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L-11 Installation

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"To: AU, ABTU, 520, AU Military Representative at factory #183

The installation of the L-11 system in the A-34 tank can be done without changes to the following parts only:
  • Gun barrel
  • Recoil mechanism
As for the remaining parts, all of them must be changed to some degree, largely covered by the following:
  1. Group 02: breech
    1. The semiautomatic cutoff mechanism is removed and the roller cutoff mechanism from the L-10 is installed.
    2. The breech handle is shortened by 20 mm.
  2. Group 03: trigger mechanism
    1. The hand trigger is different, and the attachment point is different.
    2. The hand trigger (pedal) is used from the 45 mm gun.
  3. Group 05: gun shield
    1. The gun shield is completely different, including a coaxial machinegun. The telescope mount from the old gun shield is used, but with changes. The elevation mechanism sector is different.
  4. Brass catcher: a new one with smaller dimensions (on the left side) will be used, with a trimmed stopper and a new carrier.
  5. Frame: the L-11 frame is removed completely. The gun is mounted on two vertical posts welded from the inside to the front of the turret, replacing the frame.
  6. Mantlet: a new one based on the changes to the gun shield and carrier.
  7. Elevation mechanism is used from the L-11, but with small changes.
  8. The periscope link is from the 45 mm gun.
As you can see, in order to install the L-11 gun in the A-34 tank, the factory will need to receive the system in the following configuration:
  • Barrel
  • Breech with semiautomatic mechanism
  • Trigger mechanisms
  • Recoil mechanisms
  • Telescope mount (assembled)
  • Elevation mechanism
  • Brass catcher with carriers
It is necessary to demand that factory #183 register all of their alterations in blueprints, first of all. Second of all, it is necessary for the factory itself to perform these changes, as Kirov factory will not ship the L-11 system with parts not used at the Kirov factory.

There are no fundamental protests on my part regarding the proposed changes, given that the two conditions are met. The blueprints must be presented for approval.

As for the evaluation of the installation, I deem that the L-11 installation in the A-34 turret is unsatisfactory, largely from the point of view of servicing. I cannot recommend the adoption of this gun mount in any case.

I consider that the width of the turret must be enlarged at least by 200 mm without widening the turret ring. It is also necessary to raise the turret roof.

In addition, it is necessary to:
  • Change the backs of the seats, as they impede work.
  • Move the elevation mechanism far to the right as was on the L-11.
  • Move the PT-1 to the left, as far as the turret allows, and allow access to the TOD sight (in the future, it is desirable to replace the TOD with the TMFD).
After these and other changes recommended by the commission are made, I consider that the L-11 mount can be recommended as a limited measure for short term use.

When mobility trials are done, it is necessary to:
  • Assemble and disassemble the system to check the installation.
  • Perform robustness trials with 200-300 overcharged shells.
  • Mandate that the factory develop technical requirements for the welding of the vertical plates that serve as a frame as to either prohibit defects or make them easily detectable.
Military Engineer 2nd Class, Sorokin
March 3rd, 1940"


Captured Panzerfausts

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"To regimental commanders and their political deputies:

On the initiative of the political department of the 2nd Tank Army, captured Panzerfausts have been widely used in the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The use of this weapon against the enemy led to very effective results on several occasions.

In order to improve the application of this type of weapon against the enemy, I order that:
  1. Spread experience of using Panzerfausts captured from the enemy in battle among your unit or formation.
  2. Organize the collection of Panzerfausts on the battlefield and precisely maintain their inventory. Organize training of personnel in using this weapon against the enemy.
  3. Dedicate at least 2-3 instructors in your unit to train soldiers, sergeants, and officers on how to use Panzerfausts.
Report on your experience in using the Panzerfaust against Germans and the completed work in carrying out this order by March 8th, 1945.

Commander of the 4th Guards Tank Division, Guards Major-General Millerov
4th Guards Tank Division Political Department Chief, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Halimov."

SU-100, Czechoslovakian Style

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Domestic tank and SPG designs took a downturn in post-war Czechoslovakia. The cause of this was more technical than political. Czechoslovakian engineers could not keep up with the changing requirements of the Czechoslovakian military. As a result, Czechoslovakia began licensed production of T-34-85 tanks in September of 1951. A similar situation took place with medium SPGs. Just under 800 SD-100 SPGs, licensed clones of the SU-100, were built.

A necessary step

By the end of WWII, the Czechoslovakian army possessed a number of Challenger tank destroyers. These vehicles, as well as 188 Cromwells, were a leftover from the 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade. The 1st Czechoslovakian Army Corps also had two SU-85s as of May 9th, 1945, but by July they disappeared.

By June 1946, Czechoslovakian tank brigades consisted of a mix of Soviet, American, and British vehicles, as well as 25 LT-38 and 19 ST-I (the index given to the Jagdpanzer 38). The presence of a large variety of foreign vehicles was not idea, but there was no other choice. The vast majority of domestic designs were based on pre-war projects. For instance, Skoda's medium SPGs were based on the T-22 chassis, a further development of the pre-war Skoda S-II-c, otherwise known as the T-21.

SU-100 on a parade in Kiev, May 1st 1949. Despite a wealth of choices, Czechoslovakia only managed to mass produce this SPG.

The development of the TVP (Tank všeobecného použití, main battle tank) was launched in the fall of 1945. This program was initially done by the VTU (Vojenský technický ústav, Military Technical Institute). Later, it was given to Skoda, which developed the T-40 project. Development continued as a joint project between Skoda and CKD. SPGs were developed as a part of this project starting in late 1948. According to the concept developed by the Czechoslovakian military, these would be mobile, thinly armoured SPGs with open turrets. There were two of them: the 152 mm ShKH 43,5/675 TVP and 100 mm ShPTK 14,75/950-TVP, a self propelled howitzer and tank destroyer respectively.

Two more vehicles were designed that did not have turrets, but had better protection: 152 mm ShKH 43,5/675 TVP and 100 mm ShPTK 14,75/900-TVP.

Work was taking a long time, which had to have bothered the Czechoslovakian army somewhat. Repair and refurbishment of captured vehicles was chosen as a temporary measure. The Czechoslovakian army gained the  ShPTK vz.40/75N (after 1949, SD 75/40N), built from the German StuG 40 Ausf.G. 124 of these vehicles were built. In addition, the Czechoslovakian army received 12 German Nashorn tank destroyers in 1949 under the index ShPTK vz.43N, as well as 20 ISU-152s under the index TSD 152/37S.

5 years passed since the end of the war, and not a single Czechoslovakian tank or SPG had been built even as a prototype.
100 mm R 11 AA gun that served as the basis for the A 20 anti-tank gun.

This serious issue was only corrected by a foreign purchase. In July of 1949, Czechoslovakia bought a license to produce the Soviet T-34-85 medium tank. The plan was to replace it with the TVP tank, but work on that died in the spring of 1950. The T-34-85 was obsolete by then, but it was better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush. The CKD Sokolovo locomotive factory in Prague was to build these tanks. Preparations began in January of 1950. Organization went quickly, and the first T-34-85 produced in Czechoslovakia was delivered in September of 1951.

The death of the TVP meant that all SPGs on its chassis went with it. The solution was buying a license for building the SU-100. The lifespan of this vehicle was longer than that of the T-34-85. After the Ural Heavy Machinebuilding Factory (UZTM) finished building these vehicles, production started in 1947 at factory #174 in Omsk, and continued until 1948.

This is what the SD-100 with an A 20 gun could have looked like.

The SU-100 was also obsolete by the early 1950s, but the same chassis as the T-34-85 that was already in production made it easier an easier pill to swallow. The armament of the SU-100, the 100 mm D-10S gun, was still a viable weapon. However, at a meeting held on December 13-14th, 1950, it was decided to use a Czechoslovakian gun on the licensed SU-100. This could have been the A 20 anti-tank gun that was being designed by Skoda. This was a variant of the R 11 AA gun, which was also adapted for the TVP as the AK 1. At 1 kilometer the A 20 penetrated 140 mm of armour sloped at 30 degrees. This was better performance than the D-10S.

The issue was that out of this trinity only the R 11 was ever built even as a prototype. There was no point in performing the conversion in these conditions. In addition, Czechoslovakia began receiving Soviet production SU-100s. 452 vehicles were transferred in total, indexed SD-100. The license-built version received the same name.

An SPG rooted in Omsk

The final decision to purchase a license to produce the SU-100 was made in 1951. Production would take place at the same CKD Sokolovo. Hulls would be produced at the Stalin factory (Závod J.V.Stalina, or just ZJVS) in Martin, Slovakia. The SMZ locomotive factory in Slovakia (one of Skoda's factories at Dubnica nad Váhom) produced a licensed version of the D-10S under the index 100 mm SHK vz.44 S.

An SD-100 during exercises in the mid-50s. The vehicle has "Sverdlovsk style" tow hooks, but an "Omsk style" cupola.

Organization of the SPG's production was delayed. It was first necessary to fill the tank forces with tanks, as the situation with SPGs was not as poor thanks to German and Soviet vehicles. Since production of the T-34-85 was a higher priority, the first SD-100 was only delivered in 1953. Mass production was also slow. Only 129 SD-100 were built in Prague in 1953-54, while 951 T-34-85s were built. Production of the T-34-85 started two years earlier, but this is a significant difference.

Production of tanks was moved to Martin in 1954. Final assembly and engine production was done in Czechia, but production of hulls and armament took place in Slovakia. Moving the production to Martin was a more logical solution that sped up production.

A captured SD-100 in Israel, 1957. The headlight has a distinctive guard.

The Czechoslovakian SPG had a number of distinctive features. As mentioned above, the last factory to build the SU-100 in the USSR was factory #174. It was on their documentation that blueprints of the SD-100 were based. However, documentation on the T-34-85 came from factory #183 in Nizniy Tagil. Czechoslovakian designers put in their own contributions. The result was a mix of solutions, same as with the Czechoslovakian T-34-85. Even though the tank came from Nizhniy Tagil, the Czechoslovakian vehicles had a number of features that had to have originated in Omsk.

The vehicles received Notek lights during service.

Factory #174 developed their own tow hooks without a protrusion for affixing the eye of the tow cable. The Czechoslovakian version had a regular hook with the protrusion. At the same time, the upper rear plate of the SD-100 and Czechoslovakian T-34-85 had an Omsk design. The exhaust covers had the characteristic wave shape, and the hinges of the upper rear plate were unified with the round transmission access hatch hinge. Another purely Omsk solution is seen in the road wheels. The factory #174 hub caps had a characteristic shape, which can be seen on both the SD-100 and Czechoslovakian T-34-85. The track links of both vehicles also traced their roots to Omsk, as they had the perpendicular ribs.

The quality of the armour casting was higher, and the edges of the armour plates had a better finish.

There were also purely Czechoslovakian features. First of all, it was the very careful finish. Soviet vehicles had very rough edges of the armour, especially the front plate. This is not surprising when you consider the conditions that Soviet tank builders worked in, and that the aesthetics had no effect on combat capability. However, hulls assembled in Martin were very built very carefully. The same went for the casting: there was no pitting or rough surfaces on Czechoslovakian production vehicles.

The cast side of the commander's cupola has a rectangular welded part, an Omsk feature. The same commander's cupola was also designed at factory #174. One part that gives away the Czechoslovakian origins is the telephone port for communicating with the crew located on the rear left of the hull. This port is also sometimes seen on Soviet vehicles that served in the Czechoslovakian army. The headlight also has a characteristic guard. These features are enough to distinguish between the Soviet SU-100 and Czechoslovakian SD-100.

A characteristic rear section, the same as on the Czechoslovakian T-34-85. The telephone port, typical for Czechoslovakian tanks, is seen on the left.

As in Prague, Martin's top priority was production of the T-34-85. Nevertheless, the difference was not as great as at CKD Sokolovo. 641 SD-100 and 1765 T-34-85 were built in Martin.

The availability of the SD-100 and its more powerful gun gave designers the idea to re-arm the T-34-85. However, this idea did not move past paper. Even with the more powerful gun, the T-34-85 was obsolete. Production of the T-54 that had the same 100 mm gun began in 1957, and the T-34-85 was taken out of production in 1956. The licensed copy of the SU-100 was the only SPG on a tank chassis that was mass produced in Czechoslovakia after the war. For a number of reasons, not a single SPG that was designed was ever produced, including others on the T-34-85 chassis.

A medium SPAAG

Skoda turned to development of AA guns, including autocannons, almost immediately after the war. Skoda designed a 50 mm AA gun meant for German use during WWII, and this design was developed further. The result was a 50 mm AA autocannon with German roots. The gun was finished in 1948, and was proposed for installation into the 50 mm ShPLK 2,12/1020-LP, a SPAAG on the reworked Skoda T-17 chassis. Neither the gun nor the chassis ever made it off paper.

An experimental SPAAG on the T-34 chassis, 1953.

The 57 mm R 8 AA gun entered trials in 1949. This was a reworked version of the same 50 mm AA gun. Like the previous design, it was based on German work. The gun was fed with 3 round clips. The ammunition of the R 8 was different from Soviet 57 mm ammunition.

The R 10 AA gun with a mount similar to the 40 mm Bofors appeared later. Development took a long time, and the gun was only accepted in 1956. The weapon was comparable to the Soviet S-60, superior in some ways and inferior in others. 220 R 10 guns were built, and the army bought S-60 guns as well. This was the only success of Czechoslovakian designers in the field of medium AA guns. Larger AA guns developed by Skoda were never put into production.

The turret on the model was made of plywood.

The issue of building a SPAAG was raised once more during development of the R 10. Due to the death of the Skoda T-17 and T 50 projects, the T-34-85 remained the only available chassis. VTU received an order to develop a SPAAG using the T-34-85 chassis and R 10 AA gun on September 19th, 1952. In addition to airborne targets, the weapon was also meant to combat lightly armoured vehicles. Having studied foreign experience, the VTU decided to build a tank similar to the British Crusader AA, Swedish Landsverk Anti, or the Hungarian derivative Nimrod. This made the task simpler, since this meant there was no need to install a large platform or seriously change the chassis of the T-34-85.

The turret was too small for a crew of 4.

The mass of the SPAAG had to stay under the weight of the T-34-8. The difficulty was in that the military needed the front of the turret to protect from low caliber artillery. The gun crew also consisted of 4 men (two gunners, the commander, and a loader). As a result, it was not possible to meet all requirements. The mass of the T-34-85 turret with the gun, ammunition, and crew was 7820 kg. The AA turret weighed 8400 kg. The turret was open from the rear and the top. The front armour was 40 mm thick, and the sides were 20 mm thick. However, the prototype was assembled from plywood.

The SPAAG failed trials.

The results of the trials, which lasted from March to July of 1953, were poor. The turret was too cramped, and the very idea of using the R 10 as the armament of the SPAAG with minimal changes was a mistake. The turret was also too tall. Work on this topic ended on August 29th, 1953.

LP-157 SPAAG, 1955

The Brno design bureau designed its own SPAAG in 1955, produced only as a full size model. The improved R 12 was used instead of the R 10. The turret of the LP-157 was unmanned. The ammunition was held in a bin to the left of the gun, and the crew (two gunners and the commander) were below it. This reduced the size and mass. A two-barrel variant named LP-257 was also developed. A scale model of this vehicle was also built.

However, the R 12 still needed to be built, and the time of the T-34-85 was coming to an end. Work on a SPAAG on the T-34-85 chassis ended. The ZSU-57-2 was never adopted by the Czechoslovakian army. The four wheeled Praga PLDvK vz. 53/59 built on the V3S truck chassis was simpler and cheaper.


Self propelled LV-157 rangefinder for aiming the LP-157.

The last Czechoslovakian vehicle on the T-34-85 chassis was a mobile AA gun ranging device. This vehicle was also developed in Brno for coordinating LV-157 fire. Essentially, this was a self propelled rangefinder that was armed with a quad DShK mount. Work did not progress past a full size model on the same chassis as the LP-157. Since the LP-157 and LP-257 were cancelled, there was no need for a rangefinder for them.

International warrior

The appearance of the SD-100 and SU-100 was a means of dealing with the T-34-85's weak armament. SPGs began arriving in tank regiments in 1953. The 85 mm S-53 could no longer combat all types of enemy tanks, and the SPGs were used to reinforce them. The number of SD-100s was a much as a third of a tank regiment. Tanks that were replaced with the SD-100 were sent into storage.

SD-100 on exercises, mid-1970s.

Czechoslovakian tank regiments remained mixed until 1960. The T-34-85 and SD-100 were gradually replaced with the T-54, which had a 100 mm gun in a turret, plus more serious protection. The SD-100 were now sent into storage. In addition, they were actively marketed to foreign buyers.

After the SD-100 were taken out of tank regiments, they served as training tanks until the mid-70s. Many of these vehicles were preserved in Czechia and Slovakia. The SD-100 plays the role of a T-34-85 in many public and private collections. The story is similar to the one with the G-13, but while the G-13 was at least built from Jagdpanzer 38 hulls, the SD-100 was built in Czechoslovakia from scratch, and in the mid-50s to boot. It is not the best idea to market this SPG as a SU-100. However, some museums and collectors buy these are Soviet wartime production vehicles. These kinds of frauds are not rare: museums in Munster, Sinsheim, La Wantzenau, and many others have an SD-100 on display and not a SU-100.

An SD-100 on parade in Cairo, 1957. The signs of a Czechoslovakian production vehicle are clearly seen.

In total, the Czechoslovakian army received 460 SD-100s out of 770 built. The others were built for export. On March 21st, 1953, the deceased Klement Gottwald was replaced by Antonín Zápotocký. Under him, Czechoslovakia once more became an active seller on the arms market. Sales began in 1953, and tanks were among the items on offer. One of the first buyers was Egypt, which started receiving SD-100s in 1955. It was Czechoslovakian SPGs that were used in battle against Israel, Britain, and France during the Suez conflict in 1956. The SD-100 in Bovington, Duxford, and Saumur are trophies from this war. In total, Egypt received 148 SD-100s.

Israeli trophies of the Six Day War, 1967.

Syria bought 38 SD-100s. These SPGs fought in the Six Day War alongside Egyptian ones. The IDF ended up seriously boosting its collection of trophies: 100% of SU-100s in Israeli museums are actually captured SD-100s.

The Yom Kippur War was the last to see widespread use of the SD-100.

The shipments from Czechoslovakia became mixed some time later. A significant percentage of the vehicles was composed of Soviet stock. Sometimes Czechoslovakia merely acted as an intermediary between the USSR and other nations. For instance, Cuba received 50 SU-100s from Czechoslovakia, but these were actually Soviet vehicles. The 50 SU-100s in Yemen were in the same boat. The vehicles sent there were clearly Soviet production. Bulgaria, Romania, Ethiopia, and Morocco also received SD-100s.

One can confidently say that the Czechoslovakian military made the right choice with the SD-100. Even though they did not manage to design their own tank, it was possible to arm the army using a licensed design. Thanks to exports, Czechoslovakia managed to make a mint. The country was back on the arms market, even if it was with a foreign product.

Getting Ahead

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"To the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Timoshenko
CC: Chief of the GABTU, Lieutenant-General Fedorenko
November 27th

RE: acceptance of 143 T-34 tanks with 25 degrees of gun elevation

The Ilyich Mariupol factory began producing armoured parts for the T-34 before mass production blueprints were approved, and  built a batch of turrets using the experimental blueprints with the GABTU's permission, i.e. with 25 degrees of gun elevation.

Upon receiving mass production blueprints with 30 degrees of gun elevation, the Ilyich factory did not consider the necessity of changing the gun port blank, as a result of which 143 turrets with 25 degrees of gun elevation were built. A large number of these turrets are already installed in tanks by factory #183.

Considering that fact that the elevation change does not make a significant difference and recutting the parts to meet the 30 degree elevation requirement will slow down production, especially as a number of vehicles will have to be rebuilt, I ask your instructions regarding accepting 143 T-34 tanks with 25 degrees of gun elevation.

On behalf of the Deputy People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding, Goreglyad"


"To the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the USSR comrade Kulik

I report regarding the letter of Deputy People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding, Goreglyad, regarding the acceptance of 143 T-34 tanks with 25 degrees of gun elevation.
  1. In the initial decision made by the Committee of Defense (#45 on February 2nd, 1939) the gun elevation angle of 25-30 degrees was approved. The first two experimental T-34 tanks were made with 25 degrees of gun elevation. The military trials commission requested the increase of gun elevation to 30 degrees, which was approved by the People's Commissar of Defense on May 31st, 1940.
  2. Factories #183 and Ilyich did not complete the requested changes in time, and as a result of this 143 turrets were built with a gun port that limits gun elevation to 25 degrees.
  3. Committee of Defense decree #428ss issued on November 19th, 1940, approves the gun elevation angle of 30 degrees, which the factories implemented.
  4. In order to increase the gun elevation angle to 30 degrees on the aforementioned turrets, it will be necessary to grind away 20 mm of armour, which will be a significant expenditure of funds and time.
  5. I consider it possible to agree with comrade Goreglyad's proposal and accept 143 turrets with no changes, as it does not make a significant different.
Deputy Chief of the GABTU, Major-General of the Technical Forces, Lebedev"


"To the Chief of the Directorate of Affairs, Major-General comrade Dratvin
December 6th, 1940

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulik permitted the acceptance of 143 T-34 tanks with a gun elevation angle of 25 instead of 30 degrees. This has been communicated to Deputy People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding comrade Goreglyad and the GABTU military representative at factory #183.

Deputy Chief of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Korobkov
Chief of the 3rd Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Afonin."

Leaning by Doing

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"December 13th, 1939
#212472

To the Assistant of the Chief of the General Staff of the RKKA, Corps Commander comrade Zaharov
RE: your #57129s/s

It is not possible to perform battlefield trials of the KV, SMK, T-100, A-20, A-32, T-40, A5, A7M tanks or the BA-11 armoured car in 1939, as the experimental KV, SMK, and T-100 tanks are currently undergoing proving grounds trials.

Experimental prototypes of the A-20, A-32, T-40, A5, A7M tanks, and the BA-11 armoured car passed proving grounds trials, and the factories are now making changes to blueprints based on the results of the trials, in order to produce pilot batches.

Only tanks and armoured cars produced in 1940 will be sent to battlefield trials. 

Modernized T-28 tanks will not undergo battlefield trials, and will be issued to regular Belorussian Military District units. 

The modernized T-26 tank has a new suspension, but the turbocharged engine has not yet arrived, and therefore battlefield trials will be postponed until 1940.

The SBT bridgelayer tank will be transferred to battlefield trials in December of 1939.

On the orders of Assistant Chief of the ABTU, Corps Commander Pavlov Panfilov
On the orders of Military Commissar of the ABTU, Brigade Commissar Kulikov"

By Any Other Name

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The AK is subject to a number of ongoing raging discussions, one of which had to do with its name. Some claim that there was no such thing as an AK-47, with the name of the gun being simply AK, later replaced with the AKM. Sound logic, but it is not confirmed by documents, which use the name AK-47 extensively. For instance, the manual.


Internal documentation uses the indexes AK and AK-47 to refer to the same item interchangeably. From a list of experimental works of the NKV for 1951:

"Increasing production rate and quality of mechanical finish on parts and assembly of new types of weapons. Development of new high production rate processes of finishing parts and assembly of the AK-47 system.
  1. Development and agreement on blueprints.
  2. Development of high production rate technical processes for mechanical finishing and control of AK-47 parts (factory #74 and NITI-40).
  3. Development and distribution in the Q1 of 1950 of technical tasks for design of new equipment and modernization of old equipment. GSPI-7 is to receive a task for design of transport devices and planning (NITI-40 jointly with factory #74) by August 1st, 1950.
  4. Development of transport devices, planning of equipment, and composition of technical-economical metrics (GSPI-7 jointly with the factory).
  5. Production of harnesses, experimental trials and implementation of labour intensive processes (see topic 104-102 for equipment) in 1950.
  6. Development of a project to organize and launch production of a new product (AK-47) and partial execution in 1950 (NITI-40).
  7. Production and implementation of the remaining harnesses and equipment, as well as introduction by NITI-40 of new processes for the production of the AK-47 system, development of guiding materials for the organization of assembly line production.
  8. Composition of a joint technical report."
4 pages later, we see:

"4. Execution of trials of an optical calibration system for the AK, correction of working blueprints, correction of the prototype in metal, correction of the optics, introduction of the device into production, composition of a technical report with trials and acceptance documents."

QA

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"Attachment to order #113-Mss
Approved by GKO decree #1148ss issued on January 14th, 1942

Requirements for quality assurance at tank factories
  1. Quality assurance is performed by the military representative of the GABTU.
  2. A tank can be considered accepted after firing the cannon and machineguns, test drive, correction of discovered defects and complete installation of equipment.
  3. The quality assurance process consists of:
    1. A 5 km drive for every T-34 and KV tank and 10 km drive for every tenth T-60 tank, chosen by the military representative.
    2. Firing the cannon on every tenth T-34 and KV tank and on every T-60 tank. Coaxial machineguns are fired on every tank.
      In addition, the military representative can control the quality of individual components and assemblies, as well as the quality of assembly of the tank.
  4. The military representative is permitted to accept tanks without clocks, voltmeters, ammeters (replaced with an indicator light), speedometers, aerothermometers (except one), turret fans (in winter time), turret traverse motors for the T-34, intercom (replaced with signal lights), spare containers, and radios in the event that there is a temporary absence of these parts at the tank factory."
RGAE 8752-4-8 p.169

Can Poland Into Tanks?

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Having broken away from its collapsing "big brother", Poland recalled its once serious military and political ambitions. In certain people's minds, Poland would rise to the status of a regional superpower at the very least, which meant it needed an army to match. Polish engineers began working on a new generation of airplanes, helicopters, AA systems. Plenty of attention was directed at armoured vehicles as well.

The Soviet way

The development path of Polish armoured vehicles in the late 80s was simple: production of the T-72M1 would continue until 1991, even though it was clear that it was obsolete. Polish leadership had two solutions to this issue. The first was negotiations to purchase a trial batch of T-72S tanks (export version of the T-72B) and a license for production. Negotiations began in 1987. This option was considered the most likely by both parties.

PT-91 Twardy with ERAWA armour.

The second option was to independently explore ideas for modernization of T-72 tanks based on experience gained with development of the T-55AM Merida tank. The results of this research would be applied to T-72S tanks during their production. Engineers from Bumar-Łabędy and OBRUM (Ośrodek Badawczo-Rozwojowy Urządzeń Mechanicznych, Mechanical Equipment Scientific Research Center) were involved in the project.

The situation changed radically in 1989. Due to the change in Polish government and shifts in Soviet foreign policy, issues arose with obtaining a T-72S license. The USSR hiked up the price and added new conditions: export of Polish tanks was forbidden and any changes made to the design would require participation of Soviet engineers. These conditions were unacceptable for the new Polish government, and negotiations ended.

It was clear that Poland needed to modernize its tanks on its own. Work on the Wilk (Wolf) program to produce a T-72M tank with Polish components began that same year. New features included ERAWA explosive reactive armour, a new fire control system with a laser rangefinder and second generation thermal vision, a new gun stabilizer, and a more powerful engine.

PT-91 Twardy with ERAWA-2 armour.

Work was going well overall, and in 1990 Polish industry decided to accept a more difficult challenge. The new PT-91 Twardy (Hard) was a thorough modernization of the T-72M1 tank. One of the goals of the project was not only to improve Poland's tank fleet, but to lay a foundation for bringing its tanks in line with Western standards, which were Poland's new target. The history of the T-72M2 and PT-91 Twardy falls outside the scope of this article, and interested readers can easily find information on it.

Plans for the future

Despite the work on the PT-91, it was clear that the T-72 will not be a modern tank no matter how much it's modernized. By the mid 1990s, both the Western countries and the USSR, which was now the most likely enemy, had fourth generation MBTs, for which the PT-91 was not a serious opponent. OBRUM began working to solve the army's tank problem in three directions at once.

The first variant was a thorough modernization of the T-72. Poland hoped to receive new technologies from the West that would seriously improve tanks that were already in production. The second was to develop a new domestic third generation MBT that would not be any worse than Western or Russian tanks. The third was to develop a domestic fourth generation MBT. Let us explore these three directions.

Work on modernization of the T-72 began even during the development of the PT-91, in 1991. A modernization plan was drawn up until 2005. Production of the PT-91 was planned to start in 1993, but due to a series of issues with Polish industry the tank went into production with some issues. A new stabilizer was not developed in due time, which created issues with installing a more powerful cannon. Development of the export PT-91M were supposed to start in parallel with mass production of the PT-91. This tank was supposed to use Western components without introducing significant changes into the tank's design. Poland hoped to woo nations who left the Communist bloc and wanted to modernize their armed forces. The issues of the PT-91 design were only solved with the PT-91B, which was planned for production in 1995. By then, the stabilizer, ERAWA-2 armour, and a guided weapons system were supposed to have been completed.

Main components of the PT-94 tank.

The next stage in the development of the T-72 was the PT-94, featuring widespread use of Western electronics. It was supposed to have a digital fire control system with thermal sights for the gunner and commander. Other novelties included a digital communications system, and an on-board computer for ease of maintenance and crew training. The mobility of the tank improved thanks to a new 1000 hp engine, new suspension, and an auxiliary generator that could power the electrical system without starting the main engine. The PT-94 was planned as a platform for testing solutions that would be used in more serious projects.

The PT-97 was planned as the final step in the evolution of the T-72. Work would start in 1997 and production in 2000. The front hull armour was completely redesigned. It was planned to get rid of the weaknesses in the T-72's armour and significantly increase its thickness. The goal was to protect the tank from widespread 125 mm Soviet ammunition. The turret was also changed to a new welded design. Cooperation with German companies to increase protection to the level of the Leopard 2A4 and integration of modern ERA into the design was planned.

PT-97 tank project.

The old Soviet 125 mm gun would either be replaced by a new gun of the same caliber designed in Poland, or a 120 mm gun that fired standard NATO ammunition. A remote controlled 12.7 mm machinegun and 60 mm mortar mount, a new hydraulic suspension, and a new 1200 hp engine were also planned. The PT-97 would be a tank that would be a match for early 90s Soviet designs and a passable second line tank once the fourth generation MBT was ready.

Polish war gorilla

The second direction taken by OBRUM was to begin work on a tank with the unofficial name Goryl (Gorilla). Initially, two variants with a traditional layout were considered: one with a 120 mm smoothbore Rheinmetall Rh-120 gun and a mechanized ammunition rack in the turret bustle, the other with a 125 mm gun and a T-72 style autoloader system. After some additional investigation, priority was given to the first type, as it would improve odds of survival on the battlefield.

The project was laid out in 1992. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the Polish military still saw the "Gorilla" as a potential tank for both use in the Polish army and for export. The design of the tank was reminiscent of the French Leclerc. The welded hull had a sloped composite front plate, equivalent to about 750 mm of RHA. The driver was placed to the left, just like on the Leclerc, and an auxiliary mechanized ammunition rack was to his right.

A model of the prospective Goryl tank.

The welded turret also consisted of composite armour, about 850 mm RHA equivalent. The turret held two crewmen and a conveyor type autoloader in the bustle. An armoured bulkhead and blowout panels, similar to Western tanks, separated the ammunition from the crew. NERA side armour offered additional protection. A variant with a new generation of ERA in the front was also explored.

The tank would be powered by a 1500 hp Rolls-Royce Condor engine. The hydro-pneumatic suspension would provide for smooth travel at any speed, simplifying the stabilizer's work. The fire control system included a stabilized commander's panoramic sight with night vision and thermal vision integration, and a ballistic computer with a number of external sensors. The main gun of the "Gorilla" was a dual stabilized 120 mm smoothbore gun designed in Poland, but compatible with NATO ammunition and guided missiles.

Approximate internal layout of the Goryl.

An export variant had the option to mount a 125 mm Polish produced gun. Additional armament included a coaxial 7.62 mm machinegun and one or two remote controlled 12.7 mm machineguns on the turret. Variants with a 60 mm mortar or replacement of one of the machineguns with a low caliber autocannon were also explored. The tank would also receive a GPS navigation system and computers for each crewman. An electronic warfare system could also have been explored.

A whole spectrum of fighting vehicles could have been designed on the "Gorilla" chassis. They included rocket artillery, AA missile systems, a command vehicle, a heavy APC, a bridgelayer, an engineering tank, and a recovery tank. By 1994 the project was completed and presented to the Polish army, as well as at a number of trade shows. The military proposed getting rid of the unwieldy name "Gorilla" and naming the tank after Władysław Anders. It is not known whether this suggestion was approved, but the name Anders shows up in later correspondence. It is also worth noting that the "Gorilla"/"Anders" project is often called PT-94 in online discussions, which is incorrect.

Vehicles on the "Gorilla"/"Anders" chassis.

The military approved the project by 195, but it was not developed further. The military's expectation of a larger budget fell through. While in 1990 Poland could hope for significant subsidies from the West in case of war with the USSR, there was no funding after the collapse. This also ruined Poland's export plans. Russia and the Ukraine filled the market segment that Poland was targeting with superior vehicles at a more attractive cost. As a result, the PT-94/97 and "Gorilla"/"Anders" had nowhere to go.

Leopard or "leopardization"?

Interest in new tanks arose once more in 1998, as the final decision on Poland's NATO membership was made. This created some problems for the Polish military, as the unification of its weaponry with NATO standards was insufficient. The issue of tanks was also raised. It was impossible to simply re-arm T-72 tanks with 120 mm guns due to large differences in the ammunition that made Soviet style autoloaders impossible to convert. A decision had to be made: either purchase Leopard tanks from neighbouring Germany or develop a deep modernization project for the T-72M/PT-91.

Poland's army and industry were categorically against the first choice, arguing that Germany was offering obsolete tanks at exorbitant prices. This choice would also deal a serious blow to Poland's defense industry and leave it without important customers. The "Gorilla"/"Anders" project was offered once more under the index PT-2000, and work on a modernization of the PT-91 under the name PT-2001 began. This project would combine all advantages of the Soviet layout, such as small mass and small size, with Western armament and protection.


PT-2001 Gepard, a thorough modernization of the PT-91 tank.

The PT-2001 was developed jointly with French specialists, and traces of GIAT's work on modernizations of the T-72 can be found in it. The old turret would be replaced with a new welded one that had an automated ammunition rack in the bustle. Either the Polish-Ukrainian 120 mm KBM-2 gun or French CN120-26/52 would be used. Auxiliary armament would be the same: a coaxial rifle caliber machinegun and large caliber machinegun on the roof. The fire control system would be French. The turret and hull would be protected with ERA blocks, potentially of Ukrainian or Israeli origin.

On the other hand, OBRUM showed that even a modernized PT-2001 would be inferior to its competitors in the West and East. Instead, they proposed their own PT-2000. The new proposal went far from the old "Gorilla": the turret was reworked to decrease weight, saving the initial levels of protection, the complicated suspension was discarded to reduce cost, going back to Soviet style six road wheels and torsion bars. The tank could also be assembled with converted T-72 hulls, but the amount of changes required made this an unprofitable proposition. Nevertheless, many PT-91 components could be reused.

PT-2001 Gepard, OBRUM's new tank that was more grounded in the PT-91 design.

In 2001 the military studied the T-72 modernization and OBRUM's new tank. The choice was made in favour of the first, as it was cheaper and less risky. However, the final decision was made by the politicians and not the military. It was decided that the modernization of old tanks was senseless, and German Leopard 2A4 tanks would be bought in order to "strengthen our partnership and unification". This decision was harshly criticised by the army, but there was nothing left to do.

The cutting edge of progress

Let's return to the early 90s. Even though work on a fourth generation Polish tank was to start in 1990, no serious progress was made in this direction. The situation changed after a relationship was established with the Ukrainian tank industry. Information on the Molot and Nota projects, as well as information on Objects 640 and 195 in development in Russia pushed Polish engineers into gear.

A fourth generation Polish tank with six road wheels per side designed in 1997.

Based on the analysis of Soviet designs and information about prospective tanks in the West, a two-man tank with an unmanned turret was chosen. The engine would be placed in the front to protect the crew. All ammunition would be stored in the turret bustle and loaded automatically. Similar solutions were proposed for early Leclerc designs. It's hard to say if Polish designers were inspired by them or designed their system on their own.

The ammunition was separated from the crew by an armoured bulkhead and equipped with blowout panels. The armour of the tank was supposed to withstand any 125 mm ammunition. A Polish-Ukrainian ERA and active protection complex would be installed. The main gun would be 125 or 140 mm. Development of the latter would be done in cooperation with the Ukraine or Germany.





Polish fourth generation tank with a seven wheel chassis, designed in 1997.

Both crewmen had all the controls, and could perform the duties of either the driver or the commander/gunner. This would allow the tank to remain in action in case one of the tankers was killed. Observation was performed via cameras in the hull and on extendable poles. The German MTU MT-881 1090 hp diesel powered the tank. Initially, the tank had a six wheel chassis with a hydro-pneumatic suspension. Later it was replaced with a seven wheel chassis for better distribution of weight and a smoother drive. Work on this project continued until 1999, but the assembly of a prototype was not even proposed. This was a period of trial and error for Poland's fourth generation MBT.

The topic of a new tank came up again in mid-2000s. As a result of tighter cooperation with Rheinmetall, the idea of a Polish variant of the Leopard 2A4 for export and domestic use came up. Even a draft project of this tank was prepared, but it was less revolutionary than the tank envisioned in 1997. The crew grew to 3 men, the engine returned to the rear, and the ammunition rack was in the fighting compartment.

Polish new generation tank developed in 2003.

The idea of a carousel autoloader, uncommon for Western tanks, was interesting. An additional ammunition rack was also placed in the bustle of the unmanned turret. There is no other data on this project. It is likely that it never made it out of the idea stage. The idea of working jointly with the Germans also failed. Polish leadership decided to simply purchase the more modern Leopard 2A5 tank.

Retirement home

In addition to unifying armament, the Polish military had another issues in 2000: what to do with more than 800 T-55 and T-55AM tanks that were in storage. Poland wasn't prepared to cut them up for scrap, but unlike the T-72M1 and PT-91 they weren't even viable in local conflicts. Their chassis were proposed for multiple projects, but the most interesting one is the Odyniec (Lone Boar) heavy APC developed in 2001. 

Project of the Odyniec APC on the T-55 tank chassis.

The Odyniec largely repeated solutions of the Israeli Achzarit and Russian BMP-T. The fighting compartment would be replaced with a cabin for eight soldiers. The front of the tank would house the driver to the left and the commander, equipped with a machinegun and a grenade launcher in a cupola, to the right. The Polish army could have received an APC protected from 100 and 105 mm gun fire, but the military did not take interest in the project, largely due to a lack of funding and poorly worked out placement of the infantry.

It's hard to say that the aforementioned projects ended in nothing for the Polish tank industry. Even though grandiose plans of leading the arms market failed, and the purchase of the Leopards was a blow to Polish industry, there is still a fire burning. Poland retains hope for modernization of the PT-91. Two new variants, the PT-16 and PT-17, were recently shown. Polish industry also produces the Rosomak (Wolverine) APC/IFV and is developing a next generation IFV. Only time will tell if Poland will be able to strengthen its position on the arms market.


Factory #183 Experimental Work

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"To the Chief of the 4th Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, comrade Afonin
December 1st, 1940

Summary of experimental work at factory #183 in November of 1940

Trials of A-7M tank #0314-2 with surrogate parts:
  1. Iron casing of the distributor shaft rather than aluminium alloy.
  2. Horizontal spring rods.
  3. Electrical wiring without liners.
  4. Fuel tanks coated with zinc by schooping rather than tinning.
  5. Gearbox with an iron casing. This gearbox was removed after 353 km after large cracks developing in the casing.
  6. Final drive components.
  7. Idler components and other small parts.
In addition, the following were installed:
  1. Unified main clutch.
  2. Unified oscillating levers of the turning wheels and other small parts.
The vehicle has travelled for 1488 km by December 1st, 1940, trials will continue in December.

Components were produced for the flamethrower device. Production of components will be completed in early December, and will be installed on an experimental A-34 vehicle, which is currently undergoing major repairs that will be complete on December 10-15th.

In the design bureau:
  1. Blueprints for heating of the A-7M vehicles are being completed.
    Production of components and installation is scheduled for January 1st, 1941.
  2. Blueprints for a friction clutch for the A-34 fan that would allow the fan to slip in relation to the flywheel when engine revolutions chance suddenly have been completed and parts were sent to production.
  3. Blueprints for a main friction clutch with thickened steel parts have been completed and sent to production.
  4. New driver observation devices are being developed for the A-34.
  5. Blueprints for modernization of the T-34 are being developed (new turret similar to the German type, torsion bar suspension, gearbox, etc).
Composed by: GABTU Military Representative, Military Engineer 3rd Class, Alekseev
Checked by: Regional GABTU Engineer, Military Engineer 2nd Class, Kozyrev"

F-34 Installation

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"Technical Meeting Minutes
Held on September 8th, 1940, at the State Order of Lenin Comintern Factory #183

Present:
  • Factory #183 Chief Engineer, Makhonin
  • Factory #183 Deputy Chief Designer, A.A. Morozov
  • Factory #92 Senior Engineer-Designer, P.F. Muravyev
  • Factory #92 Technician-Designer, B.G. Lasman
  • Factory #183 Senior Engineer, Maloshtanov
  • ABTU Military Representative, Military Engineer 3rd Class, Baikov
Topic: comrade P.F. Muravyev's presentation regarding the possibility of installing the 76.2 mm F-34 tank gun in the T-34 turret and the conversion of the T-34 turret made necessary by the requirement that the F-32 and F-34 be made interchangeable.

It was determined that:
  1. In order to make the F-34 system lighter and ensure reliable protection of the front of the cradle, factory #92 must pull back the trunnions by 80 mm. The existing counterweight on the cradle must be minimized.
  2. In order to make the TOD sight easier to use, lower the telescope mount and the forehead rest by 50 mm.
  3. In order to make the F-32 and F-34 interchangeable, reduce the direction part of the elevation mechanism gearbox from 110 to 100 mm, keeping the distance between the trunnion axles and the main gear axle of 400 mm by using gears with tooth correction.
  4. The turret travel lock installed in the rear part of the turret must be moved, as it interferes with the brass catcher.
  5. The part of the turret under the observation device must be lifted by 26 mm and lengthened rearwards by 70 mm. Shorten the rear plate of the turret by 70 mm from the front. Change the padding of the hatch. This allows a 20 mm gap between the roof and recoil elements given the maximum recoil length of 425 mm. Move the hatch lock to the right. Move the signal hatch 15 mm to the right.
  6. In order to allow for 30 degrees of gun elevation, trim the upper part of the front plate that touches the cradle armour by 40 mm. Change the contour of the upper part of the opening.
  7. Cut out 34 mm from the right part of the gun port. Even out the bottom of the left part with the right, cutting out 39 mm.
  8. The aforementioned changes to make the F-32 and F-34 interchangeable can be carried out by factory #183, given that changes are made to the working blueprints of the F-32 gun mount.
  9. These minutes and trial blueprints of the installation of the system in the turret signed by factory #92 designers comrades Muravyev and Lesman may be considered sufficient to perform conversion for installation of the F-34 system.
  10. When producing working blueprints for installation of the F-32, it is considered necessary to have an authorized designer from factory #92 work at factory #183 to completely and fully answer any issues that crop up.
  11. Factory #92 must send factory #92 a full set of F-34 blueprints and one sample with parts and tools, built according to production blueprints.
  12. Factory #183 must send factory #92 blueprints for installation of the F-32 gun.
  13. This agreement is subject to approval by the GAU and GABTU and enters into force immediately upon approval.
[Signatures]"

Savin's AA Turrets

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"Order of the People's Commissariat of Tank Production #26s
Chelyabinsk
January 15th, 1942
  1. To director of factory #174, comrade Katsnelson: immediately stop the work comrade Savin is performing on the T-50 SPAAG.
    Designers from Savin's group are to be moved to factory #183 immediately to perform this work on the T-34 tank. All existing materials and technical documentation is to be immediately sent to factory #183.
  2. To director of factory #183, comrade Maksarev: include Savin's group of designers into the factory's staff. Ensure that comrade Savin's group can complete its work in the following times:
    1. Complete the project and working blueprints by March 15th, 1942.
    2. Produce a prototype by May 1st, 1942.
    3. Begin trials on June 1st, 1942.
  3. To deputy chief of the NKTP technical department, comrade Ginzburg: transfer materials in possession of the NKTP on work performed by Savin's group to factory #183.
Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production, Kotin."

Romanian Czech with a Russian Accent

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The Romanian tank fleet was largely composed of Skoda Š-II-aR tanks (an export version of the LT vz. 35), accepted into service as the R-2. 126 units were purchased in 1938-1939. Fighting on the Eastern Front served as a cold shower for the Romanians. For instance, the 1st Tank Division lost 81 R-2s by the end of 1942. It was clear that these tanks could no longer be used in their initial form. The surviving 40 tanks were pulled out into the reserve.

Pz.Kpfw.III, Pz.Kpfw.IV, and StuGs were ordered from Germany to restore the 1st Tank Division (indexed T-3, T-4, and TA in the Romanian army, respectively). However, shipments were delayed, and the Romanians had to improvise. Captured Soviet T-60 tanks went into use first to make the TACAM T-60 tank destroyer. Work on developing the "Romanian Marder" on the R-2 chassis began in December of 1942. As with the TACAM T-60, work was done at the Leonida factory in Bucharest. Lieutenant-Colonel Konstantin Giulai headed the development. The project consisted of installation of a captured F-22 gun into an immobile casemate, open from the rear and partially from the top.

The TACAM R-2 SPG had a rather high silhouette.

The conversion was rather simple from a technical standpoint, but it was being delayed by a lack of chassis for conversion. The surviving R-2s were being used for training. One sample was sent to the factory only in July of 1943, and the prototype tank destroyer was ready by the end of September. Trials at Suditi showed that the new gun did not overload the chassis, as was feared. On the other hand, trials against a captured T-34 showed that Romanian armour piercing shells could only penetrate it from 500-600 meters. Another drawback was the height: the 2.32 m tall SPG would be hard to conceal on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the commission recommended the SPG for service under the index Tun Anti Car cu Afet Mobil R-2 (anti-tank gun on the R-2 self propelled chassis), or TACAM R-2.

Leonida received an order for conversion of 40 R-2s, but supplies of the chassis were limited for the same reason as before, the need to train tankers. Mass production began only in February of 1944. However, the delay allowed an improvement to be made by installing the superior ZIS-3 instead of the F-22. By June of 1944 the order was satisfied by 50%. Leonida produced 20 TACAM R-2, not counting the prototype, at which point production stopped. Remaining chassis were supposed to either carry Resita mod. 1943 anti-tank guns or flamethrowers, but these plans were never brought to life. The plans to convert 50 Pz.Kpfw.38(t) tanks (T-38 in Romanian nomenclature) were never brought to life either.

Design

The hull, engine, and suspension of the TACAM R-2 were identical to its base chassis. The hull was assembled from rolled armour, attached to a steel frame with rivets. The front armour was 25 mm thick, the sides were 16 mm, the rear was 12-16 mm, and the roof was 8 mm thick. The hull was split into the parts: the combined fighting/driver's compartment and the engine compartment. The two were separated with a fire resistant bulkhead.

The TACAM R-2 had a riveted hull and a welded superstructure.

The crew of the TACAM R-2 consisted of three men: the driver, commander/gunner, and loader. The driver's station was located to the front right. On the left was the machinegunner's station, who operated the 7.92 mm ZB vz. 37 machinegun. The tank destroyer had no machinegunner, but the machinegun remained. The driver fired it using a Bowden cable. A radio station was also located on the left. The two piece entry hatch on top of the driver was removed. That part of the turret platform was overtaken by the casemate. A 500 mm escape hatch in the floor was preserved.


Drawings of the TACAM R-2.

The casemate, open from the rear and partially from the top, was welded. It was built from available parts: 10-17 mm thick plates obtained during disassembly of captured T-26 and BT-7 tanks. It housed a captured 76.2 mm ZIS-3 gun. It could be aimed 30 degrees to the left and right, up to +15 degrees up and -5 degrees down. The ammunition capacity was 30 rounds, carried in racks on the sides and front of the casemate, as well as inside the hull.

The engine of the TACAM R-2 was the six cylinder 8.52 L 120 hp linear Skoda T-11. A planetary Praga-Wilson-Skoda gearbox offered six gears forward and six reverse. The electrical equipment was installed in series. A Chinchilla 600 W generator and two nickel-iron batteries powered the 12 V electrical system.

The running gear consisted of nine rubber rimmed doubled up 350x95 mm road wheels per side. Eight of them were combined into four bogeys. The suspension element was provided by leaf springs. The drive sprocket was in the rear, the adjustable idler was in the front. There were also four 200x60 mm return rollers. The tracks consisted of 111 links per side and were 350 mm wide.

Combat career

Unlike the TACAM T-60, the TACAM R-2 never fought against the Red Army. Ten TACAM R-2 were gathered into the 63rd Tank Destroyer Company (Compania de Vânători de tancuri), assigned to the 1st Training Tank Division in July of 1944. Romania switched sides on August 23rd, 1944, and its army had to fight against yesterday's allies. A mechanized corps was formed in late August-early September, which included the 8th Motorized Cavalry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, and the "Nicolescu" independent unit. The last included the 63rd company, which by then had 12 tank destroyers.

The casemate was open from the rear and, partially, from the top. Ammunition racks can be seen inside the turret.

By September 4th, the main forces of the Mechanized Corps were hurriedly transferred to the city of Blaj at the Transylvanian border. On September 5th, they took part in defending from a counteroffensive by the Hungarian 2nd Army from Cluj and Târgu Mureș. On September 6-7th, the Mechanized Corps fought to stop the Hungarian 2nd Tank Division, which the "Nicolescu" unit took an active part in. The SPGs then supported the counterattack of the Mechanized Corps, which threw back the 2nd Tank Division and 8th SS Cavalry Division back past the Mureș river.

During the clearing of northern Transylvania from German and Hungarian forces, an improvised tank group was formed using elements of "Nicolescu" and "Matei" units on September 29th. The group included a tank battalion (a company of T-4, a company of TA, and a company of 16 TACAM R-2), a motorized infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company, an anti-tank company, and an AA company, subordinate directly to the Romanian 4th Army. The group supported the 6th Army Corps during fighting at the river Someș. On October 14th, it was pulled out to rest and reform, but returned to battle on the 20th. Five days later, after the liberation of northern Transylvania, the group was disbanded.

A TACAM R-2 SPG.

12 TACAM R-12 SPGs were received by the 2nd Tank Regiment in February of 1945, which had a rather heterogeneous population. In addition to 8 T-4 tanks and 12 TA assault guns, the 2nd regiment contained obsolete R-2, T-38, R-35, and even downright antique Renault FT tanks. On February 8th, the regiment was sent to the front in Czechoslovakia, where it was attached to the Soviet 27th Guards Tank Brigade. The obsolete tanks of the regiment quickly dissolved in battle. By March 26th only five TACAM R-2 remained in service.

Several weeks later, the remains of the regiment were combined into a tank company. As of April 24th, it contained two TACAM R-2, in addition to other vehicles. One of them was destroyed in battle near Pasohlávky, another near Brno. When the remains of the 2nd Tank Regiment returned to Bucharest on May 14th, 1945, not a single TACAM R-2 remained in its ranks. A number of TACAM R-2s in various condition remain in Romania to this day. One of them is currently on display at the National Military Museum in Bucharest.

The only fully preserved TACAM R-2. The bow machinegun is missing.

The TACAM R-2 (as well as the RACAM T-60) is a relative of the German Marder series. The Romanian vehicles have the same weaknesses as the German tank destroyers: high silhouette, weak armour, open casemate. In 1942 this improvisation had its place, but by the second half of 1944, when the TACAM R-2 finally went into battle, it was an obvious anachronism.




Canadian Shermans Inside and Out

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By the time the M4A2E8 entered production, the Americans had no intention of using these tanks in their own army. While WWII continued, these tanks were supplied to the USSR. Afterwards, the remaining tanks were sold to Canada for a pittance, and formed the backbone of domestic tank forces for many years. As a result, there are plenty of M4A2E8 tanks still kicking around in Canada, many of them still running. The LeBreton Gallery in the Canadian War Museum has two: one of them slightly worse for wear than the other.


This is the one that works...


And this one not so much. However, we can take a close look at the innards of this tank.


The assistant driver's seat is gone, but the driver's seat is still there, for the most part.


A closer look at the instrument panel.


The fighting compartment from the other side. It's a lot emptier now than it would have been in the past, but you can see how much space the driveshaft took up. 




The engine compartment is chock full of goodies. Both diesel motors are still inside, one cut up to show its contents, the other intact.


One of those motors on display at the Ontario Regiment Museum. They don't have a cut up Sherman, however, all of theirs are right as rain and often come out for demonstrations and reenactments. 


Of course, it takes more than just the engine to make a tank go. The transmission is also on full display.


As are the final drives.


Here's a view of the bogey you don't often get, since the tracks don't get in the way on this tank. You can see that the rubber is in quite poor shape, the Achilles' heel of Sherman tanks of all types. Thankfully the bogeys were easy to replace.

Man Hours

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production #117-Ms
January 16th, 1942

Lately, many directors and chief engineers do not dedicate necessary attention to the issues of improving technologies, introducing new progressive technological processes, increasing amounts of instruments, etc, as a result of which time expenditure at various factories is unbearably high, which causes extra demand in tools and manpower.

For example:
  1. The T-60 tank takes 2500 hours to produce at factory #37, but 4700 hours at factory #264, 1.9 times greater.
  2. A V-2 diesel engine takes 2700 hours to produce at factory #76, 1800 hours at the Kirov factory, but at factory #75 the same diesel engine is produced in 600 hours.
  3. The Krasnoye Sormovo factory takes 2500-3000 hours more to make a T-34 tank than factory #183 took in its time and the Stalingrad factory does now.
It is clear that, instead of carefully and systematically working to reduce costs of producing vehicles, instead of getting technologies and use of tools in order, instead of training workers, many directors and chief engineers take the path of least resistance and complete plans only by increasing the number of tools and workers. The People's Commissariat cannot and will not support this kind of extravagance.

I order that:
  1. Chiefs of the production and planning departments must provide me with the standards for time consumption to produce KV, T-34, T-60 tanks, hulls for them, and the V-2 diesel engine, taking the leading factories as a baseline.
  2. After standards are established, calculate the requirements for equipment and workforce.
  3. The technical department (comrades Ginzburg and Rybkin) must transfer the experience of leading factories in lowering the labour requirements to factories that are falling behind.
  4. Directors and chief engineers of tank, hull, and diesel factories must:
    1. Within ten days re-evaluate the excessive time consumption and develop specific measures of improving production technologies with the goal of reducing time consumption.
    2. Force existing technical, technological, and labour calculation departments to work properly. Warn the leaders of these departments that their work will be evaluated based on the reduction in times it takes to produce each vehicle, and not by the number of requests for new equipment or new workers.
Again, I'm warning directors and chief engineers of factories that, in time of war, we need to maintain strictest economy of tools and labour force. Directors who consider their duty to complete the plan "at any cost" must be told off. The plan must be carried out with minimal costs, not "at any cost".

People's Commissar of Tank Production, V. Malyshev"

HE vs Tanks

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"Due to a shortage of armour piercing shells presently experienced by artillery units, the practice of firing other types of ammunition out of 76.2 mm divisional guns is common.
  1. Armour piercing shot. Penetrates the armour of German tanks from any direction. Insufficient beyond armour effect. Fire and destruction of the tank are only caused if the engine, fuel tank, or ammunition is hit.
  2. Steel cased HE grenade. Can be used in combat against light (in some cases medium) tanks. Aimed at the sides during oblique movement or the turret ring, it destroys or tears off side armour in addition to jamming the turret and destroying mechanisms inside the turret, including optical sights and observation devices. In a number of cases the turret stopped traversing. When howitzers are used, light tank turrets were torn off.
  3. Shrapnel is still one of the most effective anti-tank means, as at a distance of up to 300 meters it can penetrate up to 35 mm of armour, which makes it a viable weapon against light tanks, and at closer range (200 m) against the flanks of medium tanks.
  4. The incendiary shell is insufficiently effective, but in a number of cases can be used when firing directly. It is desirable to concentrate fire of an entire battery firing incendiary shells at one tank.
  5. The steel cased explosive grenade is most effective when firing at the sides of the tank during oblique movement.
  6. The cast iron fragmentation grenade can be used only when firing at the turret to blind the tank.
None of the listed types of ammunition can fully replace armour piercing shells, as they either lack the necessary penetration (at least 60 mm) or beyond armour effect."

Excerpt from "Destruction of the armour of German tanks", June 1942, NII-48

Tank Archives Turns Six

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Hello, dear readers! Another year of running this blog went by. And what a year it was. I finally got past the medium of text, appearing in not one, but two podcasts by Military History Visualized: one on kill claims back in May, and one more recently on Soviet impressions on the Pz.Kpfw.I tank. In case you missed them the first time around, I'm embedding the videos under the break.

Twitter has taken off pretty well. I'm well over the 1000 follower milestone, sitting at 1322 at the time of writing. The main blog is also doing well, right up against 4 million total views. Seems that my audience demographics have stabilized: USA at a distant first, followed by the UK, Germany, Russia, Canada, Poland, France, Finland, Australia, and Spain.
A little bit extra news for everyone who clicked the "read more" link: I'm writing a book! The working title is "Designing the T-34", but it's almost certainly going to change. As you may have guessed, I'm planning to cover the creation of the T-34, starting from lessons learned during the Spanish Civil War and ending with production and distribution of the tanks in the months before the start of the Great Patriotic War. The book will be published in the UK by Morton's, but I'm sure it will be available worldwide through standard channels. It should be out by the end of the year, so be on the lookout for more announcements.

And now, those videos I promised you:






Long Barrel for Infantry Tanks

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At the moment of its debut in 1940, the Infantry Tank Mk.III, later known as Valentine, was the most balanced vehicle in the British army. Its low top speed was compensated by a rather respectable average speed, especially off-road. 60 mm of armour was very good for the time, and even in 1942 not every gun was capable of penetrating this much armour.

Of course, by 1942 the tank was becoming obsolete. While there was no hope of increasing mobility, there was a chance to improve the firepower. Heroic efforts by Vickers-Armstrongs engineers resulted in a significant increase in caliber, while the tank's mass remained unchanged. As a result, the Valentine fought until the end of the war. Individual vehicles even saw victory on German territory.

More gun, same mass

The 2-pounder gun was a fine weapon at the start of WWII. Its penetration characteristics were about the same as those of the German 3.7 cm Pak and the Soviet 45 mm anti-tank gun. However, one serious drawback of the British gun was the lack of an HE shell. British tank policy, born in early 1920s, dictated that tanks fight infantry either with machineguns or special howitzer tanks.

Nevertheless, the 2-pounder worked just fine as an anti-tank gun. However, this started to change in the spring of 1941, when PzIII and PzIV tanks with applique armour arrived on the battlefield. The applique armour did not make them invulnerable to Allied artillery, since several shots would knock them off and the front of the turret still had no additional protection, but this was just the beginning.

General view of the Valentine IX turret. By the time this diagram was drawn, the Valentine X was already designed, hence the indication of the machinegun.

Production of the PzIII Ausf.J and PzIV Ausf.F began in the spring of 1941. The 2-pounder could penetrate their front armour only at point blank range. The British first faced these tanks towards the end of 1941, but the issue of reinforcing the tanks' armament was raised before that.

However, the British designers did not rest on their laurels in the meantime. As the Germans initiated work on the 50 mm tank gun in 1938, the British started working on a replacement for the 2-pounder gun in that same year. Work began on both tank and anti-tank versions of the 6-pounder (57 mm) gun. This caliber was a classic: famous "rhombus" tanks had this type of gun, and the Maxim-Nordenfelt guns used in German A7V tanks also had a caliber of 57 mm.

This was a progressive system for its time. It had a high muzzle velocity and penetration comparable to the Soviet ZIS-2, which had a longer barrel. The gun mount was also progressive, featuring a very low profile. However, work dragged on, and the first 50-caliber version didn't make it into production. The situation with 2-pounder gun production resulted in the more powerful gun getting held back. Production of the OQF 6-pounder Mk.II with a 43-caliber barrel only began in November of 1941. 

Cutaway diagram of the Valentine IX turret.

The new tank gun was not only more powerful than the previous one, but larger. This was a fatal flaw for some tanks. For instance, the three-man turret of the Matilda tank did not fit such a large gun, according to British engineers. The design bureau of factory #92 didn't know about their conclusions when they managed to stick the 76 mm ZIS-3 into the same turret. The Crusader tank was suitable for the new gun, but the front of the turret had to be changed, resulting in the Crusader III tank. The Churchill needed a whole new turret. It was the Churchill III that first went into production with a 6-pounder gun.

Like the Matilda, the failure to fit a 6-pounder gun would have been a death sentence for the Valentine tank. A group of engineers headed by Leslie Little got to work on converting the turret a second time.

Valentine IX produced by Elswick Works. This tank was built after a series of Valentine V tanks.

The Valentine III three-man turret was used as a basis of their designs. The larger gun did not allow a commander to fit, so it became a two-man turret wonce more. The front had to change was well, to move the trunnions forward. The engineers managed to achieve their goals, but at a cost: there was no room for a coaxial machinegun or a bomb thrower. The latter issue was partially resolved by installing two 4-inch No.2 smoke bomb launchers on the right side of the turret. The commander/loader and gunner received individual hatches for entering the turret.

The changes to the hull were minimal. Since the turret was heavier than before, the side armour had to be reduced to 50 mm. The mass of the tank was 17 tons: about the same as the Valentine III and VII.

The same tank from the right.

A decision to put the tank with a 6-pounder gun into production was made in October of 1941. The tank did not yet exist in metal. It would be put into production without first building a prototype. The new tank was indexed Valentine VIII. The tank would be based on the Valentine II chassis with the AEC 190 engine. Contract TM6771 signed on October 7th included 534 Valentine VIII tanks, but was soon changed. Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company (BRC&W), which was supposed to build the Valentine VIII, built the Valentine III instead.

As a result, not a single Valentine VIII was built. Production of the Valentine IV with a GM 6004 diesel engine began in the fall of 1941. This engine was more powerful, and more importantly, more common. A decision was made to equip the more powerful tank with this engine.

Production of the Valentine IX at Elswick Works.

The version with a GM 6004 engine was named Valentine IX. The tank had to wait: the Valentine V, which was also built without a prototype, had to go into production first. The Valentine IX chassis was somewhat modernized. The American engine was turbocharged with a more powerful injector, as a result of which its output increased to 165 hp at 1900 RPM. This small increase in power resulted in a notable increase in mobility, particularly off-road.

The chassis did not differ from the Valentine V.

Changes were made to old contracts in connection with the new Valentine. Contract T2243, which had already changed once, was changed once more to 125 Valentine IV, 400 Valentine V, and 230 Valentine IX tanks. WD numbers used by Elswick Works for these tanks ranged from T.66591 to T.67220. This range included both Valentine V and Valentine IX tanks. The cost for one tank did not increase by much: the tank itself cost 5710 pounds Sterling, plus 4490 pounds for the engine and other components.

Contract TM6618 signed on October 7th, 1941, for 455 Valentine V tanks produced by  Metropolitan Cammell Carriage and Wagon Company (MCCW) also changed. Now the factory was building 328 Valentine IX tanks with WD numbers T.82163–T.82617.

The first brand new contract, TM6116, was signed with Elswick Works on October 7th, 1941. It ordered 460 Valentine IX tanks with WD numbers T.122698-T.123157. Initially, the plan was to sign this contract to produce Valentine V tanks. A third contract was signed with Elswick Works on February 6th, 1942, TM11533. 475 more tanks with WD numbers T.123158-T.123632 would be built. Finally, the last contract numbered TM11532 was signed with MCCW in May of 1942. It ordered 460 tanks, but later this number was reduced to 260 tanks, numbered T.120690-T.121149.

The Valentine IX made its debut in North Africa in this form.

Production of the Valentine IX began in the fall of 1942. The Valentine was the last tank that the British armed with 6-pounder guns. Only a few tanks received the 43-caliber Mk.II version, as soon after production of the 50-caliber Mk.V with superior penetration began. Elswick Works completed contract TM6618 in January of 1943.

The return of the coaxial machinegun

The Valentine IX was harshly criticised by tankers after its first battles, particularly regarding the armament. A lack of coaxial machinegun turned the Valentine IX into a tank destroyer. There were no HE shells available, and fighting enemy infantry with AP shot was not the brightest idea. The tankers demanded that the coaxial machinegun be returned.

Valentine X. The coaxial machinegun is shown.

The turret had to be changed again to meet this requirement. An extra bulge was added to the right of the gun, which housed a BESA machinegun. The tank could once again fight infantry, but the addition of a machinegun weakened the turret, since the mantlet was only 14 mm thick. The machinegun mount was vulnerable even to heavy machinegun fire.

The tank also received new headlights.

Some changes were made to the chassis as well. In addition to 4 inch smoke bomb throwers, two containers for smoke bombs were added to the rear. The same containers were added to other British tanks, including the Cromwell and Comet. The headlights were also changed. These changes were not drastic, but they make it easy to distinguish the Valentine X from its predecessor.

Valentine X from above, showing turret hatches.

New contracts for the Valentine X were not signed, old ones were simply altered. For instance, the number of Valentine IX tanks built according to contract TM11352 decreased to 30. However, the number of Valentine X tanks built here was not high, only 35 units. The contract with Elswick Works was altered as well. Now contract TM11533 included 275 Valentine IX and 100 Valentine X. 135 Valentine X tanks were built in total.

The Valentine XI was the last Valentine built. The tank in the photo has a welded hull front.

Experience in North Africa and a comparison with British tanks demonstrated the weakness of the policy to only equip tanks with AP shot. However, British generals maintained that 57 mm HE shells would not be effective. A consequence of this was the introduction of the OQF 75 mm. This tank gun was similar to the American M3, used in Lee, Grant, and Sherman tanks. The ammunition it used was the same. The gun fit into the same turrets that previously housed the OQF 6-pounder, so the idea to install it in the Valentine was obvious.

The same tank in three quarters view.

The new version of the Valentine was indexed Valentine XI. Since the new gun fit into the old turret, it was not changed. Only the front of the tank was different. The British finally remembered that you could built a tank with something other than rivets and bolts. At the very least, the front part of the hulls built at Elswick Works was welded. Judging by photographs, tanks built at MCCW were still assembled using rivets.

The chassis was the same as on the Valentine X.

Production of the Valentine XI was also done through old contracts. Elswick Works built 100 tanks of this type. The last tank was delivered on September 29th, 1943. MCCW had a smaller output: 16 tanks in its first contract and 20 in the second, a total of 36. Another 175 Valentine XI tanks were built in a different way.

Valentine IX DD. 300 of these tanks were built.

Like the Valentine V, 6-pounder and 75 mm gun armed Valentines were built in a special variant. Its history began in 1941, when the Hungarian engineer Nicolas Straussler proposed a system that made any tank amphibious. Similar work was performed in Germany, namely the Schwimm-Pz.Kpfw.II. The Germans also had Tauchpanzer III and IV tanks, which drove on the sea floor. The German designs were complicated and expensive. In addition, their equipment had to be carried separately.

The Duplex Drive (DD) system was different. First of all, it was suitable for light and medium tanks. Second, the Duplex Drive could be set up in 20 minutes and deflated even faster than that. This allowed tanks to land and immediately enter battle. The Duplex Drive did not need to be removed after use. Straussler's proposal was also much cheaper, which made it viable.

175 amphibious tanks were built on the Valentine XI chassis.

Successful trials of a Tetrarch DD tank paved the way for the Valentine, the most numerous British tank of the time, to be converted in the same way. After trials of a Valentine II DD in June of 1942, the British ordered 450 DD sets to equip tanks with GM 4006 engines. The priority was given to Valentine IX tanks, but mass production had not yet begun. The contract signed on July 6th included 214 Valentine V and 236 Valentine IX tanks. The production of Valentine DD tanks was delayed, but the number of Valentine tanks with 6-pounder guns crew. By the end of 1942, a decision was made to build 135 Valentine V DD and 315 Valentine IX DD tanks.

The Valentine XI DD was only used for training.

In practice, 160 Valentine V DD and 312 Valentine IX DD were built, all at MCCW. 175 Valentine XI DD tanks were also built at MCCW.

In total, 1753 Valentine tanks with long guns were built.

Worse than the Sherman

Various production and technical difficulties led to constant delays of Valentine IX production. When it did start, production was plagued with technical issues. This is often skipped over by British sources, but correspondence that remains in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reveals that a large number of problems were experienced with the new gun at first. The unreliable elevation mechanism was the number one flaw. Judging by a list of changes made in production, this flaw affected all tanks with 6-pounder guns. These difficulties were overcome around early 1943.

The Valentine IX made its debut in Tunis in the spring of 1943.

The debut of the Valentine IX only took place in early 1943. The war in North Africa had passed a turning point by then. The Italian-German forces lost the Battle of El Alamein and began their retreat to the west. Their rapid retreat brought them to Tunisia. Here is where the Valentine IX made its debut. The offensive in Tunisia coincided with a mass delivery of Sherman II and Sherman III tanks (Medium Tanks M4A1 and M4A2). They were first used in the Battle for El Alamein, with stunning results. British tankers received a tank of their dreams, compared to which the products of British tank industry paled. Only the Churchill III and IV looked comparable.

The fighting in Tunisia sealed the Valentine's fate. After the surrender of Italian-German forces in North Africa the Valentine was pulled from the front line. Newly produced tanks were sent to the USSR. Out of 1011 Valentine IX tanks, 836 were sent to the Eastern Front, more than 80%. More than half of Valentine X tanks were sent there as well. By the end of December 1943, only 71 Valentine IX/X and 220 Valentine IX DD remained in Britain. 88 Valentine IX tanks remained in Iraq, where they were used by Polish units.

Valentine IX from the 2nd Polish Armoured Brigade, Iraq, 1943. Later, tanks of this type were sent to the USSR.

The Valentine IX DD was obsolete, but still offered some value as an amphibious tank. As a result, over 100 tanks of this type were transferred to Italy by June 1944. As of April 7th, 1945, the 15th Army contained 128 Valentine IX tanks of all types, however only 4 were on the front line. At the very least, they saw some action.

Valentine XI in Germany, early 1945.

The fate of the Valentine XI was much more interesting. Unlike earlier versions, they were never sent to the USSR. These tanks, as well as Valentine X, were used as command tanks in units equipped with the Archer tank destroyer. The British followed the same logic as the Soviets who used T-70B tanks in SU-76M units. The chassis was the same on both vehicles, and the Valentine was fine for a command tank. Command tanks in the British army often had their cannons replaced with dummies, but the Valentines kept their guns. Each tank carried only 39 rounds of ammunition.

A visualization of the end of the war. The most numerous British tank next to the unfinished chassis of the German super-heavy E-100.

The Valentine X and XI lasted for a long time in the role of command tanks. As of June 1945, the 21st Army included 16 Valentine X and 14 Valentine XI tanks. They were used by units attached to the 3rd, 5th, 51st, and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions. These tanks drove all the way to Germany. Footage exists of a Valentine XI tank next to the chassis of the German super-heavy E-100 tank. The Valentine was the longest living design of all British wartime tanks.

Valentine IX DD from John Pearson's collection, summer 2017. This tank came first in the "best British tank in show" category at The War and Peace Revival 2017.

4 Valentine tanks with long guns survive to this day, all of them Valentine IX. One tank that fought for the Red Army is being restored in Poland. Another one waits its turn in Bastogne. There are two Valentine IX tanks in Britain, both of them mobile. One is a part of the Bovington Tank Museum collection. The other is the only Valentine IX DD that survives to this day. When John Pearson found this tank, it was being used by a farm as a bulldozer without a turret. Restoration took more than 20 years, but the result was a fully complete tank, which takes place in many military historical events.



Cessation of T-50 Production

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production
#101-Mss
January 7th, 1942

To carry out decree #1114ss issued by the State Committee of Defense on January 6th on the cessation of the production of the T-50 tank due to the organization of production of the T-60 tank, I order that:
  1. Factory #174 director, comrade Kantsellson, must:
    1. Cease production of the T-50 tank after using up all hulls and engines present at the factory.
    2. Immediately begin production of KV tank components for the Kirov factory, production of KV spare parts, and spare parts for the T-26 tank using dedicated tools.
    3. Preserve all special tools, instruments, stamps, technical documentation, etc. relevant to the T-50 tank.
  2. My deputy and the director of Kirov factory comrade Zaltsmann must, within a 3 day period, determine the type and number of spare parts for KV and T-26 tanks necessary for production at factory #174.
  3. The Chief of the Planning Department comrade Vasin must make the necessary changes in the plan of factory #174.
  4. Acting director of factory #173 in Omsk, comrade Shot, must:
    1. Cease preparation for T-50 tank production.
    2. Immediately begin production of parts for T-34 tanks for factory #183 and T-34 spare parts.
    3. Begin preparation for T-34 tank production.
      Present me a draft plan for starting up T-34 production within 5 days.
  5. Director of factory #174, comrade Maksarev, must:
    1. Immediately send production engineers, technologists, and designers to factory #173 for temporary and permanent placement for assistance with production of T-34 parts and components and for preparation for T-34 tank production.
    2. Immediately send all necessary technical documentation relevant to T-34 production to factory #173.
    3. Jointly with comrade Shor, within five days, determine the necessary T-34 parts and components that need to be produced at factory #173, both for factory #183 and spare parts for January-March.
  6. Director of Saratov factory #180, comrade Suvorov, must:
    1. Cease production of T-50 tank hulls, completing the tank hulls that are already at the factory.
    2. Preserve equipment for producing T-50 tank hulls.
    3. Immediately begin preparations for organizing production of T-60 tank hulls for factory #264 and production of individual T-34 components to aid factory #264.
  7. My deputy and acting director of factory #264 must:
    1. Immediately send all technical documentation for T-60 tank hull production and individual T-34 armoured components to factory #180.
    2. Transfer existing equipment for production of T-60 hulls and some staff to factory #180.
    3. Jointly with comrades Sherbakov and Suvorov establish the deadlines for starting up T-60 hull production and send me plans for January-March.
  8. My deputy, comrade Nosenko, must establish constant control over the conversion of factories ## 174, 173, and 180, and establish deadlines for starting new production.
People's Commissar of Tank Production, V. Malyshev"

Wet Ammo Rack Effectiveness

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After reading reports of frequent fires in Sherman tanks coming from the British, the Americans decided to investigate. Separate trials were done on tanks cleared of ammunition, and frequent fires did not result from penetrations. However, the story was completely different when the opposite case was tested: the tank had a full loadout of ammo, but no traces of fuel or oil.


90% of penetrations of the fighting compartment and the turret caused a fire! To make things worse, CO2 fire extinguishers proved ineffective, and only large quantities of water could fight this fire.



To test how well water helps against these fires, a rack surrounded by water was tested, but the first penetration tore the entire rack apart due to hydraulic action. A solution was to use concentric cells, with the space between them filled with water, with some air left on top. This proved to protect the ammunition better, with one one cell bursting when hit. A new layout for ammunition was also drafted, which would not only protect it with water, but keep it out of harm's way below the track line.


Trials of the new ammo racks installed in real Sherman hulls proved promising. Out of 14 ammunition cells punctured by 37 and 75 mm shells only two caught fire. The reduction of the vulnerable area also went a long way to keep the tank safe. In addition, despite fears that this kind of modernization would decrease the amount of available ammunition, the total capacity increased to 150 rounds. However, the ready rack was reduced to only 6.

It was concluded that, short of armouring a tank to the point where it cannot be penetrated at all, this is the best available method of protecting from ammunition fires.


Bringing Tractors Back

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #133-Ms
Moscow
January 21st, 1942

Factory #183 (director comrade Maksarev), having performed the evacuation of equipment to manufacture the Voroshilovets tractor, still has not organized production in its new location. Plant an factory leadership did not pay due attention to rapidly restoring the production of this vehicle alongside the production of the T-34 tank.

The Red Army's requirements for rapid transport for its troops and artillery are not being met. To make up for this drawback in the factory's operation, I order that:
  1. Director of factory #183, comrade Maksarev, must present me with a specific schedule of restoring and organizing Voroshilovets artillery tractor production within ten days. 10 tractors are due in April, 30 in May, and 50 in June.
  2. Director of factory #76, comrade Kochetkov, must supply sufficient amounts of V-2V diesel engines to produce these vehicles.
  3. Deputy Chief of the 1st Department, comrade Davtyan, must establish the list of parts and their amounts that are required by factory #183 from other factories.
  4. Chief Quartermaster comrade Rosin must supply factory #183 with a necessary amount of materials and purchased goods.
  5. My deputy, comrade Kotin, is to present me within 2 weeks a plan to produce a tractor based on the T-34 chassis at factory #183. 
  6. Deputy People's Commissar comrade Stepanov must report on the execution of this order by February 20th.
People's Commissar of Tank Production, V. Malyshev."

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