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Heavy Tank from Pennsylvania

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The American army had the largest fleet of heavy tanks in the world at the start of the 1930s. Unfortunately, these were obsolete Mark VIII tanks, also known as "Liberty". They were built to British specifications using experience learned from the First World War, but these tanks came too late to fight. No heavy tanks were built in the US after the war was over. Work on this topic only resumed after the start of WWII. The result was the Heavy Tank M6, the first truly domestic heavy tank design.
Blank slate

The lack of a heavy tank in the American army had a simple cause. The army had no need of such a vehicle. This can be clearly seen by tracing the evolution of American tanks in the interbellum period. The country's large territory necessitated the creation of quick fighting machines that could cover large ground quickly. A heavy tank is ill-suited for such a task. The main task of heavy tanks is to break through prepared and well defended fortifications, which were entirely absent from the North American theater of war. It's not surprising that no work was done on heavy tanks until the late 1930s, barring individual proposals, which were rejected in early stages.

One of the many heavy tank projects that popped up in the US before and after the start of WWII. No one took them seriously until September of 1939.

The situation started changing with the start of WWII. The American army brass understood that the US will be drawn into the war, sooner or later. The European theater of war was very different from North America, and it meant that a breakthrough tank was now necessary. The British and French hurriedly designed new types of heavy tanks. The Americans joined them on September 27th, 1939. However, the Aberdeen Proving Grounds staff were phoning it in for the first six months.

The situation began to change in May of 1940, when the front in Western Europe erupted with activity. On May 20th, 1940, General Lynch, the commander of American infantry, initiated work on a heavy tank. A tank weighing 50-80 short tons (45-73 metic tons) was required. On May 22nd, the Ordnance Committee altered the requirements, deeming that a 50 ton tank would be enough.

The project seemed quite odd initially. Even though nothing but a textual description remains, it is clear that the Americans did not seek any shortcuts. The tank would have 4 turrets. Two main turrets, armed with 75 mm T7 (M2) cannons, each had 270 degrees of range. Two auxiliary turrets had all-round coverage. One was armed with a 37 mm M5 gun and a Browning M1919 coaxial machinegun, the other had a 20 mm autocannon and a coaxial machinegun. Each turret had powered traverse. In addition to the aforementioned armament, the tank also had 4 machineguns in ball mounts.

Despite significant mass, the tank would be very compact and have high mobility. The length of the tank was 7.5 meters, the width was 3.4 meters, and the height was 2.76 meters. The top speed was rated at 40 kph, at the level of the Medium Tank M2. The thickness of the armour was 76 mm on the front and 64 mm on the sides.

The first requirements for a heavy tank. As you can see, this concept differs radically from what was finally built.

Colonel Barnes, the head of the technical department of artillery at the time, headed the project. On June 4th, he proposed an alternative location of armament. The tank would have one turret with a 75 mm cannon, and two more turrets would have 37 mm cannons and machineguns. Barnes also highlighted the requirement that the tank needed to fit into the dimension restrictions of railroads. On June 17th, Barnes raised the issue that development of a superheavy 80-90 ton tank might be required soon, but it was never mentioned again. General Lynch shared Barnes' scepticism regarding excess turrets. In a letter written on June 20th, 1940, he reasonably stated that every extra turret is extra mass.

Meanwhile, Barnes was solving more pressing issues. The heavy tank issue had a high priority, and the project had to go from theory to practice. Negotiations with General Electric began on July 11th, 1940. The industrial giant proposed to take on the development work, especially since they had a subsidiary in Erie, Pennsylvania, which produced locomotives and train cars. The military declined this offer, but General Electric still took part in the development. It began to work on an electric transmission. These designs had nothing to do with Ferdinand Porsche and his Typ 100. By 1940, General Electric had dozens of transmissions for various vehicles.

Barnes met with representatives of Marmon-Herrington and Schneider Hydraulic Corporation on July 15th. He offered them a project of a torque converter for medium and heavy tanks. On the same day, he met with representatives of the Baldwin Locomotive Works from Eddiston, Pennsylvania. This company ended up receiving the contract for development and production of a heavy tank.

General Barnes (center) and representatives from American factories involved in the Heavy Tank T1 program inspecting a model of the tank.

Development of the American heavy tank was going at full speed starting with the end of July of 1940. Design work at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds continued, and other companies join in gradually. Spicer received the order for a hydraulic gearbox, which would be an alternative for an electric transmission. The question of whether or not a mechanical gearbox should be used is reaised. In August, General Motors demonstrated its GM Hydra-Matic automatic gearbox. Work on various variants of the tank continued.

The final configuration of the Heavy Tank T1. This exact model was never built.

The Americans quickly decided that it was pointless to have a multi-turreted tank with armament equal to that of a medium tank. As a result, the vehicle, indexed Heavy Tank T1 on August 22nd, 1940, slowly changed form. BLW's work was slowed down by the indecision regarding the type of transmission on behalf of their customer.

Hydra-Matic gearbox that would have been used in the Heavy Tank T1.

A meeting was held on September 17th to discuss the developments by General Electric. The cost of development of an electric transmission was estimated at $145,000. A choice between three torque converers, the Schneider, Brog Warner, or General Motors, also had to be made. Another alternative was the Oldsmobile automatic gearbox. A choice had to be made from two gearboxes, one of which cost $125,000 to develop, the other $150,000. A demonstration of the model of the Heavy Tank T1 was scheduled on that same day. It was only partially ready, since the type of transmission still was not decided upon. General Electric did not give up, but the Oldsmobile design slowly gained favour. One of the reasons was that the electric transmission was heavier.

Transmission assembly that was used on the Heavy Tank T1E2. A T-16001 torque converter is shown in one unit with a Timken gearbox.

A contract with Oldsmobile for $150,000 to develop the Hydra-Matic gearbox was signed. The choice of gearbox was made, at least for a while. On the same day the Ordnance Committee changed their requirements for the Heavy Tank T1. The mass remained the same, the length was reduced, the crew was set at 6-7 men. The biggest change was the number of turrets. The potential analogue to the Soviet T-35 was gone. Instead, the tank had one turret, which would house the T9 76 mm gun and a coaxial 37 mm M5E1 gun. The T9 was based on the 76 mm AA gun, and so the armament was appropriate for a heavy tank. A vertical stabilizer was proposed.

The rear of the turret housed a Browning M2HB AA machinegun. A Browning M1919 machinegun in the commander's cupola, similar to the one used on the Medium Tank M3, was also supposed to help against aircraft. Four more machineguns (2 Browning M2HB and 2 Browning M1919) were installed in the front of the hull.

Wright G-200 Model 781C9GC1 engine used by the Heavy Tank T1 family.

As it turned out, it was too early for Oldsmobile to celebrate a victory. Barnes, now a Brigadier General, gave an order to develop a mechanical gearbox on December 23rd, 1940. Its creator was the Timken company from Detroit. The electric transmission was also not yet buried. A decision to install a General Motors electric transmission on the Heavy Tank T1E1 was made on February 13th, 1941.

The Heavy Tank T1E2 with a Timken gearbox and T-16001 torque converted was approved on April 15th. All of the above tanks would be equipped with a Wright G-200 Model 781C9GC1 engine, which had a maximum power of 960 hp.

Horizontal volute spring suspension.

The new heavy tank was noticeably different than any existing American tank. The only similar component was the suspension bogeys, but even they had a horizontal placement of the volute springs. The track links were similar, but significantly wider. The transmission was in the rear of the tank, and the turret was as far forward as possible. The idlers were put as far forward and as high up as possible to improve obstacle the crossing ability of the tank. Skirt armour was added to protect the suspension. Various changes meant that the tank's mass was higher than expected and reached 57 short tons (52 metric tons).

Heavy Tank T1E2 as of September 19th, 1941.

The T1 program was on schedule by the summer of 1941. The country's military brass were optimistic about heavy tank development. The British were also interested. Michael Devar, the head of the British tank mission, stated that Britain was prepared to order 500 such vehicles via the Lend Lease program if the development was a success. However, the assembly of the experimental Heavy Tank T1 was late. The tank was still lacking its T9 cannon on August 19th. The Heavy Tank T1E2 variant was assembled, as the Hydra-Matic transmission never arrived.

The prototype took its first steps on August 21st. The testers remarked on how easy it was to control. Unfortunately, the gearbox broke during the first trials. Defects with the differential were also spotted.

The same vehicle from the rear. A massive muffler can be seen.

The issues were corrected by September 10th, and the tank set out once again. A top speed of 38 kph was achieved. Overheating of the brakes was noticed. The vehicle performed well in off-road driving trials. The issue of mass production was raised in light of these successes. Production of 50 tanks for the American army and 50 for the British was planned. Work on the electric transmission would continue in parallel. The Heavy Tank T1 program was not cheap. It cost $750,000 by October 31st, 1941.

An official presentation of the Heavy Tank T1E2 at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, December 8th, 1941.

November was full of changes to the Heavy Tank T1. An official demonstration of the T1E2 was only scheduled on December 8th, and even that was after enormous pressure from above. This happened on the next day after the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the new tank immediately became a popular subject for the press. The vehicle was not yet in service with the army, but it was already fighting on the ideological front. Development continued, including the Heavy Tank T1E1. Work on the electric transmission was never stopped, since it had its advantages.

Improved Heavy Tank T1E2, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, late February 1942.

In late January of 1942, after more than a month of trials, the Heavy Tank T1E2 returned to the Baldwin Locomotive Works. The vehicle underwent some serious changes. The biggest change was in the exhaust system. The designers removed the massive muffler and replaced it with a smaller one, hidden inside the hull. There were other changes. The brakes were replaced with an improved variant, developed by the Budd company. Another change, rejected in its infancy, was the armament. A proposal was made by the British on February 17th to install a 17-pounder gun. Barns rejected this proposal, since the tank already had a 76 mm gun.

Work on the Hydra-Matic suspension restarted in February. However, all that meant was that it was eventually delivered to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The gearbox was never installed in a tank.

The reworked rear is visible.

The Heavy Tank T1E2 had a different fate in store for it. Trials, which continued at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds after February of 1942, went well. The modernized vehicle was accepted into service on April 13th, 1942. It would be logical to expect the standardized index to be Heavy Tank M1, but the Ordnance Committee decided otherwise. The tank was named Heavy Tank M6. There were already several M1 tanks, and the addition of another one would introduce confusion. The Heavy Tank M6 was preceded by the Light Tank M5 and succeeded by the Medium Tank M7.

A variety of hulls and transmissions

The tank was not simply renamed when it became the M6. Knowing that mass production might have issues, especially when it came to hulls and transmissions, the Ordnance Department decided to add some variety to the Heavy Tank T1 family. The Heavy Tank T1E3 with a welded hull was introduced. It did not differ from the T1E2 in any other way, and was thus immediately accepted into service as the Heavy Tank M6A1. This happened before a prototype was even built. This was not enough, and another vehicle appeared at this time, the Heavy Tank T1E4. It would be equipped with a quad GM 6-71 engine and a Hydra-Matic gearbox. This tank would also have a welded hull. This variant did not exist for long, and it was cancelled on July 11th, 1942. The Heavy Tank T1 development program was also halted on that day.

A diagram of the Heavy Tank T1E1 electric transmission.

Requirements for the heavy tanks were changed once again shortly before that, on April 13th. Their mass was now estimated at 60 short tons (54 metric tons). The armament now consisted of a 76 mm T12 and coaxial 37 mm M6 guns with a vertical stabilizer. The number of M1919 machineguns in the hull was reduced to one. The thickness of the front armour increased to 127 mm, and the top speed of the tank was reduced to 37 kph. Overall, the specification was identical to the capabilities of the Heavy Tank T1E2, aside from the armour and weight.

Cutaway of the American heavy tank with an electric transmission.

The road to mass production was much longer than it was assumed when the tank was accepted into service. The Ordnance Department did not lose hope that the electric transmission would be completed. General Electric finished work on an experimental prototype of the transmission by early April. Barnes, Colonel Christmas, and other representatives of the Ordnance Department arrived in Erie on the 21st. They were shown the Heavy Tank T1E1, and the results were considered satisfactory. Assembly of the tank was completed on April 30th, and the tank arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds by May 28th.

Heavy Tank T1E1 on trials, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, May 30th, 1942.

Unlike the T1E2, the tank with an electric transmission arrived without armament. The idea in this case was just to test the transmission. The T1E1 could be visually distinguished by a larger transmission block in the rear part of the tank. The first trials caused Barnes to experience, if not outright joy, then definitely some positive emotions. In his words, this was the best performance he had ever seen. Barnes recommended the development of an electric transmission for light and medium tanks. Work on light tanks was never done, but the medium T23 reached mass production, if not standardization.

Aside from the massive transmission cover, the T1E1 also had a different engine deck.

The success with the electric transmission also piqued the interest of the British military. On June 24th, the Heavy Tank T1E1 was shown at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Its top speed was only 32 kph, but other characteristics were superior to the tank with a mechanical gearbox. It was easier for the driver to steer the tank than the driver of an ordinary light tank. The impression was somewhat soured by the breaking of a drive sprocket. The breakdown extended the trials, which continued into August and September of 1942. The Ordnance Committee was prepared to standardize the T1E1 as the Heavy Tank M6A2 in late August, but this never happened. However, the T1E1 was still considered the higher priority. A decision to build 115 tanks of this type was made on November 5th, 1942.

A production Heavy Tank T1E1.

A rather interesting situation occurred in late 1942. The American army already standardized two heavy tanks, the M6 and M6A1. The T1E1 was not standardized, but this was the preferred tank. The following decision was made in the end: the M6 and M6A1 would be sent to the British, and the T1E1 would be used in the American army.

Evolution without demand

Work on improving other members of the T1 family continued in parallel with improvements to the T1E1. A meeting was held on October 22nd, 1942, discussing the changes to the tank's armament. A proposal was made to remove the 37 mm gun and replace it with a Browning M1919 machinegun. This was a reasonable solution, as the coaxial gun already had limited performance against tanks. The two Browning M2HB machineguns in the hull would also be removed.

Production Heavy Tank M6, August 1943.

The coaxial gun was never removed, but some changes were made. The Browning M2HB AA gun in the turret was removed, since it was rather ineffective. The commander's cupola and its machinegun were also removed, replaced with a hatch from the Medium Tank M4. In case of emergency, a Browning M2HB machinegun could be mounted on the cupola. The turret was changed somewhat. The hull also changed as a result of trials. Specifically, the driver and assistant driver's hatches are different on mass produced T1 tanks. In addition, production M6 tanks had large toolboxes on teh back. Based on the attachments, they could also be installed on the T1E1.

The altered exhaust system and toolboxes.

The mass production of the M6 and T1E1 began almost simultaneously. The first vehicles were ready by the start of December of 1942. The start of production at the Baldwin Locomotive Works coincided with some sad news. Operation Torch began on November 8th. American troops landed in Morocco, with offensives towards Algiers and Tunis. Despite the fact that fighting in the first few weeks was not particularly fierce, valuable information was obtained by American soldiers, including the tankers. It turned out that two medium tanks were often more effective in a real battle than one heavy one. A 60 ton tank was hard to transport over railroads, and its top speed was low. After analyzing the results of a month of combat in North Africa, the American armoured command decided against the production of heavy tanks on December 7th, 1942.

The view from above shows how different production tanks were from the experimental one.

Despite this decision, work on the heavy tanks did not stop. Mass production was retained, although in miserly amounts. It often happened that unneeded vehicles suddenly became necessary. In addition, the German forces in Africa received their first heavy tank, the Tiger Ausf. E, in late 1942.

The question of upgunning the T1E1 with a 90 mm gun was raised on December 10th. Practical work began some time later. The issue of removing the 37 mm cannon was raised once more on December 28th, which did not prevent it from being installed on every production T1 tank. The Aberdeen Proving Grounds requested one sample of each tank for trials.

The first Heavy Tank M6A1, March 1943. This vehicle was built by Fisher Body, others were built by Baldwin Locomotive Works.

The production run size was settled on March 25th, 1943. There was no more talk of a large batch. The most numerous member of the family was the T1E1. 20 units were built. The Heavy Tank M6A1 was second, at 12 units. Only 8 Heavy Tanks M6 were built. Fisher Body delivered the first M6A1 in March of 1943, and the last T1E1 left Baldwin Locomotive Works in February of 1944. Overall, 43 T1 family tanks were built, including prototypes.

Aside from a welded hull, the M6A1 was identical to the M6.

The heavy tanks were not destined to see the front lines, but they were issued to the army. The experimental T1E2 was one of the best heavy tanks in the world when it entered trials in August of 1941. It had superior armament to the Soviet KV-1, its front turret and hull armour was thicker, and the mobility was about equal. However, the rapid development of armoured vehicles during the war resulted in a very negative evaluation in the summer of 1943. The armament did not match the size and mass of the vehicle, and there were many complaints about the crew stations and aiming system. The American tankers rejected the Timken gearbox. The overall verdict was damning: a compete redesign of the hull, fighting compartment, and transmission was needed.

On August 2nd the American armour commanders remembered their decision to not use heavy tanks. Instead, work on the T25 and T26 medium tanks would be accelerated. In order to somehow save face, the Ordnance Department offered to send 2 Heavy Tanks M6 and 6 Medium Tanks T23 to the British in November of 1943, but nothing came out of this proposal either.

90 mm T7 gun. It was later standardized as the M3.

The Ordnance Department began thinking about the disproportionately weak armament in the fall of 1942. The result was the 90 mm T7 gun. It had the ballistics of the M1 AA gun. The first T7 prototype was ready by the end of November of 1942. As mentioned above, the order to install it into a turret of the T1E1 was given on December 10th. It was carried out with great delay, only on March 10th, 1943. Firing trials that started in late March of 1943 showed that this conversion was good. The oscillations during firing were within acceptable limits. However, there were now issues with firing the coaxial 37 mm gun.

The new gun could not save the heavy tank. The idea of installing the same T7 90 mm gun into the T23 tank came up in the summer of 1943. The result was the T25 and T26. These tanks were much lower and lighter. There was no reason to develop a heavier tank with worse mobility.

A rearmed Heavy Tank T1E1 with a 90 mm gun.

Unlike the British, Soviet specialists were not permitted to get close to the heavy tank. A group of Soviet specialists managed to familiarize themselves with the M6, but information was scarce. For instance, no one mentioned the T1E1 and its electric transmission. It was mentioned that American heavy tanks have the most acceptable silhouette of all American tanks. The M6 was still too tall for Soviet engineer, however. The specialists noticed the low ground pressure and a complex torque converter. Nobody mentioned to the Soviet guests that the US Army had already given up on the tank. The tank was never observed in motion, as it was partially disassembled. Overall, the Soviet side evaluated the tank as on par with domestic designs of the same class, although a little poorly thought out.

The same vehicle from the rear. The massive transmission cover is visible.

Only one tank from the T1 family survives to this day. This is one of the production T1E1s that was sent to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds for various tests. Today it is kept in storage at Fort Lee, where a major museum is being planned.

The Americans created a very good tank. However, too much time was spent on its improvements. even worse, there was no room for a heavy tank in the American armament system by the time it was accepted into service. It's worth noting that the decision to discard heavy tanks came back to bite the Americans. When a heavy tank was needed in the summer of 1944, it did not appear out of thin air.


PzIII Battle Damage

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"SECRET
Appendix "A" to AFV Technical Report No.11 
Dated December '42
The following abbreviations have been used in the section dealing with Pz.Kw.III:
  • sa: Spaced armour
  • dfp: Driver's front plate
  • man: mantlet
  • nf: prepared but not fitted
Thus sa(nf)man means that the mantlet was prepared for spaced armour, but it was not actually fitted.
...

Type
Comments
Short gun
sadfp only
Tracks and sandbags used for extra protection, lengths of track across the nose plate and on top of turret. One strike (6-pdr or 75 mm) on left edge gun mantlet has caused general break up of armour which shows greater tendency to crack than when attacked previously by 2-pdr. The weld on the recuperator shield has broken completely where shield attached to mantlet. A heavy attack on the RH end of the mantlet has caused complete break up of the mantlet and a large piece of the mantlet had fallen into the tank. The nose plate has been penetrated on the LH end.
Short gun and no spaced armour
Tracks on the turret and nose. 1 M72 75 mm round found broken up having hit nose plate and failed to make any impression.
Short gun
sadfp & sa man
2 75 mm penetrations side plate at approx 45 degrees. Tendency for plate to flake. Plate appears to be brittle. 1 75 mm penetration side low beside driver, plate flaked and cracked.
Long gun sadfp & sa(nf)man. No side doors in hull
This was a very new tank with no apparent battle damage.
Long gun
sadfp
sa(nf)man
A large projectile (?) 88 mm has passed through OS just below side escape door and failed. Plate shows lamination. Projectile has emerged through NS side plat which has flaked badly on outside and cracked. The space between the spaced armour and dfp was filled with track pins.
Long gun
No spaced armour
1 6-pdr penetration above driver’s visor. Plate has failed poorly, the hole being square. Several 75 mm penetrations through tail plate.
Long gun
No spaced armour
1 75 mm penetration lower nose plate
1 75 mm penetration above driver’s visor
Long gun
sadfp & sa(nf)man
Demolished
Long gun
sadfp & sa(nf)man
2 penetrations at approximately 35 degrees through driver’s spaced armour, but not through main plate.
1 penetration side turret.
1 penetration side fighting chamber.
This tank was “dug in”.
Short gun
No spaced armour
Graze on top edge of nose plate. Weld has cracked along centre for entire length.
Long gun
sadfp sa man complete
Demolished
Long gun
No spaced armour
1 75 mm penetration nose plate
1 75 mm failed to penetrate nose plate
Short gun
sadfp sa man
Both tracks missing. No other battle damage.

T-60's Future

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"Minutes of a technical meeting discussing factory #37's proposal to equip the T-60 tank with a new turret with a 45 mm tank gun and thicker front armour

Present: regimental commissar comrade Vorovbyev, Engineer-Colonels comrades Alymov and Pavlov, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonels comrades Rogachev, Kovalev, Nenarokov, and Solonin

Presenting: telephone message from Engineer-Colonel comrade Afonin containing factory #37's proposal.

Complaints: comrade Pavlov claims that the increase in the tank's mass will reduce the performance of the already strained transmission of the tank. The torque will be insufficient and the off-road performance will be insufficient.

Comrade Rogachev: an analogous variant was designed at factory #92 (comrade Grabin), and was rejected since the mass of the tank increased. As a result, the tank ends up with poor stability when firing the 45 mm gun. The armour of the proposed tank is less than that of the T-70.

Comrade Solonin: the T-60 is used on the front lines chiefly as to guard the HQ, since it has poor off-road performance. The proposal of factory #37 will result in a decrease of production of the T-70, a superior tank. It is pointless to perform trials of such a tank. The engine will be overloaded and will overheat.

Comrade Kovalev: The proposed T-60 tank has weaker armour than the T-70, and has inferior engine power, and therefore inferior mobility and average speed. There are serious concerns about the performance of the tank's components: the transmission and suspension. The engine temperature is already too high, and it will be raised even higher.

Comrade Nenarokov: the requirements for the gun are the same as on the T-70.

Comrade Alymov: All engineers have a negative opinion of the vehicle, and I will join in. The T-60's engine overheats in the summer. If the vehicle is overloaded, this will exacerbate the issue. Let us build an existing vehicle: the T-60 or T-70.

It was established that:
  1. The proposed T-60 tank with a 45 mm gun and reinforced front armour is inferior to the T-70 in armour, engine power, top speed, and mobility.
  2. Due to the increase in the T-60's weight, the already strained components (engine, transmission, suspension) will be strained even further.
The meeting considers trials of this tank to be senseless.
[Signatures]
May 10th, 1942" 

PzIV Ausf. H Intel

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"Report on new types of tanks and SPGs according to reports by prisoners of war and armoured staff reports as of July 20th [1943]
...
  1. The suspension, engine, and transmission of the modernized T-4 tank are the same as the regular tank of this type.
  2. The hull has the following changes:
    1. The front of the tank has the following applique armour:
      1. The lower front plate and sloped front plate are protected by track links, held onto the armour by clamps or bolts. The upper front plate of the tank is protected by a 20 mm thick armoured plate, positioned about 200 mm in front of the main armour, and attached by welding.
        As such, the T-4 tank uses spaced armour.
      2. The sides of the tank are protected by 4-4.2 mm thick plates, four plates per side. Each plate hangs on three carriers, bolted to the side of the tank and the fenders. The bent ends of the carriers fit into slots of the 8 plates, and are additionally attached by one bolt that is screwed into a bracket welded to the upper carrier.
        The side plates are made up of very soft armour or iron. The edges are cleanly finished. The plates hang outside of the suspension, about 500 mm away from the sides.
      3. The tank turret is protected in a similar way (aside from the gun mantlet) with 8 mm thick armoured plates, affixed to carriers, which are welded to the turret. The spacing between the plates and the main turret armour is 380-480 mm. The rear of the turret (and the stowage box) is protected by 4-4.2 mm thick plates, similarly affixed to the turret armour with the same spacing.
        Like the side armour, the material is either very soft armour plate or iron. The edges are also cleanly finished.
      4. The rear of the hull has no applique armour."

Kalashnikov Acceptance

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"Order of the Red Banner Scientific Research Small Arms and Mortar Proving Grounds of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Armed Forces (NIPSMVO GAU VS)

January 15th, 1948
Shurovo, Moscow oblast

Report #374
On the issue of: trials of 7.62 mm assault rifles using the mod. 1943 cartridge designed by: Kalashnikov, Bulkin (TsKB-14) and KB-2-MV.

Annotations: The 7.62 mm assault rifles designed by Kalashnikov, Bulkin, and KB-2 (Dementyev) to use the mod. 1943 round were built according to specifications #3131 issued in 1945 and were presented for proving grounds trials a second time, after improvements recommended by the GAU NIPSMVO and GAU USV, based on the results of the first trials (see NIPSMVO report #232-1947).

The overall view of the assault rifles can be seen in the photos.


Kalashnikov assault rifle #2. Seen from the right.

Bulkin's assault rifle. Seen from the right.

KB-2 assault rifle #6. Seen from the right.

The rest of the scans repeat the excerpts I posted before, but there's more in the summary text. According to the inspection of the prototypes, Kalashnikov did more to improve his design than his competition. Out of all the drawbacks noted by the commission, all but three were corrected. Bulkin left 5 uncorrected drawbacks, and Dementyev left 10.

Firing in single shot, all prototypes satisfied the requirements. In short bursts from a bench, the Kalashnikov and Dementyev designs were equivalent in precision to the PPSh, and only Bulkin's design was superior. Firing while unsupported, all prototypes were superior to the PPSh in single shot and inferior to it in burst fire.

Kalashnikov's design, however, was much more reliable. After firing 15,000 rounds, the two AK prototypes had 0.06% misfires and two breakdowns between them, while both of Bulkin's prototypes had to be taken off trials due to 6-7 broken parts per rifle after only 6000 rounds, with 0.39% and 0.7% misfires. Dementyev's rifles also failed to meet the requirements, breaking down after 12,000-14,000 rounds fired with 0.25%-0.33% misfires and 7-10 broken parts per rifle.

The Winding Road to Nowhere

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The French were the first to master the production of SPGs. These vehicles missed WWI by only a few months. Enthusiasm for SPGs died down after the war ended, and France only returned to this topic in the 1930s. This article tells the story of French SPGs built on medium tank chassis, specifically the SOMUA SAu 40, which nearly made it into production.
From a support vehicle to a tank destroyer

Émile Rimailho, the head designer of Compagnie des Forges et Acieries de la Marine et d'Homecourt (FAMH), was one of the forefathers of French self propelled artillery. He was the creator of the "mobile gun mount" concept that was used in a number of vehicles that made it into mass production. They are known as Saint-Chamond, in honour of the city where the company was located.

Tanks designed and produced by the FAMH company also had this name. Their distinguishing feature was an electric transmission. Rimailho's SPGs were even more interesting. The SPG's electric motors was powered by a prime mover ahead of it, which also acted as a munitions carrier. Porsche's famous tanks with an electric transmission would not be built until more than two decades later!

A patent for Emile Rimailho's SPG dated 1921. The designer later used this concept for a light cavalry support SPG.

The end of WWI was a hit French military industry. The French army was not interested in a large order of Saint-Chamond SPGs, and the manufacturer had to hope for foreign orders. Several empires collapsed as a result of the war, and turned into a number of independent states. Local conflicts weren't something unusual, and even the difficult economic situation in the world was not an obstacle for growing arsenals.

However, a large number of surplus weapons flooded the market, which made the life of weapons manufacturers difficult. Nevertheless, several companies, including FAMH, were developing new types of armoured vehicles. These vehicles were aimed at the export market, since the French army had plenty left over from the war. The army itself was selling off its surplus, which made life difficult for domestic manufacturers.

Canon de Cavalerie automoteur de 75 Saint-Chamond Modele 1924

One of FAMH's humble successes was the convertible drive Saint-Chamond Modele 1921 Chenillette tankette. This vehicle was built to Rimailho's vision of 3-ton tankettes, which were ordered by the French army. The army's interest in these tankettes was temporary. Marshal Petain published a letter about the necessity of such vehicles in March of 1919, but the French military took no steps to obtain them until the end of the 1920s. As such, FAMH was aiming to export their vehicles. The Japanese bought one tankette, the Poles were interested, and Spain bought a whopping seven units. This was the first success of the French interbellum arms export market.

Rimailho developed a number of vehicles based on the tankette. They included the Canon de Cavalerie automoteur de 75 Saint-Chamond Modele 1924. This 11 ton SPG was meant for supporting cavalry units. The design was unconventional. The vehicle had a convertible drive and the gun was installed in the rear. In order to fire, it had to turn around. However, Rimailho designed most of his previous SPGs with this layout. This was a typical "self propelled gun mount": only the gun was armoured with a gun shield. The Canon de Cavalerie automoteur de 75 Saint-Chamond Modele 1924 remained on paper, since there were no foreign buyers, and the French army had no interest in it.

Garnier-Renault guard tank.

The French military began looking at creating SPGs in the early 1930s. This was a pivotal moment for the French tank industry. The army was torn between medium Renault D2 tanks and Char B "battle tanks". Heavy Char BB and Char d'arret tanks for the Maginot line were also discussed. The idea of a "guard tank" (char de protection) was mentioned in documents for the first time in April of 1932. According to the concept proposed by General Herr this was a special armoured vehicle armed with a 47 or 75 mm gun. Its objective was combat against enemy tanks. General Bezout, the chief inspector of tanks, refined the concept in July of 1932. According to him, this task required an SPG armed with a 75 mm gun. This kind of gun would allow it to destroy enemy tanks from a range of 800-1000 meters.

The Renault D3 was chosen as the chassis, which ended up killing the whole idea.

The requirements for a "guard tank" were composed on July 25th, 1932. The SPG in general, as well as its gun mount, was designed by APX. General Eugène François Gilbert Garnier directed the development, as he had great experience with towed and self propelled artillery. APX had no suitable chassis, so a choice had to be made among prototypes offered by other companies. The Renault VA medium tank, also known as the Renault D3, was considered most suitable. This vehicle was designed for export, and was therefore known as a "colonial tank". Since potential customers had no interest in the tank, it seemed logical to use it to make an SPG.

The Garnier-Renault had a rather good maximum gun elevation angle.

The vehicle was called Garnier-Renault, after its inventor and the chassis that it used. This was a worthy vehicle for its time. Its armour was 35-45 mm thick, which reliably protected it from anti-tank artillery that existed at the time. The SPG was armed with a 75 mm L/30 APX gun. The mount allowed it very generous elevation angles. The ammunition capacity of 160 rounds was sufficient.

However, there was one serious issue: the Renault D3 chassis. According to the requirements, the 20 ton vehicle had to reach a speed of 25 kph, but its actual speed was much less. In June 1934, when the work on the conversion was approaching completion, General Garnier was already sceptical. By 1935, he designed a new SPG. At a mass of 21 tons, it had 50 mm of armour. The mobility also improved. A 260 hp diesel engine would allow it to accelerate to 36 kph. The cruising range also increased from 140 to 400 km. A radio station and a radio operator, which were absent from the Garnier-Renault, were also added. Unfortunately, this project remained on paper.

Trials of the Garnier-Renault in 1935 ended in complete failure.

Garnier's fears were not unfounded. Trials of the Garnier-Renault in May of 1935 turned into a string of failures. The Renault D3 chassis was far from ideal, both in its technical characteristics and reliability. The APX project could have lived on, but APX's tank unit was nationalized under the name Ateliers de construction de Rueil (ARL) in 1936. The Garnier-Renault program was closed as it had no future, and another program was launched, which led to the ARL V 39. As for the concept of a "guard tank", there was another customer for it at the time of failure of the Garnier-Renault: the cavalry.

An SPG for the cavalry

General Flavigny, the commander of French cavalry, realized that cavalry needed mechanized artillery in 1931. The first step in this direction was mechanization of his units and creation of towed guns. This was a half-measure, since an SPG capable of firing directly at the enemy was necessary to escort these mechanized units. An idea was born to install a 75 mm gun on an AMC armoured car Automitrailleuse de combat. It's worth mentioning that the term AMC in the French army also included both halftracks and light tanks. This idea was first voiced in 1932, but it wasn't implemented until two years later.

Renault ACG 2 converted into a smoke tank. This chassis did not make for a good light cavalry SPG.

At the time, Renault's armoured cars were dominant. These were the AMC 34 and AMC 35 designs, the latter of which was also known as ACG 1. Requirements for an ACG 1 armed with a 75 mm gun were prepared by November 25th, 1934. Renault prepared the first materials for this project, named ACG 2, by March 15th, 1935. The vehicle received a large casemate instead of a turret, which had a 75 mm SA 35 gun slight right of center, the same gun used on the Char B1. The difference was that the gun mount, designed by APX, allowed the gun to be aimed both vertically and horizontally. Work on the ACG 2 continued even after APX became ARL and Renault's tank branch became AMX. Captain Devenne led the development at AMX.

The gun mount for the new SPG was similar to the one that later turned up on the Char B1 ter. Development reached the prototype stage, but this vehicle did not receive a gun. Later, it was converted into a smokescreen tank. The stopping of the ACG 2 programme was linked to the fact that the cavalry was disappointed in the ACG 2 and turned its sights on the SOMUA AC 4, which was accepted into service as the SOMUA S 35.

SOMUA CAM 1, a "guard tank" that was not built in metal for several reasons.

SOMUA, a subsidiary of Schneider-Creusot, also tried to take part in the "guard tank" tender. The CAM 1 project was designed in 1935, which was based on the AC 3, the future SOMUA S 35. Even Garnier's idea looked pitiful in comparison. The vehicle would weigh 18 tons, but be equipped with a 200 hp engine. This would give it a top speed of 46 kph, enough that no French infantry tank could catch up to it. The thickness of the armour was 30-40 mm, enough for the time.

The armament was even more serious, and the char de protection requirements paled in comparison. The first variant used the 75 mm Canon de 75 Mle.1922 with a muzzle velocity of 600 m/s. The second variant turned the CAM 1 into the most dangerous tank destroyer of its time. The vehicle could be equipped with the Canon CA 75 mm Mle.1933 AA gun. This gun could penetrate any tank of the time with ease from a great distance. Not a single tank that was mass produced during the first two years of WWII would stand against it. One drawback was the storage of "only" 70 shells, but in reality this would be enough for even a drawn out battle. The crew of the vehicle consisted of 5 men, same as on the APX design. The SOMUA project fell out of the race for many reasons that had nothing to do with the characteristics of the CAM 1.

SOMUA CAM 2, September 1937. The vehicle was built in this configuration.

On December 20th, 1935, infantry command composed requirements for a 20 ton tank that would replace the Renault D2. In 1936, their appetites increased. The updated requirements contained a 47 mm SA 35 gun in the turret and a 75 mm SA 35 in the hull. SOMUA also took part in this tender, but did not proceed past the presentation of a draft in 1936. After the requirements for the 20 ton Char G were changed in 1938 to make it 35 tons, all the work became pointless. However, it was the 20 ton tank project that remained the foundation for the creation of an SPG, but this time for cavalry.

Armour diagram. The gun is shown in travel position.

The order for such a vehicle, named CAM 2, was received by SOMUA in June of 1936. In many ways it seemed like a return to the "guard tank" concept, especially when it came to armament. The CAM 2 received the same gun as the Garnier-Renault. The difference was all in the gun mantlet. This gun was sufficient for fighting tanks of the period. Another advantage was that the gun was planned as the main weapon of the infantry SPG, which was being designed by ARL and BDR (Baudet-Donon-Roussel). This vehicle is better known as the ARL V 39, where V stands for the name of the ARL engineer that led the project, Captain Valla. 

This gun, as well as the ARL-BDR project, caused a number of issues for the CAM 2. The issue was that only one copy of the APX gun was available, and the Valla-BDR (the name of the ARL V 39 at the time) had priority. Both projects also shared a commander's cupola, which contained a machinegun. Only one cupola was also available, and since ARL was the designer, it's not surprising that the cavalry SPG did not receive it. Interestingly, the result was very similar to the Char B concept as envisioned by General Estienne.  

SOMUA CAM 2 at the factory, 1938. It does not have a cannon or a cupola.

The Canon de 75 Automoteur SOMUA project was finally ready by September of 1937. The chassis was similar to that of the SOMUA S 35, but with some changes. A bulge was added to the the front of the hull, necessary for the gun mount. The width of the vehicle increased to 2.51 meters. The track links were reinforced. The turret platform was seriously changed, as was the engine deck. This was necessary as the crew of the CAM 2 consisted of 5 men. It seemed rather odd that the 75 mm gun had two sights, but only one aiming mechanism. The crew was positioned very well, and they were not too cramped in the tank. The cupola included a rangefinger, which meant that in battle it had to be turned backwards.

Another interesting feature of the SPG was that the gun could be retracted during travel to reduce the barrel overhang. The Swedes later used a similar solution on the pvkv m/43. The mass of the vehicle was 21.6 tons. Since only one prototype of the cannon and cupola existed, and ARL was not to keen on handing them over to their competitors, the first prototype of the CAM 2 was assembled without them on December 25th, 1937.

The resemblance to the SOMUA S 35 is clear.

The Valla-BDR retained its influence on the development of SPGs for the cavalry. A second gun was later built for the two SPG prototypes, but only the first one was functional. Work on a second cupola also dragged on. Meanwhile, the French military demanded that both vehicles be trialled simultaneously. The prototype of the Valla-BDR was ready by the end of June of 1938, and joint trials began later: in February of 1939.

The need to fit five men influenced the shape of the turret platform and the engine deck.

The CAM 2 travelled 229 km in trials at Bourget, achieving a top speed of 35.25 kph. Trials continued until August 20th, 1939. Overall, the trials were a success, but issues were found. Like many SPGs with a forward gun, the CAM 2 suffered from overloaded road wheels. However, there was no time to introduce changes. A war broke out. On October 15th, 1939, the CAM 2 was accepted into service as the SOMUA SAu 40.

A fully equipped SAu 40.

The first order was for a batch of 36 vehicles. 12 of them would be commanders' vehicles, without a cannon. They would be assigned to tank destroyer units in light mechanized divisions  (Division Légère Mécanique, DLM). The vehicles would be split up into 12 groups of 3 vehicles each. The first two SOMUA SAu 40 were expected in October of 1940, 6 more in November and December, and 8 vehicles per month from then on. The order was split up between Creusot and Cail-Denain, just as the order for SOMUA S 40 tanks.

The 47 mm gun would have been installed in production vehicles.

The situation changed by April 25th, 1940. Having evaluated the 30 caliber cannon, the military decided to change the armament. A replacement was quickly found: the Canon de 47 mm SA Mle. 1937 anti-tank gun. This cannon, developed by AMX, had impressive penetration, and more importantly, was already in production. On May 9th, 1940, the contract for the SOMUA SAu 40 was changed. The number of SPGs to be built grew to 72. Instead of 75 mm guns, they would be armed with the 47 mm SA mle.1937. Research by François Vauvilliers indicates that the gun mount would be similar to the one used on the prospective AMX medium tank.

The end of its fighting career: the vehicle was taken by the Germans. Périgueux, Aquitaine, June 1940.

All of these changes remained on paper. The rapidly developing situation at the front meant that production never really began. The only prototype was sent into battle, as it thankfully was built from real armoured steel. The single working cannon was moved to it from the ARL V 39. The vehicle did not have time to participate in combat: its unit did not fight, and the SPG fell into German hands after the armistice was signed. This was the end of its story.

Canon Automoteur de 16 livres sur chassis SOMUA, the last attempt to make a tank destroyer out of the SOMUA S 35.

No work was done on prospective SPGs during the German occupation. ARL workers tried to create a modernized tank, the SARL 42. Work did not progress past paper, and ended completely in 1942. Work on French tanks resumed after the liberation of Paris in August of 1944, but the SOMUA S 35 chassis was no longer used. Even the SARL 42 was already obsolete by then. However, the SOMUA S 35 returned as an SPG chassis some time later.

Theoretically, the 17-pounder could fit.

AMX prepared a number of designs of SPGs made from obsolete tanks. The Canon Automoteur de 16 livres sur chassis SOMUA was one of them. It was an attempt at making a tank destroyer with a 17-pounder gun out of the SOMUA S 35. Calculations showed that the fighting compartment could fit not only the gun, but also 86 rounds. The mass of the SPG was 21,658 kg, or about the same as the SOMUA S 40. The project did not continue, as there were very few tanks available for conversion. In addition, the French army had enough GMC M10s, which were much more effective on the battlefield.

Peak vs Mean

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Previously, I discussed in detail what Soviet rate of fire tests actually measured. Long story short, the difference between the peak rate of fire (loading from the ready racks) and the average rate of fire (loading from all racks) was quite pronounced. Soviet figures reflected the latter scenario, which is why their rates of fire seem significantly slower when ROF figures are compared as is.

Let's take a look at another example: the Firefly, specifically the Sherman Ic. I've seen all sorts of figures on its rate of fire, from ten to twenty (!) rounds per minute. British tests, on the other hand, tell a different story.

The "Firefly" Shermans, Vc and Ic, had two ready racks on the turret basket floor: 2 rounds and 3 rounds. Loading and firing these rounds took about a minute. A very lengthy reload process followed. For starters, the loader had to empty the spent casings from the bag under the breech, since it was impossible to lift any more rounds up in the cramped space. If he was lucky enough to have a pistol port that wasn't welded up, chucking the cases through there was a little bit faster. British trials don't specify how long this took, but it would certainly add a lengthy chunk of time to the reload process.


These results are for the Sherman Vc, but the Ic had a nearly identical layout: five shells in ready racks, the rest in extremely inconvenient locations. 

Sherman Ic fighting compartment layout. Ammunition racks are highlighted in red.

You can see why it might take several minutes to extract the ammunition. Trials of the Sherman Ic have more precise information on how long it takes to take it out of the racks.


The left hand bins (8 rounds each) are pretty quick, especially if the turret is positioned favourably and the driver can help out. The downside is that he can't drive, so that makes the tank vulnerable if it's spotted. When loading from the racks underneath the turret basket floor (which contain nearly all the ammunition carried in the tank), the turret had to be lined up precisely, which made reloading even slower. Finally, the two bins that take the longest to access (2 and 3 minutes) contained more than half of the tank's ammunition, meaning that the rate of fire would drop significantly as the battle continued.

Shuffling ammunition from the less accessible bins to the more accessible bins also took a large amount of time, as no more than 5 rounds could fit on the floor at any given time. 

As you can see, while the peak rate of fire might be recorded as 5 RPM, the actual sustained rate of fire is a lot lower than that. Even loading from the most convenient rack, it will be a whole minute before the tank can fire again. From other trials I've posted, throwing out spent brass can take 2.4 seconds (Tiger II) to 2.9 (IS-2) seconds per casing. Even if you assume that the lighter 17-pounder casings take 2 seconds each to dispose of, that's another 10 seconds tacked onto the reloading process. Therefore, firing 10 times will take 3 minutes and 10 seconds, one shot per 19 seconds, or a hair over 3 rounds per minute. To compare, the SU-152 could fire off 10 rounds in its ready rack at a rate of fire of 2.8 RPM. 

When it came to the Germans, they didn't even have to expend their ready racks to experience a drastic drop in rate of fire. For example, British trials of the Tiger showed that picking out the last shells from the ready racks could take as much as 30 seconds apiece.

Far East Conversions

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"To the Chief of the Tank Directorate of the GBTU, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, comrade Afonin

RE: your letter #822338 written on May 23rd, 1944

I report that:
  1. As of June 1st, 1944, the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front have applied applique armour to 128 BT-7 tanks, 113 of which were converted in 1942-43 and 13 in 1944.
    Since no proper quality armour was available, applique armour is only installed at factories during refurbishing. Armour of written-off tanks was used. Contoured armour for turrets is not available.
  2. As of June 1st, 1944, 130 T-37/T-38 tanks have been converted to ShVAK guns. Further work to re-arm T-37 and T-38 tanks ceased due to an absence of ShVAK guns.
  3. Repair factories #405 and #77 are converting two-turreted T-26 tanks into single turreted. As of June 1st, 1944, 35 tanks have been converted.
  4. The following is necessary to continue work on rearming and adding applique armour:
    1. Contoured armour for BT-7 turrets.
    2. ShVAK guns.
    3. TMFP-1 sights.
    4. Equipment to convert two-turreted T-26es to single turreted (turrets, turret platforms, turret rings, etc).
  5. Rearmament and installation of applique armour is not being planned due to a lack of aforementioned armament and parts.
    All BT-7s refurbished by the repair factories are being equipped with applique armour.
Acting Assistant to the Chief of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Ryabov
Acting Chief of the UK ORT of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Sviridov"


Clear the Air

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"January 27th, 1941
Order of the People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding and People's Commissar of Heavy Machinebuilding
#63s/43s
Moscow

Stationary trials performed at factory #75 of air filters for V-2 tank engines produced at factories ##75, 174, and 183 showed that the air filters do not satisfy the requirements for air filters established by Committee of Defense decree #428ss issued on November 19th, 1940.

Considering the exceptional importance of equipping V-2 tank diesels with functional air filters, I decree that:
  1. Directors of factories ##75, 174, 183, the Kirov factory, STZ, and NATI must develop and test air filters for the V-2 diesel engine by March 15th of this year that guarantee at least 95% purity of air for 10-12 hours of work in dusty conditions without cleaning, according to the following parameters:
    1. Coefficient of air cleaning of 97-98% in conditions of 1 g of dust per cubic meter (dust with 0.006 to 0.020 mm grains).
    2. Loss of at most of 750 mm of water pressure (no more than 5% of power).
    3. A design that is simple to produce, reliable, and easy to use.
    4. A design that can be cleaned in the field by one person without special instruments in no more than 10-15 minutes.
    5. Moving the air filter from the engine to an unused part of the tank is permitted.
    6. If an oil bath filter is used, it must not permit the oil to get into the engine.
    7. The design of the air filter must be in cohesion with the air flow in the tank.
  2. Establish the following awards for the best air filter design for the T-34 and KV-1 tank:
    1. 1st place: 75,000 rubles
    2. 2nd place: 50,000 rubles
    3. 3rd place: 25,000 rubles
  3. The following commission is formed to test the developed air filters:
    1. Chair: M.M. Zatravkin (NATI)
    2. Members:
      1. A.A. Lavrushenko (GABTU)
      2. V.M. Kogan (GABTU)
      3. E.P. Dedov (Kirov factory)
      4. G.I. Nesterov (factory #174)
      5. Yu.B. Margulis (factory #75)
      6. Fedotor (factory #183)
        The commission is to develop the trials program, conditions of trials, location of trials, and condition of the contest, and present it to the People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding for approval by February 1st.
  4. Comrade Tolkunov (NATI) is to develop a uniform methodology and parameters for testing air filters from all tank factories (taking into account experience from factories ##75, 174, and 183) by February 13th, 1941.
People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding, V. Malyshev
People's Commissar of Heavy Machinebuilding, A. Yefremov"

Composite Hull

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"[cut off] September 1942
To GABTU BTU, Engineer-Colonel comrade Alymov
To the head of the 3rd Directorate of the NKTP, A.A. Habahklashev

RE: manufacturing item #70-145304-A2 from two parts

Due to a lack of 35 mm thick plate 1232 mm in width, we are forced to produce item #70-145304-A2 from two parts with a perpendicular joint.

We have the agreement of military representative at factory #180, Engineer-Colonel M.S. Bazumov, to produce 40 units.

We ask for your permission to continue producing this item from two parts.

Attachment: blueprints (1 copy)

Acting factory director Orlov"



Permission to build more than 40 hulls was not obtained. At most 39 hulls were converted into tanks by the start of T-70B production at the factory, and the remaining hull eventually ended up in a museum.


The First Coming of the IS-2

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The 122 mm U-11 gun designed in the fall-winter of 1941 was rather controversial. Its designers succeeded in their task of installing a gun with the ballistics of the M-30 in a minimally altered KV-1 turret. However, the howitzer had a low rate of fire, and its penetration characteristics were poor. As a result, the planed KV-9 batch remained on paper. Nevertheless, the GABTU did not give up on the idea of a howitzer tank. Despite opposition from the GAU, work on howitzer tanks continued in 1943.

Fire support

The failure with the KV-9 did not stop the GABTU. The gun was not an equal to the ZIS-5 due to its low rate of fire, smaller ammunition capacity, and, more importantly, lower penetration. However, the U-11 had one important advantage. The power of the 122 mm HE-fragmentation shell was much greater, which made the tank effective as a support tank. The KV-9 also used a very similar turret to the KV-1, which would make production simple.

Unfortunately, production of the KV-1 ceased in September of 1942, and the KV-1S took its place. It had a different turret design. Chelyabinsk tank designers also had no time for a howitzer tank, especially those rejected by the artillery branch. In addition to the KV-1S, the production of the T-34 was still a high priority. Finally, work on a completely new tank, the KV-13, was going very slowly.

Cutaway of the IS-2 howitzer tank. The turret design can be seen.

Interestingly enough, the KV-13 platform was the most interesting for the howitzer tank's developers. After trials of the first prototype were completed, work on an improved version began, which was significantly different from its predecessor. Documents on the improved KV-13, often called Object 233 (which is incorrect, since this index appeared only after trials were complete) or IS-1, were completed by early December 1942.

The project with blueprint index 234 appeared later. It is not known when the howitzer version of the IS-1 was created. This tank was left in the shadow of the main variant for a very long time. The name IS-2 first appears in documents in mid-February of 1942. Of course, work began some time before that. Officially, the index IS-2 first appears in GKO decree #2943 "On production of experimental IS tanks" issued on February 24th, 1943. The technical project was already complete by that point and work on the tank began.

There is a serious mistake that some historians make in connection with the IS-2. GBTU correspondence often mentions that the IS-2 used the turret from the KV-9. Researchers took this fact as truth, even coming up with the idea that the prototype KV-9's turret migrated to the IS-2. This assertion is baseless. There are photographs of the KV-9 when the IS-2 was already complete, and it still had its turret. The turret is also merely based on the one used in the KV-9. The design was different. It had no rear machinegun and a new vent in the roof. The total mass of the turret was 7465 kg, while the KV-9 turret weighed 9293 kg. Not surprisingly, the mass of the IS-2 was higher than the IS-1 by a ton, reaching 39.5 tons.

T-34 howitzer tank. March 1943.

The IS-2 could have seriously changed during its development. This is connected with two factors: the modernization of the SU-35 (SU-122) and the work of the design bureau of factory #9. A technical meeting where the design bureau presented the D-11 howitzer took place on the day GKO decree #2943 was signed. The D-11 was an improved U-11, featuring a simplified design and changes to several parts. This gun was mores suitable for installation in a tank, as it turned out to be more compact.

The size of the fighting compartment allowed the placement of three crewmen.

The compact dimensions of the D-11 reignited the GBTU's interest in an artillery tank on the T-34 chassis. The development was assigned to the factory #183 design bureau, who prepared a draft in March of 1943. The T-34 chassis was used without any changes. The biggest difference was an enlarged turret, somewhat reminiscent of the KV-2 one. A larger volume allowed it to house 30 rounds of ammunition and three crewmen. The mass of a howitzer-equipped T-34 would be 32 tons, just a little more than a regular T-34. The fate of this design was the same as of its predecessor. Theoretically, the introduction of a breech operator improved the rate of fire, but it was still less than that of the SU-35. As for the increased mobility of fire, it was not considered a critical parameter.

Installation of the D-12 tank howitzer into an IS-1 turret. April 1943.

The fact that a tank version of the D-11 was being developed at factory #9 was important news for the IS-2. This gun received the internal index D-12. The goal of the D-12 project was the unification of the SPG and tank variants, which was a reasonable objective from a manufacturing standpoint. Another important parameter was compactness. Factory #9's design bureau took the stock IS-1 turret  into consideration when designing the D-12, which was ready by early April of 1943. Thanks to its compact design, the gun could fit into this turret. Since the turret was smaller than before, it was no longer possible to include most of the ammunition, but the idea of using the IS-1 turret was tempting.The NKV Technical Council approved of this decision.

An experimental prototype of the D-12 was built in early May, and went through trials on the 17th. The length of the recoil was reduced to 400 mm, which allowed for a more compact recoil guard. The gun passed robustness trials.

Heavy IS-2 tank in March of 1943. The air vent and antenna port in the turret are visible.

The IS-2 was not built with the D-12. GKO decree #2943 demanded the production of an experimental IS-2 by March 10th, 1943. It was not possible to have the D-12 completed by then, so the initial design with a KV-9-esque turret was chosen. For obvious reasons, the IS-2 was a lower priority design than the IS-1. Assembly was completed on March 12th, 1943, and factory trials began afterwards. On the 19th, changes to the design were made based on the results of the trials. The tank was finally delivered on March 28th. Accompanying documentation certified that it was equipped with U-11 gun with the serial number 6, a full set of spare parts, instruments, and accessories. The tank was fully tuned, lubricated, and fueled.

A view from the side also demonstrates some differences from the KV-9 turret.

Overall, the vehicle satisfied its tactical-technical requirements. Weighing showed that its mass was 37,900 kg, more than 1.5 tons less than expected. The difference compared to the IS-1 was also less than expected. The IS-2 was only 740 kg heavier. The crew consisted of four men, three of which sat in the turret.

The tank's chassis was identical to the IS-1, but the turret was different. As mentioned above, there were plenty of differences from the KV-9. It was about two tons lighter. The shape was also different, but there were many more noticeable changes. The roof had a vent and an antenna port, since the radio was moved to the turret. Lifting hooks and handrails were added on the sides. There were three lifting hooks, just like on the KV-1S tanks produced in the spring-summer of 1943. The designers also borrowed the side observation devices and the turret hatch from the KV-1S. The rear machinegun was replaced with a hatch for throwing out spent shell casings. In other words, there were plenty of changes. To keep the turret reasonably spacious, only 8 shells were carried. The overall ammunition capacity was 30 rounds, a quarter less than on the SU-122.

The IS-1 and IS-2 chassis were identical.

Mobility trials of the IS-2 began on March 28th and continued until April 15th. The tank travelled 773 km, of which 437 were on a highway, 276 on dirt roads, and 60 off-road. The average speed was 22-25 kph on a highway, 19.2 on dirt roads, and 18.3 off-road. This was approximately the same as the IS-1. The use of a bigger turret with a more powerful gun did not affect the tank's performance. As for reliability, the two tanks were equivalent. Most of the issues were caused by the quality of manufacturing rather than design flaws.

Another difference from the KV-9 was the addition of a hatch for throwing out spent shell casings instead of the machinegun.

The armament and turret were a whole different story. The loader's station was deemed cramped, and his work difficult. The gunner's station was also not free of omissions: the elevation flywheel clipped the recoil guard at high angles of elevation. It was also difficult to service the gun. The trials commission demanded that the fighting compartment be enlarged, including by widening the turret ring by 150 mm. This requirement was also applied to the IS-1. Management of the Chelyabinsk Kirov Factory refused, stating that the mass of the tank would increase by one ton. The commission also suggested that KV-1S observation devices be replaced with "English glass MK-IV devices", the ones used on the Churchill tank. The factory also disagreed with this suggestion, as the production of these devices had not yet started.

During trials, April 1943.

Trials of the IS-1 and IS-2 continued after state trials ended. By the end of May, the IS-2 had travelled for 1545 km. A more effective cooling system and a new design of the engine frame was being tested. The tank travelled for an additional 428 km on dirt roads in early June, demonstrating an average speed of 17 kph. The cooling system issues were the same as on the IS-1. They were caused by a poor placement of air intakes, which became clogged by dirt that the tank kicked up. The tank drove for 446 km in June and 2001 km in total.

It was already clear by then that the IS-2 will not go into production. The study of a captured Tiger tank showed that the prospective heavy tank needs to have an 85 mm gun. The turret ring would have to be widened to 1800 mm. The idea of the TsAKB to install the S-31 85 mm gun into the stock IS-1 turret was not approved by the GBTU. As a result, the IS-2 harshly dropped in priority in May. However, work on tank howitzers did not stop, merely moved to a new tank.

On the KV-1S chassis

A new step in howitzer tank development, as strange as it sounds, was taken after the study of a captured Tiger by Soviet specialists. GKO decree #3289 "On the improvement of artillery armament of tanks and SPGs" was issued on May 5th, 1943. It triggered the development of the D-5T 85 mm gun. The TsAKB began working on a similar project, which resulted in the S-18 and S-31 guns.

D-5T-122 howitzer in a KV-1S turret, June 1943.

As with the D-12, the new tank howitzer had its roots in an SPG gun design. In parallel with the D-5 and D-7, which were later renamed to D-5T-85 and D-5S-85, factory #9's design bureau began working on 122 mm guns. This was caused by the fact that the UZTM was still responsible for modernizing the SU-122. The result of this modernization was the D-6 gun, later renamed D-5S-122. With minimal changes, the 85 mm barrel could be swapped out for a 122 mm barrel with M-30 ballistics. This allowed for the SU-122-III to be rapidly designed.

The gun was much more compact than the U-11.

The KV-1S was the highest priority chassis for the new gun. It was clear that the IS-2 will not go into production, and experience with designing the D-12 indicated that, theoretically, a similar gun will fit into the KV-1 turret. The tank version of the howitzer was called D-8, and the name was later changed to D-5T-122. The technical project was ready by June 21st, 1943, and the explanatory memo by early July. It was stated that the D-5T-122 can be installed in the KV-1S and IS (Object 237) tanks.

An experimental prototype was built in July of 1943, but it was never installed in any of the aforementioned tanks. There were two reason for this plot twist. One was that the D-5S-122 behaved poorly on the SU-122-III. Issues with the recoil mechanism resulted in the SPG being removed from trials. The D-5T-122 showed similar issues. Factory trials were repeated on July 15th, and they concluded much more favourably.

The second reason was much more serious. After the fighting at the Battle of Kursk, where the Germans used new Panther tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers, it was clear that a more powerful gun than the D-5T was needed. The GBTU was ready for this turn of events: the development of an SPG version of the A-19 122 mm corps gun began in April of 1943, and work on the D-25T tank gun began in May at factory #9. 122 mm tank howitzers were unnecessary in this situation. Guns with increased penetration, not better HE, were needed.

The SU-122 was replaced in production by the SU-85 in August of 1943, and production of the KV-85 began during that month. Nevertheless, one howitzer KV-1S was built after all.

Cutaway of the KV-1S with an S-41 gun. Late May 1943.

As mentioned above, not only factory #9 worked on tank howitzers, but also the TsAKB. There, P.F. Muravyev and E.V. Sinilshikov designed the S-31 85 mm gun in two variants. The gun lost to the D-5T, but further development led to the S-53. This gun was the main weapon of T-34-85 and T-44 tanks. It was TsAKB's greatest and at the same time last success in the field of tank guns. In parallel with the S-31, work on a tank howitzer, indexed S-41, began under the direct supervision of the bureau chief V.G. Grabin. The technical project was completed on May 27th, 1943.

The S-41 was even more compact than the D-5T-122.

As with the factory #9 design bureau, the howitzer was designed with the aim of using it on the KV-1S. It could also be installed in the IS-1. According to the description, the gun was meant for support of infantry and tank units for the destruction of fortifications and combat against enemy tanks. Thanks to its design it could easily be put into mass production. For example, it used the cradle of the 76 mm ZIS-5 gun and the breech of the 100 mm S-3 gun. A sliding breech increased the rate of fire. However, this was balanced out by a massive muzzle brake, which was not a great idea. It kicked up a cloud of dust during firing, which could reveal the tank's position.

According to calculations, the tank could carry 60 rounds of ammunition. The rate of fire was estimated at 5-6 RPM.

A massive muzzle brake was a downside of the S-41 design.

The note claimed that the turret would not have to be altered to fit the new gun, but the diagrams indicate that this is not so. The rear of the turret was changed, and the roof was raised. A turret turntable was also introduced. The need to alter the turret was not good for mass production of the weapon. Nevertheless, the project looked more promising than the D-5T-122. Aside from a larger ammunition capacity, this system had a higher rate of fire.

Unlike the D-5T-122, the S-41 was installed in a tank.

As with the D-5T-122, work moved out of the draft stage. A prototype S-41 was completed by early August and awaited installation in the S-18 SPG. This never happened, but the idea of installing the S-41 in a KV-1S tank that was testing the 85 mm S-31 was raised. The S-41 was eventually installed in a KV-1S, but a different one. However, that was the end. By the time the howitzer was installed in the KV-1S, the interest in this kind of vehicle waned.

T-70B: A Light Modernization of a Light Tank

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GKO decree #1394 "On production of T-70 tanks at the Molotov Gorkiy Automotive Factory" was signed on March 6th, 1942. Work on improvement of the T-60's armament resulted in a completely new tank that used many of its predecessor's components, but was superior to it in every respect. Of course, it was not a perfect replacement for the T-50, which fell victim to production issues. Nevertheless, it was suitable for the role of a light tank. The T-70 became the second most produced light tank, after the American Light Tank M3 family. This article tells the story of the T-70B, the modernized version of the light tank.

T-70 B-side

Even decree #1394 hinted that the T-70 needs some improvements. The second section of the decree tasked GAZ with correcting defects that were uncovered during trials. According to the third section, the T-70 would be produced with wider tracks and thicker road wheels starting with June 1st, 1942. The need to modernize the tank was caused by increased pressure on the suspension. While the T-60 with thickened armour put 775 kg on one road wheel, this figure increased to 920 kg on the T-70.

T-70 tanks produced at GAZ before August of 1942 looked like this.

However, this increase had almost no effect when the tank was driving on paved or dirt roads. Therefore, putting the T-70 into production with T-60 tracks and road wheels seemed feasible. However, driving on snow and swampy terrain was a different story. Complains about the T-60's poor performance on snow started coming in during the winter of 1941-42. The increased mass of the T-70 didn't help matters.

The T-70 also did not perform great on soft soil. During trials in the summer of 1942, a production tank was driven across a swamp where foreign tanks were being tested prior. The results weren't encouraging. The tank made it 70 meters out of 80, but bottomed out and bogged down. It was only able to get out using an unditching log. The Light Tank M3, Pz38(t), and Valentine VII managed to cross this section of swamp successfully.

The same vehicle from the right. Note the exhaust pipes leading across the right side. Starting on August 5th, 1942, they were moved to the engine deck.

The deadlines specified in GKO decree #1394 were not met. It proved difficult to put the T-70 into production. Initially, defects discovered during trials of the prototype and pilot batch had to be resolved. This process was not complete by May. 5 changes to the cooling system and gun mount were introduced in April of 1942, and 9 more changes were introduced in May.

Early T-70s were not equipped with radios or internal communication devices. The installation of PTUs only began on May 25th, and a portion of the tanks was equipped with 9-R radios starting on June 4th. On May 12th the electric equipment was changed from a 6 V to a 12 V circuit, and two signal lamps for the driver were added on the 19th. Serious changes were made to the cooling system, which drastically increased its effectiveness. Improvements were made in June: the first signs of an engine bulkhead appear, plus the turret was changed. The GT-500 generator was used starting in July, and a dust deflector was added to the air cleaner of the rear engine.

Early type tank, seen from above.

Another important factor that affected the course of the T-70's modernization was issues with supplies of components. For instance, issues with gearboxes were experienced in June, and complaints were made about the speed and quality of engine production as well. The biggest problems were had with the hull and turret. Factory #180 in Saratov "excelled" in this, earning as many complaints during the course of T-70 production as with the T-60. As a result, instead of 390 planned tanks in June, only 350 were delivered. Factory #38 was having similar problems, delivering only 117 tanks out of 130. The limiting factor here was the supply of hulls.

July was better from an assembly standpoint. GAZ produced all 450 tanks that were ordered, 101 of which had radios. Factory #38 managed to surpass quota, completing 153 tanks out of 150.

Trials showed that the T-60 and T-70 perform worse in swamps than foreign light tanks.

Work on modernizing the T-70's suspension began at the GAZ design bureau in July of 1942. A new 300 mm wide track link was completed by the 12th. It can be visually distinguished by a lack of round openings. At the same time, reports that came from the Bryansk and Central Fronts inidicated that 15 mm of side armour was not enough for this tank. 

In addition, the complaint that the commander of the light tank was overloaded with tasks was first raised. He had to combine the duties of the commander, gunner, loader, and radio operator. This was the trigger for the development of a two-man turret, which eventually resulted in the creation of the T-80, the last Soviet wartime light tank. Information about Astrov having plans for a two-man turret for the T-70 are fantasy.

Another famous fantasy, which appeared back in the 60s, was the name of the tank with modernized running gear. The widely used index T-70M came from one not particularly well researched reference book composed after the war. We can also thank this book for inventing the index "T-40S". As for the real name of the modernized T-70, it appeared in July of 1942, and was different: T-70B. The index T-70-B was also used in correspondence.

T-70B track link, designed in July of 1942. Other reinforced running gear elements were also designed then.

The development of new tracks coincided with complaints about the old tracks. Reports about track links bending when the tank hit hard objects began coming in. There were complaints about other running gear elements. The drive sprockets bent, and the torsion bars sagged by 6-8 cm. This was especially true for the rear of the tank.

6 T-70 tanks were put through trials on June 24th. Two of them were mass production types, the others had a reinforced running gear. Two had 25 mm thick sides, and two more had 35 mm thick sides. The tanks with 25 mm of side armour weighed 10,400 kg, and the ones with 35 mm weighed 11 tons. Two tanks had altered exhaust pipes, which were introduced for production T-70s starting with August 5th, 1942. Two more tanks received engine bulkheads which were introduced into production on August 8th. Different types of mudguards and fenders were also used. As a result, all 6 tanks had a distinct look.

Exhaust pipes going over the roof of the engine compartment were introduced on August 5th, 1942.

Trials showed that the stock running gear only performed reliably for 300 km. After that, the road wheels started breaking, torsion bars sagging, and track links cracking. The reinforced track links tested on the second tank were also rejected due to the eyes breaking. As for the reinforced suspension, it worked reliably. However, the tank's speed fell by 5% due to the increased mass. The result was Solomon's solution: this running gear would be put into production for tanks with 15 mm of side armour on September 10th. It was planned for the side armour to be increased to 25 mm on October 1st, but that never happened.

Double air cleaners were also introduced, which raised the lifespan of the engines from 640 to 1200 km. They were added to tanks on September 5th, on the same day that a reinforced main linkage was added. Another addition was the driver's hatch with an observation device. It was designed in July of 1942, tested on one of the tanks with thicker side armour, and introduced into production on September 16th.

A new driver's hatch with an improved periscopic observation device. Its introduction noticeably improved the driver's visibility. This hatch was designed in July and introduced into production starting with September 16th, 1942.

The first two T-70Bs were delivered by GAZ in late September. Officially the new running gear was in production starting with September 1st, along with an improved ammunition rack. The latter allowed the tank to carry 90 rounds of ammunition for the 45 mm gun. New fenders were introduced later, on October 10th. In parallel, T-70B production was organized at factory #38. At that point, both factories produced identical tanks. The only difference was the serial number system. According to an order from the People's Commissar of Tank Production #676ss issued on September 14th, 1942, vehicles produced at factory #38 had their serial numbers prefixed with the letter L. This order also got rid of the different serial number systems used at different factories.

T-70B tanks produced from October 1942 to early 1943 looked like this.

Both factories produced tanks like this until the end of 1942. In early 1943, GAZ remained the only factory that produced T-70 tanks. GKO decree #2559 "On organization of SPGs at the Uralmash factory and factory #38" ordered the production of SU-12 SPGs rather than T-70B tanks in Kirov. Factory #40, created via reorganization of factory #592, became the secondary light tank production center. However, there was a nuance: instead of the T-70, the factory would build T-80 tanks. GAZ would also transfer over to T-80 production at some point later, but T-80 production never took hold. In total, GAZ delivered 3495 T-70 tanks in 1942, of them 2252 regular and 1243 with radios. As for factory #38, it reported delivery of 1378 tanks.

Stamped and welded gun mantlet. It was developed in July, but introduced into production in the end of 1942.

Due to the need to quickly put the T-80 into production, the T-70 did not change too much in early 1943. The biggest change was the gun mantlet. It was designed in July of 1942, but for various reasons it was not implemented until December of 1942. There were significant issues with producing even the current model. GAZ systematically fell short of quota starting with October of 1942. In November, only 320 T-70B tanks were delivered instead of 650. Only 510 were delivered in December instead of 700. This was partially due to the modernized suspension, but there were other problems. The biggest one was issues with casting, especially of engine blocks and track links. In December, 75.5% of cast engine blocks were rejected. This was the main limiting factor.

One of the first T-70B tanks with a new gun mantlet. December 1942.

The same issues migrated to 1943. 300 tanks were delivered in January instead of 550, and 130 tanks without track links remained into February. The factory managed to complete February's quota of 400 tanks through enormous effort, and 60 tanks were left without tracks by the start of March. The March quota of 500 tanks was met, but only 500 tanks were delivered in April out of 550. The factory actually built just 440 tanks, the rest were the same 60 T-70Bs without tracks. Realistically, the customer accepted only 275 tanks, and 225 remained at the factory and had to be fixed. This is when GAZ declined to produce the T-80. In May, only 325 T-70s were delivered instead of 450.

Production of the T-70B, Molotov GAZ, spring 1943.

It would be wrong to say that Gorky did not perform any modernization of the T-70. On March 29th, 1943, GKO decree #3092 demanded that the quality of the factory's output must increase. As a result, work on improvements was expedited. A new oil filter was added on April 20th, and K-43 carburettors were introduced at the same time. The exhaust system was changed starting on April 18th to prevent burns to infantry riders. The idler carrier changed on April 10th. 37 changes were made in total in April-May of 1943. All of these changes resulted in a significant increase in quality. However, there were still issues with subcontractors, particularly with ZIS-5 gearboxes produced in Miass.

Factory after German bombings, mid-June 1943.

German aircraft caused even more issues for the factory. The factory was bombed heavily from June 5th to June 14th. Many plants were destroyed. Heroic effort revived the factory in a short amount of time. Assembly of tanks and other products continued without a roof over the workers' heads. The buildings were repaired in parallel. In total, 128 tanks were delivered in June.

T-70B tank, June 1943 production. The stamped driver's hatch can be seen. The cast hatch was still in use alongside it.

The quality of tanks produced in Gorky deserves a separate mention. However, recall the times that T-70B tanks were built. Quality issues were common with any Soviet armoured vehicle of this time. This was the cost for rapid increase in production volume to several times that of peacetime production.

Everything is relative. When reliability trials with KV-1S and T-34 tanks from various factories, as well as the T-70B, it was Gorky's tank that was deemed the most reliable. A February production tank drove for 1223 km between April 14th and May 20th. The T-70B was the only tank that could confidently continue service after the trials. Further trials of other tanks were senseless.

The same T-70B from the left. The tank looked like this until the end of October 1943.

German bombings seriously affected the output of the factory. The production quota was drastically lowered. 250 vehicles were expected in July. The factory managed to surpass this quota, delivering 260 tanks. The tank changed its look slightly around this time. This is caused by actions from the hull manufacturer. A stamped driver's hatch was proposed in the summer of 1942. It wasn't introduced then, but an altered design went into production in 1943 at factory #176 in Murom. This was factory #40's manufacturer of T-80 hulls and turrets. Since hatches on the T-70 and T-80 were compatible, these hatches were also sent to GAZ, where they were installed on May production tanks. The cast hatch also remained in production, and was used on both the T-70B and SU-12.

Some tanks were built with a radio antenna port in the rear of the turret. It's possible that this is connected with the 12-RT radio, which was used on T-70B tanks starting with July of 1943. There were also plans for infantry handrails on the turret, but it's not known whether these plans were ever implemented.

This angle shows the exhaust pipe guard introduced on April 18th.

Rapidly obsolete

The appearance of the T-70B on the front lines in late 1942 was met with mixed feelings. The reliability of the running gear increased drastically, but another issue took its place. The running gear of the T-70 and T-70B was drastically different. The road wheels and return rollers were 130 mm wide, and the torsion bars and suspension arms were different too. This was unlikely to thrill  unit mechanics. There was another, more serious issue. In mid-1942 the Germans stopped producing light tanks and switched to SPGs. The cause was simple: light tanks were no longer suited for modern war. The PzII and Pz38(t) could do little against the T-34 and KV-1. The same could be said for the T-70B when it was compared to German medium and heavy tanks.

T-70 with the VT-42 gun, May 1943.

The combat effectiveness of the T-70 was higher than that of its predecessor, the T-60 small tank. However, its enemies changed too. This wasn't so obvious during the fighting at Stalingrad in late 1942, but in February-March of 1943, during fighting at Kharkov, the situation changed. The GABTU felt that light tanks were becoming obsolete even earlier. The issue of developing a tank gun with the ballistics of the 45 mm anti-tank gun designed by OKB-172 was raised in May of 1942. This gun was adopted under the index M-42. The increased barrel length allowed the gun to defeat tanks that were too tough for the standard 45 mm gun.

The gun passed trials, but it was too late.

After some delay, the design bureau of factory #235 (Votkinsk) began working on a long barrelled tank gun. Like OKB-172, it was subordinate to the NKVD. The development there was also largely done by prisoners. The new tank gun was indexed VT-42. The trials program was signed on November 23rd, 1942, but the gun and its T-70 tank arrived at the ANIOP on May 12th, 1943. Trials continued until June 1st. The gun passed trials. However, by June 1st it was already too late. In addition, the GAU and NKV already had an alternative: a subcaliber round that could penetrate the side of a Tiger tank from 200 meters.

The T-70 was insufficiently effective by the summer of 1943. This was true for all light tanks of the era.

The T-60 was largely pushed out of the armed forces by the T-70 and T-70B by the summer of 1943. However, the T-70 itself was obsolete. Fighting at Kursk showed that the time of light tanks is going away. Units with T-70 tanks took heavy losses. Analysis of the situation forced the Red Army to abandon light tanks in their current state. This did not mean that there would be no more light tanks, but developing the T-60/T-70 family any further was pointless. Instead, a new generation light tank would be designed. Its characteristics would be like the T-50, but it would have a 76 mm gun. The long process of designing a prospective light tank began, which eventually ended with nothing. As for factories building light tanks, they switched to producing the SU-76M. The USSR did the same thing that Germany did. The only country producing light tanks at that point was the USA.

T-70B as a commander's tank in a SU-76M regiment. Note that the antenna port is in the rear of the turret.

The removal of the T-70B from production did not mean that the tanks would vanish. They continued to serve in the Red Army in their primary role. Of course, their numbers declined as they were replaced with T-34s. The T-70B was often used as a commander's tank in SPG regiments. Many T-70s fought on the Leningrad Front until the fall of 1944. Even on more central fronts, the T-70 continued to fight into the summer of 1944, specifically in tank regiments used in cavalry divisions. In these units the T-70B was actively used, for example, in the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive. Vehicles of this type were used by the 61st and 87th Independent Tank Regiments.

T-70B on parade in Kiev. November 7th, 1945.

Overall, the T-70B was a decent tank. Many issues that plagued it were caused by the speed at which it was developed and put into production. The tank's short career was caused by the rapidly changing state of the front lines. Tank development was so rapid that there was no room for the light tank on the battlefield soon after it was designed.

Nevertheless, the T-70B was not built in vain. Its chassis was useful when designing many vehicles. The most popular were the SU-12 and SU-15M, but the T-70B chassis was also used to build Ya-11, Ya-12, Ya-13, and M-2 tractors. Even the post-war K-61 prime mover is a descendant of this light tank that appeared in a very difficult time.

Tiger Air Filters

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"F.V.D.D. Cover Sheet to Test Bay Report No.4248
Performance Tests on Two-Stage Air Cleaner - German Tank Pz.Kw.6 (Tiger)


Origin:

The performance of a two-stage air cleaner removed from a captured German vehicle was ascertained in the course of a general investigation of enemy air cleaners.


Comments:

It is of considerable interest to note that contrary to the general practice of British and allied air cleaner manufacturers, the scrubber element of this unit is made up of expanded metal instead of the more usual knitted wire.

The de-dusting efficiency of this cleaner, both at varying and partial air flows, falls considerably below the requirements of this Department.

The dust capacity of the cleaners also falls considerably below minimum requirements and as a consequence a rapid rise of restrictions is encountered after running the cleaners for about 4 hours at varying air flow. It is considered that these properties are due to the fact that the height of the cleaner is severely limited as it is mounted between the engine and the adjoining top cover plate. It is understood from German documents that considerable trouble has been experienced in maintaining an air tight joint between the air outlet from the cleaner and the engine, to which the cleaner is secured by means of a single bolt.

It is understood flux ash dust obtained from the Clingenberg [sic] power station (South East of Berlin) was used for the development of this and similar German A.F.V. air cleaners and this may in part be responsible for the low efficiency when tested on D.T.D. test dust.

Conclusions:

The cleaner developed in Germany for use on the Tiger tanks does not achieve the standard required for British A.F. Vehicles.

Further action:
  1. The results of tests carried out will be made available to all concerned with the design, production, and maintenance of A.F.V. air cleaners.
  2. This project may be closed.
[Signature]
W.J. Semmons
Assistant Director (Power Plants)
[Signature]
A.E. Masters
Chief Engineer"

F.V.D.D.
Chobham Lane, Chertsey
D.6 7(o)
JFW
10/10/45"

Manufacturing Difficulty

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"Completion of quota at factory #200 in August of 1944

In August of 1944, the factory was instructed to produce:
  • IS-2 hulls: 200
  • IS-2 turrets: 200
As of September 1st, the factory delivered and QA accepted:
  • IS-2 hulls: 120
  • IS-2 turrets: 120
The quota for August was completed by 60%.

This significant shortfall of production is explained mainly by exceptionally poor output of the metallurgical plants that were supplying armour, as well as mass food poisoning of assembly and mechanical plant workers in the cafeteria.

Considering that the poisoning had some effect on the output of the factory, the People's Commissar of Tank Production permitted the extension of the due date for the August quota until September 5th and supply of workers from mother factories, delivered by airplane, without reducing the quota for September.

The total quota for August and five days of September is:
  • IS-2 hulls: 175
  • IS-2 turrets: 175
The timelines for completion of the August quota are outlined in table #1.

In September, the factory must produce:
  • IS-2 hulls: 200
  • IS-2 turrets: 200"

Yuri Pasholok writes that the annual report accounts for 200 hulls and turrets produced in August, so presumably the shortfall was made up for in September completely.

Minesweeper

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"May 27th, 1944
To the Chief of the GBTU Tank Directorate, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, comrade Afonin

Report on the issue of firing from the T-34-85M tank equipped with a PT-3 mine roller

According to orders from Deputy Chief of the GBTU, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Engineering Service comrade Lebedev, the NIBT Proving Grounds installed a PT-3 mine roller on a T-34-85 tank and determined the ability of firing from the tank after the detonation of a German TM-35 mine under the roller on May 26th and 27th, 1944.

The T-34-85M tank equipped with a PT-3 mine roller travelled on a dirt road for 1.5 km. The roller was in combat position. The turret was facing forward, with the gun level. Strikes on the gun muzzle were observed when the tank crossed pits up to 300 mm deep.

The German TM-35 mine was detonated under the two inner disks of the right side of the roller. The tank turret was turned forward, the gun was level, the traverse lock and elevation lock were disengaged.

An inspection of the tank after the mine detonated revealed the following:
  1. The explosion destroyed the right cheek of the mine roller frame. The roller was disabled. The tank would no longer be able to move with the roller attached.
  2. There is a dent on the muzzle from the left side: a mark from the impact of the roller, which was thrown upward by the mine. There is also a dent on the front part of the mine roller from the gun.
  3. The front of the hull and turret were covered in dirt. A 1-1.5 mm layer of dirt was left inside the barrel, 150 mm in length.
  4. The elevation mechanism and sight were undamaged.
As a result of the trials, the following conclusions can be drawn:
  1. Movement of the T-34-85M tank equipped with a PT-3 mine roller with the gun forward will result in impacts on the gun barrel even when crossing relatively small pits, which can cause damage to the latter.
  2. An explosion of a mine underneath the roller can damage the barrel of the gun by hitting it with the frame of the roller, which is propelled upwards, and also causing the fouling of the barrel with dirt.
    It is necessary to clear the dirt before firing, as the presence of dirt can lead to the barrel bursting and the shell exploding prematurely.
Conclusions:

The T-34-85M equipped with the PT-3 mine roller can only use it with the turret turned backwards. Trawler tanks should be supported by fire from regular tanks that follow it.

Chief of the NIBT Proving Grounds, Major-General of the Tank Forces, Romanov
Deputy Chief of the NIBT Proving Grounds, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel Sych
Assistant to the Chief of the NIBT Proving Grounds and the Chief of the Scientific Testing Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerkevich"


HOA Nightmare

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"HQ of the 12th Guards Order of the Red Banner Shepetov Tank Brigade
November 12th, 1945

Certificate 

Issued to mechanic-driver Guards Starshina Nikolai Fedorovich Agapov, to certify that he purchased with his own money the T-34-85 tank on which he fought German fascist invaders with the 12th Guards Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Order of Kutuzov Shepetov Tank Brigade.

Chief of Staff of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Dudnev."


Podcast

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Last year Tank Archives broke into a new medium, coming out in print. This year I've made another leap, this time into audio, taking part in Military History Visualized's podcast on kill claims vs actual losses. Long-time readers might find some of the content familiar, but there's plenty of fresh stuff to make it worth listening to. Keep an eye out on that channel, there will be plenty more of me to come!

SU-152: From Assault Gun to Tank Destroyer

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Work on Soviet SPGs assigned at the plenum of the Artillery Committee held on April 14-15th reached their logical conclusion by the end of 1942. The light SPG concept turned into the SU-12, designed by factory #38's design bureau and S.A. Ginzburg (the future SU-76). The most promising medium SPG was the U-35, designed at UZTM. By the end of December, the first vehicles of the pilot batch were complete.

The heavy SPG was in a more difficult situation. The project that started as the "212" bunker buster radically changed several times. The ZIK-20 SPG was to go into production, but the process dragged on. Even a model of the casemate was not completed on time, to say nothing of the SPG itself. In the end, another vehicle was developed, the KV-14.


An alternative from Chelyabinsk

After the story with the KV-7, the Chelyabinsk Kirov Factory (ChKZ) did not involve themselves in SPG development. The factory had enough to do with putting the T-34 and KV-1S into production. Nevertheless, regardless of who designed the prospective SPG, it was going to be produced at ChKZ.

ML-20 mount in the KV-14, December 1942.

The replacement of the KV-1 chassis with the KV-1S postponed any existing bunker buster project. The design bureau of factory #8 bit off more than they could chew with the new SPG, tackling several topics at once. The initiator of work on a new heavy SPG at ChKZ can be gleamed from a factory #100 report from September 15th to October 1st, 1942.
The tank with two coaxial cannons was rejected. The GAU proposed the Kirov factory to install one ML-20 system into this hull. The system has arrived at factory #100. Designers are working on blueprints for the mount, after which they will begin building a wooden model to be presented to the GAU.
The report talks about a Chelyabinsk designed SPG, not the ZIK-20. The factory did not display much enthusiasm about this project. The KV-13 just entered trials in late September, the KV-1S was giving them trouble, and much was still to be done to put the T-34 into production. It's not surprising that work on a heavy SPG proceeded quite slowly at first. Here is how N.F. Shashmurin described it in his memoirs:
Regarding the development of the SU-152, it was not irrelevant what chassis this would be done on. L.S. Troyanov was sent to join our team. He created a draft of a platform with 8 pairs of road wheels that used KV-1S components.
1942 was drawing to a close. It was clear that this suggestion was absurd. The only satisfactory solution would be to retain the KV-1S chassis. Kotin came to my department and drew me a picture: a KV-1S with a 152 mm gun, instead of a turret there was a KV-7-esque casemate. Of course, this was the only correct solution. He told me: "By 3:00 am determine the feasibility of this variant." He left me a sketch of the gun that G.N. Rybin brought from F.F. Petrov. We had the layout finished by morning. N.T. Fedorchuk and M.I. Zeltser did the work. The result had overloaded front wheels and excessive overhang of the gun. A meeting of lead engineers revealed no contrary opinions. The hull designers, led by V.I. Tarotko, and artillerymen, led by F.F. Petrov, had the hardest jobs. The KV-1S chassis was preserved. There wasn't much design to be done, and the SU-152 was ready within a month."
As you can see from this excerpt, the initial heavy SPG design was somewhat different from what was eventually built. The work on this topic was expedited no earlier than the very end of 1942. The blueprint index of the future SU-152 speaks volumes. The vehicle received the index 236. #234 was the KV-13 with a U-11 howitzer (work on this tank began in December of 1942). The next number, 235, was assigned to the KV-8S flamethrower tank. As for #236, later named KV-14 (rarely: SU-14), work on it really started towards the end of December. The reason for this was the same as why this project existed in the first place: issues with the ZIK-20. 

Experimental prototype of the KV-14 SPG. Chelyabinsk, late January 1943.

A demonstration of bunker busters was held on January 13th, 1943. Factory #9's design bureau, the reorganized factory #8 design bureau, proposed a ZIK-20 that used the KV-1S chassis. This allowed the mass of the new SPG to be reduced, but it was still high: 47-48 tons. GAU did not like F.F. Petrov's idea to alter the ML-20, as this would make production difficult. As a result, factory #9's project was rejected, even though the design bureau already completed working blueprints and a casemate model.

ChKZ's SKB-2 presented two variants of L.S. Troyanov's KV-14 project. Unfortunately, only a text description of the first vehicle survives. It was based on a KV-1S chassis that was lengthened by 450 mm. The number of road wheels remained the same, only the distance between them increased. This variant was unsatisfactory for the commission, as production of a hull that long could run into issues, and increased spacing between road wheels would lead to poor mobility on soft soils.

KV-14 from the front. The vehicle turned out to be rather low for its class.

The second KV-14 variant was chosen as the winner. It retained the chassis and gun unchanged. This vehicle was also a lot lighter. Calculations showed that its mass would be only 45.5 tons. This was more than the KV-1S weighed, but less than factory #9's proposal. The fighting compartment was also better laid out. It's not surprising that this variant was chosen, even though its documentation still needed work.

Stalin signed GKO decree #2692 "On production of a prototype of the 152 mm SPG on the KV-1S chasssis" on January 4th, on the day after the commission's meeting. The characteristics of the vehicle were copied from the second KV-14 variant. The decree provided ChKZ and factory #9 with a difficult task. The gun mount was to be delivered by January 23rd, and the prototype had to be ready for trials on the 31st.

The same vehicle from the right.

On January 5th, Zaltsmann issued order #6ss "On the production of a 152 mm SPG on the KV-1S chassis". According to the order, chief designer Zh.Ya. Kotin would deliver the blueprints by the 10th. Factory #200 would deliver a complete hull by January 18th. Assembly of the KV-14 would be complete by January 25th. Factory trials would be complete by January 29th, and the vehicle would be sent for proving grounds trials by February 1st. Tactical-technical requirements were finalized on January 6th, and were generally the same as those stated in the GKO decree.

Work started at SKB-2 immediately after the order was received. According to GBTU reports, the first blueprints were delivered to production on January 8th, and the last on January 10th. Parts were assigned to each plant on the next day. Work on a model proceeded in parallel. The KV-14 armour model was built by the 14th, and the full model was built and approved on the 17th. Factory #200 completed the casemate plates by the 19th, and installation on a KV-1S hull began immediately. A complete hull was delivered on the next morning. Assembly work began the same day: the engine and gearbox were centered, torsion bars and suspension arms were installed.

View from the left.

Work on producing an SPG variant of the ML-20 gun was underway at factory #172 in parallel. On January 11th, 1943, this variant was given the name ML-20S (ML-20-S and ML-20s were also used). The gun was held on a frame, protected with an armoured cover and massive gun mantlet. The mantlet had an opening in it to allow service of the recoil mechanisms, covered with a cover. A hydraulic pump was used to fill the mechanism with fluid. A special slot for the pump was added to the front of the hull, where it was fitted during service. Since removing the muzzle brake would have introduced too many changes, it was left as is. As per the customer's requirements, the variable recoil length mechanism was removed, and the tail rod was set to short recoil operation. Half-round elevation and traverse mechanisms with worm gears were added. A loading tray was added to the cradle, which doubled as a guard rail for the loader.

The SPG with fighting compartment hatches open.

The biggest change in the ML-20S compared to the towed gun was the installation of a T-9 (TOD-9) sight, initially designed for the KV-2 tank. The T-9 was a modernized KT-1 (casemate-telescopic) sight for the DOT-4 fortress gun. The prism in its design gave it a characteristic "knee bend". The PG-1 sight with a Hertz panorama was left for indirect fire. The T-9 sight was considered a temporary measure, and later the T-10 sight would be used, which had markings for ML-20 ballistics. In practice, initial production KV-14s were built with T-9 sights.

View from behind.

The design of the vehicle diverged from initial requirements slightly. The KV-14 was supposed to have a crew of six, but the dimensions of the fighting compartment left no room for a radio operator. This issue was resolved by assigning the gun commander to the the radio operator. The dimensions of the fighting compartment also did not allow the use of KV-1S fuel tanks. Instead, new fuel tanks were placed along the right of the casemate, 480 L in total. This placement of fuel tanks made them more vulnerable to being hit with an enemy shell, but there was nowhere else to put them. 

The initial designs of the Kirov Factory's design bureau were also altered. According to GBTU's requirements, all tanks and SPGs had to be equipped with handrails for infantry riders. Even though the KV-14 had no handrails initially, they were added to the prototype.

KV-14 during gunnery trials.

Assembly of the prototype KV-14 was complete by the morning of January 23rd. Only the gun was left, and it arrived in the evening. Installation went on all night, and on the next day the final assembly was finished ahead of schedule. As planned, the KV-14 with serial number 3011 set out to factory trials, which were completed by January 29th. Proving grounds trials followed. The KV-14 would have driven for 200 km and fired 296 shots according to initial plans.

However, the actual distance travelled was less: 85 km to the proving grounds and 88 km back. Driving to the proving grounds was done in very harsh conditions. The highway was covered in snow and the temperature was -42 degrees. Water got into the fuel, which led to frequent stalling of the engine. As a result, it took 13 hours to travel 85 km. Gunnery trials had to be shortened. 234 shots were fired instead of 296, 100 of them with increased propellant. No deformation was found after the trials. Rate of fire trials showed an average result of 2.8 RPM. This was less than required, but acceptable for a gun with of this caliber.

The commission made the following conclusions:
  1. The experimental prototype of the SPG with a 152 mm mod. 1937 gun-howitzer on the chassis of the KV-1S tank designed by the design bureaus of the Kirov factory, factory #172, and factory #9, and produced by factory #172 and the Kirov factory, satisfies the requirements for this kind of SPG and has passed proving grounds trials.
  2. This SPG is recommended for service with the Red Army artillery branch and immediate production after the introduction of changes listed in section A of part VI of this report.
  3. Task the Kirov Factory, factory #172, and factory #9 with the development of an SPG described in section B of part VI, delivering it for review by the Artillery Committee by March 15th of this year. 

KV-14 in front of a target. There was no issue with precision.

The Red Army finally had a heavy SPG that was approved for mass production. It was radically different from what the military wanted initially, but it matched the realities of war. The development of this vehicle did not go unseen: Zh.Ya. Kotin, S.N. Makhonin, L.S. Troyanov, and F.F. Petrov were awarded the Stalin Prize "For the development of a new type of artillery armament" in March of 1943.

Evolution without drama

As mentioned above, the KV-14 was the last of the SPG triad to enter production. By the time it got on the conveyor belt, Sverdlovsk and Kirov were already building the SU-35 (SU-122) and SU-12 (SU-76). However, both the SU-12 and SU-122 ended up with a large amount of design flaws. The SU-152 was the only one of the three that was put into production nearly unchanged. Of course, it had its issues. The trials commission came up with a list of more than ten items that should be corrected. The rear of the fighting compartment was to be widened, the ML-20 would receive a sliding breech, and the fuel tanks moved out of the fighting compartment. However, these changes were never made.

Early production KV-14s look nearly identical to the prototype.

Stalin signed GKO decree #2883ss "On production of the SU-14 SPG, KV-1S tanks, and hulls in February and March of 1943" on February 14th. According to this decree, 30 KV-14s were due in February and 75 in March. An agreement was made with the factory to set the cost of one SPG at 265,000 rubles. Due to a shortage of components only 15 KV-14s were produced in February instead of 30. This meant that 90 had to be delivered in March: 75 normal ones and 15 to satisfy the shortfall. The situation was critical: only 23 KV-14s were accepted by March 28th, and production was blocked due to a lack of track links. Truly heroic efforts allowed assembly of the rest of the vehicles to be completed in the last 3 days. This manner of production was typical for ChKZ. Considering the fact that the factory built 3 vehicles at once (T-34, KV-1S, KV-14), this was not unexpected.

This is what the SU-152 looked like from March to July of 1943.

There were inescapable deficiencies in various components. The gun mount frames often had tolerances that were off, which meant that they had to be trimmed to fit the armour, which introduced delays. Shortages of toolkits, which came along with ML-20S guns from factory #172, were also common.

As mentioned above, initial KV-14 vehicles were equipped with T-9 sights, later replaced with T-10 sights, which were later renamed to ST-10. There were wishes to replace the ST-10 with a sight that didn't have the "knee", but no work was done past experiments.

The same vehicle from the left. To make production easier the handrails were produced in separate pieces.

The first changes to the KV-14 design was made in March of 1943. Changes from the trials reports were implemented. External changes include a rough aiming indicator for the driver, consisting of a sight post welded in the middle of his observation slit. The simplified handrails are also worth a mention. The handrails on initial SU-152s were connected, but in March they became separate, which made production easier. The cap above the gun mantlet also changed. It used to be rounded, but now became more angled. A holder for a pickaxe was added on the rear right side of the casemate.

The cap above the gun mantlet was simplified.

Even though only one factory built the SU-152, there was a certain variety in its form. Initially the casemate armour was cut very carefully, but there was no time for cosmetics in March. The rear hatch, initially somewhat rounded, became rougher in shape. The sides of the hull were cut roughly, sometimes sticking up past the roof and blocking the observation periscopes. To enable them to see, the plates had to be trimmed. This phenomenon was not present on all SPGs, plus the height of the protrusions could be different, giving the vehicles a certain individuality.

Two types of suspension arms were used: regular and lightened, which were introduced for the KV-1S in December of 1942. A feature of some SPGs was a counterweight on the gun mantlet. It is not a distinguishing feature of some production batch, as it can be encountered on an SPG made in any timeframe.

A completed SU-152 at the Kirov factory, Chelyabinsk, 1943.

Issues with components continued into April of 1943. Assembly of the SU-152, which was the new name of the KV-14 as of this month, was delayed due to a lack of guns and wiring for the Luch ("Beam") lighting system. As a result, only 31 vehicles were accepted by April 24th. The April quota of 75 vehicles was achieved, but further issues lay in wait. As of May 25th, 1943, only 5 SU-152s were accepted. The fault lay with factory #200, which supplied only 28 hulls by that point. Supply issues with gearboxes and other components were also common. A number of SPGs awaiting correction of defects after participating in training piled up at the factory.

Early June was no better. Based on reports by military representatives, the factory had assembled 36 SPGs by June 10th, but not a single one was accepted. The issue was poor quality of the delivered engines and gearboxes. These components broke down in droves. The situation was corrected only towards the end of the month, when 84 vehicles were accepted instead of 75. The factory also managed to repair 15 SU-152s that were built earlier.

Stalin inspects the SU-152. After his comment, fans were installed in the roof of the fighting compartment.

The quotas for SPG production in the third quarter were corrected. Instead of 75 vehicles, 80 SPGs were due in July, and 84 in August and September. In addition, according to an agreement between the Kirov Factory, the NKTP, and the GAU, the cost of one SU-152 decreased to 250,000 rubles. Despite a number of delays, the factory put out 80 SU-152s. Vehicles produced towards the end of the month had some changes. The rear handrail was attached at three points instead of two. Another change was made to the SU-152 and KV-1S at the same time. The exhausts received shorter and more reliable armour covers. The SU-152 remained unchanged from here on until late September of 1943.

SU-152 hull assembly, October 1943.

August was a calm period for ChKZ. The SPGs were delivered gradually instead of all at once: 28 by the 10th, 36 by the 15th, and the full 84 by September 1st. However, there were some issues that were only revealed after the SPGs were delivered to their end users. The Military Representative at the Kirov Factory, Sharonov, accepted several dozen SU-152s with gun mantlet defects. The opening for the hydraulic fluid tank cap wrench were drilled incorrectly, which made it impossible to refill the recoil mechanism with fluid. This defect was discovered after the vehicles were sent to the Moscow Self Propelled Artillery Center. The omission had to be corrected on the spot with gas cutters.

Late production SU-152.

The final changes to the SU-152 were made at the end of September. A rim was added around the rear pistol port. In addition, it was discovered that fumes gather inside the fighting compartment during combat, which resulted in carbon monoxide poisoning. This issue bubbled up to not just the GABTU, but to the very top. Stalin personally raised the issue during an inspection of new vehicles in the Kremlin on September 8th, 1943. Starting with September 23rd, two fans were added to the roof of the fighting compartment of the SU-152. 84 vehicles were delivered before the end of the month.

The view from above shows the fans on the roof.

The situation with the SU-152 began to change in October. The IS-152 (ISU-152) went through trials during this month. GKO decree #4504 "On the heavy IS-152 SPG armed with the ML-20S gun-howitzer" accepted the vehicle into service on November 8th. ChKZ began preparing for production of the ISU-152. An order to stop production of the SU-152 was given on the same day. The monthly quota was reduced to 42 units. The last SU-152 were finished by November 20th, and the first 5 ISU-152 were complete by the end of the month.

The last SU-152s were delivered after the official end of production. They aren't listed in the factory's reports, but are recorded in the list of delivery of SPGs that were sent to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria every 5 days. According to them, ChKZ delivered 4 SU-152s in December of 1943, and the last two production vehicles were accepted in late January of 1944. This increases the number of SU-152s produced to 670 units.

Beast killer

Even though the first SU-152s were delivered in February of 1943, they arrived on the front lines significantly later. Overloading of ChKZ with three types of vehicles reflected on the quality of their production. Issues with the SU-152 meant that they were only issued in April of 1943.

Spring 1943 production SU-152s on the offensive.

On February 14th, 1943, at the same time as the KV-14 was accepted into service, Stalin signed GKO decree #2889 "On formation of heavy SPG regiments of the Supreme Command Reserve". According to the document, 16 heavy SPG regiments (TSAP) would be formed: 1 in February, 5 by March 25th, 5 by April 15th, and 5 more by May 25th. The TSAP had 310 men and 12 SU-152s according to TO&E #010/454, accepted in April of 1943. In addition to the SPGs, the regiment also contained a commander's KV-1S and a BA-64 armoured car. The SPGs were split into 6 batteries of 2 vehicles each.

SU-152 in Karelia, summer if 1944.

Initially, these units just discovered defects with their new SPGs. For instance, defects were discovered with 7 of the 1536th SAP's SPGs, same with the 1537th. The 1538th SAP had 10 defective vehicles, and the 1539th SAP found defects with all of its SPGs. Because of this, the SPGs took a while to reach the front lines.

However, out of all the three Soviet SPGs developed after the Artillery Commitee plenum, this was the best. The design had no inherent engine group issues like with the SU-76. The fighting compartment was not as cramped as on the SU-122. The design of the SU-152 turned out to be very good. Of the three SPGs, the SU-152 was the only one with a telescopic sight, which came in handy. Fate had a different plan in store for the SU-152 than what was initially envisioned.

The same vehicle from the right.

The SU-152 made its combat debut in July of 1943, at the Battle of Kursk. The 1541st SAP was helf in reserve in the north of the salient, commanded by Guards Major A.F. Sankovskiy. It's worth remembering that the SU-152 had no AP rounds designed for it, but that did not make the lives of German tankers any easier. From July 8th to 18th, the SAP reported 7 Tigers destroyed, 39 medium tanks, and 11 SPGs. Some publications change 10 of those SPGs into Ferdinands, but authors of such fiction should hold their horses. Nevertheless, these results were very impressive, especially for a debut. In these battles the SU-152 earned the name of Beast Killer. This was an official title, and bestowed only on the SU-152. The soldiers gave the SU-152 a number of their own nicknames, often very inappropriate ones.

Even though a large amount of IS-152s were in service by the summer of 1943, their predecessors continued to fight.

The SU-152 became a tank destroyer by necessity. As mentioned above, it had no AP shell. The design process began in April of 1943, and it was officially indexed BR-450 on June 14th, but in practice it only appeared in August. However, the HE shell was a terrifying weapon. The 43 kg projectile carried enough energy to crumble a medium tank upon impact. Even if it did not penetrate the armour of a heavy tank, it still resulted in significant damage. In most cases, a hit from this SPG meant that the enemy was at least partially disabled. The SU-152 was the only Soviet vehicle in 1943 that could combat any enemy tank or SPG.

Inside the SU-152. Not very roomy, but hardly a sardine can.

Of course, the SU-152 had its drawbacks. Complaints were made about the visibility from the fighting compartment. The design of the observation periscopes, which had large dead zones, was often the cause of losses. Complaints were made about the small amount of ammunition. Many units increased the capacity to 25 rounds by stowing 5 additional shells in wooden pallets underneath the gun. A proposal was made to add proper ammunition racks there, but it was never done. The quality of existing racks was also not without issues.

The presence of a large fuel tank in the fighting compartment led to serious consequences for the crew if it was penetrated. Finally, the turning mechanism turned out to be poor. Until the end of production, the SU-152 was equipped with the ML-20S with the old style of turning mechanism that pressed against the driver's shoulder or back in some positions.

SU-152 captured by the Germans in the summer of 1943. Later, this vehicle ended up at the Kummersdorf proving grounds.

Heavy SPG regiments equipped with the SU-152 played an important role in operations from the summer of 1943 to the spring of 1944. Many of the regiments earned Guards status. Most regiments received superior ISU-152 SPGs by the summer of 1944, but SU-152s survived in some units until the start of 1945. One of these units was the 268th Guards SAP. By the start of the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive, this unit had a mixed composition: both SU-152s and ISU-152s. One of the SU-152s was commanded by Guards Lieutenant S.A. Stychinskiy, who had a wealth of combat experience by then. On July 15th, 1944, his crew faced off against a group of German tanks, destroying 5 of them. Sergei Alexandrovich thanks the hilly terrain for his success. His tank rolled up to the top of a hill, fired a shot, and immediately retreated. Later, Stychinskiy liberated Lvov, fought in Poland, and made it to the victorious end in May of 1945.

Parade in Kiev, May 9th, 1945.

Only three SU-152s survive to this day. Two vehicles can be seen in Poland, one more in Patriot Park. The long road to the heavy SPG was not walked for nothing. It didn't end up being a bunker buster, but it turned into a dangerous opponent for any German tank. In this respect, the SU-152 was the best Soviet vehicle in production in 1943.


Where Infantry Can't Pass

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History enthusiasts are familiar with Winterketten and Ostketten track links for PzIII and PzIV tanks. The use of these track links was a necessary measure to increase mobility in the snow and on wet, soft soil. The history of these track links did not particularly attract historians, but at the very least their existence is widely known. There are photos of German tanks with these track links and they are fond in the ground on battlefields. However, nothing is known of equivalent development in the Red Army. Let us try to fill this gap.


German PzIII tank with winter tracks.

Even though the USSR tested various designs of tracks that reduced ground pressure and some of them demonstrated impressive results, none of them entered mass production. However, there are archive documents that shed some light on this page from the history of Soviet tank building, at the scientific approach to the study of off-road mobility, and the influence of this work on subsequent tank development.

The issue of poor mobility on soft soil was encountered by tankers along with the first tanks. Even though tracks had their advantages over wheels, there were still limitations. This was especially evident when driving in the sand, on ice, snow, in riverbeds, swamps, or flood plains. Situations when a tank becomes bogged down and cannot get out is common in our times. Work on reducing these drawbacks has been done and is still being done in many nations.

Winterketten tracks found on battlefields.

The most obvious way to reduce ground pressure is to widen the track. However, one cannot widen the track indefinitely due to limits of toughness of the metal and increasing weight of the vehicle, which will in turn require a more powerful engine. In addition, a wider track is more vulnerable to enemy fire. Designers of each tank have to find the balance between the mass, width, and reliability of track links while still ensuring satisfactory mobility.

Tanks that find this balance and obtain good mobility and speed on difficult terrain were quite extraordinary. One of them was the legendary T-34, although early tracks for this tank had issues. The T-34's success was not an accident. In December of 1938, the ABTU Automotive and Armour Scientific Research Proving Grounds performed a series of trials, the results of which formed the foundation of the research performed by the 8th Department of Kirov factory #185. The results of trials were summarized in 1939 and sent to the ABTU, Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization, and tank factories.

The light T-26 tank was the most common Soviet pre-war tank.

But what to do with existing tanks? The RKKA had a large amount of T-26, T-28, T-37A, T-38, and a whole family of BT tanks. The T-26 tank and vehicles on its chassis were the most common, numbering over 10,000 units. Even though the T-26 showed itself well in trials of 1938, the Winter War showed that existing vehicles still have to be modernized in this regard.

Engineers from KB-1 of 8th Department of factory #185 developed two types of devices that improved the T-26's mobility in swamps and on soft terrain. Trials were performed in Leningrad, at Voroshilov factory #174, which produced this type of tank.

T-26-B device

The first device was developed under the guidance of Engineer Shufrin and was called T-26-B. Three variants were delivered for trials, all three using track pins that were 545 mm long instead of the stock 280 mm. The diameter remained the same: 18 mm. Unlike the regular track pin, the new one had grooves on each side for a stopper ring. The width of the track link doubled: from 260 mm to 520 mm. The contact surface also doubled, reaching 28,912 cm². This measurement and all subsequent ones were made between the axles of the front and rear road wheels.

Components that were manufactured anew: lengthened track pin, lengthened axle, road wheel distance sleeve, additional track link (second variant).

The first variant of the T-26-B used a second set of regular tracks, a full set of road wheels, and half of the return rollers. One addition was the distance collar, which added space between the regular and additional road wheels. Instead of the axle cap, the first and last return roller had additional rollers added. The cap was installed on the outer roller instead.

Track links slid onto the lengthened track pin. On the bottom, there was a second row of road wheels. On the top, two extra idlers on each side. The idler and drive sprocket were unchanged. The overall increase in mass was 1233 kg. The ground pressure was reduced from 0.59 kg/cm² to 0.34 kg/cm².

Variant 1 of the T-26-B device.

It took 660 man-minutes to convert a T-26 tank. In other words, two crewmen would spend 5.5 hours to replace the track links and add extra road wheels.

The second variant of the T-26-B differed little from the first one, aside from the outer track. Instead of regular track links, 5 mm thick stamped track links were used. The eyes were formed by simply bending the metal, without welding. All additional components were the same as on the first variant.

The second variant of device T-26-B.

The mass of the additional track was reduced compared to the first one, making the conversion weigh only 920 kg. The ground pressure was reduced to 0.325 km/cm². The conversion time was the same as before: 5.5 hours.

The third variant of the T-26-B device.

The third variant of the T-26-B was similar to the second one, but omitted the extra wheels. The additional mass of the third variant was 430 kg and the ground pressure was 0.308 kg/cm². Two tankers needed 132 minutes, or 2.2 hours, to perform this modernization.

T-26-1/P device

The second device was proposed by Engineer Zhukov and designated T-26-1/P. This device also consisted of additional track links attached to the main tracks.

T-26-1/P device. Additional track links are added to each production track link.

Each additional track link was composed of two parts, which were attached to the outer and inner side of the stock track link. The design was not complicated. The inner part was a metallic plate with eyes for the track pins welded on. The outer part was longer. Two ribs were welded to the metal plate, and eyes for the track pins welded to the ribs. The length of the eyes was about half as much as the ribs.

The design of the track pin was analogous to the stock design: the diameter was 18 mm, same as on the original. The length was increased from 280 mm to 425 mm.

Additional track links of the T-26-1/P device.

The overall width of the track was twice as much as standard: 520 mm. The contact surface increased from 14,456 cm² to 28,912 cm². It was suggested that T-26-1/P additional tracks be installed on every other track link. This way, the extra mass was reduced to 458 kg and the ground pressure to 0.31 kg/cm². It would take two tankers 2.2 hours to "dress up" their tank.

Trials

The goal of the trials was to test the effectiveness of these changes in real conditions, determine the toughness of the additional tracks, and figure out the effect they had on driving the tank.

To understand the effect on swamp driving, two tanks were tested at the same time. A production tank and a modified tank crossed the same section of the swamp in parallel. To determine the defects of each device, it was decided that each tank must drive for at least 100 km.

A T-26-B (first variant) overtakes a production tank during trials in a swamp.

T-26-B variants 1 and 2 were installed on production tanks. The devices travelled 210.9 km between May 13th and 21st, 1940, 64 on cobblestones, 99.8 km on beaten dirt roads, 2.1 km on swamps, and 26 km off-road. During this time, track pins slipped out six times due to poor quality limiter rings and one extra road wheel fell off a T-26-B due to a minor design defect, where the axle cap twisted itself off.

As a result of the trials, it was determined that the changes do not noticeably affect the steering or resistance during movement when compared to a regular tank.

A trail left in the swamp by the first variant T-26-B tank.

Tanks with additional tracks left less noticeable trails in the swamp and did not get stuck where the  production tank became stuck. The modified tanks did not have their tracks slip when starting in a peat bog, and could get out on their own by rocking back and forth if they became bogged down.

The third variant of the T-26-B was tested separately. Two trips were made: on May 23rd and June 9th, 1940. The tank travelled 127.4 km, 35 on cobblestones, 42.4 km on a gravel road with big potholes, 48 km on dirt roads, and 2 km through swamps.

Bent track pins on a third variant T-26-B.

It turned out that the track pins bent when driving on uneven terrain. The lack of extra road wheels made itself known. Additionally, the track pins popped out due to poor quality limiter rings. If a track pin slid inwards, it would be bent by the hull, and become useless.

Since the tracks did not slip on the third variant of the T-26-B, the tracks could be straightened with a mallet. However, the tracks turned inside out when driving in swamps. The tracks became disengaged from the drive sprockets, and the tracks slipped off. If the track was turned inside out inwards, then the engine would stall, as there would be no way to continue forward.

The track turned inside out and the tank stopped.

The T-26-1/P was trialled in three stages between June 14th and 23rd, 1940. The tank drove for 112.38 km with this device, 65 on cobblestones, 46.3 on a dirt road with potholes, and only 1.5 km through a swamp. During trials, two track pins broke along the joint of a stock track and the additional one. Due to a slightly smaller length than the ones on the T-26-B, they did not become deformed. The tracks were not thrown while driving through a swamp, despite the testers' best effots.

It's important to note that the testers installed T-26-1/P tracks on every track link instead of every other, which would double the additional mass and increase the ground pressure. However, this was not recorded in the report. Perhaps the testers did not consider it important.

Results

It became clear that the first two variants of the T-26-B were useful, with the additional road wheels being necessary. Despite the harsh trials, no deformations of track pins were observed. The only thing that needed to be done was change the design of the limiter rings and prevent the axle caps from unscrewing themselves. 

Trails made in the swamp by a production tank (right) and a tank with a swamp crossing attachment.

The third variant of the T-26-B was useless due to tracks turning inside out and slipping off the idlers.

The simpler T-26-1/P was no worse than the first two T-26-B variants, even though it had no extra road wheels and weighed less. Zhukov's variant was deemed the most promising due to its simplicity and convenience.

The final report was signed on July 20th, 1940, by Chief Engineer of the 20th Department of factory #174, S.A. Ginzburg, after which the document was sent to the ABTU and VAMM.

Bogged down T-26 with regular tracks.

Unfortunately, the report disappeared into obscurity. The additional track links were never produced, despite the great help they could have been in the North, Karelian, Leningrad, and North-West Fronts in 1941-1943.

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Here's a rather interesting analysis of the Tiger's commander's cupola by British tankers. It's no secret that the British weren't huge fans of German observation devices, but here is a pretty thorough list of its deficiencies, backed by a handy diagram.



As you can see, the Tiger has a pretty sizeable dead zone (30.5 to 36.5 meters) to the right and rear-right due to the position of the commander's cupola, which the British comment on as being an effective approach for infantry with anti-tank weapons. 

Let's compare this cupola to that of the KV-1S tank


Despite having a cupola in roughly the same place, the dead zone to the right and rear-right is only 11-14 meters, less than half as much as the Tiger. The KV-1S also sees slightly better to the left and rear-left, with a dead zone of 9-11 meters to the Tiger's 12-15. The KV-1S has worse vision forward though, a dead zone of 28 meters compared to the Tiger's 18. The field of view is also obscured by the gunner's periscope, which the Tiger does not have. On the flip-side, the Tiger's gunner is restricted to the narrow field of view of his gun scope. 
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