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VK 36.01: Half a Step from the Tiger

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Henschel's tank program looked somewhat comical in late 1941 and early 1942. The company was working on three heavy tanks at the same time. The lifeline of one of them, the VK 30.01(H), was just about to end, but work was still going on in December of 1941. The second tank being developed was the VK 45.01(H). Another tank, indexed VK 36.01, took the place between them in mass. The story of the first tank with a tapered bore gun that nearly went into production was far from simple.
Rapid weight loss

The VK 36.01 project appeared due to the "siege tank" program, approved by the Commander of the Land Forces, Major General Walther von Brauchitsch on November 24th, 1938. According to this concept, three tanks would be developed with the size and layout of the PzI, PzII, and PzIV. In the first case, the result was the PzI Ausf. F, in the second the PzII Ausf. J, and in the third, the VK 65.01. Initially, the VK 65.01 was indexed S.W. The 65 ton class tank would have 80 mm of armour. 75 mm and 105 mm guns (the latter would have a length of 20 calibers) were considered as weapons. A decision to install a 75 mm KwK L/24, the same gun as on the PzIV, was made in June of 1939.

The 25 caliber howitzer that was to be used as the A.W.'s main gun.

A project for another even heavier tank appeared around the time that the VK 65.01's armament was limited to that of the PzIV. Little is known about it, but its size was clearly larger than the VK 65.01. The mass of the vehicle named A.W. (Artilleriewagen, artillery vehicle) would surpass 80 tons, and its armour would be 100 mm thick. The Henschel company would develop the A.W., with the contract for the turret going to Krupp.

A 105 mm main gun would be used. Initially, the designers picked between a 20 caliber howitzer and the 10.5 cm leFH 18 with a barrel length of 28 calibers. On October 20th, 1939, Krupp presented another option. The 105 mm 25 caliber howitzer was taken as the starting point. The turret that housed this gun would need a 1750 mm wide turret ring, and its full width would be 2270 mm. The mass of the turret was also impressive: 8.4 tons.

The reworked A.W. would receive a weapon with the ballistics of the 105 mm leFH 18 howitzer.

The lifespan of this project was even shorter than that of the VK 65.01. Battles in France showed that the development of tanks that weighed more than 30 tons was pointless, since they would not be supported by existing river crossing equipment. The A.W. was the first victim of this new tank doctrine, adopted in early July of 1940.

However, the idea of arming a tank with a 105 mm howitzer remained. This weapon would allow tanks to combat more impressive fortifications than the 7.5 cm KwK L/24 could handle. Because of this, the A.W. did not die completely. On July 5th, Krupp received an order from the 6th Department of the Armament Directorate to develop a howitzer version of the VK 30.01.

The first variant was to receive a turret similar to the A.W.'s turret. The gun was replaced with an adapted 10.5 cm leFH 105. The front armour was thinned down to 80 mm, and the sides to 50 mm. The turret ring diameter was reduced to 1700 mm. In case the weight limit was still not met, the turret could be redesigned. Instead of typical Krupp style angled surfaces, the sides and rear of the turret would be rounded. Later, this layout would be used on the first variant of the VK 30.01(P), and then evolve into the Tiger's turret.

The second variant was for a howitzer version of the VK 30.01(H) turret. During the design process  that started in the fall of 1940, this was the preferred variant. The reworked turret would also have 80 mm of armour in the front and 50 mm in the sides. The final choice of the converted turret (called D.W. Turm in correspondence) was made in January of 1941. The turret received a cast gun mantlet. Prior to this, Krupp strived to avoid casting when designing tank turrets.

The stamp on one of the first VK 36.01 blueprints, March 1941.

In parallel with work on the turret, Henschel was redesigning the chassis. The front armour became 80 mm thick, and the floor was thickened to 25 mm. It was clear that a tank with these characteristics could not remain in this weight class, and the limit was lifted. The reworked chassis was named VK 36.01.

The increased strain forced a serious redesign of the chassis. Little remained from the VK 30.01(H). Even the hull, especially the rear, was changed. Amusingly, Heinrich Kniepkamp, who had a lot of influence on the development of the VK 36.01(H), kept trying to shoehorn elements from lighter vehicles into it. The chassis repeated the same metamorphosis as was seen on the VK 6.01 (later PzI Ausf. C) and then migrated to the PzI Ausf. F and PzII Ausf. J. Even the design of the evacuation hatches in the sides was borrowed from the light tanks. The same happened with the running gear. The 700 mm road wheels were discarded, and instead 800 mm road wheels were used. The number increased to 8 pairs per side. At the same time, return rollers were eliminated. The track links remained the same width as on the VK 30.01(H), but their pitch was reduced to 130 mm, and a second tooth was introduced on each track link.

A decision was made to increase the mobility of the new heavy tank. The 17.4 L V-12 450 hp Maybach HL 174 would be used. The transmission consisted of the 8-speed semiautomatic Maybach Olvar 40 12 16 and Henschel L 600 C turning mechanism. The tank's top speed was estimated at 50 kph, and the transmission was designed to suit it.

Heavy tank destroyer

Work on the chassis and turret of the VK 36.01 entered the active phase in the spring of 1941. At the time, Krupp and Henschel moved from working on the general concept to drawing blueprints. Krupp received an order for 4 hulls on March 6th. Two were due in January of 1942, and two in February. On May 5th, Krupp signed contract SS-006–4086/40 for four turrets. By then, Germany was working on four types of heavy tanks. In addition to the VK 30.01(H) and VK 36.01, Porsche was working on the VK 30.01(P) with more powerful armament. Work on the successor of the VK 65.01 also restarted by the spring of 1941. It is likely that this work formed the basis for the Soviet intelligence report on new German heavy tanks. The VK 36.01 matches the description of the "Type V", the VK 30.01 (P) is similar to the "Type VI", and the prospective VK 70.01 was the "Type VII". This information triggered work on the "big three": the KV-3, KV-4, and KV-5. The KV-3 was envisioned as a temporary measure, and either the KV-4 or KV-5 would enter production in 1942. Until the end of 1941, the Soviet Union was ahead of Germany in heavy tank design.

One of the first sketches of the VK 36.01 equipped with the Waffe 0725 gun. The drawing is from a British report from 1947.

The Germans likely did not know about the Soviet pre-war heavy tank design program. However, rumours definitely made their way to Berlin. One can assume that they triggered the change in requirements that Hitler approved at a meeting on May 26th, 1941. The thickness of the front armour was increased to 100 mm, and the sides to 60 mm. In addition, guns with anti-tank capability joined short barrelled weapons, with the former given priority. 

The VK 30.01(P) was already designated to carry a gun with the ballistics of the 8.8 cm Flak 18, so penetration had to be increased further. However, this type of gun did not fit into the turret of the VK 36.01. The solution was the use of the Waffe 0725 with a tapered bore. The caliber at the breech was 75 mm, but 55 mm at the muzzle, which radically increased the muzzle velocity of the round. However, there was one caveat. Each shot from the Waffe 0725 cost one kilogram of tungsten. Germany had a very limited supply of this metal. Nevertheless, this gun was chosen as the VK 36.01's main armament.

Development of the 5th and 6th German heavy tank began on June 26th, 1941. The first was a response to the requirement to install a turret capable of carrying the 88 mm gun onto the VK 36.01 chassis. The second was an alteration of the VK 30.01(P) design.

The turret of the VK 36.01 was similar to the VK 30.01(H). Since a larger gun would be installed, the commander and his cupola were shifted to the left.

On June 11th, 1941, the 6th Department told Krupp that they will have to change their turret once more. The overall configuration of the VK 30.01(H) was preserved. However, the size of the Waffe 0725 was such that the commander could no longer sit behind it. His station and his cupola were shirted to the left. The gunner and loader's hatches were also changed.

The gun mantlet was also changed. Its thickness, as the thickness of the turret front, remained at 80 mm. The thickness of the sides was increased to 60 mm as required. The Waffe 0725 had a coaxial MG 34 machinegun with the TZF 9b binocular sight. The thickness of the front armour was increased to 80 mm. The rear was 60 mm thick. The approximate mass was now 40 tons, but the top speed was still estimated to be 50 kph.

Odd one out

The mass production of the VK 36.01 was already under question in July of 1941. One of the issues with it was supplying the Waffe 0725 with ammunition. Hitler hardly yearned for a weapon that would consume all of Germany's tungsten. For this reason, only 6 VK 36.01 tanks and 8 Waffe 0725 guns would be built. Later, the numbers of hulls ordered from Krupp went up to 8. In October of 1941 the tank received a new name. In correspondence, it was referred to as the Pz.Kpfw.VI Ausf. B (VK 36.01). However, this index was rarely used.

The only experimental VK 36.01 chassis. The VK 13.01 chassis is nearby.

The first hull of the VK 36.01 was completed in Essen in late 1941. Henschel was receiving more and more orders for other products. The company was one of the producers of the PzIII, Germany's main tank at the time. Heavy losses on the Eastern Front required increasing production. Because of this, the 6th Department ordered the reduction of the VK 36.01 batch to two vehicles. However, Krupp finished their job, having produced 8 hulls and 8 turrets. 2 Waffe 0725 guns were completed, but they were never installed in the turrets. Henschel also never finished the two chassis. According to documents, one chassis was finished in March of 1942, but the second was never finished, since the VK 45.01(H) had higher priority. This tank had a lot more potential, and its gun did not devour tungsten.

The Maybach HL 174 engine. This engine was used on the VK 36.01.

A decision was made to convert the 5 VK 36.01 hulls into the VKz 35.01 ARVs. The vehicles were to be equipped with the Seilwinde 22/40 winch, which could carry up to 40 tons of mass. The Maybach HL 174 was replaced with the more powerful Maybach HL 210, so the ARV had the same engine as the VK 45.01(H). They were meant to work in tandem. The idea of building the VKz 35.01 stemmed from the VK 45.01. There was nothing that the Germans could evacuate a knocked out or bogged down tank with. The Sd.Kfz.9, Germany's main tank recovery vehicle, could only handle tanks that weighed about 20 tons.

The contract for conversion of the five VK 36.01 hulls into the VKz 35.01 was given to FAMO, the company that built the Sd.Kfz.9. However, not a single vehicle was ever built.

VK 36.01 chassis on trials.

Another unfinished idea for the project was the replacement of armament. The 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 and the 7.5 cm KwK 42 (one of the names for the Waffe 0725) were not the only guns that were designed in the first half of 1941. Rheinmetall-Borsig began working on another 75 mm gun on Hitler's orders. The first prototype had a barrel length of 60 calibers and could penetrate a 100 mm plate at 60 degrees from 1400 meters. In February of 1942, a 70 caliber version with even higher penetration was developed.

At the same time, Rheinmetall-Borsig designed a turret was that similar to the one that Krupp designed for the VK 36.01. This turret was meant to be installed into the VK 45.01(H). The idea to install this turret on the VK 36.01 (the letter used another index, VK 35.01) appeared in June of 1942. This vehicle would be called VK 35.02. However, this project did not live for long, only to mid-July of 1942. The idea of using the 75 mm gun in the VK 45.01 was rejected, and Rheinmetall-Borsig was about half a year too late to save the VK 36.01.

Albert Speer (driver's station) and Ferdinand Porsche (wearing a cap) during trials of the VK 36.01, November 1942.

However, the VK 36.01 was not a waste of time. The vehicle was actively used by Maybach during the development of the VK 45.01 transmission. Both tanks used the same gearbox.

In addition, the VK 36.01 took part in various trials as a part of the development of Tiger tanks. The most famous one is the trials that were held on November 8-14th, 1942, in Bad Berka. Here, the vehicle was driven by Albert Speer himself several times. The VK 36.01 was tested not only without a turret, but without a dummy weight. As a result, the tank was not only lighter than its heavy cousins, but the DB and MAN VK 30.02 tanks. The VK 36.01 turned out to be the fastest. This lead was lost during off-road trials, where it lost to the VK 45.01 and the VK 30.02. In addition, the tank broke down. The trials decided nothing, since the VK 36.01's fate was already sealed.

VK 36.01 turrets remained at Krupp's warehouse.

The last events the VK 36.01 took part in took place in 1944. 8 turrets remained in Krupp's possession in various stages of completion. The idea to convert them info fortifications came up back in November of 1942. The turrets would finally receive their armament and use ammunition from the 7.5 cm Pak 41. The hydraulic traverse mechanism, gunner's seat, and loader's seat were removed.

However, there was an issue. Some equipment was destroyed in March of 1943 during the bombing of Krupp factories by the British. This bombing buried the project. Damage after the July 25th, 1943, raid was so heavy that the turrets were abandoned. The idea returned in May of 1944. Krupp received orders to convert 6 turrets, but did not even begin to carry them out until the end of the war. In the spring of 1945, the turrets were captured by the Allies.


Tanks in the Snow

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Crossing of the snow obstacle by the German PzIII tank

Photo #25: Crossing the snow obstacles. The PzIII tank punches through the first obstacle.
Photo #26: Crossing the snow obstacles. The PzIII tank punches through the second obstacle.

The tank penetrated the first obstacle and reached the second in 7 minutes. After the eighth attempt, both obstacles were passed after accelerating in 3rd gear from 50-60 meters. Total time taken was 16 minutes.



Crossing of the snow obstacle by the M-3 English tank

Photo #27. Crossing of the snow obstacles. The M-3 punches through the first obstacle.
Photo #28. Crossing of the snow obstacles. The M-3 punches through the second obstacle.


Photo #29: Crossing of the snow obstacles. The M-3 punches through the second obstacle.

The tank penetrated the first obstacle after six tries after accelerating from 30-50 meters in second gear in 10 minutes. After 10 tries, the tank crossed both obstacles in a total time of 14 minutes. The engine stalled during obstacle crossing due to insufficient power.


Crossing of the snow obstacles by the English M-2a tank

Photo #30: Crossing of the snow obstacles. The M-2a punches through the first obstacle.
Photo #31: Crossing of the snow obstacles. The M-2a punches through the second obstacle.

After 3 tries in reduced speed gear, the tank penetrated the first obstacle in 6 minutes by accelerating from 40-50 meters. The tank penetrated both obstacles after 8 tries, taking a total of 21 minutes. The engine stalled during obstacle crossing due to insufficient power.


Photo #36: Crossing of the snow obstacles. The T-34 punches through the first obstacle.
Photo #37: Crossing of the snow obstacles. The T-34 punches through the second obstacle.

The tank crossed three snow obstacles after accelerating from 100 meters in second gear in 10 seconds."

CAMD RF 38-11355-804

Spare Parts

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding of the USSR #320ss
Moscow
July 12th, 1941

To ensure timely delivery of spare parts for KV and T-34 tanks to their destinations and reduction of tank repair times, I order that:
  1. Kirov factory director comrade Zaltsmann and Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory director comrade Shor must send a full set of parts with every 7 KV tanks according to attachments 1 and 2.
  2. Factory #183 director comrade Maksarev and Stalingrad Tractor Factory director comrade Dulkin must send a full set of parts with every 10 T-34 tanks according to attachments 3 and 4.
  3. Factory #75 director comrade Kochetkov must send a full set of parts with every 7 V-2K diesel engines sent to Kirov and Chelyabinsk factories and 10 V2-34 engines sent to STZ and factory #183 according to attachments #2 and 4.
  4.  
    1. All parts and assemblies listed (section 1 of attachments) will be debited to the NKO parts list for the plan of the second half of 1941.
    2. Components and assemblies received by factories from subcontractors will be debited to the NKO by GABTU representatives.
  5. Begin equipping vehicles with spare parts immediately upon receiving this order.
Signed by S.A. Akopov on behalf of Deputy People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding of the USSR, V. Malyshev"

Lethality in Berlin

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Some interesting data from the 2nd Guards Tank Army gathered during their fighting in Berlin. Analysis of tanks that were badly damaged enough to have to be written off from their unit was performed at the repair base. There, a decision was made: either the tank is irreparable and is destined for the scrap heap or is salvageable, but only after refurbishment, and is thus sent to the factory. Unfortunately there are no notes that tell us why each specific type of tank typically became unsalvageable, but only a general rule of thumb: if the ammunition rack is hit, the tank blows up and is a complete loss. If the ammunition does not go off, then the tank will probably be suitable for refurbishment, even if there was a fire.

Type
Total
T-34
IS-2
M4A2
SU-76
SU-85
SU-100
ISU-122
Irrep.
Maj.
Irrep.
Maj.
Irrep.
Maj.
Irrep.
Maj.
Irrep.
Maj.
Irrep.
Maj.
Irrep.
Maj.
75 mm shell
39
6
8
-
-
3
16
2
2
-
2
-
-
-
-
88 mm shell
27
7
3
7
-
4
4
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
1
100 mm shell
9
2
2
3
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
22 mm AA gun
5
-
1
-
-
4
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Artillery total
80
15
14
10
-
12
21
2
2
-
2
1
-
1
-
Faust
47
16
2
2
1
13
8
3
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
Aircraft
4
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
Mines
4
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
1
-
-
-
Total
135
33
16
12
1
25
31
5
3
-
2
3
-
4
-


Compared to T-34s, Shermans are fairly repairable. About half of T-34s lost to artillery can be repaired, but nearly two thirds of Shermans. The Panzerfaust, however, evens the playing field. Once you count that in, the total loss rates are about even. Interestingly enough, the total number of tanks lost is also about even, even though the army marked 123 T-34s and 53 Shermans as losses. It would seem that a lost T-34 is much more likely to end up falling into the medium and light repairs category. There is little information on other tanks, but it would seem that IS-2s are all or nothing (with only one Panzerfaust-struck tank being repairable), with one other tank being subjected to only medium repairs, or just 14 losses in all.

A remark is made that the enemy typically aims at lower hull plates or the turret at point blank distances, opting to avoid the angled armour of T-34s. Hits on the front of the tank are rarer, and hits in the back are very rare.

Reconnaissance Cats

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The last light tank of the traditional variety produced in Germany, the PzII Ausf. F, was removed from production in July of 1942. Nevertheless, light tanks continued to exist within the Third Reich. These were reconnaissance tanks, similar to reconnaissance armoured cars in function. Even the German term "Panzerkampfwagen" was not used to refer to these vehicles. This article will cover German reconnaissance tanks of WWII: Gefechtsaufklärer Leopard, Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN Luchs and Aufklärungspanzer 38(t), none of which were truly mass produced.


Two-man turret

German light tank developers were far behind their medium tank colleagues in the domain of separating the duties of crewmen. The La.S, aka PzI, was created as a two-man tank. All PzI family tanks, including the PzI Ausf.C and PzI Ausf.F, retained the same concept. The three-man La.S.100, aka PzII, also remained the same. Like the French Renault D1, and SOMUA 35, the additional crew member was a radio operator in the hull. Meanwhile, in the USSR, USA, Czechoslovakia, and Great Britain light tanks produced since the mid 1930s had two turret crewmen. The Soviet T-60 and T-70 two-man tanks are outliers, since they were built as a result of a hurried development of the T-40 amphibious reconnaissance tank, which was already unsatisfactory in the spring of 1941.

The first experimental VK 13.03 chassis, spring of 1942.

As for the Germans, a one-man light tank turret was the norm for a very long time. The situation began to change after the start of WWII. As a result of the fighting of the 2nd Light Division (one of the two divisions equipped with PzII Ausf.D tanks) an idea of a light reconnaissance tank was developed. The vehicle was called simply Einheits-Aufklärungsfahrzeug: Single Reconnaissance Vehicle. The idea was that the vehicle would be used in tank and light divisions.

Officially, the order from In.6 (Inspekteur für Heeresmotorisierung, Inspectorate of Motorized Forces) for a "single reconnaissance vehicle" came on September 15th, 1939, before the fighting in Poland ceased. According to the requirements of the order, the Wehrmacht needed a tracked reconnaissance vehicle with a high top speed and good off-road mobility. As fighting in Poland showed, existing German light tanks were unsuitable for this job. In addition, the order stated that it was desirable to use rubber-metallic tracks that performed well during trials. However, further work showed that the tracks performed well on halftracks, but were a poor choice for tanks, even light ones.

The first production Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN, September 1942. The vehicle does not yet have smoke grenade launchers on the sides of the turret.

The contract for the development of a reconnaissance tank chassis was given to MAN, and the turret platform and turret went to Daimler-Benz. The chassis received the index VK 13.01 (fully tracked, 13 ton weight class, first type). According to specifications, the 11 ton tank would accelerate to a top speed of 70 kph. The armour was 30 mm thick in the front and 20 mm along the sides. The armament consisted of the same 20 mm autocannon with a coaxial MG 34. The difference was that the 2 cm KwK 38 had the full length 2 cm Flak 38 barrel instead of a shortened one, which increased penetration. However, even this gun was not capable of penetrating the tank's own front armour.

Man and the 6th Department of the Armament Directorate didn't try to reinvent the wheel. The light VK 9.01 tank was taken as the basis for the chassis. The engine, gearbox, and turning mechanisms were taken from the lighter vehicle as well. Initially, the VK 13.01 had lower priority than a different vehicle, the VK 9.03. It appeared in the development program on June 22nd, 1940. It featured a 180 hp Maybach HL 66 engine and side armour thickened to 20 mm. The tank was supposed to have been produced in two variants: the PzII Ausf.H with the one-man turret from the VK 9.01 (PzII Ausf. G) and the PzII Ausf.M with a two-man turret, which was designed by Daimler-Benz for the VK 13.01. The variant with a two-man turret was designed to fill the role of the Gefechtsaufklärungsfahrzeug, the reconnaissance vehicle for tank regiments.

The same tank from the side.

In July of 1941, the first VK 13.01 prototype, also known as the PzII n.A., entered trials. Unfortunately, no information regarding this vehicle or any photographs have been preserved. All that is known is that it did not manage to meet the performance requirements. The contract for a zeroth batch for 15 tanks was cancelled. The VK 13.02 would have been a further development of this vehicle, but almost nothing is known about it. Presumably, it would have a different engine and transmission.

Another vehicle appears in correspondence on August 1st, 1941: the VK 13.03. This tank received the engine and transmission elements of the VK 9.03. A 200 hp turbocharged HL 66 P is also mentioned. The top speed requirement was reduced to 60 kph. The armament and turret remained unchanged. A 250 tank production run was planned.

The hatch in the rear of the turret can be seen.

Understanding that the development of the reconnaissance tank can stall or hit a dead end, the Armament Directorate decided to have a backup plan. Requirements for the tank were sent to BMM and Skoda factories on July 31st, 1940. The Czech companies were asked to design a reconnaissance tank weighing 10.5 tons with a top speed of 60 kph. Each company was to build 5 tanks. Skoda managed to finish first, finishing its prototype T-15 tank in October 1941. BMM presented the experimental Pz38(t) n.A. in December of 1941. The first VK 13.03 prototype was finished in early 1942. The VK 13.03, renamed to Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN in March, did not meet the 10.5 ton weight requirement. Its mass was 11.8 tons. to compare, the Pz38(t) n.A. (Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.BMM) weighed 11.5 tons, and the T-15 (Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.Škoda) was even lighter: 10.8 tons.

Inside the fighting compartment.

MAN's vehicle was the longest, had the weakest engine, and was no better than its competitors in speed. Nevertheless, the result of trials that began on March 16th, 1942, were not in favour of the Czech tanks. A report was prepared on June 26th, naming the  Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN the winner. Over this time, the tank drove for 2484 km. The report praised the vehicle's maneuverability, but noted that there was a danger of drifting on slippery roads. Despite the weaker armament, the  Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN was deemed superior to its competitors. The volume of the turret was greater, which was important for a reconnaissance tank. The  Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN also had the biggest clearance and longest range. Trials opened the path to mass production.

Overgrown scout

The VK 13.03 was not the only reconnaissance tank that was being designed by MAN in late 1941. In mid-1941, the company received orders for a larger reconnaissance tank, which was indexed VK 16.02(M). This was the second tank with this index. Earlier, the index VK 16.02 belonged to a "paper" version of the PzII Ausf.J assault tank. The VK 20.02 medium tank was taken as the basis. The two tanks evolved together. After the analysis of the T-34 in the fall of 1941, both vehicles received sloped armour.

The draft project and wooden model of the reworked VK 16.02 chassis were demonstrated in late November of 1941. The vehicle had impressive armour: 80 mm in the front and 60 mm on the sides, equivalent to the PzII Ausf.J, VK 36.01, and VK 30.01(P). The difference was that these plates were sloped. The vehicle was powered by the 400 hp Maybach HL 100 engine. Since the VK 20.02(M) had higher priority, the 6th Department of the Armament Directorate decided to pass on the VK 16.02(M) to MIAG, Mühlenbau und Industrie Aktiengesellschaft.

A somewhat altered turret of the VK 16.02 was later used on the Sd.Kfz.234/2 "Puma" armoured car.

The contract for the design of the VK 16.02(M) turret was given to Daimler-Benz. Work was led by Herbert Kunze, the lead turret design engineer at Daimler-Benz Werk 40. The design of the turret had a lot in common with the VK 30.01(D) medium tank, which, in turn, was influenced by the T-34. The turret had to be radically changed in comparison to previous designs since it now had to fit not only two crewmen, but the 50 mm KwK 39 L/60 cannon. The turret ring had to be enlarged, which influenced the shape of the turret. Like the hull, its armour was sloped. The gun mount received a mantlet that received the nickname Topfblende (pot mantlet) because of its characteristic shape.

The VK 16.02 chassis as of late November 1941.

Senior design engineer Wolf led the work at MIAG. By the spring of 1942, the VK 16.02(M) received a new name. Like several other projects, the vehicle was named after a beast. Now it was referred to as Gefechtsaufklärer Leopard. According to documentation presented by MIAG on June 1th, 1942, the Leopard now weighed 26 tons. There was a lighter variant, but it was rejected by Hitler, who thought that a tank of this class needs to have thick armour.

Those of you who treat this as more evidence of Hitler's madness should look at the American Light Tank T7, which, as a result of constantly increasing armour thickness, ballooned out from 12.5 tons to 25 tons. A year later, the same thing began to happen in the Soviet GABTU in relation to light tanks. The USSR went as far as a 25 ton light tank project with an 85 mm gun. However, Soviet and American tankers needed a light tank, and not a reconnaissance vehicle.

On July 27th, 1942, MIAG demonstrated the revised variant of their tank. Overall, it was the same as the VK 16.02(M) from November of 1941. There were some differences, however. The wheel diameter increased to 960 mm. The size of the idlers also increased. The VK 20.02(M) style protrusions from the upper front plate, absent on the VK 30.02(M), remained.

A reconstruction of the Gefechtsaufklärer Leopard's external view.

MIAG continued work on the lighter variant of the Leopard that had 60 mm of front armour and 40 mm of side armour. However, Hitler rejected that variant outright in September of 1942. The plan was to begin production in April of 1943, and produce 20 tanks per month by October.

Meanwhile, the tankers needed a fast reconnaissance tank rather than a well armoured one. On October 13th, 1942, during a meeting with Hitler, a decision was made to produce the lighter variant after all. The tank initially weighed about 18 tons, but later the weight grew to 21.9 tons. The PzIII Ausf.L, which had the same armament, weighed almost as much. The Gefechtsaufklärer Leopard was powered by a 550 hp Maybach HL 157 engine. The transmission included the Maybach OG 55 11 77 semiautomatic gearbox and a multi-stage turning mechanism. The expected top speed of the tank was 60 kph on highways and 30 kph on dirt roads. The range was also impressive: 500 km on a highway and 300 km on dirt roads. The design of the running gear was generally unchanged, but 660x150 mm track links, like on the Panther, were later used instead of 650 mm wide track links.

A full sized model of the Gerät 5-1028. This is the only vehicle from the VK 16.02 family of which any photographs survived.

Work on SPGs using the Gefechtsaufklärer Leopard began at the same time as work on the tank. The first was the Sturmgeschutz auf Leopard (L/70). Alas, no information at all aside from the mention of a name was preserved. However, photographs of a full sized model of the Gerät 5-1028 SPG survived. Like the Sturmheschutz auf Leopard (L/70), it was designed by Rheinmetall-Borsig. The somewhat altered Leopard chassis carried a turret with bulletproof armour that held a 105 mm leFH 43 howitzer. The rear of the turret could fold out, which improved crew working conditions. The sides could also flip out to form a large platform. The result was a maneuverable self propelled howitzer with 360 degree firing ability.

On January 3rd, 1943, Hitler personally crossed the Leopard off the tank program. It was clear that a reconnaissance tank with these dimensions was unnecessary. However, this did not prevent the Germans from designing a reconnaissance tank on the Panther chassis. 

Despite the fantasies of some authors, work on the Leopard and vehicles from this family did not progress past models. Information about a VK 16.02 designed by Daimler-Benz is also nonsense. It appears that someone incorrectly interpreted information that Daimler-Benz was working on the turret of the reconnaissance tank.

Revised specifications of the Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN which mention the Daimler-Benz turret for the VK 16.02.

Work on the Gefechtsaufklärer Leopard affected the Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN, which received the name Luchs (Lynx) in the spring of 1942. On July 1st, a contract was signed to produce 800 of these tanks, including 100 with the 2 cm KwK 38 gun (Luchs 2 cm). The Luchs 5 cm would enter production in April of 1943 with the same turret as the Leopard.

A reconstruction of the Pz.Sp.Wg.II Ausf.MAN with the VK 16.02 turret.

Even a prototype of the Luchs 5 cm was never produced. A heavier turret would add a few extra tons of weight. It also partially covered up the entrance hatches to the driver's compartment and the engine compartment hatches. Finally, there was no point in such a turret since the 5 cm gun was no longer powerful enough. Nevertheless, this fragment of the Leopard program entered production. The turret was slightly reduced in size and used on the Sd.Kfz.234/2 armoured car.

Herbert Kunze, the creator of the turret, did live to see a Leopard with one of his turrets. He was one of the developers of the turret of the Leopard 2 main battle tank.

Production without success

The reconnaissance tank was accepted into service under the index Sd.Kfz.123. It was also called PzII Ausf.L. but this name was only used on registration number plates. In correspondence, the vehicles were referred to as Pz.Sp.Wg.II or Panzerspähwagen II. The name Luchs was also used, but rarely.

The Luchs 2 cm looked like this from October 1942 to May 1943. This vehicle belongs to the 2nd company of the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 4th Tank Division. That can be established by the applique armour on the front of the hull.

According to contract #210/1901/41 signed on July 1st, 1942, MAN was to produce 100 Luchs 2 cm reconnaissance tanks. Later, as mentioned above, 700 Luchs 5 cm tanks would be built, but the idea was scrapped in early February of 1943. Theoretically, the 100 Luchs 2 cm would be ready by April of 1943, but in practice production went on much slower. MAN only built one tank in September of 1942, 7 in October, and 4 in November and December. Only 25 tanks were built from January to April of 1943, and no tanks at all were produced in May.

A tank from the 1st company, 9th Reconnaissance Battalion, 9th Tank Division. Late production reconnaissance tanks looked like this.

The reason for such slow production hide in MAN's main duties. As mentioned before, the company worked on the VK 20.02(M) medium tank, which evolved into the VK 30.02(M), the Panther. The priority for this work was higher, since this was not a mere reconnaissance tank, but a medium tank to replace the PzIII. Preparation for production of the Panther Ausf.D, as well as the production itself, were very difficult. Production of the Pz.Sp.Wg.II was a best-effort project. Knowing the situation, the German Armament Directorate did not load MAN excessively.

The same tank from the front.

Even later, the rate of production of the Pz.Sp.Wg.II was very low. Monthly production went over 10 units only once, in July of 1943. It is not surprising that production of the 100 tanks took over a year. Only 77 tanks were built in 1943. The last 7 tanks left the factory in January of 1944. No attempts were made to expedite the production of a vehicle that spent 3 years in development and had incredible difficulty with production. There was simply nowhere to build it. MIAG was overloaded with the PzIII, and after February of 1943 the factory switched to building the StuG 40 Ausf.G. In addition, the factory began assembling Jagdpanther tank destroyers starting in January of 1944. Other factories were also busy with much more important work than the reconnaissance tank.

The fuel can rack on the turret is a signature modification of the 1st company, 9th Reconnaissance Battalion, 9th Tank Division.

Even though the Pz.Sp.Wg.II was produced in miserly amounts, the vehicle was changed during production. Smoke grenade launchers were added to the turret in October of 1942. They were installed until the end of May of 1943. In October, the tank also received an engine heater, very important for the Eastern Front. The rear hatch in the turret was widened in December of 1942. Starting with February of 1943, K.F.F.2 combat driving periscopes were no longer installed on the tank, but the openings remained. The last major changes were introduced in the summer of 1943, when the turning mechanism was changed and the number of headlights was reduced to one.

The same tank from above.

The Luchs was supposed to be used by special units: tank reconnaissance companies (Panzerspähkompanie b). The K.St.N.1162b  TO&E was approved on January 10th, 1943. According to it, one Luchs was used by the company HQ and 28 more were spread out between 4 platoons. The company also included an Sd.Kfz.9 recovery vehicle, 7 Sd.Kfz.2 halftracks, and 4 Sd.Kfz.250/1 halftracks.

Due to the slow production of the Pz.Sp.Wg.II, the first reconnaissance company, attached to the 9th Tank Division, only reached combat readiness on March 21st, 1943. The company reached its authorized strength in May of 1943, and was sent to the front. Despite all efforts, no more than three of these companies could be formed. In practice, things were even worse. Only two companies formed according to K.St.N.1162b reached authorized strength. The second was the 2nd company of the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, which was attached to the 4th Tank Division. The rest of the tanks were either later sent to these units as replacements or parcelled out to other units. For instance, 5 tanks ended up in the 4th Cavalry Brigade, and one turned up in the Hermann Goering division by December 30th, 1944.

Another tank from that unit.

Operation Citadel was one of the few operations where the Pz.Sp.Wg.II was used in numbers. By August 17th, 1943, only 5 functional tanks remained in the 2nd Reconnaissance Company. By September 1st, out of 29 vehicles only 10 remained in any condition. Losses were not only taken from Red Amy fire, but from breakdowns: there were frequent complaints about the turning mechanisms. Similar issues were recorded even before entering combat, which is why new turning mechanisms were introduced in July of 1943.

The company was disbanded on September 26th, 1943, and the remaining tanks were sent to the factory for refurbishment. Not all tanks came back, as a number was written off. The "Luchs company" was later reformed, but it only reached combat readiness by March of 1944. This time, it included 25 tanks: one in the HQ and 6 in each of its four platoons. These tanks did not reach the Eastern Front. The 1st company of the 9th Reconnaissance Battalion fought in France in June of 1944. Two tanks from it survive to this day: one in the Bovington Tank Museum, the other in the Musée des blindés de Saumur. The tank in France is in running order.

A characteristic feature of tanks from the 9th Tank Division is the rack for fuel cans on the sides of the turret.

A tank from the 2nd company of the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, 4th Tank Division.

Tanks from the 2nd company of the 4th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 4th Tank Division survived for longer. The company reached the Eastern Front in September of 1943. Soon after, 4 tanks were knocked out by mines, and only several were later restored. Unlike their colleagues from the 9th Tank Division, the reconnaissance tanks from the 4th held on for much longer. As of January 1st, 1944, 22 Luchs tanks were still functional. Losses were slowly replenished with newly arriving tanks.

Tanks from the 4th Tank Division had one characteristic feature. Applique armour was added to the front of the hull, which also served as a container for tools. Spare track links were added to the front as well. Even though the 4th Tank Division fought fairly actively, many reconnaissance tanks remained in it until the end of the war. As of July 1st, 1944, the unit had 24 tanks, 19 in October, 24 at the end of December, and 16 in March of 1945. It's strange that even though more than half of all Luchs tanks fought on the Eastern Front, the GABTU received almost no information about them.

The V29 experimental tank on the VK 13.01 chassis.

To conclude, let us mention one fairly mysterious vehicle. In addition to the first VK 13.01, three more experimental tanks were built: the V29, V30, and V31. One of them, the V29, was used for experiments with new engines. The design of this tank's hull was noticeably different. The armour was sloped, making it look like a "pocket Panther". The VK 9.01 turret was used. This tank was never to be mass produced, and was only an experiment.

The tank had an enlarged engine compartment to fit a Tatra diesel engine.

The main feature of the reworked VK 13.03 was the engine. The tank received a 210 hp V-12 air cooled  14.8 L Tatra V910 engine. A decision was made to use this engine, designed for the Tatra 111 truck, in tanks and armoured cars. Trials began in March of 1944. The reworked VK 13.03 was supposed to travel for 3000 km. However, when the suspension broke in May, the trials ended.

The V910 engine was used on the Sd.Kfz.234 family of armoured cars. As for German reconnaissance tanks, the last of the work was done in Czechia.

A necessary move from Bohemia

The desire of German companies to get every contract for themselves ended poorly. It would have been better to use Czech companies to develop reconnaissance tanks, but nobody thought about it in the summer of 1942. The T-15 and Pz38(t) n.A. programs continued by inertia, but mass production was already out of the question.

A model of the Aufklärungspanzer 38(t).

The German brass figured out that something went wrong with their reconnaissance tank program in the summer of 1943. In July, BMM received a task to develop a reconnaissance tank, and full scale models were presented in September. The reconnaissance tank, named Aufklärungspanzer 38(t), was made from a converted Marder III chassis. The feature of this tank was that it was not built from scratch, but converted from repaired vehicles. Thanks to the Praga AE 160 hp engine, the top speed of the 9.5 ton vehicle increased to 58 kph. The cruising range was 250 km. In other words, it was the same Luchs, but simpler and cheaper.

A second variant of the tank that was not put into production.

The Aufklärungspanzer 38(t) was designed in two variants. The first was a reconnaissance tank that used the 2 cm Hängelafette 38 turret. This was a further development of the turret from the Sd.Kfz.222 armoured car. The 2 cm Hängelafette 38 was universal: it was used on the Sd.Kfz.250/9 Ausf.B reconnaissance halftrack and the Sd.Kfz.234/1 heavy reconnaissance armoured car. Because of this unification, building the tank would be easier. Of course, it was not as well protected as the Luchs' turret, but a reconnaissance tank's main protection comes from its size and speed. The Aufklärungspanzer 38(t) surpassed its predecessor here: it was only 2120 mm tall, 10 cm lower than the Luchs. The vehicle was also more than 2 tons lighter.

Production Aufklärungspanzer 38(t).

The second Aufklärungspanzer 38(t) variant was much more exotic. Instead of a rotating turret, the vehicle received a semi-open casemate, which used the 75 mm Kanone 51 L/24. This was a modified version of the 75 mm StuK L/24 used on the StuG III SPG. A similar weapon was used on the Sd.Kfz.234/3 armoured car, Sd.Kfz.250/8 Ausf.B halftrack, and late model Sd.Kfz.251/9. BMM designed two variants of the Aufklärungspanzer 38(t), which had a different shape of the front hull, casemate, and gun mantlet.

The same vehicle from above.

After the models were inspected, a decision was made to build prototypes. Three vehicles were built with serial numbers 3105, 3106, and 3107. The version with the 2 cm Hängelafette 38 was accepted into service under the index Sd.Kfz.140/1. 34 reconnaissance tanks were built (or rather converted)  in February of 1944, and then 33 more in March. They received serial numbers from 3105 to 3416. After that, production ceased, since BMM was producing the Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank destroyer. There was no longer anywhere to produce the reconnaissance tank.

 Aufklärungspanzer 38(t) captured by American forces.

Two  Aufklärungspanzer 38(t) companies were created based on TO&E  K.St.N.1162b. In April of 1944, 25 tanks were sent to the 2nd company of the reconnaissance battalion of the Grossdeutschland division. 25 more tanks were sent to the 1st Reconnaissance Company of the 3rd Tank Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3rd Tank Division. The Aufklärungspanzer 38(t) served this way until the end of the war. At least one vehicle was captured by the Americans, but did not survive to this day. These vehicles were also used during the fighting at Lake Balaton in Hungary.

The German light reconnaissance tank program ended in complete failure. Four reconnaissance companies equipped with two types of tank is a drop in the ocean.

A Timely Purchase

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Soviet trials of the PzIII medium tank, purchased in the summer of 1940, are frequently discussed by military history enthusiasts. The conclusions that various authors make from these trials seem rather mixed. Let us try to figure out the real influence of the study of a PzIII Ausf.G tank purchased at the dawn of war using archive documents.
The result of cooperation

The Red Army's Main Auto and Armour Directorate (GABTU) had nearly no information about the PzIII until the start of WWII. The reason for that was simple. Unlike the PzII and the PzI, German medium tanks were not available in large numbers. Various issues led to the first PzIII tanks being shown at a parade in Berlin only on April 20th, 1938. These were PzIII Ausf.A and PzIII Ausf.B tanks. Both variants, as well as the Ausf.C and Ausf.D that followed were built in very limited numbers.

The vehicle that was to be Germany's main tank was pursued by technical issues, chiefly with the suspension. After Porsche K.G. designed a torsion bar suspension, the Z.W.38 came to be. However, this tank did not go far from the initial concept. However, after a six month delay, the Z.W.38, later indexed PzIII Ausf.E, was put into production. Initially, the numbers were not high, and a rate of more than 20 tanks per month was only reached in August of 1939. In total, only 96 tanks of this type were built. Considering that the PzIII Ausf.D was the most numerous PzIII variant before that with only 30 tanks built, this was already an achievement.

As of September 1st, 1939, the Wehrmacht had only 51 PzIII tanks in its ranks. It's not surprising that nearly nothing was known about it in the USSR.

PzIII Ausf.G NIIBT proving grounds, August 1940

The Red Army first familiarized itself with the PzIII tank in late September of 1939. This happened in Western Ukraine, which was a part of Poland at the time. On September 19th, the Soviet 24th Light Tank Brigade entered Lvov, after which it engaged the German units in the city. The brigade lost a BT-7 tank, and the Germans lost a few anti-tank guns. The fighting quickly stopped. Afterwards, at the end of September, the 24th Light Tank Brigade formed a special group. Its objective was a Polish repair yard at Tomaszów Lubelski. It was known that Polish tanks were there, plus an unknown amount of captured German tanks. A bold raid managed to extract "two German anti-tank guns, 9 Polish tanks, 10 tankettes, and up to 30 cannons".

The same tank from the rear. The smoke grenade launcher can be seen.

Two German tanks were found among the trophies. Incorrect interpretations of this information led to a number of sources claiming that a German PzIII was extracted in this way. This is incorrect. Documents clearly state that no German medium tanks were obtained in the fall of 1939. However, two PzII tanks were obtained, one Ausf.B and one Ausf.C. One of the vehicles was used as a spare parts donor, then shot up.

Purchased in late spring of 1940, the tank was very interesting to Soviet specialists.

However, one PzIII tank was stolen after all. This episode is described in the memoirs of A.V. Yegorov, who served in the 24th Light Tank Brigade. The incident occurred during a visit to a German tank unit quartered in Poland.

"This meeting may not have been memorable if not for one unforeseen event that took place. My subordinate, Senior Lieutenant Tkachenko, displayed "initiative" that I later got an earful about from my superiors.
When after inspecting the tanks, the hosts and guests went to the mansion for a banquet, Tkachenko fell behind. He climbed into a German T-III tank, carefully inspected the controls, and figured out what did what. He tried to start the engine: pressed the starter, increased the fuel supply, and the engine started. He came up with a daring plan: to steal the tank and study it carefully. The Germans told us that this was their newest tank...
The Germans found out about this missing tank on the same day. We received a complaint. Colonel Fotchenkov, the head of our delegation, could not answer anything, and was very surprised when I reported about Tkachenko's actions. He called us both up. As soon as we reported of our arrival, he descended upon the Senior Lieutenant:
"You understand nothing of politics, comrade Tkachenko!" Fotchenkov exclaimed, not attempting to hide his fury. "Your poorly thought out actions could cause serious complications in our relationship with Germany! What were you thinking?"
"I was thinking about my Motherland, our army!" Tkachenko replied.
Fotchenkov was marching up and down the office. He stopped in his tracks. He didn't expect such an answer.
"Get a load of this guy's lofty excuses!" This time he was talking to me. "He was thinking about his Motherland, about our army. Did you think about how our country always precisely respects its agreements and deals with other nations?"
Tkachenko was silent. Perhaps he only now realized the consequences of his action...
"Comrade Colonel, listen to me," the senior lieutenant pleaded. "I am a reconnaissance commander, I thought only to find out information about the vehicles of the enemy."
"Reconnaisance is not done so brashly!" Fotchenkov retorted. "This is not a permitted technique, comrade Tkachenko."
"In battle this information would cost tens, maybe hundreds of lives," the senior lieutenant tried to reason. "I tried to preserve those lives..."
The conversation ended with a formal reprimand for me and Tkachenko, as well as immediate orders to retrieve the tank and return it to the Germans."
Of course, it would not have been possible to study the tank in such a short period of time. However, in the fall of 1939 a diagram of a German medium tank with its approximate characteristics and weak points was composed. The diagram showed a PzIII Ausf.D. It is likely that Senior Lieutenant Tkachenko stole this type of tank.

The same tank from the right, antenna raised.

Full scale study began only in the summer of 1940. By that point, mutual cooperation was set up between Germany and the USSR. The Germans purchased raw materials, the USSR purchased tools. Nearly 6500 German tools were received, which came in very handy later. The inverse of the popular quote "the German sword was forged in the USSR" was true: the Soviet sword was forged using German tools.

In addition, the USSR obtained German armament and vehicles. This included German Sd.Kfz.7, Sd.Kfz.8, and Sd.Kfz.9 halftracks. 3 samples of each were purchased. Finally, a tank was bought, a PzIII Ausf.G. This was one of the last PzIII tanks armed with a 37 mm gun. As of July of 1940, the PzIII Ausf.G was built with a 50 mm KwK 39 L/42 gun. The Soviet military did not know about this. Either way, the purchase of a German tank was very fortunate.

Upsetting the balance

Study of the tank began immediately upon its delivery to the USSR. The vehicle was delivered to the NIBT proving grounds in Kubinka in early June of 1940, along with the halftracks. On June 10th, a plan of inspection was composed. In addition to members of the General Staff and People's Commissariat of Defense, the document mentioned engineers from leading tank factories. Various components of the PzIII were disassembled for study. A fairly detailed album with technical descriptions was composed by September 4th, 1940. 

Photograph showing the driver's observation device. These observation devices were installed on early models of the PzIII.

A large white spot follows in the history of this PzIII. It is known that mobility trials were held, but no report is present at the RGVA (Russian State Military Archive) and RGAE (Russian State Economics Archive). One can confidently say that the Soviet testers rejected the German air filter. Because it worked so poorly, it was taken off the tank and replaced with a domestic one. During the war, captured tanks that were repaired, as well as the SG-122 and SU-76I were immediately equipped with Soviet air filters.

The tank travelled for 800 km during mobility trials.

The dual MG-34 mount is visible. The Germans got rid of it in the summer of 1940.

Since the report is missing, one can only make some assumptions based on other available information, specifically the characteristics that the NIBT proving grounds prepared about its tanks. The most interesting item is the top speed of 69.7 kph. Many debates raged about this number. In reality, the tank could indeed accelerate up to this speed. The Z.W.38 was designed as a combat vehicle with very high mobility. The tank, equipped with a Maybach Variorex 328 145, could attain the top speed of 67.07 kph in tenth gear. Considering errors on the speedometer and the road conditions, 69.7 kph could indeed be a realistic figure. Either way, the table of technical characteristics of foreign tanks composed on March 7th, 1941, states this as the tank's maximum speed.

Characteristics of foreign tanks, March 1941. The PzIII's top speed is 70 kph.

Further actions of the GABTU in relation to the SP, and the future T-50 tank, and modernized T-34 also confirm these findings. The initial concept of the SP (aka T-126) was of a tank with a top speed of 30 kph, later 35. This was the speed that the T-26 could attain. But the T-135, later T-50, had different requirements: 50 kph. The prototype T-50 could go even faster, 52 kph. The Kirov factory prototype was even faster than that, at 64 kph. This speed has a direct cause. In some documents, the T-50 is directly compared with the PzIII.

In the T-34 modernization project dated January 1941, the top speed is given as 65-70 kph. A 600 hp V-2K engine would be installed to provide that speed. However, the factory admitted that this sort of speed was impossible. The draft requirements for the A-43 tank examined in April of 1941 state the stop speed of 60 kph for the tank with 45 mm of armour and 55 kph for the tank with 60 mm of armour.

Driver's combat observation device.

As you can see, the speed of the German tank was an unpleasant surprise for the GABTU. However, there was one caveat that came with that speed. Heinrich Kniepkamp would have smirked if he ever found out about the noise that was raised around this German tank. The problem was that the PzIII could not drive for long at that speed. At speeds over 40 kph, the road wheel rims started to layer and peel off after a short time. The speed was limited to 40 kph as a result. Starting with the PzIII Ausf.H, the 6-speed ZF SSG 77 synchronized gearbox limited the tank's speed to 42 kph, even though the NIBT proving grounds managed to accelerate a captured tank to 50 kph.

The observation devices were interesting to Soviet engineers.

The top speed was not the only feature of the tank that influenced Soviet tank design. After trials at Kubinka, the PzIII went on tour through Soviet tank factories. Some Russian historians claim that Soviet tanks were copies of the PzIII, but let's leave those claims on their conscience. Not a single clone was built in the USSR. Individual components were either copied or creatively reworked, however. About the same thing happened in Germany a year later, when the study of a captured T-34 forced the Germans to make significant changes to their plans. Neither case involved direct clones. Both tank building schools developed in their own way.

The turret direction indicator was later copied on the T-50.

Leningrad factories were the first to get acquainted with the German tank. The tank was carefully inspected by staff of the Kirov factory, Izhora factory, and factory #174. After that, it was partially disassembled. One spare track link, a torsion bar, and a road wheel were kept as samples. The observation devices, aforementioned components that were removed, turret traverse mechanism, and other minor components were considered interesting. Factory #174 composed diagrams of nearly every component. Samples were taken from the hull for study, and oil was drained for study as well. 

The MG mount itself was not very interesting, but the idea of a dual MG was used on the T-50.

The influence of the German tank on the Kirov factory was minimal. KV family tanks received commander's cupolas. It was first used on the T-150, but the design was nothing like the German cupola. The Soviet cupola was meant only for observation and did not have a hatch in the middle.

The influence of the German tank on another vehicle, the T-50, was much more noticeable. Aside from the increased requirement for top speed, some German elements migrated onto the vehicle. The most noticeable was the commander's cupola, which was also different from the German variant. The turret also received a dedicated commander's station. The idea of a dual machinegun mount was also borrowed. The military liked this idea, since it improved the density of fire. However, that is where the influence ended. The Kirov T-50 was largely an original tank that was already fully formed before the German tank arrived at the factory.

Smoke grenade launcher.

The theory that the T-50 was a copy of the German tank holds no water. The SP program began back in February of 1940, and the full scale T-126 model was presented on July 9th. The tank already took its shape by then. As for the parts borrowed from the PzIII, they are listed in the report prepared by the T-50's chief designer, S.A. Ginzburg, on April 10th, 1941.

"In response to your letter #144353 sent on January 27th, 1941, I report that the experience from the T-III tank was used in the following components of the T-50:
Position of crew and armament in the turret
Like on the T-III tank, the commander of the T-50 is located in the rear of the vehicle, behind the brass catcher. To allow for 360 degree vision, a commander's cupola is installed on the turret, 240 mm tall, equipped with seven (either on the pilot batch) observation prisms, unlike the vision blocks on the T-III, which noticeably increases the commander's safety.
Like on the T-III tank, the T-50's 45 mm gun has two coaxial machineguns. In order to reduce the size of the turret front and increase the protection offered by the armour, the T-50, unlike the T-III, cannot independently aim the cannon and its machineguns.
In addition, the T-50 uses the following T-III-style devices:
  1. Three-colour light indicators for commander-driver communication.
  2. Gun position indicator.
  3. Portable lamp with an electromagnet.
  4. Individual elements of the ammunition and tool racks.
As for the transmission, even though it was very interesting, neither the layout nor the individual components could be used on the T-50. Unlike the T-III, the T-50 has a rear transmission.
Nearly all designers, testers, and researchers were familiar with the T-III. A number of components, such as the spare gearbox and spare shock absorber, were completely taken apart and diagrams were drawn. A number of components were photographed.

A number of engine elements were used when designing the new engine at our factory."
Tales about a significant number of parts copied from the PzIII when building the T-50 are exaggerations.  The A-43 (T-34M) received even less from this tank. It was thoroughly studied at factory #183 when it arrived in December of 1940. Specialists took samples from the torsion bars, suspension arms, track pins, and armour. The engine, suspension, transmission, armament, and observation devices were taken apart and studied. Drawings of the more interesting elements and parts were made. Of course, the study of the German tank came in handy when designing the A-43, but aside from the addition of a cupola and a third turret crewman nothing else was used. The torsion bar suspension for the T-34 was proposed long before the German tank appeared, and its design was different. As for the running gear of the first A-43 variant, it was closer to the T-50 running gear than that of the PzIII.


The same tank at the NIBT Proving Grounds in September of 1941. The number 37 indicates the caliber of the gun.

In March of 1941, as a result of demands by the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, the German tank was sent to Stalingrad. On June 20th, by the demand of the chief of the proving grounds, it was returned to Kubinka. The vehicle stayed there until the evacuation to Kazan. Its brief characteristics made it into the reference book composed in September of 1941. To make the vehicle look more "authentic", German crosses were painted on it. Later, the tank's trail vanishes. Perhaps, it was sent to Kazan and then used to repair the PzIII Ausf.H that was tested in the winter and summer of 1942.

A trick with the armour

In addition to Leningrad tank factories, the PzIII was studied at the Izhora factory. This was the leading Soviet organization in the field of armour study. Later, the Armour Institute, or NII-48, was formed from it. The tale of how the tank's armour went through trials should be told separately, since a rather creative retelling of the trials has very little in common with reality. According to this legend, a tank allegedly captured in Poland was shot at in the spring of 1940. Allegedly, the results caused panic, since the armour was only penetrated 2 of 5 times.

In reality, the trials that were held in the fall of 1940 were with a hull and turret of the PzII Ausf.B. Firing at the right side with a 37 mm gun showed that German armour was brittle, but the welding seams were deemed good.

The right escape hatch that was studied at the Izhora factory.

The PzIII Ausf.G arrived at the Izhora plant in September of 1940. Of course, the hull was not shot up, since only one was available. The first order of business was to measure the plates, take samples from the sides and front, and determine hardness using the Poldi method. Later, specialists performed a chemical analysis, but since the samples were contaminated by a large amount of carbon in the steel, the data was deemed approximate. Conclusions were made that German armour was made from high-carbon steel. The hardness was deemed normal for this kind of armour.

Unlike the common misconception, the thickness of the plates was measured correctly: 30 and 20 mm. The sides of the turret and hull were made from homogeneous armour, and the front from heterogeneous.

Half of the hatch before firing.

Later, permission was obtained from the GABTU to extract one component for study and firing. The evacuation hatch door was chosen for samples. The component was replaced with an identical one produced by the Izhora factory. The Kirov factory cut the extracted part in half. One half stayed at the factory, the other was given to Izhora. It turned out that the hatch made made from high carbon steel that was different from the type used in main armour and hull plates.

The result of the trials. The plate shattered after the first hit with a 45 mm shell.

Firing trials were held to determine the robustness of the armour. The shell used was a 53-BR-240 blunt tipped shell at a range equal to the limit of penetration for a 30 mm plate (velocity of 533.8 m/s). The result of the trials was unexpected. The first hit shattered the plate into 8 pieces. Later, the plate was shot at with the 12.7 mm DK machinegun. It turned out that the limit of penetration was 150 meters. There was a suspicion that this behaviour came from the size of the part or the thermal effect of cutting. To confirm this, the Izhora factory produced an identical component from Soviet FD 5634 armour steel. It was first cut in half and then shot at the limit of penetration (525.4 m/s, then 564.2 m/s). The shells did not penetrate, and only two bumps formed. The problem was clearly not with size or the thermal effect.

The result of firing at the same component made from Soviet steel.

The Izhora factory considered this result incomplete, since the other parts of the tank were made from different steel. However, trials of the rest of the hull were not possible at the time.

Panic about "bad shells" mentioned by some authors was noticeably absent in late 1940 and early 1941. In October of 1940, trials of the 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 showed that it could penetrate 30 mm of armour at an angle of 30 degrees from 1000 meters. The worry was caused by 40 mm plates, which could only be penetrated from 150 meters. Insufficient robustness of shells was indeed noted, but it was only critical when firing at plates 40 mm thick and higher.

The insufficient penetration was already known, which was one of the reasons work on the 57 mm ZIS-2 began. As for 30 mm plates, they were penetrated without problems at long range. Data from later trials also confirms this. For instance, when firing on the side of the StuG III Ausf.B with a 53-BR-240 shell produced in 1938, the T-70 penetrated its side from 850 meters. The same result was observed when firing on other 30 mm plates. Issues only arose when firing at thicker armour, but this was not news for the Soviets.

Anti-tank Infantry

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0052
On reinforcing the infantry core and anti-tank defenses of rifle divisions

March 16th, 1942

In order to reinforce the infantry core and anti-tank defenses of rifle divisions, I order that:
  1. Each rifle platoon in rifle regiments and divisions is to be reinforced with 3 snipers, 4 sharpshooters, and one light machinegun.
  2. Introduce a training battalion into the rifle division to train junior officers numbering 600 men according to TO&E #04/768.
  3. Independent anti-tank squadrons in rifle divisions (TO&E #04/753) are to be converted to  independent anti-tank battalions (TO&E #04/767) numbering 241 men with 3 batteries of 45 mm guns (12 guns) and a company of anti-tank rifles (36 rifles).
  4. Introduce a company of anti-tank rifles into each rifle battalion (16 rifles), numbering 53 men.
  5. Introduce a third squadron into the rifle division artillery regiment with one battery of 4 76 mm USV guns and one battery of 4 122 mm howitzers. Introduce 15 tractors to tow the howitzers.
  6. Reduce the service personnel by 850 in order to keep the total numbers in a division below 12,785 men and 1850 horses.
  7. Order the Chief of the Main Directorate of Formation and Equipment of the Armed Forces to alter the TO&E of infantry divisions by March 30th, 1942. 
  8. This order will come into force on April 1st, 1942.
People's Commissar of Defense, I. Stalin."

Homegrown

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0580
On direction of tanks built by the Stalingrad Tractor Factory to the Stalingrad and North Caucasus Fronts
July 30th, 1942
  1. Mandate that the GABTU send all tanks produced by STZ to the Stalingrad and North Caucasus Fronts.
  2. Form homogeneous independent battalions and independent brigades out of STZ produced tanks: only T-34 tanks without small tanks.
  3. Stalingrad type independent tank battalions will contain 21 T-34 tanks, independent tank brigades will have two battalions plus two tanks for the brigade's commander and chief of staff, for a total of 44 T-34 tanks.
People's Commissar of Defense
I. Stalin"


Night Witches

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0099
October 8th, 1941
Moscow

Contents: on the formation of female aircraft regiments of the Red Army VVS

In order to utilize female pilots and technical ranks, I order that the following must be formed by December 1st, 1941:
  1. 586th fighter regiment equipped with Yak-1 aircraft according to TO&E #015/174 located in Engels.
  2. 587th bomber regiment armed with Su-2 aircraft according to TO&E #015/159. Form the regiment within the 10th reserve aircraft regiment in Kamenka.
  3. 588th night air regiment with U-2 aircraft according to TO&E #015/186 located in Engels.
  4. The commander of the Red Army VVS must equip the aforementioned regiments with aircraft and women personnel from the VVS,  Civilian Air Fleet, and OSOAVIAKhIM.
  5. Retraining of personnel with their new materiel will be done at:
    1. Pilots: at the formation sites of the air regiments.
    2. Technicians: at the collection point of technical personnel in Moscow.
    3. Navigators and staff: 2nd Post-Secondary Ivanovo Navigator Academy.
  6. The Chief Intendant of the Red Army and Chiefs of the Central Directorates of the NKO are to arm the air regiments with all necessary equipment.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
I.Stalin."

High Caliber Beast Killers

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The acceptance of the KV-14 SPG, better known as the SU-152 "Beast Killer", didn't mean that further development of its design ceased. The use of an ML-20 gun-howitzer was, in a way, a compromise, and attempts to install more powerful systems continued. This article will discuss alternative armament for the heavy Soviet SPG: 203 mm howitzer and mortars. The SU-203 could have been one of these vehicles.


An intermediate type

The reason for searching for alternative armament is simple. During development of "bunker busters" it was assumed that they would use the high power Br-2 152 mm gun. This gun was chosen as the most powerful of all guns of this caliber used by the Red Amy. The most important thing was that the 53-G-551 concrete piercing shell could punch through up to 2 meters of concrete. This meant that bunkers such as the Finnish "millionnik" became vulnerable to SPGs. It's no wonder that the GAU tried to get a heavy SPG with this gun.

When designing his ZIK-20 SPG, F.F. Petrov had a variant with a reworked Br-2 in mind. The project, developed by the factory #8 design bureau, mounted a Br-2 barrel on the ML-20 mount. A massive two-chamber muzzle brake was installed. After factory #8 was split into two (factory #8 and factory #9) by GKO decree #2457ss on October 30th, 1942, Petrov continued his work, not as the chief of the factory #9 design bureau. The converted Br-2 was built as the experimental 152 mm D-4 gun.

203 mm U-3 corps howiter, 1942.

There was another alternative that never panned out. It consisted of installing the 203 mm U-3 corps howitzer onto the ML-20 chassis. This gun was designed in 1938 at UZTM under the direction of V.N. Sidorenko. It was built as a lighter and less powerful alternative to the B-4. With a shorter barrel (3250 mm), the U-3 was significantly lighter than the B-4 (9.4 tons compared to 17.7).

The U-3 was more promising than the rival M-40, but trials showed that it needed more polish. The start of the Great Patriotic War paused development, but the howitzer returned to trials in April of 1942. It failed again due to issues with the mount and the elevation mechanism. That led to the modernization on the ML-20 mount. According to the design, the mass of the system decreased from 9400 to 8100 kg. One drawback was the addition of a massive two-chamber muzzle brake and reduction of the maximum elevation angle from 75 to 65 degrees.

Installation of the U-3 howitzer on the ML-20 mount, October 1942.

The project description mentioned the possibility of a self propelled variant.
"As the 152 mm Br-2 shares its mount, cradle, breech, and recoil mechanisms, installation of the Br-2 on the ML-20 tank cradle opens the possibility, if necessary, of installing the monobloc barrel of the 203 mm B-4 howitzer, but it would be easier to install the 203 mm U-3 howitzer into a tank."
The barrel of the reworked U-3.

Not even a sketch of the installation of a converted U-3 into the ZIK-20 was made. Nevertheless, the story continued. In the spring of 1943, the factory #9 design bureau was working on installing the U-3 into another vehicle: the SU-152. The draft took many liberties. If such a vehicle was built, it would likely have the same mantlet as the SU-152. However, work did not move past this sketch. The issue was that the U-3 shell, identical to that of the B-4 special power howitzer, weighed 100 kg. It was not clear how ammunition would fit into the narrow and low casemate of the KV-14. It was also not clear how the loader would load them by hand, since it would not be possible to install a loading crane into the KV-14 due to the size of the casemate, like it was possible in the U-10.

The U-3's star set in 1943. The gun did not make it into mass production, and the possibility of it being installed in an SPG was more remote than ever. The idea of installing the U-3 on an ML-20 mount was never realized, even though the order to build a prototype came through in February of 1943. The U-3BM, a modernized version of the U-3 with a barrel lengthened to match the ballistics of the B-4, was never built in metal.

Draft of the U-3 in the SU-152.

The U-3's main competitor was the BL-39, designed in 1938-39 at the NKVD Independent Technical Bureau (OTB), the future OKB-172. The OTB was located inside the infamous "Kresty", and the letter index stood for "Beria, Lavrentiy". This was one of the infamous prisons where convicted engineers worked. In 1941-42, the OTB was evacuated to Molotov (modern day Perm), where it was renamed to OKB-172. Work on the BL-39 continued. Now the system competed against the M-40 high power corps howitzer, designed in 1938-39 at the design bureau of factory #172. The BL-39 lost to the U-3 during comparative trials, but it also did not enter production.

203 mm M-40 howitzer on trials.

The M-40 was also unlucky. The gun failed proving grounds trials in 1940, since its wheels sank into the ground after firing. By 1942 the M-40 was not considered hopeless, but at the very least secondary. In October of 1942 orders arrived from the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army to cease work on this howitzer.

Nevertheless, this was the weapon considered suitable at factory #172 for installation into an SPG. In the spring of 1943, the factory's design bureau used the M-40 in an SPG, which was given the index M-17. The M-17 was designed at the initiative of the factory, later approved by People's Commissar  of Armament Ustinov. The project was presented for approval on June 5th, 1943 two weeks after OKB-172's failure with the SU-203. Unfortunately, only a written description and calculations related to this SPG survive. The concept of the M-17, designed under the direction of the chief of factory #172's artillery design bureau, V.A. Ilyin, was close to that of the SU-203. Minimal changes were made to the KV-1S chassis, and as many parts as possible were used from the SU-152. The gun mantlet, gun shield, and frame were taken without changes.

M-17 calculations.

The M-40 was used since its barrel was the most suitable for installation into the M-17. The M-40 barrel was installed in the ML-20S cradle, which was minimally altered. In addition, the M-40 barrel received a two-chamber muzzle brake that was over a meter in length. The T-5 telescopic sight was used for direct aiming. The ammunition capacity of the SPG would have been 16 rounds. The shells were kept in two racks: 9 along the left side of the casemate and 7 in the front. The propellant was stored in two metal boxes, one of which was under the gun, the other in the right corner of the fighting compartment. In addition, the vehicle carried 25 F-1 grenades and 21 PPSh disk magazines.

The same crew, radio, hatches, and observation devices were used as on the SU-152. To allow for an angle of depression of 3 degrees, the roof slanted forward with that angle. The sides of the fighting compartment in the rear were also moved out to cover the entire width of the vehicle to increase space. The main fuel tank was widened, and the size of the fuel tank that was placed along the left side of the fighting compartment was reduced. To lower the mass of the SPG, the thickness of the gun mantlet was reduced to 65 mm, the front plate to 60 mm, and the sides and rear of the casemate to 45 mm. The mass of this SPG would have been 45.8 tons. A variant with the stock SU-152 armour thickness was also considered, in which case the mass would be 46.8 tons.

The muzzle brake was 1140 mm long.

The project was reviewed by the SPG Directorate of the GBTU, where it was decided to authorize a prototype. The GAU had a different opinion. Recall that the M-17's main objective was to destroy enemy fortifications, which is where an issue arose. Calculations showed that the penetration of the M-40's concrete piercing shell was only 4% greater than that of the ML-20 at 2000 meters, equal at 1000 meters, and 6% less at a range of 200 meters. Considering that enemy fortifications were usually engaged in direct fire, there was no point in building this SPG. Work on the M-17 ceased in the end of July of 1943.

Miniature U-19

203 mm SPG projects on the SU-152 chassis had one significant drawback. The fighting compartment of this SPG was already considered cramped, and fitting in 203 mm shells would not add any space. In addition, there was no room for equipment that would move the heavy ammunition. The SU-203 was unsuitable for this purpose. The only solution was to change the fighting compartment. This project was introduced in May of 1943.

203 mm M-4 corps mortar on trials, 1943.

The precursor for this project was another self-initiated project that rivalled the U-3, BL-39, and M-40. In March of 1942, the factory #172 design bureau began working on a 203 mm corps mortar. Work on the system, which received the index M-4, was led by S.P. Gurenko. The idea was simple. A shortened B-4 type barrel was installed on the ML-20 mount. The howitzer also donated the breech. On May 14th, 1942, the Artillery Committee approved the M-4 project.

The first trials of the mortar were held between May 18th and 23rd of 1942 when the mount was tested. A barrel made from the M-40 tube and the breech of a 152 mm B-30 gun was used. In August of 1942, a monobloc barrel was made for the mortar. The breech was taken from the B-4 howitzer, with some changes. Ammunition from this gun was also used. The mass of the M-4 in travel position was 8300 kg, an in combat position only 7500 kg, which was less than half a ton heavier than the ML-20.

M-4 barrel.

Despite a number of issues, the M-4 was suitable for mass production. On June 12th, 1943, Stalin signed GKO decree #3564ss "On preparation for production of the 203 mm M-4 mortar". This triggered the idea to make an SPG with the M-4. According to documents, the initiator of this project was Major-General of the Engineering Artillery Service A.A. Tolochkov, who held the post of the chief of experimental works at the Technical Council of the People's Commissariat of Armament. OKB-172 verified the preliminary requirements that would form the foundation for the project with him.

It was not clear when the M-4 heavy SPG program was launched. Judging by the dates on technical documentation, work was already underway in April of 1943.

General view of the SU-203 SPG.

On May 12th, 1943, two draft projects were sent to the chairman of the NKV Technical Committee Satel and the chairman of the Artillery Committee Lieutenant-General Hohlov. One of them was the SU-2-122, a double barrelled SPG on the T-34 chassis. The other was an SPG indexed SU-203. According to the description, the following requirements were considered during development.
  1. KV-14 type layout.
  2. Maximum ammunition capacity.
  3. Crew comfort.
  4. Simple loading procedure without the use of great force, rate of fire of 1-1.5 minutes per shot.
  5. Loaded mass of about 46 tons.
  6. Telescopic main sight, regular normalized sight as installed on the M-4 howitzer. PTK commander's panoramic sight for observation.
  7. 70 mm of front armour, 60 mm of side armour, 20-25 mm roof and rear armour.
  8. AA machinegun and pistol ports as additional armament.


Cutaway drawing. A redesign of the casemate allowed for the installation of lifting equipment.

The note of "KV-14 type" is very descriptive of the result of the efforts of A.F. Smirnov's team. Only the gun shield and mantlet remained from the original project. The rest was a completely new SPG on the KV-14 chassis. The project did not require that the SU-152 casemate be used, and so OKB-172's designers had a certain freedom allotted to them. The result was a project with great attention paid to the crew's working conditions.

Despite the increase in caliber, there was plenty of room in the fighting compartment.

Since the M-4's aiming mechanism took a lot of room, it was moved to the right. To make the driver's job easier, the gun was moved to the left. However, there was the option of leaving the driver in place was also explored. In this case, the breech mechanism had to be made more compact. The location of the commander, who sat to the right of the gun in the SU-152, was solved simply: he was made the gunner as well. The SU-203 was not equipped with a radio, which was another argument for combining the functions of the gunner and commander.

The number of crewmen did not decrease, since there were now two loaders. The loader to the left of the gun lived like a king. He also had access to a commander's cupola with five observation periscopes taken from the KV-1S. The right loader was also fairly comfortable. He had a hatch with a built in pintle mount for a DT AA machinegun. The breech operator also had a PTK periscopic sight. The commander only had the telescopic ST-10 sight and panoramic sight for indirect fire.

Lifting equipment that was necessary in such an SPG.

14 shells lined the sides of the fighting compartment, 7 per side. The fuel tanks had to be taken out of the right side to accomplish this. A special mechanism was developed to move such heavy weights. To fire, the nearest shell was taken from its slot, after which another shell was rolled over in its place. Propellant was kept in individual containers that were housed in the ammunition racks. Two more shells were placed in bustles that went outside the casemate. In addition, two more shells could be carried in loading trays. The six aforementioned shells were carried as backup ammunition that had to be loaded into the main rack as that ammunition was expended.

Thanks to the dense layout, the SU-203 was only 10 cm taller than the SU-152. The increase in height was necessary to fit lifting equipment, without which heaving around shells that weighed 100 kg would have been difficult. Smirnov's design group deserves praise. Unlike the U-19, monstrous in both mass and dimensions, the SU-203 was as compact as possible. At the same time, there was plenty of room to fit the crew comfortably inside.

The ammunition racks on the SU-203 were well thought out.

The conclusions regarding the SU-203 was made on May 21st, 1943. There were no complaints about the design, but the issue was external. The problem lay in the M-4 gun. It turned out that the ML-20's shell penetrated 1200 mm of concrete, while the M-4 could only penetrate 800 mm. It turned out that the gun was not as good at fighting enemy fortifications. Considering that its rate of fire topped out at 1.5 RPM, there was no point in building and producing the SU-203. Of course, the HE effect of the 203 mm shell was much better, but that was not what was needed from the SPG.

An SPG on the KV-1S chassis with a special power gun was eventually built, but the layout was completely different.

Cheating at Statistics: Coverup at Kovyagi

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If there's one trend with SS armour units, it's that their successes seem to be accompanied by sudden and unpredictable failures. Whenever a unit fails to take an objective or is pushed off their lines, it always seems to be accompanied by fantastical achievements that just happened to not have altered the course of battle at all. Let's examine one of these scenarios. As it happens, Forczyk has done all the hard work for me in Red Steamroller.
"On 11 August, Katukov fought his way across the Merchyk River despite desperate efforts by Totenkopf’s Panzergrenadiers to stop him. Then he sent the lead elements of 6 TC and 3 MC south to Kovyagi, which was a station on the Polatva-Kharkov rail line. Getman’s tankers, with some attached sapper squads, succeeded in blowing up several sections of rail track. Priess committed Edwin Meiderdress’ I.SS-Panzer-Regiment 3 to counter-attack Polkovnik Vladimir M. Gorelov’s 1st Guards Tank Brigade, which had just stormed its way into Kovyagi. The result was another vicious meeting engagement and this one went very badly for Totenkopf; one company commander was killed in his tank and two others were badly wounded. However, Meiderdress had better luck against the 22nd Tank Brigade, which only had seven tanks left and its commander, Major Aleksei A. Laptev, was killed in action. Altogether, Totenkopf knocked out 18 Soviet tanks in its counter-attack."
Seems believable, even a little humble for an SS unit to claim only 18 tanks in such a high profile engagement. However, even this is unlikely. August 11th was quite far into the offensive portion of the Battle of Kursk, and leading Soviet brigades were quite exhausted by that time. Let's see how many Soviet tanks were there to face the Germans.

"By 6:00 on August 11th, 1943, the 1st and 2nd tank battalions, consisting of 12 tanks joined by an independent AA battery and two AT batteries from the 35th IPTAP approached the railroad north of Kovyagi. Since the tanks made the ford across Sukhoi Merchic unusable for wheeled vehicles, and the road was poor due to the rain, the remainder of the brigade and its reinforcements remained on the north shore of Sukhoi Merchic."
The other brigade in the area, the 22nd Tank Brigade, was doing even more poorly.

"From the morning of August 9th, 1943, the enemy attacks... A prisoner indicates that the SS "Death's Head" division is coming into the brigade's operational area. When darkness falls, the enemy, having gathered infantry and submachinegunners at Kirasirskiy farm attempted to take the bridge at Aleksandrovka several times. The first tank battalion, with 4 T-34 tanks available, defeated all enemy attacks."
4 T-34 tanks isn't a lot, but at least there's a whole second tank battalion, right?

"August 11th, 1943. Until 14:30, the elements of the brigade were stationed in previously captured areas. At 14:30, the 2nd tank battalion was withdrawn into the brigade commander's reserve and concentrated in the northern face of the forest south of marker 199.8. Three T-34 tanks were left to cover Mirnoye." 
And so the active elements of the 22nd Tank Brigade were down to only 3 tanks. This brings the tanks available to fight at Kovyagi to only 15! If the Germans had really destroyed 18 tanks, they would have readily eliminated all opposition. Yet, somehow, the units remained. There was also the 49th TBr nearby, with a handful of T-34s and light tanks. They didn't participate in the attack on Kovyagi, but let's count them anyway, just in case.

"August 11th, 1943. Located in the forest near Aleksandrovka, the brigade command post was attacked by all sorts of weapons in the first half of the day. As a result of the assault, from the enemy located near Aleksandrovka, 6 men were killed, 14 wounded. 4 field kitchens and one T-60 tank burned up. The command post was moved back to Kieny."
Doesn't look like that's our unit. Let's go back to the 1st Guards and see how they were doing.

"During the entire day, elements of the brigade fought attacking enemy tank stubbornly. The enemy, having no ability to restore the railroad, was forced to offload trains coming from Kharkov east of Kovyagi and continue movement along the highway through Valki.
Our losses for the day: three T-34 tanks burned up, 4 knocked out. Therefore, the brigade had 5 battle-ready T-34 tanks at the end of the day. Five T-6 tanks and three armoured cars were destroyed. Many trophies were captured, but due to the impossibility of evacuating them the latter were partially destroyed and partially abandoned."
That looks like our Death's Head attack. Looks like it wasn't quite as effective as the Germans claimed. Let's check in on the 22nd Tank Brigade, which was in far worse shape.

"In the night from August 10th to August 11th the railroad near Kovyagi was destroyed by a group that penetrated the enemy rear under the command of Senior Lieutenant Trofimov. The group returned with no losses. The enemy trains between Kharkov and Poltava were stopped. The enemy tried to capture the southern edge of the Sharobskiy sanatorium forest with groups of submachinegunners supported by artillery fire and tanks, which approached the river crossing and opened fire at our units. The enemy's attacks were deflected by the 1st tank battalion (three T-34 tanks) and and the motorized machinegun battalion (40 men)."
Another attack here, but this too has failed. The three defending T-34 tanks remain. Therefore, the German counterattack could be, at most, responsible for the 7 T-34s that were lost by the 1st Guards Tank Brigade. Quite a far cry from the alleged 18. Forczyk writes that Death's Head had 36 tanks at the time, 3 of which were Tigers, so this performance against only 15 T-34s is quite sad.
Nipe's Decision in the Ukraine credits the SS with five anti-tank guns in this attack. Let's see if the 35th IPTAP will corroborate these losses.

"11.08.1943 The unit is at its previous positions. 1st, 2nd, and 4th battery took up defensive positions according to diagram #2. 3rd battery is surrounded around [illegible] village. A direct hit from enemy fire destroyed one GAZ AA truck, one Willys, and one cannon."
The one battery was in a tough spot, just as Nipe tells, but the actual losses were also nowhere as high as the Germans claimed. Instead of five guns, the battery lost only one.

Mastery Badge

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #72
On Establishing Classes of Tank Drivers
November 18th, 1942

Experience shows that successful tank actions depend, first and foremost, on their drivers. Skilful driving of the tank and constant maintenance of it in working order requires significant experience and knowledge. In order to improve the training level of tank drivers and reward the best of them, especially those with significant combat experience, establish the following categories:
  1. Master tank driver
  2. Tank driver 1st class
  3. Tank driver 2nd class
  4. Tank driver 3rd class
The specification for attaining each class is contained in the attachment. 

Tank drivers will be paid an additional monthly reward:
  1. Master tank driver 150 rubles
  2. Tank driver 1st class: 80 rubles
  3. Tank driver 2nd class: 50 rubles
Complete classification of drivers by January 1st, 1943.

People's Commissar of Defense,
I. Stalin"

Christmas Present

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #050 
On rearming one regiment in independent anti-tank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the Supreme Command with 100 mm guns
December 25th, 1944

In order to increase the firepower of  independent anti-tank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the Supreme Command, I give the order to:
  1. By January 15th, 1945, complete re-arming one regiment in the following  independent anti-tank artillery brigades:
    1. 1st Belorussian Front: 3rd Guards, 8th, 20th, and 41st Brigades.
    2. 2nd Belorussian Front: 4th, 5th, 14th, and 44th Brigades.
    3. 1st Ukrainian Front: 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Guards Brigades.
  2. Cancel NKO order #0046 issued on November 13th, 1944, regarding the rearmament of one battery in each regiment of  independent anti-tank artillery brigades.
  3. Send this order to the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts by telegraph.
People's Commissar of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. Stalin"

Well Aged Browning

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The reviews of the Nagant revolver were not particularly thrilling by the end of WWII, and even its replacement, the TT, was no longer adequate. In the search for a new pistol, the Soviets saw a surprising bit of inspiration.


"The design of the Browning 1903 is complex and obsolete. However, the mass, dimensions, and combat characteristics are close to those required of modern so called "officer type" weapons.

The small weight and size as well as the good stopping power of the 9 mm caliber demand attention from designers and researchers to the Browning 1903. It is important to study the characteristics of the Browning, especially now that the requirements for a new pistol (its caliber, power, weight, size, etc) have not yet been set.

See report #406 dated 1941".

The Birth of the Three-Line Rifle

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The history of the Russian model 1891 bolt action rifle, better known as the Mosin rifle or the "mosinka" has spanned over 100 years, but this weapon still fights, and doesn't just collect dust in warehouses. How did the three line rifle come to be, and what came before?


A pause with the Berdan

With the adoption of the Berdan #2 rifle, the Russian army obtained an effective, reliable, and fairly modern weapon. For the time being, the officers responsible for rifle procurement could breathe and continue working at a pace other than "go go go, we needed it yesterday", stopping and thinking.

One of the issues that the Berdan rifle didn't solve is equipping the army with a magazine-fed rifle. On one hand, the solution was clear. The Americans equipped their infantry with Spencer rifles that fed from a seven round tube magazine, about which their enemies, the southerners, said that "the Yankees load their gun on Sunday and shoot all week long".  On the other hand, those Yankees, having won the war, armed their army not with magazine-fed rifles, but with single-shot Springfields.

The mod. 1944 carbine, the last variant of the legendary rifle.

At that point, the advantages of magazine-fed rifles were not so clear cut. Spencer's rifle had a maximum effective range of 500 yards. The Henry repeaters that everyone knows from Westerns were typically chambered in revolver rounds, with the expected consequences for range. Meanwhile, the military wanted a longer range weapon. The experience from the Russo-Turkish war was clear.
"The Krnka rifle had a short range, 600 paces. The Turks can hit you from 1.5 verst (1.6 km) away. His rifle is excellent, the extractor throws the casing out so hard that you have to turn your face away so it doesn't his you in the eye, and quick! Plus their sights are long range."
In addition, the design of many magazine-fed rifles at the time did not allow for reloading with single rounds. Having expended his magazine, the rifleman became weaponless for some time, at the most heated moment.

Of course, nobody argued that the presence of a magazine was not an advantage. Magazine rifles were studied by Russian officers carefully before and after the Berdan rifle was adopted. The conversion of a single shot rifle into a magazine fed one was one of the most promising courses of action. A number of countries selected this option. For instance, the French turned the Gras single shot rifle into the Gras-Kropatschek rifle with the addition of Austrian Major Alfred Kropatschek's under-barrel magazine. 

Trials of the Kvashnevskiy rifle began in Russia in 1883. This was a Berdan rifle with an underbarrel eight round magazine. It looked promising compared to its competitors, both Russian and foreign. The ammunition was fed upon pressing the trigger, and the magazine could be cut off, with the rounds loaded in the usual way, one at a time.

Experimental conversions performed well during trials, but expanded trials of the first 200 rifles came to an explosive end, quite literally. It turned out that a round in the loading tray could impact the primer of a round in the magazine.

A diagram of the modernized Mosin rifle with accessories and various types of scopes.

The delay with the conversion had a positive effect, if not for the army, then at least the treasury. Technical progress in the late 19th century was quick, at least by contemporary measure. If the 4.2  line (10.75 mm) Berdan was considered low caliber compared to the 6 line (15.24 mm) Krnka rifle in the 1860s, 15 years later the military begrudgingly accepted that 7-8 mm calibers are also acceptable. These rounds weighed less and could still punch a hole in a person just as well.

In the mid 1880s the GAU performed a number of experiments with Rogontsev's round, which was a stock Berdan cartridge necked down to accept a 3.15 line (8 mm) bullet. The results were not particularly impressive compared to the regular Berdan rifle. While the Russians looked at Austria and Germany, who were both quickly rearming to small caliber rifles, technical progress stepped forward once more. France adopted the Lebel rifle, which not only had an 8 mm round, but it was propelled with smokeless gunpowder. Russia obtained these rifles in 1889, and immediately formed a "commission to develop a small caliber rifle" led by Lieutenant-General Chagin.

The three line rifle with a three sided spike bayonet became the symbol of Russian infantry in the First World War.

Russia managed to miss several iterations of weapons and several rearmament cycles. Hindsight tells us that waiting a little bit longer would have resulted in rimless ammunition that would have made the lives of domestic automatic weapons designers much easier. However, few people thought about these things in the late 19th century, and the need of a modern magazine fed rifle was more and more pressing.

Birth of the three line rifle

The story of the fight between the "greedy Belgian factory owner" Nagant and Mosin was frequently told even back during the Soviet era. It is more interesting to see what was the end result. As it is commonly said, the foundation was Mosin's, specifically:
  • The overall layout of the bolt components
  • The deflector
  • The safety
  • The clip of the magazine cover and the attachment of the feed operating arm
  • The locking mechanism
  • The ball and socket stock swivel
The "greedy Belgian"'s contribution was much lesser. Nagant claimed the idea of placing the feed operating arm on the magazine door, the indentation for a stripper clip in the receiver, and the clip itself. The other parts of the future three line rifle and the whole system of the rifle and its round had its own contributors. The barrel and the new round were designed by Colonel Petrov and Stabs-Captain Sevastyanov, using the work of the aforementioned Colonel Rogovtsev. Captain Zakharov took part in the completion of the bolt.

The Mosin rifle is also associated with the Red Army in the opening stages of the Great Patriotic War.

If we look at the three line rifle from the point of view of the Soviet era, then it might as well carry the name of Nikolai Ivanovich Chagin, since it was he who headed the design bureau that brought the rifle into its future shape. Sergei Ivanovich Mosin had the role of the lead designer, whose name may or may not have ended up attached to the final product. In reality, the decision on the name of the rifle made "at the top" was the same compromise as what was taken during the design process. The "three line rifle model 1891" had no name attached to it. However, this did not prevent it from becoming the "Mosin rifle" in Soviet years and the "Mosin-Nagant" abroad.

The acceptance of the three line rifle solved the rifle problem for the Russian army, at least for the time being. If they knew how long the rifle would remain in use, it would certainly have been a shock.

Of course, this road was not travelled without changes. The first serious modernization was triggered by the appearance of an improved sharp-tipped bullet with improved ballistics in 1908. Out of the modernizations proposed before WWI, the one proposed by General N.I. Holodovskiy was the most complete. He proposed a whole spectrum of improvements which would decrease the weight of the rifle and increase convenience and reliability. Holodovskiy proposed the use of a rifle stock liner that would allow the rifleman to adjust the weapon for his height and length of arms.

A Red Army border guard with a PE scoped Mosin rifle.

A small party of three line rifles underwent the improvements suggested by Holodovskiy before WWI. The GAU committee established the following after the trials:
"...the following changes can be introduced when the rifles are refurbished: 1. The trigger, for improved safety switching. 2. The spring slot for the ramrod. 3. The long bolt handle. 4. A loading mechanism with an indicator of the number of rounds left. 5. Box magazine with an indentation for a finger on the left side with an altered slope of the slot for the clip."
All other changes proposed by Holodovskiy were considered pointless. However, even the introduction of these changes was postponed until the end of the war, which could "give valuable experience in addition to what has already been gathered for a more correct solution to the issue."

A temporary rifle that became eternal

The experience of war, not just WWI, but the Civil War that followed it, showed that the three line rifle was far from the peak of perfection. A big problem was caused by the new ammunition, which was much pickier when it came to the loading mechanism (and far from all rifles had the new mechanism), as well as the declining quality of both the manufacturing and the training of soldiers.

Nevertheless, a serious modernization of the rifle was not performed, for the reason that putting significant resources into the alteration or even the design of a new bolt action rifle was pointless. The RKKA would get a new automatic or semiautomatic rifle any day now, and the modernization performed in 1930 had more to do with production than improving the design of the rifle itself.

One of the most famous three line rifles. Army Commander Chuikov inspects Zaitsev's sniper rifle. Stalingrad, winter of 1942-43.

The predictions did not come to pass. Even though attempts were taken to rearm the army with the semiautomatic SVT, it was the three line rifle that remained the main weapon of the Soviet infantry, only retreating to the second line after the introduction of the AK. Only sniper variants remained in service. Even at the end of the century, snipers gladly used the sport variant of the rifle, the AV, created for Olympic competitions in the military rifle class.

The rifles hit the civilian market even earlier. Rifles converted into shotguns, the so called "Frolovka", after the designer P.N. Frolov from Tula, were available in the 1920s. In the 1930s, a hunting carbine chambered in the 8.2x66 mm round was developed using the rifle as a foundation. After the Great Patriotic War, hinters began to use regular rifles and carbines used in the war, where the only step of the demobilization process was to remove the bayonet lug.



Repair Rewards

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense
On rewards for personnel of armoured units for quick and high quality repair of tanks
#0140
February 25th, 1942

In order to accelerate repair and restoration of tanks currently undergoing light and medium repairs in army level, front level, and military repair units, I order that:
  1. Starting on March 1st, 1942, the following monetary reward for personnel of repair units that can provide quick and high quality repair of tanks in the timelines defined by their commanders is introduced.

    Light repairs
    Medium repairs
    KV tank
    350 rubles
    800 rubles
    T-34, Mk.II, or Mk.III tank
    250 rubles
    500 rubles
    BT, T-26, T-40, or T-60 tank
    100 rubles
    200 rubles
  2. The monetary reward will be issued twice a month based on the presentation of a report and its approval by the superior commander.
  3. The reward is distributed as follows:
    1. To the head and military commissar of the repair unit: 5% each from the total reward amount.
    2. At least 70% must go to reward the workers of the unit.
    3. The remainder is to be distributed by the head of the unit and the military commissar among the commanders and service personnel of the repair unit.
  4. Personnel who receive a monetary reward and the reward amount are chosen by the commander and commissar of the unit depending on their participation in the repair work and quality of the work performed, and then announced to the entire unit.
  5. The monetary reward to the head and the military commissar of the unit is assigned by the commander of the Armoured Forces of the Front (or Army). 
  6. For systematic overfulfilment of government quotas for tank repair, personnel of repair units are nominated by the military council for decorations in addition to the monetary reward.
  7. This order must be announced to the personnel of the armoured vehicle repair units and formations.
People's Commissar of Defense
I. Stalin."

Tiger Defender

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"Award Order
  1. Name: Agafonov Yakov Grigoryevich
  2. Rank: Senior Sergeant
  3. Position, unit: Gun commander, 1st battery, 1840th Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment, 28th Independent Tank Destroyer Brigade
    Is nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
  4. Year of birth: 1921
  5. Nationality: Russian
  6. Party affiliation: none
  7. Participation in the civil war, subsequent combat in defense of the USSR and in the Patriotic War (where, when): [illegible] in 1941, Voronezh Front since 1942
  8. Wounds and contusions in the Patriotic War: wounded once
  9. In the Red Army since: 1941
  10. Recruited by: Kuybyshev regional recruiting office
  11. Previous awards: Order of the Red Banner, Medal for Combat Merit
Brief and specific description of the heroism or achievements: In the night leading up to November 13th, 1943, the enemy was firing on the Schevchenkivka village. Under the cover of exploding shells, 17 tanks came around the rear of our units from north-west of Schevchenkivka and opened fire at the battery, attempting to catch them unawares. Comrade Agafonov's crew was the first to take the blow. Comrade Agafonov displayed tenacity, courage, and heroism, firing at the German tanks and soldiers at point blank range. He destroyed three tanks (2 of them T-4 and one T-6) and up to 50 enemy soldiers. When his crew died the death of heroes and the gunner was wounded, comrade Agafonov continued to fight the enemy and remained with his gun until the end of the battle. 

Comrade Agafonov is worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Regiment commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mescheryakov"

Let's see if any Tigers were actually in the area at the time. North-west of Schevchenkivka lies Fastov, where the 509th Heavy Tank Battalion was kicking around at the time. A lot of action is recorded on the night from the 12th to the 13th, so it's possible that one of the Tigers happened to come across Agafonov's battery. Loss figures in Schneider's book are sparse as always, but the battalion spends several days idle after the fighting for Fastov, three of which are spent on "urgent maintenance work", so they definitely took a lot of damage around this time.

Sherman Tracks

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"To the Chief of the GBTU Tank Directorate, Engineer-Colonel comrade Blagonravov

I additionally report on the issue of quality of M4A2 tanks with modernized suspension. After informing the Americans that M4A2 tanks with serial numbers less than #64926 have defective tracks, serial numbers of tanks in possession of the 16th OTP and the department were checked.

As of May 25th, 1945, the department and regiment have a combined total of 177 M4A2 tanks with modernized suspensions. All 177 tanks have serial numbers below #64926. These are the tanks whose tracks are considered defective.

Inspection of the markings on the track links was performed. It was determined that each track consists of links of various brands. The track links in one track are not of uniform brand.

Track links are marked as follows:
  1. D80073 CC
  2. C 135 866 E
  3. CWC
Track links of the third brand have a number underneath the W: 7, 8, 9, or 10.

During trials of M4A2 with serial number #64525 and registration number 30122505 a track link with the marking D80073 CC broke. This track link also had an old crack through 80% of the eye. This occurrence confirms that track links marked D80073 CC are not reliable.

Markings on broken track links that were observed by the 16th regiment earlier were not recorded, as the need for this only arose after receiving reports of low quality of CC branded track links. 

I consider that until information from the USA arrives on the specific brand of tracks that is considered reliable, all 177 M4A2 tanks need to have their tracks replaced.

At the same time, I report that new track links for M4A2 tanks with modernized suspensions have not yet arrived to URT warehouse #37.

I ask for your direction on the aforementioned issues.

Chief of Military Acceptance of Imported Armament, Engineer-Colonel Davydov."

Super T-50

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"Calculations of mass of the hull and turret according to technical requirements of the GBTU TU for 1945

On the increase of mass of the T-50 due to thickening the armour (calculations are approximate, measurements were taken from photos of the cutaways of the hull in the proving grounds report).

Item
Thickness
Mass (kg)
Required thickness
Increase in mass (kg)
Turret
37 mm
2000
Comparable with the IS-3
4000
Sides (upper)
37 mm
2600
74 mm
2600
Sides (lower)
37 mm
850
92 mm
1275
Rear plates
37 mm
870
74 mm
870
Floor
15 mm
952
20 mm
315
Cannon
45 mm caliber
313
76 mm caliber
840
Total

7585

9900
The mass of the T-50 tank is 14,000 kg. When the armour is increased to the thicknesses in the table, the mass of the tank will be 23,900 kg. 

When designing the new tank, it is necessary to also take into account the increase of the mass of the engine by about 500 kg.

Assistant to the Chief of the 2nd Department of the GBTU TU, Engineer-Captain [signature]"

Personal Artillery for a Downed Pilot

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Attempts to increase the firepower of an infantryman on the battlefield have been made since time immemorial. From time to time, various compact types of weapons were invented, well made or otherwise. They were often invented not only by professionals, but by people whose duties were far from invention: soldiers, commanders, civilians. The KMB, Baranov's Pocket Mortar, invented by Technician-Lieutenant of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet VVS, G.P. Baranov, belongs to this category.

Before telling the tale of this project, let us step back a little. The lieutenant did not propose something unique. The Germans created and used an analogous design, and a number of hints show that Baranov was inspired by a German sample.


German samples

The Germans modernized a flare gun to fire ammunition designed to combat tanks or infantry rather than flares or smoke bombs. The names Sturmpistole, "Assault Pistol", and Kampfpistole Z are widely used. However, there is a mixup. These are common names that were widespread among German infantrymen on the front lines, but not used in official documentation. German historians did not see these names in the archives, but documents use others: Kampfpistole, Leuchtpistole Z, Leuchtpistole. The last one can also mean a regular flare gun.

German LP.34 (Leuchtpistole 34) flare gun.

There is no answer about what kind of weapon should be counted as the"Assault Pistol". It is clear that this category includes weapons with a shoulder stock and a special sight, firing special ammunition. This can be either a regular smoothbore flare gun (Leuchtpistole), a flare gun with a rifled barrel insert (Kampfpistole), or a flare gun with a rifled barrel (Leuchtpistole Z). All three types fired explosive (Sprengpatronen) or armour piercing (Panzergranatpatronen) ammunition. The sight and stock could be installed on all three types or flare gun.

Flare gun with a rifled barrel (Leuchtpistole Z) and a round of ammunition. The inset in the lower left is an angle sight.

The stock was necessary for firing accurately, especially since the powerful recoil was too much to handle with just the hand. However, the sight was not mandatory, you could fire by eyeballing it.

After encountering massed attacks of Soviet infantry backed by T-34 tanks in the winter of 1941-42, the Wehrmacht desperately needed a weapon to combat this phenomenon. It would be some time before the arrival of the Pak 40 and Pak 41, and more expedient measures had to be used. Subcaliber ammunition for the 3.7 cm Pak could be used, as well as a much cheaper solution of converting flare guns into assault pistols.

There is no exact date for the arrival of the assault pistol, but it happened in the spring of 1942. Everything in connection with it was strictly classified. For instance, boxes of ammunition were labelled "Nicht in Feindeshand gelangen lassen — bei Feindgefahr vernichten!", "Do not allow to fall into enemy hands, destroy in case of enemy threat". 

Flare gun with a rifled barrel insert (Kampfpistole).

Based on the dates of publication of the list of standard and experimental weapons (Gerätliste D 97/1), we can try to reconstruct the story of the various types of assault pistol. Each edition contained descriptions of all types of weapons used in the Wehrmacht. The close combat weapons section (Nahkampfgerät) lists assault pistol accessories on March 1st, 1942 and a rifled insert on July 1st, 1942.

Most likely, the Leuchtpistole Z flare gun was created first. Visually, the difference was only in a large Z on the breech. Later, certain types of ammunition for the Leuchtpistole Z was used in the regular Leuchtpistole 34, and only then was a rifled insert for the Leuchtpistole 34 invented. This variant was called Kampfpistole. This sequence of events is entirely the author's guess.

Kampfpistole with an extracted rifled insert.

The Germans considered this weapon simple, universal, and effective. It was used not only on the Eastern Front, but also in Africa. Somehow, one of these pistols must have fallen into the hands of Technician-Lieutenant Baranov, and he managed to familiarize himself with it.

Sailor, pilot, and artilleryman in one

Technician-Lieutenant G.P. Baranov was recovering from a wound in the Baltic Front VVS hospital, and he had the spare time to complete and submit his proposal for a pocket mortar. By September, Baranov made his blueprints, completed calculations, produced prototypes, and completed trials which appeared satisfactory to him. On September 24th, he sent all his materials to the Deputy Commander of the Political Section of the Baltic Front VVS, Major-General of Aviation A.N. Filaretov, with a request to allow him to travel to Moscow to meet the Technical Council of the NKV for the approval of his design and the introduction of it into production. 

OSP-30 flare gun.

In his accompanying note, Baranov explained that he wanted to create a simple, cheap, and easy to use weapon that required minimal use of materials and highly qualified workers. The proposed weapon was light, compact, and had a range of 200-350 meters (the paper carries a note in pencil about increasing the distance to 600-700 meters). The exploding round would strike a target 2.5-3 meters away. Due to the small size of the ammunition, a large amount could be carried at once, and the sight was easy to master.

The proposal was to arm infantry, scouts, partisans, and pilots with this pistol. Infantry cold use it in street fighting, scouts could confuse the enemy, and partisans could set fire to warehouses and various other objects. Pilots could defend themselves if they went down.

The letter was sent in late September, and in October Major-General Filaretov was appointed the Chief of the Political Section of the Black Sea Front and left the Baltic. Perhaps that is why Baranov's invention was lost. His proposal was only reviewed in March of 1946. It's possible that it was encountered when the navy's papers were being reorganized to deliver to the archive. Baranov served in the navy's air wing, which gave a certain twist to the organizations his letter went through. The weapon was examined from the point of view of naval aviation, for protection of downed pilots. No other application was even considered.

Baranov's pocket mortar.

The invention was not very interesting in 1946. The war was over, there were more effective weapons available, and a proposal from 1943 was no longer timely. Nevertheless, it was examined, and a conclusion was given on March 11th.
"1. This type of weapon is not interesting for naval aviation, as the effectiveness of this weapon against the enemy is less than that of a pistol (TT).
2. The documents pertaining to the KMB mortar are also not interesting for further study, as the calculations were elementary and insufficiently thorough."
How did Baranov aim to create his "pocket mortar"? He noticed that the warehouses and VVS units held a large amount of  flare guns, which were, in Baranov's opinion, not useful. The conversion of the OSP-30 could quickly and easily breathe a second life into the "useless" flare gun given a workshop with minimal tools. The OSP-30's handle and firing mechanism were used without changes. A post and a rear sight were soldered or welded to the barrel. An angle sight was added to the left of the handle.

OSP-30 flare gun holster. The KMB holster looked about the same.

The tactical-technical characteristics of Baranov's "pocket mortar" were as follows:
  • Mass: 1085 grams
  • Overall length: 245 mm
  • Caliber: 26 mm
  • Mass of one "malyutka" round: 175 grams
  • Explosive charge: 8 grams
The converted flare gun was tested with a dummy round. A number of trials showed that if the pistol was not held tightly enough, the recoil of the KMB twisted the hand up and backwards, making it possible to hurt the shooter's arm with the hammer. This forced the installation of a shock absorber that braced against the arm. To soften the blow, it was padded with rubber.

The KMB fired a "malyutka" (baby) round, also developed by Baranov. The projectile was shaped like a droplet and had a stabilizer made from four fins. Three types of rounds were proposed, with different ignition methods for the distance fuse. The fuse used during trials was taken from the ShVAK round. A standard case from a flare gun was used, but it was shortened. 5 grams of gunpowder were loaded into the case, then wadding, then the projectile.


Projectile for Baranov's pocket mortar.

Baranov proposed the use of a leather or imitation leather holster that was very similar to a revolver holster. Pockets for tools and spare parts lined the outside. In general, this was a converted holster from the OSP-30 flare gun.

The ammunition was carried in a special leather or imitation leather bag on a belt. The bag consisted of four sections of five slots each, and could carry a total of 20 rounds. Each section had its own flap. The rounds were inserted with the fuse downward. In order to prevent them from going off from shock, each slot had a shock absorber cap in the bottom that protected the round from impacts or vibration. The flaps had to be precisely aligned to prevent moisture from entering the container. This was very important, since Soviet flares used cardboard casings. The total mass of the ammunition and bag was about 4 kg. Later, Baranov increased the amount of ammunition carried to 30 rounds, and the total weight to 5.2 kg.

During trials, the instant fuse went off when the rounds hit dirt, snow, or any obstacle. The radius of damage was 3.15 meters, and the area covered in shrapnel was about 20 square meters. The range was 250-400 meters. Firing the KMB could be done in any position.

One of the four sections of the ammunition bag.

According to the inventor, the weapon could be used in the role of the 50 mm PM-40 mortar, specifically:
  1. Destruction of enemy forces in buildings, in attics, or in other cover.
  2. Instead of hand grenades when destroying machinegun nests, artillery or machinegun crews, and small groups of infantry.
In the end of his proposal, Baranov pointed out that the KMB was simple, allowed fire from up to 400 meters, easy to fire, and quick to come into action. There was enough ammunition carried for one battle, and the round with an instant fuse allows fighting the enemy at point blank range.

Conclusions

The unused weapon is interesting from a technical point of view, especially compared to the German equivalent, which received decent reviews despite all of its drawbacks. Another interesting detail was that Baranov consulted engineers from the Leningrad branch of the TsKB-22 on the use of detonators and distance fuses, managed to independently convert an OSP-30, made an angle sight, produced an tested three types of live and one type of practice ammunition, describe, and document his invention. Considering that the 34 year old inventor was only drafted by the navy in 1941, he likely received a technical education before the war and worked in his field. According to his award orders, Senior Technician-Lieutenant Gennadiy Petrovich Baranov finished the war in the position of a commander of a platoon in a transport company in the 11th Air Base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

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