In addition, 24 PzI Ausf. A tanks were converted into SPAAGs called 2 cm Flak 38 auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.A. These SPAAGs, built at the Stöwer in Szczecin, had very questionable fighting ability.

This SPG's crew seriously modified their vehicle. An improvised brass catcher can be seen, as well as a radio in the casemate.

The Alkett SPG, with the memorable name 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B (15 cm motorized sIG 33 gun on the PzI Ausf. B chassis) also had a very questionable design. It is often called Sturmpanzer I or Bison, but neither of these names has any connection with reality.

The unusual task given to Alkett resulted in an extraordinary vehicle. The turret platform was removed from the tank, and the modifications of the chassis ended with that. Installation of the oscillating part of the gun would be logical, but the requirements insisted on retaining the original design. The gun was simply rolled up onto the PzI Ausf. B chassis and fixed in place. The sIG 33 wheelbase was so wide that it had to be rolled up onto the fenders. Since they were not expected to hold up such a heavy mass, the gun's wheels were attached to special reinforcement brackets.

To protect from rifle fire, the front and the sides (partially) were protected with shields. The height of the SPG was 2.7 meters, and its weight was 8 tons. At the moment of its creation, it was the Wehrmacht's tallest tracked vehicle. Its crew consisted of seven men, three of which followed in an Sd.Kfz. 10 halftrack, which also served as a munitions carrier. The SPG itself only carried a handful of rounds (2-3). It also had no radio. The issue was solved using portable radios.

The fifth SPG from s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 703, June of 1940. According to the inscription on the gun shielf, one of the SPG's crewmen died on May 24th of that year.

Such an odd design did not stop the German command. With a clear list of drawbacks, it had one advantage: the increased mobility of the sIG 33 on the battlefield. In February of 1940, a batch of 38 SPGs was built. However, the word "built" is misleading, since, according to correspondence, Alkett played no part in the process. Most likely, these were conversions at army workshops.

A special type of unit was created for this vehicle: battery of motorized heavy infantry guns (s.IG.Kp(Mot.S)). According to the TO&E, each battery included 6 SPGs. The battery consisted of three platoons of 2 SPGs and 4 Sd.Kfz. 10 halftracks each. Six batteries were formed in the spring of 1940, distributed in the following way:
  • s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 701 – 9th Tank Division
  • s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 702 – 1st Tank Division
  • s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 703 – 2nd Tank Division
  • s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 704 – 5th Tank Division
  • s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 705 – 7th Tank Division
  • s.IG.Kp(Mot.S) 706 – 10th Tank Division

All six batteries were ready for battle by the time the French campaign began. The results of use in combat were contradictory. On one hand, the firepower of the gun was impressive. One hit could destroy a house. On the other hand, the vehicle had plenty of drawbacks. Its large size made the 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B a tempting target. Only the brief length of the campaign saved the new SPGs from significant losses.

The overloading of the PzI Ausf. B chassis was no smaller fault. Breakdowns on the march were a common occurrence. Strangely enough, the odd design of the vehicle helped here. It was possible to take off the heavy gun and hook it up behind the chassis. It's possible that the idea of the Waffentrager was born here: a self propelled chassis with the possibility of installing a towed gun.

Destroyed SPG named "Alter Fritz", the first SPG of the 703rd battery. Strangely enough, it continues to be listed as a part of the unit throughout the spring of 1941.

Three batteries were used during the invasion of Yugoslavia: 701st, 703rd, and 704th. A month later, all SPGs were used during the invasion of the Soviet Union. Here, the  15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B were frequently used as tank destroyers. They were clearly not meant for that role, but their crews achieved some measure of success. For example, the 705th battery claimed two tanks, and the 702nd battery also claimed a few. As in France, the sIG 33 guns spent most of their time being towed behind the SPGs instead of on them.

Fifth vehicle from one of the batteries, crossing a pontoon bridge, Eastern Front, summer of 1941.

Even though the war in the Soviet Union was not the same as the war in France, the losses in the batteries were not as high as one would have thought. The 706th battery took the hardest hit, and was disbanded by early 1942. Other batteries fought for much longer. The 702nd battery was disbanded in December of 1942, others in July of 1943. By the end of that month, the 5th Tank Division still had one 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B. 

A Voroshilovets tractor is towing  a captured SPG from the 705th battery. Winter of 1942.

A long list of drawbacks of this SPG did not scare off the German military. On the contrary, for a nearly improvised design, the 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B was rather decent, which is illustrated by its relatively long career. At the same time, experience showed that the PzI is not suitable for this kind of task. The chassis was much better suited for a different SPG.

A mix of Rhein and Bohemia

The idea of a light tank destroyer SPG was conceived in Germany in the mid-1920s. The result was the appearance of the Rheinmetall Leichttraktor Selbstfahrlafette and leichte Selbstfahrkanone. An insufficient design and other reasons caused the idea to be abandoned. Attempts to build a tank destroyer on a halftrack chassis followed. Experimental prototypes were built, but work did not move very far.

47 mm PUV vz.36 in the German army, 1941.

The idea of a light tank destroyer on a fully tracked chassis surfaced again in early 1940. The cause was simple: the military suddenly found out that their anti-tank arsenal is insufficient to fight the Char B1 bis. The German 3.7 cm Pak had insufficient penetration, and the 88 mm Flak 18 AA gun had poor mobility on the battlefield. 47 mm Skoda PUV vz. 36 guns obtained by the Germans after the occupation of Czechia were quite a fortunate acquisition.

The PUV vz. 36 could penetrate 55 mm of armour at 60 degrees from a kilometer away. This was enough to fight the Char B1 bis at medium distances. The gun had its drawbacks: greater mass than the 3.7 cm Pak, and wooden wheels, which limited the speed of transport. The gun was accepted into service with the Wehrmacht under the index 4.7 cm Pak 36(t). Production continued, and Skoda delivered 200 guns to its new customer in 1939. These guns, as well as later models produced for the Czechoslovakian army, were equipped with new wheels, with steel rims and pneumatic tires.

One of the 132 Panzerjager I built in the spring of 1940.

Alkett also received the order for a tank destroyer on the PzI Ausf. B chassis. The experimental prototype, personally inspected by Hitler, was ready by February 10th, 1940. Alkett didn't reinvent the wheel: the turret platform had its roof and rear cut off, which were replaced with an open casemate. Unlike the 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B, where the casemate was riveted, the tank destroyer had a welded casemate. The oscillating part of the PUV vz. 36 and a new gun shield were installed inside.

The tank's crew increased to 3 men, and the fighting compartment had enough room for a radio and 84 shells for the gun (74 of which were armour piercing). The mass did not increase much, only to 6.4 tons, which helped the SPG retain its mobility. Its index was no simpler than that of the 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B: 4,7 cm Pak (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw.I (Sd.Kfz.101) ohne Turm (47 mm self propelled anti-tank gun on the PzI Ausf. B chassis without a turret).

The tank destroyer's design was much better than that of the assault SPG.

Before the first tank destroyer was ready, a battle broke out within the German military. On one hand, the tankers wanted these new vehicles, since the tank destroyer was built on a tank chassis. On the other hand, the infantry also wanted a highly mobile anti-tank gun. Initially, the tankers were winning: a day before the demonstration to Hitler, the infantry was scheduled to get only 10 vehicles out of 132. Everything changed on the next day: a decision was made that all SPGs would end up in units formed from infantry anti-tank battalions.

Understandably, these plans had their opponents. On February 20th, Guderian noted that infantry units would have issues with spare parts and repairs. It was logical, in his view, to give the tank destroyers to tank units, and leave towed anti-tank guns for infantry.

During these debates, the vehicle was called Panzerjäger or Panzerjäger Pz.IB. Later, this index transformed into Panzerjäger I, which became the official title.

The fighting compartment of the Panzerjäger I. It's hard to call it roomy, but considering what the designers had to work with, it is acceptable.

Production of the Panzerjäger I was organized at Alkett. 40 conversions were planned for March of 1940, another 60 for April, and 30 in May. Krupp also took part in the process, as it was up to them to build 60 casemates. In Krupp's correspondence, the vehicles were indexed La.S.47. Another 72 casemates were built at Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG (DEW) in Hanover. Skoda wasn't left out, and received a contract to produce guns for the tank destroyers.

A three-man tank destroyer crew. Situations where the crewmen wore a tank uniform and the commander wore an infantry uniform were not uncommon.

According to plans of the Armament Directorate signed on March 20th, 1940, 132 Panzerjager I would be distributed in the following way. Wa.Pruf 1 and Wa.Pruf 4, responsible for ammunition and artillery respectively, received one vehicle each. By April 1st, 36 vehicles would be sent to equip six batteries to make two tank destroyer battalions. 54 SPGs would create three more battalions by May 1st, and 36 vehicles would be sent out by June 1st. 6 SPGs were left in reserve.

In reality, only the 521st Tank Destroyer Battalion received 6 SPGs in each battery. It was reformed by April 2nd, 1940, from a towed gun unit. Other battalions had a different structure. The 616th, 634th, and 670th battalions had three batteries with 9 SPGs each. By May 31st, another 18-vehicle battalion was being formed, with one SPG in reserve. In reality the last two vehicles remained at Alkett for a long time. Skoda traditionally failed to meet its quota. The second to last Panzerjager I was finished in September of 1940, and the last much later, in July of 1941.

Tank destroyers in ambush. The low silhouette was remarked on by commanders of battalions which used the Panzerjager I.

Self propelled anti-tank battalions were formed in a hurry. This did not allow the crews to fully get used to their vehicles. Nevertheless, the Panzerjager I showed itself well in the May-June campaign in 1940. The vehicle was rather low, and breakdowns did not happen as often as with the 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B. There were some issues with spare parts, but they were solved quickly. The Panzerjager I proved itself as an effective measure against French tanks and fortifications.

SPG crossing a bridge, France, spring of 1940.

Of course, the SPG had its drawbacks. The crews complained about poor visibility and a cramped fighting compartment. The ammunition loadout was deemed poor, and the share of high explosive shells was increased to 50%. Despite all of its drawbacks, the Panzerjager I was evaluated as a more effective weapon than towed guns.

Panzerjager I from the second production batch, 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Vehicle #32 from this unit survives to this day.

These results were sufficient to consider building an additional batch of SPGs. On September 19th, 1940, a contract for 70 casemates was signed with Krupp. Vehicles from the second series had a slightly different casemate, which also had additional side armour.

Initially, Alkett was supposed to convert the PzI Ausf. B into the Panzerjager I again, but plans changes on October 15th. Alkett was busy with building the StuG III Ausf. B. As a result, only 10 vehicles were converted in Spandau. Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz was chosen as a backup. This company, which included the Magirus firm, was known for its trucks. Nevertheless, it was responsible for converting 60 tanks into Panzerjager Is between December 1940 and February 1941. 

The new tank destroyers were sent to the 529th and 605th battalions, 27 vehicles apiece. The Leibstandart SS division was another unit to receive these vehicles, a battery of nine Panzerjager I. The remaining SPGs were sent to the 900th Training Brigade. It was a training unit only on paper, since the brigade was taking part in combat in the USSR in July of 1941.

This SPG was lost in 1941. Judging by the patch in the front armour, this was not the first time it was knocked out.

All units armed with the Panzerjager I fought on the Eastern Front, with the exception of the 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The units were constantly given completely unsuitable tasks. For example, the 529th battalion was given objectives better suited for the StuG III. Without the armour of an assault gun, the tank destroyers were more vulnerable, which led to heavy losses. The Panzerjager I was also plagued with technical problems. This often applies to road wheels, which did not survive long marches.

Captured Panzerager I from the first production series in Moscow, summer of 1943.

The 47 mm gun was sufficient to fight Soviet T-34 tanks. In addition, production of subcaliber Pz.Gr.40 shells began in 1941, which let these tank destroyers fight the KV as well. Nevertheless, 140 Panzerjager I were lost in 1941. The remaining SPGs kept fighting until early 1943. The vehicles in the 521st Tank Destroyer Battalion served the longest, eventually sharing the fate of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.

The 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion deserves a separate mention. In March of 1941, it was sent to Lybia, where it was included in the 5th Light Division. In 1941, the battalion lost 13 vehicles. Most of the losses happened during November, when the British launched Operation Crusader. One of the enemies of the tank destroyer was the British Matilda tank. At 600-800 meters, the armour piercing shells could not penetrate this tank, but spalling could injure the crew. The Matilda could only be penetrated with subcaliber shells. German crews complained that there was shortage of them.

The same vehicle from a different angle.

Including reinforcements, the 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion had 11 Panzerjager I by October of 1942 and the start of the Battle of El-Alamein. The British captured three SPGs during this battle. One of them, a vehicle with tactical number 32, was handed over to the Americans. This vehicle spent a long time at Aberdeen. In the early 1980s, it was returned to Germany, where it was restored. Presently, it is the only surviving Panzerjager I in the world.

Unlike the 15 cm sIG 33 (mot S) auf Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B, the first German mass produced tank destroyer was a very good vehicle. Despite many drawbacks, mostly connected with the chassis, the Panzerjager I met its expectations. While criticizing the PzI as a chassis, one must remember that it was far from the worst, recalling the 4.7 cm Pak(t) (Sfl) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731(f), whose combat career lasted for less than two weeks in the summer of 1941.

An abandoned SPG on the Panzerjager I chassis, Berlin, May 1945.

In the end, let us mention one more SPG that was built from the Panzerjager I. During the Battle of Berlin in April of 194, the Germans used a vehicle which carried a 75 mm StuK 40 L/48 gun. It is not known who built this SPG. It is only known that the Germans used it in Berlin and abandoned it.

Experimental Guns, 1941

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"Experimental works
at the Order of Lenin Molotov factory #172, 1941

According to contract #3-84 signed on March 18th, 1941, the factory is working on the following systems and parts:

1. 152 mm gun, 203 mm howitzer, and 280 mm mortar on a unified mount (M-70)

The technical project was completed in March of 1941. In August of this year, it was reviewed by the NKV Technical Council, along with a GAU representative. As a result, the factory received several directions regarding the technical project and the permission to begin development of working blueprints, which were completed to 40%, after which the factory ceased work under orders from the NKV. Until the end of the year, we did not work in this area.

According to the agreement, the factory was supposed to deliver working blueprints and the prototype by March of 1942, but it appears that the factory cannot do that.

2. 203 mm corps howitzer (BL-39)

The 203 mm corps howitzer was supposed to have been finished in April of 1941, and two prototypes delivered. Currently, one gun was accepted, the other is still in the process of assembly.

3. 203 mm corps howitzer (M-40)

In January of 1941, the system was undergoing proving grounds trials at the ANIOP, which it failed, and was returned to the factory with notes from the ANIOP for improvement.

In September of 1941, the system was submitted for factory trials, as a result of which it received a series of deformations and was removed from trials. The system is currently undergoing imrovements.

4. Hydraulic brake with Steol fluid for the 152 mm mod. 1937 howitzer

It was designed and built, then submitted for factory trials, where it was discovered that it did not meet the technical requirements. Given the requirement of no more than 200 mm of recoil, firing with the Steol brake gives 350 mm of recoil. For this reason, I deemed the brake unsatisfactory and the design was rejected. The factory was offered another chance to rework the part to conform to requirements.

5. MTs-3 sight for divisional and corps artillery

Finished and submitted for factory trials in September of 1941. Trials showed design and usage defects: large dispersion of elevation angles up to 101 minutes, loss of calibration, and impossibility to fire directly from the ML-10 and ML-20 systems, as the dimensions of the sight are incompatible with them.

Due to the issues with the sight, it was removed from trials, which I reported to the 1st department of the GAU UVNA with attached documentation.

I declined to accept the sight and pay for it, as it did not meet requirements.

6. Bag loading breech for the 152 mm mod. 1937 gun-howitzer

Parts of the breech were completed, but assembly is being delayed due to a lack of the packing pad with a brass mesh and the packing ring, which were ordered from the Bolshevik factory in Leningrad, but the factory has not yet received them.

Attempts to produce packing components on our own did not give good results. A proposal to install a regular packing pad without a brass mesh was rejected, as it does not conform to the blueprint, and, as experience shows, trials of such a breech will not give good results.

7. Barrel for the 152 mm mod. 1937 gun-howitzer with a free cylindrical pipe (contract #1431)

According to the contract, the factory was supposed to have delivered three barrels by October 15th, 1941.

The barrels were completed by this time, but trials were supposed to take place along existing ML-20 trials, which, as a result of decrease of shells alotted for the ML-20 (5 instead of 10) and removal of pipes from production, and rare instances of surplus, were very difficult to organize and perform. As a result, the acceptance of the pipes dragged on until December of 1941.

In these conditions, the factory made decisions to host special firing trials, which was done on December 23rd, 1941. All three barrels were accepted, and further instructions regarding their use are necessary.

8. 107 mm anti-tank gun (M-75)

In May of 1941, the factory received orders to design and built two experimental 107 mm anti-tank guns, based on Deputy People's Commissar Comrade Vannikov's orders. No contract was signed with the GAU regarding these guns.

In June-August of 1941, the guns were undergoing factory trials, where it showed satisfactory results, was accepted, and sent to proving grounds trials to the NKV proving grounds in Nizhniy Tagil, where it is currently present.

9. 76 mm regimental gun mod. 1927, modernized (M-2)

The experimental modernization of the 76 mm regimental gun mod. 1927 (M-2) consists of a change in design of the 76 mm mod. 1927 gun. The change is aimed at increasing the amount of regimental guns that are produced by means of simplifying production and decreasing the number of hours required, especially when it comes to the sliding cradle.

The 76 mm mod. 1927 regimental gun was changed in the following ways:
  1. A spindle type hydraulic brake and telescoping return mechanism were installed instead of the sliding cradle.
  2. The new box-type cradle is made from 3.5 mm thick stamped steel, without bronze liners (the bronze liners are installed on the barrel mount).
  3. The monobloc barrel has three mounts, the first of which is welded on, and the middle and rear ones are a part of the barrel. The rear mount is held on by five bolts.
    In order to prevent the gases from affecting the cradle, the barrel was lengthened by 200 mm.
  4. Mount. The deployable trail was replaced with a stationary stamped one, the carrier is welded on, reinforcements are added.
  5. The worm gears in the aiming mechanism are made from steel instead of bronze.
  6. The mount axle is straight, without lightening.
  7. The wheels were replaced with metallic disc wheels on a metal rim. Instead of ball bearings, bronze plugs are used.
  8. The movable shield was changed to be compatible with the movable cradle.
I composed a program to test the new gun consisting of 1500 shots and 2000 km of towing. 

When Deputy GAU UVNA Chief, Military Engineer 1st Class, comrade Lipmanovich arrived at the factory, based on the proposal from Deputy People's Commissar of Armament, comrade Mirzakhanov and factory director, comrade Bykhovskiy, the trials were stopped after 500 shots and 1000 km of towing.

As of December 19th of this year, the system was presented for proving grounds trials under the supervision of the Chief of the 1st Section, 2nd Department of the GAU UVNA, comrade Major Cheretov, during which it was discovered that the recoil mechanisms were not working satisfactorily, as a result of which it was removed from trials for improvements.

Overall notes regarding experimental work

In 1941, the factory did not complete almost any agreed upon experimental work. This can be explained by the factory's incorrect priorities regarding experimental work: the factory's attention is focused on mass production, and experimental prototypes are produced irregularly.

The experimental design bureau workers, up to the chief designer, are constantly busy with issues of mass production, fixing production defects, and anything else, aside from experimental work. Only when the state of experimental work is critical does the factory increase the priority.

The result is a rush that is bad for productivity, as a result of which the prototype is poorly finished, and not analyzed, as there is not enough time. The factory rushes to deliver a prototype or component, regardless of its quality. There is no fighting for the factory's brand.

Regarding the design bureau and its management: chief designer comrade Gurenko does not have a serious and dedicated relationship with experimental work, and because of this, the systems and components are constantly returned to the factory for improvements (M-40, MTs-3 sight, Steol recoil brake).

Senior GAU UVNA Military Representative, Lieutenant-Colonel Abramov"

T-34 with U-11

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"To the director of Kalinin factory #8, comrade Fratkin, Sverdlovsk
CC: NKTP Technical Department Chief, Engineer-Colonel Ginzburg, Sadovo-Sukharevskaya 9.11.
CC: NPTK Technical Council Chair, comrade Satel, 35 Gorkiy St.
July 20th, 1942

The design sent to us for review in letter #1430s of a 122 mm U-11 howitzer in a T-34 turret, designed under the initiative of factory #8, was reviewed by the Artillery Committee of the GAU.

The design describes the installation of an experimental U-11 122 mm tank howitzer into a new T-34 tank turret, while maintaining the existing turret ring. Since the proposed fighting compartment only fits two men to service the gun, which is insufficient for the howitzer to work normally, the project is not of interest and is rejected.

Considering that the installation of this howitzer in the larger KV tank turret resulted in insufficient comfort of service and rate of fire, the development of this project is nonsensical.

In order to avoid unproductive waste of effort and resources, the Artillery Committee consider it prudent to seek approval from the GAU before projects are started.

Deputy GAU Chief and ArtKom chair, Major-General of Artillery, Hohlov
ArtKom Military Commissar, Regimental Commissar Vasiliev"


Here is the proposed design.



Cromwell Armour

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Photo #3. Armour diagram of the British Cromwell IV tank.

Photo #4. Components of the front of the British Cromwell IV tank

Photo #8. Attachment of the front turret plate.

Br-19 152 mm Gun

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"To the Chief of the 3rd Department of the USSR NKV 85 Gorkiy St
In response to #5488s and 5255s-41

CC: Factory #221 director, Stalingrad
In response to #2890s-41

CC: Chief of the 2nd Department of the GAU UVNA, 2nd NKO Building

CC: GAU Regional Military Engineer at factory #221, Stalingrad

September 2nd, 1941

RE: Br-19 system

The Br-19 152 mm gun showed satisfactory precision at proving grounds trials, and the elevation mechanism worked flawlessly.

Considering the positive results of the trials and the advantages of the Br-19 over the 152 mm Br-2 gun in its lack of balancing mechanism, I consider it possible to put the gun into production to replace the 152 mm Br-2.

In connection with this, I ask that you instruct factory #221 to develop copies of blueprints and technical documentation for the Br-19 gun and send it by November 1st, 1941, through the GAU regional engineer to the 1st Department of the GAU UVNA for approval.

GAU UVNA Chief, Colonel Sorokin
GAU UVNA Military Commissar, Regimental Commissar Kozlov
1st Department of the GAU UVNA Deputy Chief, Komarov
3rd Section of the 1st Department of the GAU UVNA Chief, Yudov"

Superheavy Trophy

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The German superheavy Maus tank left a mark in the history of tank building. This was the heaviest tank in the world, developed as an assault tank, practically invincible to enemy fire. In many ways, its fate was the same as the fate of another giant, the French FCM 2C, which holds the title of the world's largest tank to this day. Like the French heavyweight, the German tank never saw combat. In both cases, the tanks were blown up by their own crews. Another similarity was that the tanks became the subject of a careful study.


Defender of the German General Staff

Work on superheavy tanks and SPGs in Germany was cancelled in the latter half of July 1944. In practice, even the order of the 6th Department of the Armament Directorate to turn over the already built hulls and turrets, given on July 27th, was not followed. Krupp hid the existing parts in their warehouses, where they were later found by British and American soldiers.

On August 19th, Krupp's management informed Porsche that the Armament Service ordered the cessation of work on the Typ 205. Specialists assembling the second prototype left Boblingen. However, this did not mean that trials of the Maus were finished. In the fall, the second prototype of the tank, called Typ 205/II, was equipped with a new engine. Instead of the gasoline Daimler-Benz MB.509, the tank received the diesel MB.517 engine. The first proposal to install this engine into a tank was made in the fall of 1942. This time, the engine was turbocharged, which increased its power output to 1200 hp. It is not known when the MB.517 was installed, but correspondence dated December 1st, 1944, states that the engine was installed into the Typ 205/II, but trials have not yet been performed.

Porsche managed to install the engine behind the back of the SS, which curated the project. By the time the SS-men took notice, one of the two 125,000 Reichsmark engines was already installed in the tank.

The last photograph of the "living" Maus tank, taken at the Ruhleben railway station in January of 1945.

The only effective way to stop work on the tank was the confiscation of Porsche's favourite toy. In late December of 1944, both Maus prototypes were taken from Boblingen to a warehouse near the Ruhleben railway station. The tanks were left there until at least January of 1945, after which they were sent to the Kummersdorf proving grounds, 25 km south of Berlin. Here, a technical description of the second prototype (the only one with a turret and armament) was composed, after which the tanks were parked in a garage that Porsche had no access to.

It is not known what happened to these vehicles between January and March of 1945. There is no credible information about any sort of trials. However, it's possible that the first prototype, the Typ 205/I, underwent ballistic trials at this time.

This is how Soviet forces discovered the Typ 205/II.

In March of 1945, the Typ 205/II was driven to Wunsdorf, 2.5 km south of Zossen, home of the German General Staff. In Soviet documents, this location is often referred to as Stammlager. The tank was included in the list of vehicles that protected the General Staff. The outer ring of Berlin's defenses also went through Zossen.

Much was written about the use of the Typ 205/II in the Battle of Berlin, and many flame wars were fought. One can only say with certainty who Porsche's superheavy tank could have potentially fought. Elements of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were advancing on Berlin from the southeast. On April 21st, 1945, the 6th Guards Tank Corps from this unit reached the Töpchin-Zelendorf line. Zossen was very close by, and it was taken on the night of April 22nd. Thanks to the chaos, the German General Staff managed to escape from Zossen while it was being captured by the 6th Guards Tank Corps. According to memoirs of the commander of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade, the SS-men executed some of the staff, and took the rest with them.

The same tank from the rear. A ruined movie theater is seen in the background.

As for the Maus, its combat career was short and sad. The engine broke down during maneuver. The immobilized vehicle was stuck at the crossroads of Zeppelinstrasse and Zerensdorfstrasse in Wundsdorf, near the General Staff. It stopped in a place where it could not be used as a bunker. Because of this, the crew had no choice but to blow it up. There was no heroic defense: the superheavy tank turned out to be a colossus on clay feet.

Damage from the left side was minimal. The guard building can be seen in the background. A tourism agency stands there today.

Arkhipov's memoirs refer to the Maus V2, but with some distortions.

"We captured two enormous tanks in the town. Their hatches were open, everything was fine on the inside, even the ammunition was prepared for battle: factory grease was wiped off. The tanks were so huge that even the King Tiger would look like a tankette next to one. The turret was flat, like a pancake, armed with a 155 mm gun. It was a very impressive tank, but just like the King Tiger, I am certain that its mobility was poor."

The explosion tore off the external fuel tank. The bathhouse can be seen in the background.

Either the editor mixed in the Tiger II tanks captured on the Sandomierz foothold or Arkhipov himself mixed something up, but the reality was different. The tank was captured by the Red Army in destroyed condition. The force of the explosion tore off the right side of the hull and the turret along with the turret ring.

Underestimation of mass

Thanks to the overall chaos, no one had time for the destroyed tank at the crossroads. Soviet specialists only discovered that the Germans designed and built superheavy tanks after the end of the war. A thorough study of the Third Reich's military-technical heritage scattered around its capital only began towards the end of May. On June 29th, 1945, reports were sent to the State Committee of Defense, including Stalin and Beria, signed by the GABTU Chief, Marshal of the Armoured Forces, Ya.N. Fedorenko.

"I report that Soviet occupational forces in Germany discovered two superheavy tanks.
One of them, with a turret and a diesel motor, is 40 km south of Berlin, near Stammlager. The second tank, with a dummy turret and a gasoline engine, is 62 km south of Berlin, near Kummersdorf. 
Defining features of the superheavy tanks include an electric transmission and a large caliber gun (128 mm) with a coaxial 75 mm gun.
German engineers that used to work at the tank proving grounds report that the superheavy tanks were designed by Porsche near Stuttgart-Boblingen, and were built at Nibelugenwerke (Austria).
In late December of 1944, both tanks were delivered to the proving grounds for trials, from where one prototype (armed) drove to Stammlager in Mach of this year.
I attach the tactical-technical characteristics of the tank. The characteristics are approximate, as both tanks were blown up and have not yet been studied by specialists. I will report more precise information after the specialists have examined the tanks thoroughly."

The second prototype was the most interesting. Even though the explosion dealt heavy damage to the interior, it was the one that was studied. The issue was that the first prototype had no armament, and a dummy was installed instead of the turret.

The explosion blew out the turret hatches.

Specialists arrived at the scene of the discovery, and began studying the tank. For starters, a technical description of the vehicle was composed. The report was short, only 18 pages. This was caused by an order from above to finish the report urgently. The rush seemed reasonable, as the tank appeared to be a much more dangerous enemy than any encountered before.

The explosion destroyed the gun mechanisms.

Contradictory results of interrogations and significant damage resulted in a series of errors in the description. For example, the mass was recorded as 120 tons. The error was not the fault of the Soviet military. German prisoners of war taken by the Western Allies reported the same mass. This was not intentional misinformation, as the Maus indeed weighed that much at one point. However, that was still at the paper stage, as this was the initial mass of the project, dated June of 1942. Since then, the prototype managed to "fatten up" to 1.5 times the weight.

A mostly accurate armour diagram composed by Soviet specialists.

Another serious error was made in describing the armament. Aside from a 128 mm long barreled and a 75 mm short barreled gun, the description included two 7.65 mm machineguns. An even more surprising addition is a 20 mm AA autocannon. It likely appeared in the description due to reports from POWs. As strange as it may sound, this was not disinformation either. In early 1943, the Maus designs had the 20 mm MG 152/20 as AA armament. However, the idea was discarded, as it could only be aimed vertically, and using a massive tank turret to aim an AA gun was deemed a silly idea.

Component layout diagram.

Despite these errors, the description included a precise diagram of the tank's composition and armour. Of course, there were some errors here, but they were relatively mild.

MB.517 diesel engine, the breakdown of which forced the Germans to blow up the tank.

Soviet specialists paid close attention to the engine and transmission of the superheavy tank. Almost half of the description was dedicated to these components. This is not surprising, as the USSR actively worked on an electric transmission a year beforehand, and the work was largely unsuccessful. Now, the Soviet army had a tank with an electric transmission, and a superheavy one at that. The engine was disassembled and studied on the spot. The same thing happened with the transmission mechanism and drive sprocket. The suspension was also thoroughly studied.

Study of the electric transmission of the destroyed tank.

The technical description was sent to Moscow in the mid-summer of 1945. Meanwhile, the captured Kummerdorf proving grounds were gradually studied by Soviet specialists. Captured German soldiers and engineers were also questioned. Available information on German superheavy tanks was accumulated. The Soviet military got their hands on documents from the German Ministry of Armament, and precise information on the Maus was available by the end of the summer. In addition, a portion of the blueprints was found.

The perforated road wheels were replaced with the earlier type.

As mentioned above, the Red Army captured both Maus prototypes. The first was found on the Kummersdorf proving grounds shooting range. According to initial information, the Typ 205/I was also blown up, but photographs disagree. If an attempt at demolition was made, it was unsuccessful. The Typ 205/I did not receive damage comparable to an ammunition rack explosion like the second tank. It is more likely that the tank was taken apart at the proving grounds.

The first prototype was discovered at the shooting range like this. You can see marks from shell impacts on the left side of the hull and turret.


Interestingly enough, the tank had four marks from high caliber armour piercing shells on its left side. Another mark was made on the left side of the dummy turret. 

Preparations for removing the dummy turret.

It is not possible for these marks to have been made by Soviet guns. Nine similar marks were present in the front plate. The tank stood parallel to a forest, and it was not possible to shoot at the front from any other angle. By the time the tank was discovered, it was already immobile, so it was impossible to rotate it for trials. In other words, the Germans themselves shot at the tank. It's possible that the other prototype was responsible. By the time the tank was discovered, it had welded on holders for spare track links in the front, with three impact marks in the area.

Several cables had to be hooked to the turret to remove it.

Both tanks were slowly taken apart throughout the summer and in early fall of 1945. It was impossible to repair either one. In addition, the components were interesting on their own. In order to make it easier to disassemble the first tank, the dummy turret was removed. Description of components taken from the tanks were immediately recorded. In the fall of 1945, components removed from the tanks were sent to a branch of experimental factory #100 in Leningrad. It was currently at work designing a new heavy tank, one of the versions of which used an electric transmission.

The instrument panel can be seen through the opening.

The tanks themselves had a different fate. A decision was made to assembly a hybrid with the Typ 205/II turret and Typ 205/I hull. It was not easy, since the evacuation of a 50 ton turret still attached to the turret platform was complicated. The problem was solved with a whole train of German halftracks, largely Sd.Kfz. 9. This train dragged the turret to Kummersdorf, where it was possible to disconnect the turret ring. In September of 1945, the Maus that was assembled from both tanks was loaded onto a special railroad platform that survived the war.

Interestingly enough, the serial numbers of the hull and turret from different tanks coincide: hull #35141 holds turret #35141.

Maus assembled from two tanks, Kummersdorf, 1945.

The tank spent a long time at Kummersdorf in this form. Even though it was prepared for delivery in the fall of 1945, the order to ship it was only issued half a year later. According to proving grounds records, the vehicle arrived in May of 1946. Study of the tank continued, but simplified. Since all of its components were sent to Leningrad, it was not possible to perform mobility trials. Mostly, the suspension was being studied at Kubinka. Gunnery trials were also out of the question, since the gun mount was damaged by the explosion and the 128 mm gun barrel dangled freely.

As you can see, the upper front plate has markings from shell impacts.

Ballistics trials were one of the few trials held at Kubinka. The trials were shortened: one shot was fired at the front of the hull, right side, front of the turret, and the right side of the turret. All other impacts on the tank were made by Germans.

Tank from the right side.

Unlike the superheavy E-100, which the British sent to the scrap heap, its competitor was luckier. After the study, the Maus was towed to the proving ground's museum. At the moment, it was simply an open courtyard. A proper museum was only built in the early 1970s, when the Maus took its place in the German exhibit.

The idea to restore the tank recently came up, but the project did not move past the preparation stage. The idea was, of course, interesting, but the result would have been nothing more than taxidermy with questionable reliability. All components were removed from the tank, and one of the bogeys is missing. The lifespan of the track links is also low, and repairing a track on a 180 ton tank in the middle of a field is not a fun task. This is only a small subset of issues that will arise during restoration, as even transporting the tank is no simple task.

Growth booster

The influence the captured superheavy tank had on Soviet tank building deserves a separate telling. Unlike the British and Americans, which had almost no reaction to captured materials on the E-100 and Maus, the GABTU's reaction was lightning fast.

There was nothing strange about that. The Object 257 was presented on June 5th, 1945, which had improved armour and a 122 mm BL-13 cannon. The tank was supposed to be a giant leap forward for Soviet tank building. However, suddenly, a tank appears that would have been a tough nut to crack for the prospective gun, while its own weapon was effective against the Object 257's armour. 

German superheavy tank, NIABT proving grounds, Kubinka, 1946.

On June 11th, 1945, a list of requirements for a new tank was composed. Its combat mass was capped at 60 tons, the crew increased to 5 men. The armour had to protect from the German 128 mm gun. In addition to the BL-13, a new 130 mm gun was required. It's hard to give another reason for these new requirements, except the need for a "Maus killer". Because of them, the tank now known as the IS-7 was born.

The same tank from the front.

The discovery of the German tank triggered a second wave of an arms race, similar to the one that birthed the KV-3, 4, and 5. Instead of improving existing tanks, designers began creating steel monsters. Even the IS-4 now seemed obsolete: the second five-year plan of the 1940s proposed production of 2760 new model heavy tanks (IS-7) per year, starting in 1948. The Object 260 was not even the heaviest and best armed. The Object 705, designed in Chelyabinsk, had a 152 mm cannon in its heaviest configuration, which would weigh 100 tons. In addition to tanks, tank destroyers on the IS-4 and IS-7 chassis carried long barreled 152 mm cannons.

The tank at the museum, 1950s. Another hit can be seen on the front.

This whirlwind of activity did no less damage than the development of steel monsters in the spring-summer of 1941. Prototypes of the IS-7 were built, but mass production never started. The tank turned out to be exceptional, but too heavy. On February 18th, 1949, decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR #701-270ss stopped development of heavy tanks over 50 tons in mass. Instead, a heavy tank better known as the IS-5 entered development. Later, it was accepted into service under the name T-10.

The tragedy of this situation was that four years were essentially wasted by Soviet tank designers. The only worthy opponent of the IS-7 stood at the museum courtyard in Kubinka. As for former allies, they axed the development of their own behemoths. Prospective Soviet tanks had no one to fight.


SG-122: Assault Gun on a Foreign Chassis

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Work on SPGs, especially heavy ones, stopped in the USSR after the start of the Great Patriotic War. This was largely caused by the fact that the factories were busy with other orders. In addition, many factories were evacuated eastward. Only light SPGs were put into production at the start of the war, and these were largely improvised.

Meanwhile, due to the number of factories that switched from making artillery tractors to tanks, the artillery branch was forced to revisit SPGs towards the end of 1941. Experience gained in battle and a number of other factors meant that the new generation of SPGs that was built in 1942 was radically different from pre-war designs. This is especially true for medium SPGs, which became assault guns instead of tank destroyers. The SG-122 was one such SPG, built on the chassis of a captured German SPG.


First, there was Atrshturm

In early December of 1941, the GAU prepared a plan for work on SPGs. The plan included an 85 mm tank destroyer on the T-34 chassis, which was to be assigned to factory #8. This project, known as U-20, became a victim of its own requirements. According to them, the factory could not make changes to the T-34 chassis. The designers managed to build such an SPG, but it did not match other requirements.

Column of captured "Artshturms", spring of 1942.

Meanwhile, the Red Army began receiving medium SPGs with short 75 mm guns: captured German StuG IIIs, which Soviet forces captured as early as the summer of 1941. These vehicles, built to support infantry and tanks, were initially called "German T-3 medium tank with an immobile turret". Soon after, they were dubbed "Artshturm", "artillery assault tank". This is how the SPGs were referred to in many Soviet documents.

Initially, the trophies were used haphazardly. Later, centralized repairs of these vehicles were organized. In late 1941, repair factory #82 was created at the Podyemnik factory (modern day OAO MoZAL, Moscow, 14 Podyemnaya St.). Thanks to its proximity to a railroad and a large amount of lifting equipment, the factory became one of the largest tank repair organizations in Moscow.

The organization received a large amount of captured tanks, as well as tanks from the Western Allies. Until the end of the war, Lend Lease and captured tanks became the specialty of repair factory #82. Aside from repairs, the factory performed conversions of tanks into special vehicles, for example repair tanks. StuG III SPGs were also repaired here.

Repair factory #82, spring of 1942.

The captured SPG was well received by our military. "Artshturms" were used widely by the Red Army. However, our specialists had a number of complaints about the vehicle even in late 1941. Most importantly, ammunition was hard to come by, for obvious reasons.

There were also other questions. For example, the StuG III chassis was suitable for more powerful and more effective guns than the 75 mm short barreled gun. The fighting compartment of the German SPG was also too low.

In February of 1942, the issue of rearming captured tanks and SPGs to use domestic guns was raised. According to archive documents, the GAU Artillery Committee tasked E.V. Sinilshikov and S.G. Pererushev with this task. They worked at factory #592, which was organized at the Mytishi machinebuilding factory in Mytishi, Moscow oblast.

Formally, the factory housed artillery design bureau OKB-16, but in reality, factory #592 worked on many subjects, including design and production of heavy armored sleds. Sinilshikov and Pererushev used to work not at OKB-16, but the Bolshevik factory.

Factory #592 was tasked with rearming the Pz38(t) with the 20 mm TNSh autocannon or 45 mm gun, the PzIII with a 45 mm gun, and the PzIV with the 76 mm F-34 gun. As for the StuG III, the GAU wanted to install the 122 mm M-30 howitzer.

In reality, the last item on the list was the only one worked on.

Draft of the 122-SG, April 1942.

On March 17th, 1942, the NKV Technical Council gave the StuG rearmament project a green light. Sinilshikov was appointed as the manager and Pererushev as the chief designer. The draft project, indexed 122-SG (122 mm self propelled howitzer on the Artshturm chassis), was completed on April 3rd, and presented to the Artkom on the 6th.

Overall, the 122-SG differed little in purpose from its German predecessor, but the firepower of the 122 mm howitzer was much greater than of the 7.5 cm StuK. It was enough to defeat any German tank, although the main target of the 122-SG was, of course, light fortifications and strongholds.

Installation of the 122 mm M-30 howitzer into the 122-SG.

The fighting compartment had to be redesigned to fit the much larger gun. The roof was raised by 100 mm, increasing the height of the fighting compartment to 1620 mm. The SPG's crewmen, especially short ones, could now stand, which improved working conditions. The overall height grew to 2050 mm; the vehicle was still quite low.

The front of the casemate received applique armour, which increased the armour thickness to 70 mm. The ammunition capacity of the SPG was 50 rounds, more than of the StuG. The number of crewmen increased to 5, but their working conditions were no worse than those of the German crew.

The unaltered M-30 oscillating part was installed on a pedestal mount, covered with 10 mm thick plates from the sides. The recoil mechanisms were protected with 30 mm of armour. According to calculations, this would increase the mass of the SPG by 2.4 tons, which was acceptable.

The SPG from the front.

After inspection of the 122-SG project materials, the 2nd Department of the Artkom approved them as the foundation for a technical project. At the same time, the deadline for producing an experimental prototype of the 122-SG and mass rearmament of the Artshturm was set.

On April 15th, 1942, a Plenum of the Artillery Committee was held, which cemented the direction of Soviet self propelled artillery. Even though the T-34 tank destroyer with an 85 mm gun was still listed in the plans, the overall development took a different route. A decision was made to abandon the concept, and pursue a medium assault gun on the T-34 chassis instead. For the short term, production of the SPG on the StuG III chassis, the name of which was changed to SG-122, was approved.

Chassis shortage

The Plenum's demand that an analogous SPG be developed on the T-34 chassis had a good reason behind it. The use of a captured tank as a base had a number of problems. First of all, it was necessary to capture a required number of SPGs in a functional state. However, even the capture of a suitable vehicle did not mean that it would be sent to conversion. Captured vehicles were used to make up for losses. Repair factory #82 alone, the biggest source of chassis for the SG-122, sent 8 of the 27 StuG IIIs that arrived back to the front lines. 15 captured SPGs arrived in March, giving hope for large volumes in the future. Unfortunately, shipments as large as the one in March of 1942 never happened again.

122-SG from the top. As you can see, there is enough room for five crewmen.

In late April of 1942, tactical-technical characteristics for the SG-122 were developed. Work on the technical project for the SPG began at around the same time. A number of authors state that G.I. Kashtanov was the chief designer on this project, but that is incorrect. All documents, including factory blueprints, list Sinilshikov as the chief designer. In June of 1942, factory #592's design bureau was reinforced with engineers who formerly worked at the Bolshevik factory. Many engineers came from factory #8.

Experimental prototype of the SG-122 on trials, August of 1942.

The SG-122 technical project was completed by the middle of June of 1942. Production of a prototype began at that time. During development, factory #592 introduced a number of changes into the initial design. For starters, the height of the fighting compartment was further increased, letting crewmen up to 170 cm tall work without bending down. The applique armour for the front of the casemate was changed, and the slope in the back of the casemate was removed, increasing the volume of the fighting compartment. The overall height of the SG-122 increased to 2250 mm.

On June 15th, the test program of the SG-122 was prepared, signed by chief designer Sinilshikov and chief engineer of factory #592 Lomakhin. According to the program, the SPG would fire 40 shots and drive for 100 km. The outskirts of Mytishi were chosen as the proving grounds, and the firing would take place at the factory #8 shooting range, located nearby. On June 25th, the program was approved by the GAU.

This is what the SG-122 looked like in production. The fighting compartment is visibly roomier thanks to the raised roof.

The trials schedule for the prototype SG-122, which was only finished in late June, was very optimistic. Trials began on July 25th and ended on August 16th. The SPG was was delivered for trials had a large number of changes compared to the initial project.

In addition to the aforementioned casemate, the changes touched many other components. The M-30 received new armour for its recoil brake. Additional springs were installed to help balance the gun. A guard rail, trigger pedal, and a loading assistance tray were added.

After all of these changes, the mass of the SPG reached 23.3 tons, which was acceptable. To compare, the StuG 40 Ausf. F with a 7.5 cm StuK 40 with a 43 caliber barrel weighed 23.3 tons, and the StuH 42 weighed 24 tons.

The top speed achieved during trials was 50 kph on a highway and 30 kph off-road. During trials, the SG-122 drove for 50 km, mostly off-road. The average speed was 15 kph, and fuel consumption was 300 L per 100 km. The vehicle survived the off-road portion of the trials, but the crew noted that it was hard to drive, since the center of mass shifted towards the front. The friction clutch caught fire. In addition, the road wheels wore down faster.

Gunnery trials were performed in much larger volumes than anticipated. 234 shots were fired, almost 5 times as many as planned. The sight shifted by 1-2 divisions with every shot, but the precision was judged to be satisfactory. The rate of fire ranged from 5 to 11-12 RPM, depending on the angle of the gun. The gun was comfortable enough to service, and the location of ammunition was satisfactory. It took 20-25 seconds to switch from travel to battle mode. There was enough room for the crew, but only the driver had a seat.

Overall, the trials were deemed a success. Factory #592's design bureau was instructed to add seats for the rest of the crew, add armour for the panoramic sight, and make the trigger guard sturdier.

The layout of the fighting compartment was largely the same.

The fate of the SG-122 could have been sealed before the trials even began. The GABTU was against the rearmament of the StuG, claiming that there was a shortage of materiel as is. This is similar to the story with the Matilda and Valentine, where the vehicles passed trials, but production never began.

However, there was a difference between the Lend Lease tanks and captured SPG, which didn't let the GABTU kill the SG-122. Self propelled artillery was under the jurisdiction of the GAU, and the tankers weren't allowed to touch its projects.

Work on the SG-122M, which would have used the T-34 chassis, stalled for the same reason: the GABTU didn't give them any tanks, even though the first request was made on June 30th, 1942. It took until August 20th, when Molotov personally gave his permission to use two T-34s that returned from repairs. This strange behaviour from the GABTU nearly left the Red Army without any medium SPGs.

Despite these dramatic events, a contract between factory #592 and the GAU was signed on September 7th, 1942, for the first five SG-122s. The cost of converting an Artshturm into an SG-122 was 45,000 rubles. 

Perpendicular cross-section of the SG-122.

The final word on the issue of rearming the Artshturm was up to Stalin personally, who signed GKO decree #2429ss "On production of experimental prototypes of SPGs" on October 19th, 1942.

"10. The GABTU (comrade Fedorenko) must provide factory #592 with 120 captured German Artshturm SPGs or T-3 tanks according to the following schedule: October: 20, by November 15th: 10, by December 1st: 20, by December 15th: 20, by January 1st: 25, by January 15th: 10, by February 1st: 15.
11. The People's Commissariat of Armament (comrade Ustinov) must produce and deliver to the Chief of Artillery (comrade Voronov) 120 SPGs with the M-30 122 mm howitzer, like those that passed GAU trials, according to the following schedule: by October 25th: 10, by November 15th: 10, by December 1st: 10, by December 15th: 10, by January 1st: 15, by January 15th: 20, by February 15th: 20."

In reality, repair factory #82 could only deliver 19 StuG IIIs and 20 PzIIIs in all of 1942. No order could change this situation, and real production was nothing like the GKO expected it to be. Even involving other repairs factories did not change the situation significantly. As of December 5th, 1942, the factory could have theoretically received 47 captured tanks for conversion.

Production issues added to that, since factory #592 had never produced anything en masse before. Judging by correspondence, the factory tried to blame the GABTU for some production issues, but the attempt was unsuccessful.

The factory managed to produce seven SG-122s in October, two more in November, and none at all in December. Six vehicles were delivered: two each for the 15th Reserve Training SPG Regiment, 2nd Kiev Artillery Academy, and the 2nd Rostov Artillery Academy.

By that point, the fate of the SG-122 was sealed. GKO decree #2559 issued on December 2nd, 1942, "On organization of production of SPGs at the Uralmash factory and factory #38" removed the responsibility of T-70 production from factory #38. Instead, decree #2661 issued on December 27th, 1942, tasked factory #40, which factory #592 was reorganized into, with production of the light T-80 tank.

Nevertheless, factory #592 was still expected to build 10 SG-122s. In reality, the factory built 12 more SPGs in January. The total production was 21 units, 20 of which were sent to the army. These vehicles had serial numbers 1001-1021.

Brief battle career

The 14 SG-122s that were delivered in January were sent to the Moscow Artillery Center, from where they were transferred to the 1435th Self Propelled Artillery Regiment (SAP), formed on January 1st, 1943. On January 5th, the unit began receiving SU-12 (SU-76) SPGs, followed by the SU-35 (SU-122). On January 28th, the SU-35 were transferred to the 1433rd and 1434 SAPs, which were replaced by SG-122s in early February. The unit's documents periodically referred to them as SU-35.

As of February 2nd, the regiment had five rearmed Artshturms, and by the 4th, three of them already needed repairs. Documents state that delivery of SPGs from factory #40 was slow, and several of the SPGs arrived with defects. Some of them were so severe, that they needed repairs at the factory.

By February 8th, the number of SG-122s reached seven, five of which were in repairs on the next day. Finally, on February 15th, the number of SG-122s reached sixteen (14 from the factory and two from the reserve training regiment), five of which were in repairs.

The only known photo of the SG-122 at a repair base. SPG with serial number 1002 is seen on the right of the photograph.

The 1435th SAP was sent to the front on February 20th, by which time the number of SG-122s dropped to 12. Four vehicles were given to the SPG Training Center. The 1435th SAP unloaded at the Dabuzha station. SG-122 1002 and 1011 were left along the way. By March 3rd, only eight SG-122s remained combat capable out of 12.

The SPGs trial by combat happened on March 7th, 1943, in battle for the Verkhnyaya Akimovka village. The SPGs supported an attack by the 248th Tank Brigade of the 9th Tank Corps. Seven SU-12s and seven SG-122s went into battle. Three of them were knocked out, and two burned up. The SPGs' fire destroyed three anti-tank guns, two machinegun nests, and one tank.

On the next day, SG-122 #1003 burned up, #1016 and #1025 were knocked out. On March 9th, the battle for Verkhnyaya Akimovka continued. There were no losses that day, and the SPG crews claimed one anti-tank gun and two MG nests. Lieutenant Koval and gunner Yurin excelled in these battles, claiming two guns, four dugouts, four MG nests, and one car.

The 1435th SAP went into battle on March 14th for the last time. Three SU-12 and four SG-122 SPGs were used to attack the Yasenok village. Two vehicles returned from the fight with insignificant damage, two burned up, and three were knocked out.

The fate of the SG-122 was unfortunate. Nevertheless, the SPG left its mark on Soviet SPG building history. Many solutions developed by factory #592 during its design were later used to design medium SPGs, creating the SU-122. The idea of a loading tray was later used on the SU-152.

The SG-122 was not the last SPG for Sinilshikov. On November 5th, 1942, GKO decree #2477ss organized the Central Artillery Design Bureau, headed by V.G. Grabin. Sinilshikov was included into its staff. The TsKB's first project was the S-1 SPG, a 76 mm F-34 gun on the PzIII chassis. This vehicle was built in large numbers and deserves its own story.

New Heavy Tanks, 1943

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"To the Chief of the GBTU TU 6th Department, Regional Engineer at the Kirov Factory
July 5th, 1943

I report on the experimental work performed at factory #100 during June of 1943.

The most attention was paid to Objects 237 (experimental IS tank) and 239 (KV-1S tank with an IS tank turret and 85 mm gun).

1. Object 237 (IS tank)

Assembly of the first Object 237 began on June 21st, 1943. Assembly was completed on June 30th, 1943. Assembly did not include installation of the turret, as it has not arrived.

The turret is being assembled at the Kirov factory.

On July 2nd, the tank traveled for 24 km for breaking in, showing defects in the tuning of the main friction clutch and planetary turning mechanisms.

The hull of a second tank was built at factory #200 on July 1st, 1943. Factory #100 began assembly of a second tank on July 3rd, 1943. Factory #200 is in the process of assembling a third hull.

2. Object 239 (modernized KV-1S tank with an IS tank turret and armament)

Work on converting the hull of KV-1S #15002 was finished at factory #200 on June 30th, 1943.

Presently, factory #100 has begun work on assembly of the tank. The turret is not completed. Delays in producing turrets for prototypes happen exclusively due to the management of the Kirov factory, which has distanced itself from this work and is at fault for failing to meet targets established by the GOKO.

3. On the armament of Objects 237 and 239

The factory received four 85 mm S-31 guns and one D-5 gun designed by factory #9 to arm the IS and modernized KV-1S experimental tanks.

The S-31 gun has a recoil length of 540 mm and a large bulky cradle, which makes it difficult to install into a tank.

The D-5 gun has a recoil length of 300 mm with a small and compact cradle, as well as a low loading axis. The ballistics of the guns are identical.

In addition, the D-5 gun can be converted to use the 122 mm caliber if the barrel and breech are replaced."

Tanker Rations

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"Report

On the supplies of Guards tank units, attached to the 64th Army by order of the Member of the State Committee of Defense of the USSR, comrade Malenkov,

As of March 6th, 1943, in days:

Name
47th GTR
27th GTB
41st GTB
8th OGTB
91st GTB
254th GTB
Bread
4
8
5
7
2
6.5
Hardtack
8
10
8
13
13.5
4.1
Whole grain flour
15
15
15
67
11
80
Tinned meat
10
15
15
9
6.5
10
Fish
15
20
15
16
10.8
24
Tinned fish
3
5
-
87
-
-
Various cereals and concentrates
12
19
19
44
11
12
Pasta
10
8
9
41
7
19
Sugar
5
4
4
28
6
6
Compound lard
15
15
15
23
14
15
Dairy butter
3
-
-
10
25
-
Salo
10
18
15
6
-
10
Vegetables
3
3
3
0.5
3.5
3
Tobacco
10
15
10
83
12
10
Matches
10
10
10
72
19
30
Rolling papers
-
-
-
-
-
-
Makhorka
10
8
10
20
5
5
Soap
8
14
10
7
5
29
Cookies
10
10
10
6
6
6
Tea
15
18
14
80
28
10
Salt
30
40
15
10
37
31

Notes: a representative of the 9th Tank Regiment was summoned to receive supplies on March 8th, 1943.

The 8th OGTP (formerly 5th TP) arrived with significant leftovers and only received some types of supplies from the 64th Army warehouses.

Everybody has one day's worth of vodka.

The low levels of supplies of sugar, tobacco, tinned fish, and cookies is due to the fact that these goods are absent from the warehouse.

Chief of the Food Supplies Department of the 64th Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanov."

RGASPI 644-4-1

Lend Lease Truck Requirements

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"People's Commissariat of External Trade, Technical and Industrial Imports
To comrade Pritvorov

When ordering trucks, keep in mind the following technical requirements that GABTU has for foreign vehicles:
  1. From the total, 70% must be two axle 4x4, 20% two axle 2x4, and 10% three axle 4x6. The cargo capacity must be 2.5-3 tons. One or two brands.
  2. All vehicles must be equipped with tools and spare parts, and have special Ground Grip type tires.
  3. In addition, the vehicles must have:
    1. Tow hook
    2. Anti-slip chains: 1 set
    3. Heating cowls: 1 unit
    4. 4x5 meter tarp: 1 unit
    5. 10-18 mm tow cables: 5 meters (the thickness depends on the cargo capacity)
  4. Vehicles with the cabin above the engine are acceptable.
  5. Trucks without truck beds are acceptable.
It is necessary to order light Willys cars, which must have the following in addition to the above requirements:
  1. The car must have a convertible top with sides.
  2. The tires must be self-sealing.
  3. All wheels must be powered.
  4. The car must come with a spare wheel.
I ask you to give the necessary instructions to the trade representative in the USA.

Chief of the GABTU, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, Fedorenko
Military Commissar of the GABTU, Army Commissar 2nd Class, Biryukov"

Dinger Tank

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"USSR NKO
BTU HQ of the Voronezh Front
Reconnaissance Dept.
May 3rd, 1943

To the divisional HQ chief
Operational department only

Through POW interrogation, it was established that:

The German army is receiving a new "Dinger" tank. The mass is 65 tons, armament is one 100 mm cannon and two M-42 machineguns. The armour thickness (front and engine compartment) is 90 mm. The crew consists of 6 men.

This type of tank is being built in Austria, at a tank factory in Proll. Mass production began in the fall of 1942.

In addition, infantry units received a new type of anti-tank grenade. The grenade carries three magnets on the front of a round plate. The grenade is used as follows: a tank hunter attaches the grenade to the tank and pulls out the cord (the grenade is held on the tank with magnets), after which the grenade explodes.

Inform your subordinate forces of this kind of tank and anti-tank grenade, make it a priority to clarify data on the type of tank and anti-tank grenade.

Chief of the Armoured and Motorized Department of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant-Colonel Sch[illegible]enko."

M24 Chaffee: Test Drive at the End of Lend Lease

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Starting in the second half of 1943, the approach to sending British and American Lend Lease armoured vehicles to the USSR changed. Instead of immediate large scale shipments, the Western Allies sent a few samples of new vehicles. If the tank or SPG was satisfactory for the Soviet side, full scale shipments followed.

The first vehicle to arrive on this trial basis was the Light Tank M5A1. By that point, production of light tanks in the USSR was wrapping up, so the American novelty never made it into service. Nevertheless, the USSR received another foreign light tank. This was the Light Tank M24, the best American light tank of WWII.


Not in a rush

In many ways, the arrival of the Light Tank M24 was triggered by American attempts to increase the firepower of a light tank. It was clear that the 37 mm gun was insufficient in 1942. Trials of the M3 75 mm gun in the turret of the HMC M8 showed that the light tank platform was suitable for firing a gun of this caliber. However, the turret of the Light Tank M5 was too small for such a gun.

Because of this, the Ordnance Committee composed requirements for a new tank in March of 1943: the Light Tank T24. It carried the T13E1 gun, a lightened aircraft version of the M3, installed on B-25G/H bombers. Cadillac acted as the subcontractor in charge of development.

The tried and tested Cadillac Series 42 engines from the Light Tank M5A1 were used as the powerplant. This also improved parts compatibility with earlier models. Another logical solution was to reuse the concepts designed for the Gun Motor Carriage T70, designed by another division of General Motors: Buick. This was especially true of the torsion bar suspension.

American Light Tank M24, Kubinka, NIBT proving grounds, April 1945.

The first sample of the Light Tank M24 arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds on October 15th, 1943. Interestingly enough, Soviet specialists saw the prototype before the American testers. In the late summer of 1943, a group of Soviet specialists visited the proving grounds of the General Motors company in Milford, Michigan. It just so happened that they piqued the interest of Major Berg. The reason was simple: the officer was responsible for the development of the GMC T70's suspension, and wanted to receive as much information as possible about torsion bar suspensions of Soviet tanks. As it turned out, the Soviet side received a lot more information. They did not see the GMC T70 in detail, but their unexpected visit to Detroit revealed a large number of experimental vehicles. Among them was the "T-24 light tank".

Since the tank was only seen from afar, the data on it was inexact. According to engineer Sorvin's report, dated 1944, the tank was designed on the chassis of the "T-70 self propelled gun". The gun caliber was estimated as 37-57 mm. The armour thickness was estimated at 38 mm, same as other American light tanks.

The tank differed noticeably from its predecessors, both in hull shape and suspension.

Reliable information about this tank began to arrive significantly later, in the summer of 1944. Precise information was received in August, not just about the tank, but about the rate of production. Our specialists also knew the exact date of standardization under the name Light Tank M24: July 25th, 1944. On August 22nd, the GBTU received a precise report on the new tank, which included a technical description spanning 17 pages.

Soviet specialists were also invited to the Tank-automotive Center in Detroit (modern day Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, or TACOM). From September 11th to 15th, Guards Major B. Afonin and Engineer-Captain G. Bogolubov studied transmissions of American tanks. Among others, that included the Hydra-Matic 255-T, used on the Light Tank M24. One important feature of the 255-T was that it had no planetary reverse gear. Instead, a geared reductor was used.

Conclusions regarding the gearboxes for light tanks were against their use in domestic tanks due to both difficulty in production, and the forced nature of their appearance. Soviet specialists considered the fact that these gearboxes worked well in the hands of poorly trained drivers a definite plus.

The three-man turret was another difference. The first time American engineers made a three-man light tank turret was for the Light (later Medium) Tank M7.

Afonin judged the M24 highly when composing his report. According to his conclusions, the M24 was the best armed light tank at the time. The overall layout was also good, as it allowed for a compact and highly maneuverable vehicle. However, the armour was poor. Another significant drawback was the need to provide the tank with highly trained service personnel.

In his conclusions, Afonin proposed that samples of the American tank should be purchased. However, there was no hurry to do so. The USSR had not produced light tanks for a year at that point. Renewal of light tank shipments was not planned, so the purchase of the M24 was postponed.

Progress in the light weight class

The issue of buying M24 tanks was raised in early 1945. By that point, the tanks were actively used in Western Europe, and were no secret. Five tanks (the number of Light Tanks M5A1 ordered) already seemed too much, so the number of tanks purchased was reduced to two.

On March 11th, 1945, convoy JW 65, composed of 26 transports, left for Murmansk. Out of those 26, one transport, SS Horace Bushnell, was seriously damaged by the U-995 submarine, and another, Thomas Donaldson, was sunk by U-968. This happened close to Murmansk. On the next day, the convoy arrived at its destination, bringing the two M24 light tanks along with its other cargo. On March 25th, they were loaded onto a railroad and sent to Kubinka.

The large hatch for removal of the gearbox in the upper front plate was a distinguishing feature of the new American tank.

The tanks arrived at the NIBT Proving Grounds closer to April 10th. Out of the two, the tank with registration number U.S.A. 30120376 was chosen to undergo the full trials program. In addition, the new tank was thoroughly studied from April 15th to April 20th. Overall, the opinion of the examiners was largely the same as the conclusions made by Afonin in August of 1944. According to the verdict, the M24 was a composition of the best ideas taken from General Motors' vehicles: the Light Tank M5A1 and GMC M18 (T70).

The engine compartment became lower, thanks to its rearrangement.

Like with the GCM T70, the attached technical manuals made studying the tank much easier. However, a serious mistake was made in judging the tank due to this documentation. According to the manual, the output of the Cadillac Series 44T24 engine was 110 hp. This is true, but with a small clarification: this was the nominal power. The maximum power was 148 hp, meaning that the real maximum power of the pair of engines was 296 hp. The same mistake was made here as with the Light Tank M5A1, which was equipped with the same engines.

The Browning M2HB AA machinegun can be seen on this photograph.

Unlike the M5A1, the M24 joined the output of the two engines using a demultiplexor in the engine compartment, reducing the number of driveshafts to one. In addition, it was now possible to disable one of the engines. Another novelty was the addition of a neutral pedal, and dual driver controls. The first time this solution was implemented by American engineers was on the Medium Tank T20. Now, the assistant driver finally earned his title. 

Cutaway of the tank. The overall layout is the same as that of its predecessors, but with many changes.

The differential was the same as the one used on the GMC T70. Its connection with the final drives was made with knuckle joints. This made the design and installation of the differential simpler. The installation was done through the large hatch in the upper front plate,

Light Tank M24 transmission diagram.

The suspension of the American tank was close to that of the GMC T70, which is not surprising. However, there were enough differences. For starters, instead of horizontal bidirectional shock absorbers used on the GMC T70, the Light Tank M24 used slanted telescoping shock absorbers. Another difference noticed (and sketched) by Afonin was the design of the idler carrier. It was connected to the balancer of the rear road wheel. This way, the tracks were always taut.

As for the track links, they were very similar to those used on the SPG. The size of the connector pins and pin stopper were changed. The latter change was deemed unfortunate, as the pins and pin channels bent during usage, and removing the tracks became a complicated task.

Diagram of the idler carrier made by Soviet specialists in 1944.

The observation devices were also lauded. For starters, the commander had a cupola with six observation devices, which provided good visibility. There was also a periscope in the hatch. The gunner, driver, and his assistant also had observation devices with 60 degrees of horizontal and 50 degrees of vertical view range.

The sights were also good, but the markings were only made for the M61 armour piercing shell. A lack of an HE shell scale was a clear drawback. In addition for a direct fire sight, an angle measurement device for indirect fire was added.

Visibility diagram of the American Light Tank M24.

The crew stations were also highly rated. The loader's position drew the most criticism, as he had no observation device, and his seat was uncomfortable. However, the fact that the tank could be crewed by four men must be kept in mind, in which case the loader's duties were performed by the assistant driver. Overall, the tank was rather comfortable, especially considering its small size.

The M24 was not only comfortable to sit in, but easy to drive, with 9-12 kg of effort required to move its levers. The aiming flywheels were also easy to turn, requiring only 1.5 kg of effort. The addition of a hydraulic turret traverse was also a plus. Without it, it took 95 seconds to fully rotate the turret, and 15 seconds with it.

The M24 could climb a grade of up to 30 degrees.

Mobility trials of the American light tank took place between April 21st and May 24th, 1945. The tank drove for 859 km, 145 of which were on a paved highway. The Light Tank M5A1 and SU-76M SPG were compared with the M24. The incorrect information about the engine power introduced confusion. With it, it seemed that the SU-76M  had a higher power to weight ratio at 12.38 hp/ton. The power to weight ratio of the M5A1 was deemed to be 15.7 hp/ton, and the M24's to be 12.2. In reality, the power to weight ratio of the M5A1 was 19.5 hp/ton and the M24's was 16.08.

The top speed of the M24 was lower than that of its predecessor, 55 kph. However, the SU-76M's was even lower: 41 kph. Soviet specialists explained the difference in top speed with the different gear ratios, missing the fact that the M24 had more than two times the engine power of the GAZ-203. The average speed on a highway was also high, 30.05 kph, with a fuel consumption of 203 L per 100 k, or 1.5 times more than the M5A1 (135 L). Driving on a highway was performed in 4th gear.

The tank during a descent.

On a dirt road, the tank's average speed was only 17.45 kph. This was caused by a thick layer of mud covering the road. The tank could mostly drive only in 3rd gear, using 300 L of fuel per 100 km. In the same conditions, the SU-76M used up 215 L per 100 km and had an average speed of 16.2 kph. To be fair, recall that the M24 was 1.5 as heavy as the Soviet SPG, which explains the higher fuel consumption. Another reason for higher fuel consumption was the mechanically switched demultiplexer. To compare, the 15 ton Light Tank M5A1 spent 197 L per 100 km, but it drove on a dry road.

Another factor that influenced fuel consumption was engine problems. The liner on the left engine was slowly being burned through due to loosening of the cylinder head hold-down stud. In addition, the fuel filter was dirty, and the control rods of the demultiplexer were miscalibrated. There were also issues with the suspension. On the 396th kilometer, the rubber rim of a road wheel on the right side peeled off. Overall, a week was spent repairing various breakdowns.

Driving on a tilt.

Obstacle trials showed that the maximum climbable grade on a hill without topsoil was 30 degrees. The slipping hydraulic clutch did not allow the tank to take a steeper hill even in first gear. The maximum tilt was 32 degrees, after which the tank started to slip. Trials showed that the minimum turning radius was 5-5.35 meters.

Acceleration trials were very interesting. The mobility of the M24 and GMC T70 was compared. It turned out the the light tank could accelerate to 16 kph in 23 meters, and to 32 kph in 80 meters. With a significantly more powerful engine, the distance needed for the T70 was 180 and 360 meters respectively.

One of the discovered defects was the peeling off of a road wheel rim.

Trials showed that the tank was stable while firing. This meant that its precision was also high. The aimed rate of fire was 9-10 RPM, which dropped to 7.2-7.7 RPM when using the ammunition underneath the commander's seat. While firing on the move, the tank could hit 30-40% of its targets while driving at 11-13 kph, and 10-20% at 24-26 kph. When the stabilizer was enabled, this number increased to 70-80%.

As for the 75 mm M5 gun, the recoil brake was the most interesting thing in it. However, the penetration was deemed insufficient. The M61 shell could penetrate the side of a Tiger Ausf. E tank at 500 meters, and the side of a Panther tank at 1500 meters. Measurement of gas concentration inside the fighting compartment led to interesting conclusions. It turned out that the fan didn't help with gases, but the opposite, kept them inside the tank due to the gusts it created. The best method of ventilation turned out the be the tank's engine.

Undervalued tank

The final verdict regarding the new American tank was unexpected. The NIBT Proving Grounds staff deemed the Light Tank M24 as not meeting modern requirements. This was mostly due to the firepower and thin armour (only 25-38 mm). This conclusions is debatable, to say the least. However, it can be explained by a very interesting opinion of the Soviet military regarding what a light tank should look like. Its enough to say that the military demanded a light tank with 90 mm of front armour and an 85 mm cannon in March of 1944. The resulting light tank with heavy armour was a fearsome sight by the summer of 1945, especially its armour. The idea that a light tank is meant for slightly different tasks than a heavy or medium one was not clear until the late 1940s.

As for the "not meeting requirements" M24, its career continued for several decades. The tank was used by over twenty nations and actively participated in Cold War conflicts.

Despite such a negative verdict, the M24 did influence Soviet tank development, or rather the SPAAG on its chassis did. In late January of 1945, the GBTU learned of the 40 mm GMC M19. This vehicle was designed in 1943-44 on the converted M24 chassis. The distinctive feature of this SPAAG was the pair of 40 mm Bofors autocannons. Thanks to this pair, the density of fire increased.

Preparations for launching the Soviet ZSU-37 into production were underway, and someone had the bright idea to change it to be the same as the M19. The ZSU-37 had a long and unfortunate fate: factory #40 barely produced 75 of them in 1945-46. The idea of modernizing it to be similar to the American SPAAG was buried. Nevertheless, the M19 seriously influenced development of domestic SPAAGs.

M4A2(76)W Shipment

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"ACT
October 5th, 1944
Baku

We, the undersigned, Senior Assistant to the Chief of the GBTU TU Military Acceptance Department, Engineer-Captain comrade A.M. Davydov, and Technical Deputy to the Commander of the 27th Independent Training Tank Regiment, Engineer-Captain comrade Dudin, compose this act to state that the former had delivered and that the second had accepted tanks that arrived on the "Darma" on October 4th, 1944, and the "Neftedag" on October 2nd, 1944.

14 M4A2 tanks: ## 3080666, 3080663, 3080577, 3080662, 3080657, 3080604, 3080592, 3080513, 3080575, 3080595, 3080688, 3080648, 3080578.

All tanks were delivered in driveable condition, with normally functioning mechanisms, and are technically fuctional.

Along with tanks, the following was delivered: 14 sets of tools, instruments, and supplies, 14 functional radio sets (## 26931, 13807, 7298, 14623, 15276, 20218, 15284, 15396, 14524, 18617, 7299, 17304, 25238, 16757). Armament with each M4A2 tank (1 76 mm cannon, 2 0.3" caliber Browning machineguns, 1 0.5" caliber Browning machinegun, 1 Thompson submachinegun), parts and tools.

The tanks are fully filled up with fuel and oil. The cooling system is filled with antifreeze. Tanks are additionally equipped with large tarps. 14 certificates were delivered along with the tanks.

Delivered: Senior Assistant to the Chief of the GBTU TU Military Acceptance Department, Engineer-Captain Davydov
Accepted: Technical Deputy to the Commander of the 27th Independent Training Tank Regiment, Engineer-Captain Dudin"



M4A2(76)W: Emcha With a Long Hand

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The Americans considered improving the firepower of the Medium Tank M4 back in September of 1941. A year later, experiments with installing the 76 mm T1 gun into the stock turret commenced. Even though the gun fit, the military was unsatisfied with this rearmament. A decision was made to equip the M4 with the turret from the Medium Tank T23, which did not enter production. This was not hard, since the turret ring diameter was the same.

Shortly before that, the M4 (known in the USSR under the nickname "Emcha") was equipped with wet ammunition racks. These modernized tanks, whose name received the suffix (76)W, went into production in January of 1944. Among them was the M4A2(76)W, the production of which began in May of 1944. The USSR received these tanks under the Lend Lease program.

Study with a time limit

Dmitriy Loza's memoirs "Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks" make it seem like the first M4A2(76)W were at the front lines in August of 1944, but that is not the case. Usually, at least several months went by between a new modification going into production and it appearing in Lend Lease shipments. The M4A2 with a 76 mm gun was no exception. Information about the upcoming arrival of Shermans armed with 76 mm guns was made available by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade on August 22nd, 1944.


The tanks with new guns arrived much later. The first vehicles of this type arrived in the Soviet Union through Iran in the second half of September of 1944. This can be seen in delivery reports for this time period. The problem was that the tanks were not fully equipped. For instance four tanks that arrived in Baku on the "Shubany" transport had no signal flags, or return springs and brass catchers for Browning M1919 machineguns.

According to the reports, these were the first M4 tanks with 76 mm guns to arrive in the USSR, at least by the southern route. It's possible that individual vehicles arrived with northern convoys, but accounting was less precise there. In any case, these tanks did not arrive in Gorkiy in September of 1944.

Overall view of the M4A2(76)W, Kubinka, November of 1944.

Fully fledged supplies began in October. On October 5th, the "Darma" transport brought 14 M4A2 tanks with 76 mm guns. The same number arrived with "Emba" on October 14th. In total, 131 M4A2 tanks were received in October, only 4 of which had a 75 mm gun. Tanks were sent to Gorkiy, where they were distributed to units. According to reports, Gorkiy military acceptance received 319 M4A2 tanks, which included tanks arriving by the northern and southern convoys in September. 279 M4A2 tanks were distributed into tank units from Gorkiy, including 203 with 76 mm guns. Later, the division between tanks with 75 and 76 mm guns disappears from documents, since supplies of M4A2 tanks with old guns ceased.

The same tank from the front.

The new tank was not only awaited by the military, but by specialists from the NIBT Proving Grounds. By the middle of September, the Red Army GBTU received more precise information about the 76 mm guns that could be installed in the M4A2: the M1A1 and M1A2. Overall, the guns were identical, except for the rifling angle. In the M1A1, it was equal to 40 calibers, but the M1A2 had it at 32 calibers.

On September 20th, the trials program of the "76 mm gun installed on the American M4A2 tank" was completed. According to it, the muzzle velocity of the shell and other data would be obtained. 182 shots were planned, 131 with armour piercing shells and 51 with HE shells. The plan also included studying the compatibility of ammunition for the gun of the M4A2 and the GMC T70, which was tested at the proving grounds prior to that. The ability to use domestic ammunition was also tested, with an emphasis on subcaliber and HEAT ammunition. 5 days were allotted for trials.

Another tank was sent to the Gorohovets Artillery Proving Grounds.

The testers had to wait for weeks for a tank to be assigned to them. The tank with registration number U.S.A. 3080832 was only selected for the NIBT Proving Grounds by the Gorkiy Military Acceptance on October 7th. This was only the beginning of problems with initial plans. Instead of testing the gun, the proving grounds specialists were given a different task: the composition of a technical description of the new tank. It was ready by November 14th, 1944.

According to the specialists, this was the fourth modification of the tank. The second variant was the M4A2 with a telescopic sight, "wet" crankcases, applique armour on the sides, a new oil filter, and ammunition capacity reduced to 85 rounds. The testers estimated that these tanks were received by the USSR closer towards the end of 1943. The third modification, according to the description, was the M4A2(75) with an altered hull, but without a wet ammo rack, which was introduced later.

This vehicle had improved T54E1 track links.

The description was not very in-depth, which led to a scandal in December of 1944. A number of mistakes were made, including ones connected with the parking brake. The thickness of additional armour on the sides was evaluated as 25 mm instead of 38 mm. The purpose of the armour was also incorrectly stated: it was there to protect the crew, as well as the ammunition. The proving grounds staff also missed the fact that the turret basket was gone. The overall verdict was that the technical description had to be composed anew.

Same, from the rear.

Study of the new tank was not going according to plan. Instead of Kubinka, the task was assigned to the Gorohovets ANIOP. A new tank with registration number U.S.A. 3081179 was also sent there. Gunnery trials were not performed, since it was clear that there was not much of a difference between the guns used on the M4A2, GMC M10, and GMC T70. A technical description of the gun was composed, as well as a guide with differences in its service.

It's worth mentioning that the tank that arrived at the ANIOP was somewhat different from the one that arrived in Kubinka. The former had T54E1 track links, with chevron type cleats. The second one had the earlier T49 track links, with three bar cleats per track link.

More than a new gun

The dismissive reaction on behalf of the NIBT Proving Grounds staff was caused by an overload with work. They had to simultaneously study and test a large number of vehicles. Suffice it to say that trials of the British Cromwell IV and German Tiger II were going on at the same time. Romanian and Hungarian tanks were also being studied. Compared to this, the description of the M4A2 with a 76 mm gun (as it was often called in the report, "M4A2-76 mm") was routine.

Arrows point to spare track link holders.

Another piece of evidence was the length of the second study of the tank, which lasted from early 1945 to the end of July. By the time that trials were coming to and end, superior M4A2E8 tanks began arriving in the USSR. The lengthy trials were connected with the fact that instructions were given from the top to perform a full set of reliability trials. The tank would not just be studied, but thoroughly tested. Such a radical change in requirements had a reason behind it: the mass of the tank increased from 30.9 tons to 34.1, which had to have an impact on mobility and reliability.

The AA machinegun is stowed for travel.

The GBTU was interested in other aspects of the tank, in addition to its increased mass. As with the T-34-85, the tank was not simply an old tank with a new gun. The tank had a completely new turret, which had a number of features aside from its increased size. For example, the D82183 commander's cupola interested the specialists so much, that a separate report was prepared about it in late December of 1944. Each observation device provided 145 degrees of horizontal range and 90 degrees of vertical range. The conclusion of the report illustrates how much Soviet specialists like the cupola.

"1. Recommend the installation of the commander's cupola of the modernized American M4A2 tank into domestic tanks, as it is the most suitable for modern tactical-technical requirements for commander's cupolas on tanks.
2. The inner and outer dimensions of the cupola allow it to be used on T-34 and IS tanks."

Even though the cupola did not directly migrate to our tanks, its design had an impact on domestic tank design. This is especially true of the observation devices, which granted good visibility. One prototype of the IS-7 used an almost direct copy, they were also used on the BTR-152.

The cupola that so interested GBTU specialists.

The overall visibility from the modernized American tank was good. In addition to two periscopes installed in the roof of the driver's compartment, there as also another periscope in the hatches of the driver and assistant driver. The dead zone when looking forward was only 6 meters, which is not a lot for a tank. In addition, the seats could be elevated, and the driver could look out of his hatch while driving. The gunner and loader, also equipped with observation devices, could also see well.

Visibility diagram of the tank.

The layout of ammunition inside of the tank was also given a thorough description. The ammunition capacity decreased to 71 shells. Of them, six were located in a rack on the floor, and were used up first. The rest of the ammunition was stored in cassettes underneath the turret floor. On the right side, 35 rounds were held in slanted cassettes of 5 each, and it was easier for the assistant driver to reach them. Another 30 rounds were stored to the left, the loader's main rack. The ammunition racks were called "wet" because there were special containers in between the racks, filled with water in the summer and antifreeze in the winter. This reduced the odds of ammunition detonation when hit by an enemy shell.

Ammunition rack next to the assistant driver.

The NIBT specialists had split opinions about the rack. On one hand, moving the ammunition from the sides of the fighting compartment to the floor, as well as the wet ammo rack, made it less vulnerable to enemy shells. The racks were also simple and more convenient to use. On the other hand, it became very difficult to use the racks at certain turret positions, and the assistant driver had to be distracted from his job to help load from the right racks.

Either way, this rack forced the American engineers to discard the turret basket. This was an advantage, since the sides of the basket could serve as a deadly trap for crewmen that were unable to get out of a knocked out tank. The testers considered this an advantage of the new design.

Ammunition storage diagram.

As mentioned above, the tank's trials program was changed significantly. This was caused by the fact that the GBTU decided to test the reliability of the tank, claimed by the manufacturer at 300 engine-hours or 2000 km. The trials would span for 3000 km, 100 on a highway, 1700 on dirt roads in winter conditions, and the remaining 1200 on dirt roads in the summer.

The trials also measured the top speed of the tank, pegged at 51.4 kph, or even more than the claimed top speed (48 kph). To compare, the M4A2 on rubber-metallic tracks reached 50 kph in the summer of 1943. The average speed of the tank on a highway was 26 kph, and the fuel expenditure was 330 L per 100 km. This was twice as much as a regular M4A2, but it could be explained by difficult road conditions. That also explained the low average speed, which was 39.7 kph on a regular M4A2.

This explanation is confirmed by the data gathered on dirt roads. For the M4A2, the average speed was 20 kph and fuel consumption was 246 L in the summer. In the winter, this was 22.4 kph and 268 L, respectively. As for the M4A2(76)W, its average speed was 19.2 kph in the spring, and 15.8 kph in the winter, on a dirt road covered in up to 0.8 m of snow. Considering the terrain, this is decent performance. Fuel expenditure was 371 L for 100 km in the winter, and 410 L in the spring. As you can see, there was not much difference between the highway and dirt road.

The trials program also included climbing hills. In the winter, a 22 degree slope stopped the American tank. In the summer, it managed to climb a 26 degree slope. The tank could drive while tilted up to 12 degrees in the winter, and 20 degrees in the summer. The limiting factor was often the T49 track links, which did not grip the ground well. The double differential turning mechanism also resulted in slipping. Trials in towing a T-34-85 showed that the M4A2(76)W could tow it in second or third gear with an average speed of 9.5 kph, but the fuel consumption increased to 490 L per 100 km.

Climbing trials.

The reliability of the tank was in line with the claimed values. However, trials did not go without incident. The right engine broke down on the 949th kilometer. This happened because the engine was heavily tasked: the tank was driving along a dirt road covered with heavy snow. The second engine worked for 2126 km, after which it needed minor repairs. The suspension also had problems. Road wheel rims began breaking up starting with the 1339th kilometer, mainly the ones in the rear part of the tank. The track links were much more reliable: it took until 3120 km before tearing became common. The drive sprocket crowns and springs also needed replacing.

Road wheels with peeled off rims.

Overall, the trials showed that the American tank's reliability was not any worse after modernization, with the exception of some suspension elements. On the other hand, the more powerful gun radically increased the effectiveness of the new tank on the battlefield. To compare, the 75 mm gun could penetrate the side of a Tiger tank from 500 meters. The improved gun could do it from 2.5 km. Improved visibility also helped. Gunnery trials showed that the gun has high precision and accuracy. The testers also liked the hydraulic turret traverse. The gyroscopic stabilizer improved the gun's precision on the move at a speed of 15 kph by 2 times, and 5-6 times at a speed of 25 kph. The modernization was a success.

Workhorse of the last year of the war

Even though real supplies of M4A2(76)W tanks only began on October of 1944, this tank was the most numerous type supplied under the Lend Lease program. According to American data, 2095 tanks with 76 mm guns were sent to the USSR, a little higher than half of all M4A2 tanks sent, and more than 2/3 of all M4A2(76)W tanks. However, this number includes M4A2E8 tanks, which began arriving in April of 1945. They deserve a separate article.

Knocked out M4A2(76)W on the grave of Major I.E. Lagutin, the commander of the 116th Tank Brigade. Chojnice, 1945.

The first Soviet unit to receive the new tanks was the 27th Independent Tank Training Regiment, located in Baku. It encountered the same issue that units with M10 tank destroyers: a shortage of shells. A telegram sent on September 30th, 1944 by the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Vylegzhanin, demanded shells for his tanks. On October 28th, the regiment received 19,277 HE and 6952 AP shells. Clearly, this was not enough to solve the issues, since another large order followed in December. Each tank needed 10 ammunition loads, 80% of which must be HE. It was noted that there were no reserves at the front or in warehouses.

It's possible that this was the real cause for investigating the possibility of using domestic ammunition. The shortage caused the removal of gunnery trials from the trials program. The issue was solved quickly, and 33,920 shells were shipped to Murmansk in December, 22,044 HE and 11,876 AP.

Tanks from the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps were the first to enter Vienna.

There were also instances of not fully equipped tanks. For example, 10 tanks that arrived in Gorkiy had to be equipped with Soviet radio stations. Another 8 tanks came in November with no sights. These incomplete deliveries happened in December, and in 1945. A frequent defect was the breakdown of the lock on the driver and assistant driver's hatches. 4 cases of wounds due to this breakdown were recorded in Baku.

Another issue was rather unusual. Due to the long barrel, the gun was turned backwards 180 degrees during transport. There was no rear travel lock, which caused the elevation mechanism gears to break.

A known issue of the M4A2 was the poor traction between the tracks and the ground. This issue cropped up more often in the winter. For this reason, tanks that went through the 27th training regiment received additional cleats, welded onto every fifth track link. This modernization was applied starting in November of 1944.

Tanks from the 9th Mechanized Corps enter Brno.

The first 76 mm M4A2s were sent to the 1st Mechanized Corps. The deliveries began in October and continued into November. The corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General S.M. Krivoshein, was a part of the 2nd Tank Army (starting with November 20th, 2nd Guards Tank Army) of the 1st Belorussian Front. By the start of the Vistula-Oder offensive, the 1st MC had 175 M4A2 tanks, all in working order. The measures taken to equip units with ammunition had an effect: on average, there were 1.5 ammunition loads available per tank.


The 8th Guards Tanks Corps, a part of the 2nd Belorussian Front, had even more M4A2s. As of January 14th, 1945, it had 185 of these tanks. The tanks were also a part of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. All of these units retained "ordinary" M4A2 tanks with 75 mm guns.

A tank from the 219th Guards Tank Brigade, 1st Mechanized Corps. It carries the characteristic markings of the 1st MC on the side. Berlin, April 1945.

New American tanks took an active part in the fighting of winter-spring of 1945. The fact that these battles happened in much better road conditions was a definite plus. In situations where it wasn't necessary to drive through snowbanks or mud, the high reliability of American tanks made a difference.

The tanks of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps were the first to enter Vienna. M4A2 tanks from the 1st Mechanized Corps also played an important part, encircling the ring around Berlin from the northwest. American tanks also took part in the liberation of Prague. The 9th Guards Mechanized Corps excelled here. The war was not over for the tanks in this unit, as the M4A2 tanks from 9th Guards MC fought against Japan.

M4A2(76)W tanks in China. American tanks took an active part in the defeat of the Kwantung Army.

The M4A2(76)W was the best tank out of all of those that were delivered to the USSR in large numbers under the Lend Lease program. Its characteristics were comparable to those of the T-34-85, making it a very modern tank.

Unfortunately, time did not spare them, and until recently, not a single complete tank of this type was known. However, misfortune sometimes turns to fortune. On March 20th, 1945, a German torpedo fired by U-968 sank the SS Thomas Donaldson, a part of convoy JW-65. It sank near the island of Kildin, just a little bit short of Murmansk. The transport sank at a small depth, only 60 meters. In 2014, the first M4A2(76) was recovered, and another tank was recovered in 2016. These are likely not the last tanks to come from SS Thomas Donaldson.

KV-1 Transmission Upgrade

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"Transmission for the KV tank with a preselector gearbox

Variant 1

The main clutch, gearbox, both final drives, brakes, and the lines to these components are removed. Instead, two identical Wilson type gearboxes with preselectors are installed symmetrically in the transmission compartment on each side (photo #2).

Photo #2. Transmission diagram, variant 1.


These components fit into the same dimensions as the mechanisms that are removed and do not require any changes to the hull (see layout on photo #2a).

Photo #2a: Transmission component layout, variant 1.

Variant 2

The main clutch, gearbox, final drive, and brakes are removed.

Instead, a preselector Wilson type gearbox is installed, analogous to the Matilda tank gearbox, and a two-stage planetary gearbox turning mechanism joined to the final drives. The layout is shown on photo #8a.

Photo #8a. Transmission component layout, variant 2.

The kinematic diagram of the gearbox is shown on photo #8. Photo #9 shows a diagram of each kinematic block and the calculation of the gear ratios.

Photo #8, 

Photo #9. 

Stuart Hero

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"Award Order 
  1. Name: Pavkin, Aleksandr Yakovlevich
  2. Rank: Lieutenant
  3. Position, unit: company commander in the 75th Independent Tank Battalion
    is nominated for the Order of Lenin.
  1. Year of birth: 1921
  2. Nationality: Russian
  3. In the Red Army since: 1939
  4. Party affiliation: VKP(b) member
  5. Participation in battles: Southern Front, Transcaucasian Front, 1942
  6. Wounds and contusions: twice lightly wounded
  7. Previous awards: none, but was nominated.
Brief and specific summary of personal heroism or achievements: On September 9th, 1942, the battalion fought the enemy at Kizlyar. Lieutenant Pavkin, with three M3 tanks, fought in the direction from Razdolnoye to Kizlyar. During the battle, he destroyed or damaged 8 field guns, 2 AT guns, 2 mortars, 9 anti-tank rifles, and dispersed up to a battalion of enemy infantry, dealing the enemy significant losses. His platoon ensured the advance of our infantry, which forced the enemy to fall back to a new line of defense. In the evening of September 11th, 1942, two M3 tanks under the command of Lieutenant Pavkin were sent on a reconnaissance mission to the north-eastern outskirts of Western Malgobek. When 16 enemy tanks appeared, Pavkin's tanks knocked out 11, forcing the rest to turn back. Pavkin personally knocked out 7 enemy tanks. 

After that column, another column of over 40 tanks was sent. Heavy and medium tanks from the 52nd TBr came to his aid and, having lost 20 tanks, the second column was forced to retreat. Lieutenant Pavkin was wounded, in a disabled tank, but continued to fight and participated in pushing back the second enemy tank column.

Commander of the 75th OTB, Major [signature]
Military Commissar of the 75th OTB, Senior Politruk [signature]"

Bulletproof Vests

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"GOKO decree #6949
November 16th, 1944
  1. Permit the NKTP to produce parts for 2000 bulletproof vests at factory #50 using 2.6 mm thick 30-35 HGSA steel.
  2. The People's Commissariat of Light Manufacturing must sew together the plates and deliver the bulletproof vests to the GBTU before November 30th, 1944.
  3. The GBTU (comrade Fedorenko) must test the bulletproof vests in the army before January 20th, 1945, and report to the GOKO with conclusions regarding the need of mass production.

Report date
Completion of the decree
December 1st, 1944
Armoured components will be ready at factory #50 on December 15th and delivered to the People’s Commissariat of Light Manufacturing for sewing.
January 1st, 1945
The armoured components did not pass trials. The NKTP did not complete the GOKO’s decree in time, and comrade Beria was informed in letter #525102 sent on December 12th, 1944.
As of December 23rd, 1944, only 37 sets were delivered to the Sverdlovsk People’s Commissariat of Light Manufacturing.
February 1st, 1945
920 sets of bulletproof plates were made by January 28th, 1945. 1300 units were expected. Sewing is going slowly. Only 200 units were sewn.
March 1st, 1945
An experimental batch of 1400 units was finished. A transport was ordered for March 4th, 1945, to take them to the Self Propelled Artillery Training Center. The vests will be sent to the front lines from the training center.
April 1st, 1945
1404 bulletproof vests were finished and sent to the Self Propelled Artillery Training Center.
May 1st, 1945
The bulletproof vests were sent to the Belorussian and Ukrainian tank camps, as well as the Self Propelled Artillery Training Center (Pushkino). Currently, the vests are located in the specified camps.
Officers were sent out to observe the vests in combat conditions. Due to completion of the war, it is unlikely that the bulletproof vests will be sent to the army.

Trials and Tribulations

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"...execution of complete trials was impossible for the following reasons:
  1. NIPSVO does not have a T-38, for which comrade Polyubin's mount was built (feed system, ammunition racks, toolkit, etc).
  2. The provided 7.62 mm modernized tank machinegun mod. 1940 was very worn out, the logbook and toolkit were missing. By the time the shortened trials program was completed, the machinegun was inoperative.
  3. Comparison of the TP and TP-1 sight and subsequent choice of the superior model (as per your instruction) was impossible, since only the TP sight arrived."
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