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Inspection

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"Issues that comrade Marshal Fedorenko, Commander of Armoured and Mechanized Forces, pays special attention to during inspection of units and formations.
  1. Preparation of vehicles:
    The Marshal considers that vehicles are fully ready when the following is achieved.
    1. The full cargo load of cars is calculated and cargo is loaded.
    2. The amount of cars needed to transport remaining cargo is calculated.
    3. The driver of each car has a list of contents, who he has to report to, etc.
    4. Each car has additional barrels for gasoline, water, and oil. Each tank has a barrel of fuel.
    5. When crews enter their vehicles they must act strictly according to the manual. The senior vehicles, flanking vehicles, and observers must know their responsibilities.
    6. Cargo must be loaded into cars carefully and crews placed correctly.
  2. Preparation of individuals:
    1. Their presentation.
    2. Knowledge of weapons and its conditions.
    3. Care for and protection of the gas mask.
    4. The Marshal pays close attention to the presence of pouches and their condition, the amount of ammunition in each. He personally checks soldiers' reports on the amount of ammunition in pouches. In addition to pouches he checks the ammunition held in reserve.
    5. Flasks must be stored in carrying cases and filled with water.
    6. Trench shovels must be in carrying cases.
    7. Each soldier must have two days of rations in his pack.
    8. Each soldier must have a helmet.
  3. When inspecting commanders, he pays attention to:
    1. Knowledge of the commander's unit. Tank commanders are asked in detail about their tank crew.
    2. Knowledge of the units in a platoon/company.
    3. All commanders are asked the topics covered in training and the proficiency in these topics. He can call out a company or a battalion to demonstrate the solution of a tactical task.
    4. Each commander must have a compass, a ruler, a map, paper, and a candle.
    5. He likes to ask tankers about their knowledge of topography.
  4. Readiness of tank crews:
    1. The tank's battle stowage.
    2. Knowledge of the tactical-technical data of their tank by the crew.
    3. Battle condition 1, 2, and 3, especially condition 1 in a gas mask.
  5. Work of the brigade, corps, and battalion staffs:
    1. Battle alert instructions.
    2. Diagram of deploying and forming up of each battalion with time calculations.
    3. Documentation and battle training plans.
    4. Control of the staff and assistance provided in training units and formations.
Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Vazanov"

T-28 Successor

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In 1935, even before the influence of the Spanish Civil War, the Red Army was looking to modernize its tank fleet. The objective of a fast moving convertible drive tank with a diesel engine was only achieved with the BT-7M tank in 1938. 


"Based on the direction of work on improving existing fighting vehicles to create fast moving convertible drive operational tanks with diesel motors by the 4th years of the 2nd five year plan, the new T-26A convertible drive tank needs to be introduced to replace the T-26 and BT, instead of the PT-1 and T-28 tanks, a new convertible drive T-28-B tank with a powerful diesel motor. The rest of the tanks can be retained without major changes.

T-28-B tank:
  1. Mass: 20 tons
  2. Armour: 30 mm
  3. Armament: 1 76 mm gun and 3 super rapid fire machine guns
  4. Motor: special 500 hp diesel
  5. Speed: 70 kph on wheels, 50 kph on tracks
  6. Range: 200 km on tracks, 300 km on wheels
  7. Crew: 6 
  8. Maximum trench crossing width: 3.3 m
  9. Maximum vertical obstacle crossing height: 0.85 m
  10. Maximum fording depth: 1 m"

Tanks to Sleds

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GKO decree #1958ss "On production of T-34 and T-70 tanks" was published on July 3rd, 1942. According to this decree, production of T-60 small tanks ceased as of July 5th. By this point these tanks were in production at factories #264 and #37. The first factory, located in Stalingrad, switched to producing hulls for T-34 tanks. Factory #37 in Sverdlovsk switched to the T-70, but not for long: T-34 production started here as well.  

This is usually where the tale of the T-60 tank ends. However, that is not the end of the story. In late 1942 - early 1943 Soviet industry continued to build products made from T-60 armoured hulls. These were armoured sleds, work on which began in early 1942.

Overweight cart

The Red Army began thinking about building APCs in the 1930s, but work did not proceed past some experiments. A certain APC-like vehicle was used in the Winter War. These were Sokolov armoured sleds, which allowed infantry to remain protected while accompanying tanks. 300 sleds of this type were in storage by spring of 1941. The topic was revisited in late 1941. The Department of Inventions of the Main Automotive and Armoured Directorate of the Red Army (GABTU) was flooded with proposals for armoured sleds of various types.

There were some exotic designs among them. A designer from factory #112 V.E. Gubanov proposed an armoured assault trailer in late February of 1942. It consisted of a shortened T-34 hull with the same armament and armour. In the summer the trailer retained its tracks, in the winter the tracks were replaced with skis. According to the author's calculations, the trailer would weigh 10-15 tons. These sleds could be developed in three variants: combat, combat assault, and special type.

According to the author, the trailer could be designed and built at factory #112 in a short time. To make work faster, ordinary T-34 hulls could be used. In this case, the mass would increased to 15-20 tons, but the amount of troops carried would increase from 10 to 15.

BDTP armoured trailer, February 1942. The author was too optimistic in his calculations. It is not likely that the T-34 would be able to tow such a huge weight.

The BDTP was reviewed on February 27th, 1942, by the 5th department of the GABTU. The same meeting discussed the B-65 armoured sled developed at factory #592. These 20 ton sleds could barely be towed by even a KV-1 tank. Commanders and technical deputy commanders from the 31st, 33rd, 62nd, and 143rd Tank Brigades with experience in winter combat were invited to discuss the designs.
They unanimously declined these huge trailers. A conclusion was composed as a result of the meeting.

"
  1. The 15-20 ton trailers proposed by factories #112 and #592 are not acceptable. The KV tank does not have the final drive or main clutch reserve to operate with them, and the T-34 will be at its limit.
  2. To provide protection for the tank rider company of the tank brigade, it is desirable to develop a trailer for the T-34 tank with the following characteristics: 
    1. Weight: 5 tons
    2. Crew: 15
    3. Armour: 13-15 mm
    4. Firing ports:
      1. 5 per side
      2. 2 in the rear
      3. 2 in the front
    5. Height: 1.5-1.6 meters
    6. Width: same as the tank
    7. Exits: rear, sides, floor
    8. Running gear: wheels and tracks
    9. Unhooking mechanism in the tank
    10. Rear tow hook
    11. Visibility: mirror periscopes along the sides, front, and rear
    12. Ground pressure: no higher than the tank
  3. Amount of trailers per tank brigade: 5
  4. It is reasonable to use BT tank hulls without the turret and engine, converting them to meet the assault trailer requirements.
  5. It is desirable to include tractors into the tank brigade to tow the trailers, one tractor per two trailers."
This document contained the first requirements for an armoured sled. The meeting participants did not shy away from the idea of using existing tank hulls. However, everyone present understood that the mass of the trailer had to be radically decreased. As further events showed, this was a reasonable requirement.

TD tank trailer, February 1942.

Analysis and study of various inventions that were sent to Moscow during the war is treated as a waste of time by many. This is not the case. Of course, most proposals submitted by citizens were impossible, but even the 1% of successful ideas made the paperwork worth it. One of these rare proposals was sent to Moscow from Chelyabinsk on February 16th, 1942. Its author was the deputy chief metallurgist at factory #78 D.I. Chizhikov. In a letter addressed to Stalin Chizhikov described an armoured trailer that used the T-60 tank running gear.
"For deployment of troops in the enemy rear, use tracked armoured trailers (TD) (tank desant, mobile pillbox".
The TD trailers can also be used as pillboxes, ammunition carriers, ambulances. The TD is not a difficult transport to produce. It consists of a simple hull and suspension on tracks with no engine. 
The TD hull can be made from steel by either welding, riveting, or casting. The TD can be built using small armour plates with defects that were rejected during tank production. Components from knocked out tanks or those rejected during production can be used to make the running gear. Tractor parts, such as those from the S-2 ChTZ tractor, can also be used.
As the TD is a very simple design, production can be set up in a short time at any factory, no matter how limited in its ability.
I asked the director of factory #200 (Izhora factory in Chelyabinsk) comrade M.N. Popov for help in the development, and he reacted positively, immediately allotting designers. Currently the TD variant built from the T-60 tank is finished. One TD can be built for trials."

Chizhikov's idea turned out to be much more realistic than the previous proposals. The TD was 4.5 meters long, 2 meters wide, 1 meter tall. The suspension and running gear came from the T-60 tank. The armour and capacity of Chizhikov's trailer surpassed the desires of the military: the sides were 40 mm thick, the front and rear were 30 mm thick, the roof was 20 mm and the floor was 15 mm. The TD fit 25 riflemen who could fire out of 14 portholes. The mass of the trailer was estimated at 9 tons, and a KV tank was proposed as the tractor. It could be built at factory #200, which was formed out of factory #78 in 1941 to produce KV turrets.

The TD-200. This variant was built in metal.

One advantage of the design was that it was based on existing components. Even in Chizhikov's initial proposal, the vehicle seemed very attractive. Factory #200 was also an interested party, especially financially. The actual developers were its engineers, and not the deputy chief metallurgist of factory #78. "Foreign" projects were never welcomed at any factory, unlike "local" ones.

It is not surprising that factory #200 received Chizhikov's idea with enthusiasm. The TD project at factory #200 was led by senior designer Krasilnikov and design bureau chief Sergeyev. The name of the trailer changed to TD-200, where 200 stood for the factory where it was being developed. Chizhikov played the role of a consultant and promoted his brain child, bombarding various organizations with letters in case of delays. At the same time, his name is not mentioned in discussions of the project.

TD-200 at factory #200, spring 1942.

According to senior military representative 2nd class Pestov, by March 20th the factory was building three TD-200 prototypes.
"Production and trials will be completed on March 20-22nd, after which they will be sent out with one of the units being formed at the Kirov factory. This is approved by the regional engineer. 
The early trailers use the running gear of the T-60 tank because it was the easiest to obtain. In the future it is necessary to use tractor type running gear, for instance from the STZ-HTZ tractor, to reduce cost.
It is also necessary to test the armour thickness used, whether the portholes are sufficient or ball mounts are needed, if observation devices are needed, how fast can the hatches be used, etc.
On my side, I think that the trailers are necessary for the Red Army and mass production should be arranged after their first use in battle, especially since various armour available in Kuznets and Magnetogorsk with defects and chemical deviations can be used.
I will do all I can to ensure that these trailers are produced and sent to the front as fast as possible." 
The same trailer from the rear.

The characteristics of the prototypes largely matched those proposed by Chizhikov. The infantry entered and exited the trailer through hatches in the front, rear and the roof. Another evacuation hatch was added in the floor. According to the GABTU's requirements, the TD-200 had to be able to drop off infantry through the rear hatch both while stationary and in motion. The infantry sat inside on benches that fit 5 men each. Tow hooks similar to the ones used on the KV tank but shorter were installed on the front and rear. A tow bar was mounted to them. The TD-200 had 10 portholes for fire: 3 per side, 2 in the front, and 2 in the back. The portholes were closed by sliding covers.

Hatches and portholes are open.

Factory trials of the TD-200 began on April 26th. The average towing speed behind a KV-1 tank was 16 kph. The trailer was towed for 48 km, 37 of them on a cobblestone road and 11 off-road. There were two cases where tracks slipped off: one when reversing at 75 degrees, one when moving forward at 50 degrees. The tracks were also poorly tightened. It was impossible to drop the trailer while moving, and 30 cm of clearance proved too little. It also turned out that the portholes could be opened from outside. After trials the prototype's single piece hatches were changed, which introduced a month-long delay. Worried about his creation, Chizhikov wrote another letter to Stalin asking to help speed up the work, but this had no effect.

Trials in May of 1942.

The second stage of the trials, conducted from May 19th to May 25th, took place at the same time as exercises at the Chelyabinsk tank proving grounds. This time the trailer was towed for 28 km. The TD-200 was tested at full load with 20 troops. It took 60 seconds to embark. The riflemen could successfully exit at a speed of 4-5 kph. The trailer was tested at full load off-road, 2 pits 1 meter deep and 4 pits 1.2 meters deep were successfully negotiated. To make the test more difficult, a 25 cm thick log was placed between the tank and the trailer. This obstacle was crossed twice at low speed. The tow bar was bent during trials, and a rock became lodged between the track and right fender, which bent it. One track tooth was bent while negotiating an obstacle, and one road wheel rim was damaged as a result. However, not a single instance of slipping tracks was recorded.

Factory trials concluded on June 15th. Inspection of the running gear showed that all parts were within tolerances. The trailer successfully passed factory trials. The second and third prototypes were completed in May and delivered in early June.

The tow bar and cable that was used to unhook the trailer from the tank can be seen.

Work stalled after that. There was no official rejection of the TD-200, but these trailers do not appear in correspondence any more. It is possible that the mass was too great, since the requirements composed by the GABTU in February of 1942 were still in effect. Finances could also have had an effect. The overall cost of the three trailers was 126,000 rubles, or 42,000 rubles each. Considering that the trailers were supposed to be built from byproducts of T-60 production, this was not very logical, as a whole T-60 cost not much more than that.

The suspension at work.

In addition to the TD-200, factory #200 developed the GHP chemical trailer. The design was very similar to the TD-200, but instead of an armoured capsule for the infantry the GHP mounted a contained for smoke or poison gas tanks. The gas was deployed from the rear. The GHP was offered in three different variations, differing in internal layout and size of tanks.

GHP chemical trailer, June 1942.

The GHP was reviewed by the 4th department of the Main Military Chemical Directorate (GVHU). The conclusion was ready by July 3rd, and it was not in favour of this idea. The T-60 chassis was in deficit, especially the tracks, as many T-60s stood idle without them. The GHP was also not cheap. Further development was declined.

TD-2, an attempt to make a smaller TD-200.

Only several days later, on July 5th, 1942, a letter from factory #200's chief engineer L.I. Eiranov arrived at the office of GABTU chief Lieutenant General Ya.N. Fedorenko. He proposed two more types of armoured trailers, indexed TD-2 and TD-3. This was the last attempt at saving the project. The proposal was nothing new: factory #200 pitched the same TD-200 but smaller. The TD-2 weighed 5750 kg and carried 15 men. The number of road wheels was reduced to 3. The TD-3 carried 20 men, and was heavier at 7850 kg. Like the TD-200, this trailer had 4 wheels per side.

The 20-man TD-3. Like the TD-2, it was not needed.

Initially, a prototype of the TD-3 was requested, but after Fedorenko examined the letter he ordered that only a TD-2 be built. The characteristics of the TD-3, like those of its predecessor, did not meet the requirements of the military. As for the TD-2, it received a green light. P.K. Voroshilov was responsible for its development. According to his report, the experimental trailer was ready by October 10th and went through factory trials. However, the idea of building trailers using the hulls of tanks removed from service was already raised. The Chelyabinsk trailers still had the chance to fight. Three experimental TD-200 trailers were sent to the 19th Tank Brigade, which also tried out experimental night vision devices. Alas, the trailers are not mentioned in the brigade's documents.

From existing stock

The end of work on Chelyabinsk trailers did not mean that this topic was closed. However, building of dedicated trailers was deemed an expensive endeavour. On September 11th, 1942, tactical-technical requirements for "armoured tank sleds" were composed.
"Towed tank sleds are designed to transport soldiers through enemy defenses and transporting assault teams into the enemy rear.
Consider the following requirements:

  1. The height must be no more than 650 mm.
  2. The armour must protect the troops from rifle fire at any distance and angle.
  3. The sleds must be protected with armour from all sides.
  4. The hatches must provide quick exit without subjecting the troops to enemy fire.
  5. Develop a towing device that can be used at an angle and tilt and disconnect from inside the tank.
  6. Include portholes in the front and sides for rifle fire. 
  7. The sleds should fit 16-20 men lying down. The maximum width of the sleds cannot be more than the size of the tank.
  8. The floor of the sled needs to have two grooves to protect them from slipping.
  9. The sleds must be reliable.
  10. The sleds should be transportable in trucks when disassembled.
  11. The front armour must not collect snow in front of it, but direct it downwards."
Some requirements proved impossible. 16-20 men shoulder to shoulder was not the way to go. The mass of an empty trailer was limited to 2500 kg, its width to 2200 mm. The technical characteristics resulted in the creation of a new generation of armoured sleds. The T-60 tank, recently removed from production, proved to be a suitable donor. By November 11th 212 T-60 hulls and turrets collected at the Molotov GAZ factory, plus 120 T-30 hulls and 50 turrets. With these stocks, the idea of a T-60 sled seemed tempting. The production cost would be minimal, the sleds would be cheap, and the issue of excess stock would be resolved.


DP sled draft.

Representatives of the Auto-Tractor Scientific Institute (NATI) approached the GABTU with the idea of an armoured sled on the T-60 chassis in September of 1942. A draft was completed by September 16th. The DP-60 developed by NATI engineers L.F. Kiselev and V.F. Goranov was reviewed by the GABTU. The project was pitched in three variants. The version weighing 3.3 tons was the most interesting. The design was based on the T-60's hull with portholes and a hatch in the rear. This variant fit 8 men. Initially, the GABTU considered the variant that retained its turret more promising.

The final variant of the NATI trailer, October 6th, 1942.

The final variant was prepared in early October 1942. The armoured trailer indexed BP had a mass of 3.5 tons. Its capacity increased to 10-12 men. In addition to infantry, it could carry 10-12 fuel barrels. A T-34 tank was used as the tractor. A special tow bar was hooked up to the rear tow hooks and the front of the trailer. If necessary, the crew of the trailer could disengage the tow bar without leaving the trailer.

Analogous designs were developed at two other organizations. On September 29th a letter was sent to  the director of factory #180 proposing the development of 4 experimental trailers for the T-34 tank based on the T-60 hull. A similar proposal was sent by People's Commissar of Medium Machinebuilding Akopov to the GAZ. In correspondence GAZ calls this product "armoured sled", and only one letter gives its index: BP-60.

A T-34 with two BP-60 trailers on trials.

Like in Saratov, the development at GAZ was done with the help of NATI engineers. According to correspondence, blueprints of the BP-60 were sent to the GAZ on October 22nd, 1942 and to factory #180 on October 30th. The armoured sled consisted of a T-60 tank hull on two wooden beams. Steel strips attached to the bottom formed the runners. The T-60 hull was modified as follows:
  • The turret ring was covered up with an armoured panel. The final drive openings, torsion bar ports, and air intakes were also welded shut.
  • A 1080x670 mm hatch was cut into the rear of the hull with two-piece doors that had hinges at the top. The crew entered and exited the sled from here. The driver's hatch was also preserved for this purpose.
  • Three firing ports with shutters were cut into each side at a height of 670 mm. The shutters could be opened and closed from inside the hull. Two ports were cut in the rear. The driver's hatch was used to fire forward.
  • A rope was attached to the roof along the middle for the riders to hold on to.
  • Two hooks were attached to the roof that could be used to tow a second sled.
The mass of the sled was 4 tons, which met the GABTU's requirements. Two sleds could be towed behind a T-34, with 20 riflemen in total. The sleds hooked up to the T-34 with a tow bar made from steel pipes. A lock with a cable leading to it allowed the sled crew to unhook itself from the tank.


The same "train" from the back.

The first four samples were produced at factory #180 towards the end of November of 1942. Work was supervised by NATI senior designer Garanov, one of the project authors. The sleds were produced in two variants with different tow links. One had hooks and another had loops. A meeting was held on November 27th, as a result of which changes were made to the sleds. The runners were lengthened in the front and back, the tow links changes, the rear loops were reinforced. Garanov was later sent to the Molotov GAZ factory where he took part in preparing for production of the sleds. The first production BP-60 sleds were finished in January of 1943.

Fields of fire from the sled.

The armoured sled was to be tested in motion behind a tank (25 km on a road and 25 km off-road). Tactical exercises with three sleds were also planned to determine their suitability as mobile bunkers. Trials held on January 13th-14th at the NIIBT proving grounds at Kubinka had to be shortened. The tow bar was bent when determining the minimum turning radius.

Two trials were held: one with two sleds lasting 5 km, one with one sled for 3 km. In both cases the sleds were fully loaded. The T-34 could confidently tow one or two sleds. The average speed was 25 kph on a road and 20 kph off-road in 400 mm deep snow. Trials showed that if turns tighter than 20 meters are made then the tow bar bends and tow hooks are torn off.

#2 indicates the cable that the sled crew could use to disengage from the tank.

Trials showed that a crew of 10 men with weapons could embark in 20-25 seconds and disembark in 30-35 seconds. The design of the hatches with hinges on the sides was deemed to be poor and it was recommended for it to be changed. The crew sat on the floor (due to the T-60's low height there were no seats), which was uncomfortable, but no excess shaking was detected during trials. Using the firing ports was convenient.

However, when towing the sled along snow covered dirt roads or off road, a cloud of snow was kicked up that made aimed fire from the portholes impossible. Trials also showed the fields of fire from the sled.

The rear hatch doors are raised.

Despite the defects discovered during trials, the verdict was positive:
  1. The proposed armoured sled can be used to transport 10 men or as an immobile firing post.
  2. It is possible to transport two sleds with one T-34 tank.
  3. The design of the tow bar makes it possible to disengage it on the move.
  4. The design of the tow bar makes it impossible to turn at a radius of under 20 meters.
  5. The armoured sled can be recommended into service with the Red Army, contingent on the correction of the defects outlined in the "trials results" section.
Finally, the armoured sleds were greenlit. Production began at GAZ in late January of 1943. Production in Saratov started in January as well. In addition to T-60 sleds, factory #180 produced 18 sleds based on the T-50 tank hull. The sleds were first used in the army before production began. According to the GABTU, T-60 sleds were used successfully by the 65th Army in the fall-winter of 1942 (likely these were leftover hulls from factory #264) on runners towed by tanks.


Process of exiting from the sled.

As of March 3rd, 1943, the Molotov GAZ factory finished 250 sleds, 35 of which were sent to the 1st Tank Army, 75 to the Western Front, 41 to the North-Western Front. Factory #180 produced 24 units for the Kalinin Front. As of December 21st, 1943, 120 sleds were present in warehouses that were headed to the front: 60 for the 2nd Baltic Front, 30 for the 1st Baltic Front, 30 for the Belorussian Front. The exact number of BP-60 sleds produced is not known, but the total production of factory #180 and the GAZ was approximately 300 units. Unfortunately, no details about their use in combat are available. The idea turned out to be very interesting. Similar designs were developed in other countries, but they pale in comparison to the BP-60.


IS Debut

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"Military Council of Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army

April 1st, 1944
#481904ss

To commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Konev

The regiments of heavy IS tanks and ISU-152 SPGs consist of the first tanks and SPGs of this type. As tanks and SPGs of the first production batch, they have a number of minor technical drawbacks, as there is not yet sufficient experience in their use. I ask you to take measures and offer assistance in the matters of studying these vehicles in battle, discovery of their usage and technical drawbacks, and study of the best way to use them in battle.


IS tanks and ISU SPGs are mainly designed for fighting enemy heavy tanks and SPGs, artillery, pillboxes, and dugouts deep within enemy defensive lines. Heavy tank regiments, like others, must chiefly be used within tank and mechanized corps.

Until the enemy is encountered, their place is in the second echelon. They must be protected by medium tanks from the flanks and every tank or SPG must be protected from tank destroyer groups by a submachinegunner squad. A company of SMG squads is included in the TO&E of the regiments with the ratio of 5 men per tank or SPG.

When the regiments are put into action, it is desirable to apply them on terrain that is most advantageous for tanks and can be navigated without excess pressure. Take all measures to ensure that these tanks do not fall into the hands of the enemy.

Take into account that these regiments do not have organic reconnaissance elements. As a rule, units that fight with them must supply them with reconnaissance.

Tanks equipped with 122 mm guns and SPGs equipped with 152 mm guns as a rule fire from standstill, short stops, or ambushes from 1.5-2 km. Tanks armed with 85 mm guns fire from 1.2-1.5 km. 

As tanks equipped with 122 mm guns and SPGs equipped with 152 mm guns carry a limited amount of ammunition, it is necessary to organize timely supplies in battle and ensure that ammunition is expended wisely.

I especially ask you to provide the units due time to perform technical service and correction of defects.

Lieutenant General comrade Taranovich and a group of officers have been dispatched to study these tanks and SPGs to establish their value in battle. I ask you to offer them assistance.

Inform me of any notes regarding the advantages and drawbacks of IS tanks and ISU SPGs.

Commander of Armoured and Motorized Forces, Marshal of Armoured Forces Fedorenko
Member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General of the Technical Forces, N. Biryukov"

Artillery Wishlist

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"Themes for research to inventors and technologists of small arms and artillery for 1943
  1. Develop an a muzzle brake for the anti-tank rifle that also acts as a flash suppressor.
  2. Design a suppressor that can silence a gunshot past a range of 100-150 meters. The suppressor must weigh no more than 1 kg, must be removable from a machine gun without disassembly, must be simple in design, and must have minimum screw threads or deep drilling. The precision of fire must not suffer from using the suppressor.
  3. Develop a method for increasing the lifespan of light machine gun barrels. The lifespan should be 25-30 thousand rounds.
  4. Develop a new mount for the Maxim gun. The new mount must weigh 18-20 kg and provide the same precision as the current one. Other parameters must be at least on par with the current design. It must be simpler to produce.
  5. Develop a new method of attaching the barrel to the receiver of a DShK machine gun. It must be robust but also offer rapid barrel replacement.
  6. Develop a new extractor for the DShK machine gun.
  7. Simplify the design of the DShK machine gun.
  8. Develop a simple hand grenade with an impact fuse weighing no more than 400 grams.
  9. Develop an anti-tank rifle grenade with a range of 200-250 meters that can penetrate 30-40 mm of armour at 30 degrees.
  10. Develop a 7.62 mm rifle tracer-incendiary bullet.
  11. Design a 120 mm mortar with a wheeled carriage that can be towed behind a car or by horse.
  12. Design an 82 mm company mortar weighing no more than 20 kg with a range of 1800-2000 m.
  13. Design a device for inserting and extracting a charge into mortar shells of all calibers.
  14. Develop a method to repair half-segments of the upper and lower carriage of an anti-tank gun in field workshops.
  15. Design a new device or improve an old one to take apart a gun's recoil buffer that makes it safe to do so.
  16. Improve the lock that connects trails.
  17. Develop a folding or sliding 45 mm gun shield that can be deployed quickly.
  18. Design a simple device to transport ammunition to firing positions on the battlefield.
  19. Develop a flexible boresnake for small arms.
  20. Develop a universal (for all guns) system to count number of rounds fired at a reduced propellant load.
  21. Develop a universal knife for all forces. It is desirable if the function of a weapon is combined with various tools.
  22. Develop a universal toolkit for the MP, SVT, and DT weapons.
  23. Develop a fixed high capacity magazine for the SVT rifle.
  24. Develop a method to quickly seal holes in the Maxim machine gun cooling jacket. The method must be usable in field conditions.
  25. Develop a simple method of intensive machine gun barrel cooling.
  26. Develop a simple device that prevents double loading after a misfire in all existing mortars that does not require radical changes to design. The device must be simple and safe to use.
  27. Develop a moving pop-up target for snipers.
  28. Develop a device to load machine gun and PPSh magazines.
Inspector of Inventions, Major Kovachev."


Start of T-54 Development

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"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #637s
Moscow
November 1st, 1944

Factory #183 (comrade Morozov) developed a new T-54 medium tank with improved armour. 

The review of the project showed that the new T-54 medium tank retains high maneuverability and mobility characteristics but has significantly better armour and more powerful armament than existing medium tanks.

The presented T-54 medium tank project should be approved and a prototype developed.

In order to develop the new T-54 medium tank, I order that:
  1. Director of factory #183 comrade Maksarev and Chief Designer of factory #183 comrade Morozov must develop blueprints of the new medium tank with a 100 mm D-10T gun with the following armour thicknesses by December 1st of this year:
    1. Upper front plate: 120 mm
    2. Lower front plate: 120 mm
    3. Sides: 90 mm
    4. Turret front: 150 mm
    5. Front section of turret sides: 150 mm
    The turret design should be similar to that of the IS-6 with a commander's observation device installed in a rotating hatch without a commander's cupola. Use high hardness armour for the turret, with a ring to be welded into the upper turret ring.
    The full weight of the tank must not be greater than 34 tons.
  2. Director of factory #183, comrade Maksarev, must produce a prototype of the T-54 by January 1st, 1945, and complete trials by January 15th."

New Machine Guns

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"State Committee of Defense decree #6721s
October 14th, 1944
Moscow, Kremlin

On the production of modernized light infantry and tank Degtyaryev machine guns

In order to improve the fighting ability of light infantry and tank Degtyaryev pattern machineguns, the State Committee of Defense decrees that:

The People's Commissar of Armament comrade Ustinov and director of factory #2 comrade Fomin must prepare the tools and the manufacturing process for production of modernized light infantry and tank Degtyaryev machine guns before December 1st, 1944, and shift to production of the modernized  light infantry and tank Degtyaryev machine guns in December.

Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin"



The changes made to the machine guns are outlined in the draft attachment to the decree.

"To the Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, comrade I.V. Stalin

We present a draft decree of the Committee of Defense "On the production of modernized light infantry and tank Degtyaryev machine guns".

The following changes have been made to mass production DT machine guns:

  1. The return spring has been moved from under the barrel to a special frame.
  2. The bipod is reinforced and no longer removable.
  3. A pistol grip was introduced.
  4. The safety and stock were altered.
Trials at proving grounds and in the field show that the changes are positively received, as they have the following effect:
  1. The return spring is made more robust and it is possible to replace it without upsetting the aim.
  2. It is no longer possible to lose the bipod.
  3. The precision and accuracy of the gun are improved.
  4. It is easier to fire.
We ask you to review and approve the GOKO decree draft.

L. Beria
D. Ustinov
N. Yakovlev"

Heavy Tank Destroyers that Remained on Paper

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The KV-14 (SU-152) SPG was accepted into service on February 14th, 1943. It was designed primarily to combat enemy fortifications, but its first use in combat pitted it against German tanks. Work on tank destroyers on the SU-152 chassis began in the spring of 1943. Even though none of these projects was implemented in metal, the work eventually led to the ISU-122.

Unification of the mount

The Soviet artillery school, like the American and German, often created artillery systems where two guns (duplex) or three guns (triplex) shared the same mount. At the start of the Great Patriotic War two systems formed the backbone of Soviet corps artillery: the ML-20 and A-19. The A-19 was the first large caliber gun designed entirely in the USSR. The ML-20, built under the direction of F.F. Petrov, had a similar, but improved mount. The installation of the A-19 barrel on the ML-20 mount resulted in the improved 122 mm corps gun model 1931/37.

The A-19 was not as numerous as the ML-20, but had higher anti-tank performance.

In 1940 the gun was evaluated as a bunker buster. While the armour piercing shell performed poorly and had to be improved, calculations showed that it could penetrate 130 mm of armour at 30 degrees from 1000 meters. This penetration came in third among high caliber systems designed to be used against fortifications. Instead, the naval 130 mm B-13 gun and 152 mm high power Br-2 gun were used to equip bunker buster SPGs.

The start of the war put things in their place. The A-19 was used in direct fire roles from the very beginning, sometimes even against tanks. Even though the Germans periodically felt the outstanding power of the gun, it was not considered anti-tank artillery up to the spring of 1943. The 107 mm high power gun seemed like a more promising weapon. However, neither the M-75 nor the ZIS-24 towed anti-tank guns were successful in trials, and their installation in SPGs did not proceed past paper.

The situation changed in the spring of 1943. German Tiger tanks were captured near Leningrad, and in early February of 1943 the German heavy Pz.Sfl.V SPG on the chassis of the VK 30.01(H) tank was captured near Stalingrad. A description was composed at the NIBT proving grounds in Kubinka in March of 1943. The proving grounds staff suggested installing the A-19 gun on a KV-1 chassis to create an analogue of the German vehicle.

The Soviets did not develop a German style tank destroyer. However, a "122 mm A-19 SPG on the SU-152 chassis" turned up as a project by April of 1943. This work was initiated by the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). Work on installing the A-19 in the SU-152 was underway at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Factory (ChKZ) by April 28th. The prototype was scheduled to be ready by May 10th. However, the work stalled, and there was no information about this vehicle after that.

A draft project to install a Br-2 gun on the ML-20 mount. This project was later built as the D-4 system.

There was another project that was never mentioned in GABTU documents. It began in October of 1942, when the design bureau of factory #8 developed a whole slew of artillery systems unified on the M-30 and ML-20 mounts. The ML-20 mount was used with the 203 mm U-3 barrel and the 152 mm high power Br-2 gun. These guns would also be used on the ZIK-20 heavy SPG that was also being developed at the design bureau of factory #8.

The SU-152 with the D-4 artillery system could look like this.

Factory #8 was split in November of 1942. The remainder of factory #8 worked on towed guns, the new factory #9 developed tank and SPG guns. F.F. Petrov continued to work on towed guns. The Br-2 on an ML-20 mount was indexed D-4. This gun was put through trials but did not enter production. The idea of installing the Br-2, or rather the D-4, on a self propelled chassis returned in the spring of 1943. This time the SU-152 was considered a suitable chassis. Since the mounts of the two guns were the same, this would have been theoretically possible, but the project remained on paper. Only sketches remain, but this was only the first of many long-barrelled SU-152 projects.

A longer barrel

Another pivot in Soviet tank building took place in July of 1943. A number of new German tanks and SPGs made their debut at the Battle of Kursk, including the Ferdinand heavy tank destroyer. To say that Soviet specialists took note of this SPG is a wild understatement. The appearance of the German vehicle at Ponyri triggered a number of projects. For instance, requirements for the Object 701 heavy tank (future IS-4) were developed in November of 1943 specifically to design a counter to the Ferdinand. A report dated July 20th, 1943, less than a week after the end of active fighting, indicates how seriously the Soviets took this threat. The military demanded that the new IS-85 heavy tank must have not only an 85 mm gun, which they considered obsolete, but 100, 122, and even 152 mm guns.

Trials showed that the 122 mm A-19 gun could penetrate the front armour of the Ferdinand, although at short range.

A list of work on tank, anti-tank, and self propelled guns dated September 15th, 1943, once again listed the 107 mm M-75 gun. One of the reasons why the gun, abandoned in 1942, made a sudden comeback was that it was installed on the ML-20 mount. The idea of an SPG with the M-75 died in the summer of 1941, but had a good chance at a comeback two years later, since there were at last worthy targets for it.

However, the return of the 107 mm guns was short lived. The same letter that mentioned the M-75 contained a proposal by the Chairman of the Artillery Committee, Major General Hohlov, to cancel a number of projects and replace them with more promising ones. Among them was an SPG with a 122 mm gun that had a muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s. A meeting of the Technical Council of the People's Commissar of Armament (NKV) was held on the same day. Work on the lengthened 122 mm gun was approved.

S-26, the result of TsAKB work on a 122 mm gun with improved ballistics.

On September 24th, a letter was sent to the chief of the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB), Major General V.G. Grabin from the NKV Technical Council. A similar letter was sent to factory #172 director A.I. Nehovskiy and chief of OKB-172 NKVD Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Ivanov.
"According to a decision made by the People's Commissar of Armament and the GAU Chief, you are to begin development of a 122 mm tank and SPG gun with a muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s with the 25 kg shell. I ask you to produce a draft by October 10th of this year. Pay close attention to the ballistics and barrel of the gun. At the same time, send a list of draft tactical-technical requirements for such a gun to the NKV and Artillery Committee. 
The aforementioned 122 mm gun would be installed on the chassis of the SU-152 SPG and the T-34 tank. In the case of the latter, this will be an SPG with comparatively weak armour with an open top. The tank gun will be installed on the IS tank with thicker armour. The draft project must resolve all unclear issues about whether or not it is possible to install this gun on the aforementioned chassis."
3 days later the Artillery Committee approved tactical-technical requirements. The gun was propsoed in two variants: for tanks and for SPGs. The rate of fire was set at 6-7 RPM. The designers were tasked with the creation of a gun that could penetrate 200 mm of armour, hinting at what the target for this gun would be. The high explosive round was taken from the A-19.

The second variant of the S-26 system, this time 130 mm. Like the first version, it was tested in an ISU-152.

The TsAKB project had a complex history. According to correspondence, the bureau received the requirements and began work on September 25th. The 122 mm long-barreled gun was given the index S-26-1. At the same time, the TsAKB chief managed to push through a 130 mm tank and SPG gun with the ballistics of the B-13 naval gun. Development of the project, titled S-26, was delayed. It was only approved in early 1944. Because of this, the S-26 and S-26-1 were designed for the ISU-152, which entered production in late 1943.

Paper battles in Perm

The GAU Artillery Committee assumed that the design bureaus at factory #172 would work on the gun together, but the design bureau of factory #172 and OKB-172 produced competing projects. OKB-172 had its documentation ready in record time, only two weeks. The work was directed by the chief designer of land artillery at OKB-172, M.Yu. Tsiryulnikov. Like other workers of the "science prison", he was serving time, but by the time the project began he was pardoned by GKO decree #3612 issued on June 18th, 1943, for his work on the M-42 45 mm anti-tank gun. Beria himself argued for Tsiryulnikov's freedom.

Draft OBM-50 and OBM-53 SPGs.

The draft projects were presented to the Artillery Committee Chair by October 5th, 1943. In addition to a 122 mm high power gun, OKB-172 designed a draft project of the OBM-43 152 mm gun with the ballistics of the Br-2 high power gun in the SU-152. The gun was similar to the D-4, with the difference that the OBM-43 used Br-2 ammunition instead of ML-20 ammunition. This was a significant advantage, since it would use the same ammunition as corps artillery. The development of a self propelled version of the OBM-43, indexed OBM-53, seemed reasonable.

The OBM-50 gun.

The OBM-50 was designed in three variants at OKB-172. They all had the same muzzle velocity: 1000 m/s. The first (variant A in documents) had the an 8566 mm long barrel (L/70.2) and a maximum pressure of 2670 kg/cm². The design of the gun was the closest to that of the 122 mm A-19. On October 28th two additional variants of the OBM-50, indexed Variant I and II, were proposed. Variant I had a shorter barrel (8390 mm or L/68.7) with a 990 mm long chamber. Variant II had a 7430 mm (L/60.9) barrel and a 990 mm long chamber with pressure increased to 3000 kg/cm². The increase in pressure required a new sliding breech.

The Artillery Committee gave its conclusion on November 12th. The first department of the artillery committee proposed a gun with their own ballistics: 7440 mm long barrel and a maximum pressure of 3200 kg/cm². The Artillery Committee had to choose from four different designs. Variant II was chosen due to its sliding breech. A request was made to either increase the space between the guide rings or rework them, since the current design would result in high vibrations. The committee also required that the breech should be simpler and its width should be reduced to 420-450 mm. A roller type semiautomatic mechanism was also suggested.

OBM-50 and OBM-53 guns were built in metal and tested on the ISU-152.

The OBM-53 project was launched in parallel. By this time the SU-152 was no longer the option for a chassis. The last SU-152s were built at ChKZ in November of 1943, after which production of the ISU-152 began. Of course, the OKB-172 did not cease development of its high power guns. They were built and even tested, but on the ISU-152. By then the OBM-53 was called BL-8 (Beria Lavrentiy, a new index for all OKB-172 products) and the OBM-50 became the BL-9.

Blueprints of the M-21 122 mm high power SPG.

The factory #172 design bureau did not sit around idly. The draft of a 122 mm high power gun indexed M-21 was ready by October 9th, 1943. Work on the M-21 was led by the chief of the design bureau, V.A. Ilyin (at the time he was also the chief designer). The elevation and traverse mechanisms, cradle armour, and sights were taken from the ML-20S. The cradle and frame were also borrowed with some changes. The barrel was 7747 mm (63.5 calibers) long. Calculations showed that the M-21 was supposed to penetrate 208.4 mm at normal from 1000 meters or 169.8 mm at 30 degrees.

Unlike the OBM-50, the design of factory #172 had a muzzle brake.

According to the tactical-technical requirements for the gun, it was equipped with a muzzle brake that consumed 50.4% of the blast. The M-21 also had a sliding breech that was the almost the same as the breech of the 107 mm M-75 gun, only some minor changes set it apart. The firing mechanism was analogous to that of the ZIS-3 gun. The cradle included a recoil system control plunger that further reduced the recoil length. The trigger mechanism was reworked to work with a sliding breech. No changes were planned for the SU-152 casemate, only ammunition racks had to be adapted to the new gun.

The SU-152 with an M-21 gun could have looked like this. Out of the three high power guns designed according to the requirements made in the fall of 1943, the M-21 was the only one never built in metal.

Unlike the OBM-50, factory #172's project was never built in metal. It was clear that the OKB-172's designers were much more promising even at the review stage. The draft spent over a month without changes. The Chair of the Artillery Committee received the project from the Technical Council of the NKV only on November 12th, the day that the conclusion on the OBM-50 was made. The OKB-172 project was already accepted and the M-21 was extraneous. Of all the 122 mm guns it was the only one to have a muzzle brake, not the greatest feature for a tank destroyer.



T-43 Power Up

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"To the Deputy Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces comrade Korobkov
October 20th, 1943

According to your order given on October 4th of this year, a meeting was called regarding the issue of the T-43 tank and the possibility of creating a new medium tank. The meeting was attended by specialists from the Red Army BTU. The meeting came to the following conclusions:
  1. Due to new tanks used by the enemy (Panther, Tiger) with more powerful armour and a higher amount of 75 and 88 mm anti-tank guns, the T-43 would no longer be capable of fully completing its objectives.
  2. The creation of a new medium tank with more powerful armour, more powerful armament, and modern mechanisms in a short time is impossible for our industry.
  3. The prototypes of the T-43 tank produced by factory #183, while not of a tank that includes the latest achievements of armoured vehicle technology. However, the T-43 with several changes will meet the goal of improving the combat capability of the T-34.
    Proving grounds trials show that the T-43, due to a change in layout and the use of a torsion bar suspension, has significantly more powerful protection (armour is 66% thicker) with a negligible increase in weight (2.7 tons or 9%), as a result of which the difference in mobility is not much different than the T-34.
  4. To improve the combat qualities of the T-43 tank, perform the following changes:
    1. Install the 85 mm D-5 gun in the T-43 tank.
    2. Increase the thickness of the front armour to 90 mm, the roof and floor to 20 mm, the rear to 60 mm.
    3. Install road wheels with rims made from 120s rubber without ventilation openings that showed satisfactory results at the proving grounds.
The realization of all requirements will not overload the tank and can be done without increasing the mass of the tank, or maybe even lowering it.

Based on the above, I consider it necessary to agree with the NKTP about performing the aforementioned changes, organizing a 500 km long trial of the T-43 tanks, and asking the government about production of the T-43 tank at factory #183.

I have given the Tank Directorate the order to perpare tactical-technical requirements for a new medium tank that includes the latest achievements of armoured vehicle technology. However, I think it would be reasonable to present them to the NKTP only after the start of production.

Chief of the GBTU, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces, Vershinin
Acting Chief of the Tank Directorate of the GBTU, Engineer-Colonel Muravich"

Suggestion for Stalin

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"To the Chairman of the Committee of Defense, comrade I.V. Stalin

In June of 1941 the 23 mm aircraft gun designed by us passed trials in an airplane, showing good results firing both on the ground and in the air. In addition to the good performance, NKV experts remarked that the gun is 50-60% simpler to produce than the VYa gun that is currently in production. Half as much time, tools, plants, workers, etc. will be required to make our gun, which is important at this time to ensure defeat of fascism.

Despite the obvious advantage of our gun, the issue of putting it into production is not yet solved and production has not started.

In September we also designed a 7.92 mm anti-tank rifle for the German cartridge. Our rifle is simple to produce and has only 50 parts, while the German rifle has 209 parts. Despite the massive difference, factory #65 continues to produce the German type rifle, disregarding the domestic design.

Having informed you of the above, we deem it necessary to:
  1. Put the 23 mm aircraft gun into production as the technologically superior variant.
  2. Build at least a large batch of our anti-tank rifle for the 7.92 mm German cartridge.
TsKB-14 designers
V.Salishev
V.Galkin

December 15th, 1941
Zlatoust"



Tiger II Intel

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"Secret
Military Mission in the USSR
Moscow
August 25th, 1944

To the Chief of External Affairs of the NKO, Major General Mister V.N. Yevstigneev

We have received a report on a new type of Tiger tank weighing 67 tons with serial number P280637 captured in northern France.

This tank is of typical German design with a rear engine and front gearbox, turning mechanism, and final drives.

Visually it resembles a large Panther tank. Its armour is made from the same type of cut and welded plates.

Attachment A includes a detailed description of the tank. I would be grateful for any data regarding the use of this tank on the Soviet-German front.

We will send you details and photographs as soon as they are received from England.

Brinkman
Colonel, General Staff, Head of Army Section, British Military Mission in the USSR.

Details of the new Tiger tank:
  • Mass: 67 tons
  • Overall height: 122 inches
  • Height to upper platform: 70"
  • Height of turret: 36"
  • Height of commander's cupola: 16"
  • Overall width: 143.5"
  • Width of the hull tub: 76.2"
  • Width of the superstructure, upper portion, front: 102.5"
  • Width of the superstructure, lower portion, front: 117.5"
  • Width of the superstructure, upper portion, rear: 113.5"
  • Width of the superstructure, lower portion, rear: 125.5"
  • Overall length: 286"
  • Length of the front sloped plate: 51.5"
  • Length of the muzzle brake: 23.5"
  • Width of the turret base: 99"
  • Turret ring diameter: 78 3/8"
  • Diameter of the turret ring gear: 73"
The turret can turn 360 degrees and is paired with the turret platform. The front of the turret is rounded and has an opening on the right side for a monocular sight and on the left for a machine gun. There are no other openings in the sides. A large rectangular hatch with a pistol port is present in the back, the same port as used on the Panther tank. The commander's cupola is of the same type as used on latest Tiger tanks. It has 7 openings for periscopes and is installed on the left side of the turret. In the front and left parts of the turret there are openings for an episcope. A round hatch is installed in the middle of the rear part of the turret.

Armour
Thickness
Angle
Front turret
80 mm
Rounded
Turret rear and sides
80 mm
25 degrees
Turret roof
42 mm
Front portion is horizontal, rear is tilted at 5 degrees
Side superstructure
80 mm
25 degrees
Superstructure roof
42 mm
Horizontal
Sloped plate
150 mm
40-45 degrees
Front plate
150 mm
55 degrees
Tub sides
80 mm
Vertical
Tub rear
80 mm
25 degrees
The armour plates are connected and welded in the same way as on the Panther tank.

Suspension

The suspension is composed of nine individual torsion bars per side. The road wheels are large, paired, with steel rims and rubber bushings, tightly packed together. The track is supported by the same wheels while it returns. No return rollers are used. The wheels are in two rows: five outer and four inner.
  • Height of the drive sprocket from ground: 29 "
  • Height of the center of a wheel: 21.5"
  • Contact surface length: 160"
  • Number of track links: 90
  • Main track pitch: 150 mm
  • Connecting track pitch: 100 mm
To improve ground traction, every other track link has five cleats made from 0.5" thick steel plates.

Armament

The main gun is an 8.8 cm KWK 43 tank gun in a large mantlet that turns in relation to the front of the turret. A model 43 coaxial machine gun is used. Another machine gun of the same type is installed in the front sloped plate like on latest Panther tanks.

Vision device

In addition to the episcope opening in the roof, there is an opening for a driver's periscope in the right side of the superstructure. 

Engine

We have not received information about the engine, but based on the engine deck it is also an HL 230 type like on the Panther. The gearbox has eight forward gears."

Truck Proportions

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There is a commonly held opinion that, without foreign aid, the Red Army would have hardly any trucks at all and would not be able to execute strategic offensives. Indeed, if you compare the amount of trucks produced in the USSR during the war and the amount of trucks shipped in, the amount of the latter is much greater. This creates the impression that the Red Army was almost entirely dependent on foreign aid for trucks.

However, it is incorrect to take into account only what was produced during the war without looking at what was already in stock. At the start of the war trucks in agricultural use were confiscated en masse for military use. This injection of new trucks ensured that the majority of the Red Army's trucks were still domestic even by the end of the war. 


Domestic
Imported
Captured
Total
June 22nd, 1941
272,600
100%
-
-
-
-
272,600
January 1st, 1942
317,100
99.6%
-
-
1,400
0.4%
315,100
January 1st, 1943
378,800
93.7%
22,000
5.4%
3,700
0.9%
404,500
January 1st, 1944
387,000
77.9%
94,100
19.0%
14,900
3.1%
496,000
January 1st, 1945
395,000
63.6%
191,100
30.4%
34.700
6.0%
621,200
May 1st, 1945
385,700
58.1%
218,100
32.8%
60,600
9.1%
664,400
As the war went on, the amount (if not the proportion) of domestic trucks in the Red Army increased, so even at reduced capacity domestic industry managed to make up for losses and more. Even at the very end of the hostilities in Europe, Lend Lease trucks composed less than a third of the Red Army's truck fleet.

Small Modernization of a Large Tank

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Many tanks received significant upgrades after they first saw battle. Practice often trumps theory, especially during WWII where military vehicles quickly became obsolete. The IS-2 heavy tank was no exception. It was built with enough armour to protect it from the German Tiger tank, but it turned out that there were more dangerous opponents on the battlefield. As a result, a modernized IS-2 tank entered production in Chelyabinsk in late summer of 1944. It is sometimes called IS-2M or IS-2 model 1944, but neither designation was used in reality.

Away with the step!

The idea of improving the IS-2's armour was first considered in February-March 1944. The result was a not very successful debut of the tank's predecessor, the IS-85. The first battle at Lisyanka showed that the front armour can be penetrated by the 75 mm KwK 42 L/70 gun used on German Panther tanks. Manufacturing defects were partially to blame for insufficient protection, but it was clear that the front of the new tank was too weak against the Panther's gun. The IS-2 had the same hull and turret armour.

Modernized IS-2 hull with a straightened front, blueprint 240-50-Sb.5 dated April 14th, 1944.

Work was aimed in two directions. GKO decree #5583ss "On production of experimental prototypes of new heavy tanks at the Kirov factory" was published on April 8th, 1944. The third item mandated necessary actions to reinforce the armour of the IS-2 to be taken within three months. It was also necessary to improve the transmission and running gear using elements developed for the Object 701 heavy tank. The IS-2 would go through a deep modernization. This work was done by both the SKB-2 of the Chelyabinsk Kirov factory and experimental factory #100. The experimental factory gave this work the highest priority. This resulted in the creation of several projects, however none of them made it out of the draft stage. 

IS-2 hull armour with a welded front.

ChKZ's SKB-2 chose a different direction. Unlike the experimental factory, which had little ties to manufacturing, this design bureau understood the manufacturing process. Work on the Object 701 tank, the IS-2's replacement, was already underway. A radical modernization of the IS-2 could become a competitor for their own project. The requirement to increase production of the IS-2 and SPGs on its chassis also hung above ChKZ like the sword of Damocles. No work was performed to modernize the tank until at least mid-summer of 1944. However, the quality and design of the mass production tank was constantly improved. For instance, in June of 1944 a new turret and gun mantlet were introduced that improved protection from the front.

The second variant with a cast front hull developed in late April 1944.

The most difficult part to improve was the front of the hull. Its characteristic "step" was inherited not even from the KV-13, but the KV-1. This was caused by a curve in the armour to accommodate the driver's observation device. This solution improved visibility but created a number of problems. This "step" made the front plate more complicated to produce, which often caused manufacturing defects. The observation port was also a weakness of the design. At Lisyanka a number of penetrations of the front hull were made through here. The upper part of the "step" had a reduced angle, which also did nothing to improve protection.

The designers declared war on the "step". The Object 701 was the first Soviet heavy tank to get rid of it. It was reasonable to migrate the solution from one tank to another.

The cast front armour was thicker. As tests in the fall of 1944 showed, this resulted in significant improvement.

On April 14th, 1944, just one week after the GKO decree, SKB-2 prepared a blueprint of a modernized hull. According to requirements, the production of a single piece 90 mm welded front plate had the highest priority. Calculations showed that this design would be equivalent to much thicker cast armour. The front was assembled from two parts: the upper (240-50-77) and lower (240-50-131). The weld seam between the two was reinforced by interlocking. Instead of an observation port, the tank received an Object 701 style observation device (240-50-78) which was welded into the center of the upper plate. An arc shaped deflector protected it from shells that bounced off the upper front plate.

The hull of an IS-2 with a "step" in the front plate after penetration trials, September 1944.

The upper plate, 240-50-77, was produced by stamping. The Ural Heavy Machinebuilding Factory (UZTM) had an appropriate press, which was used, in part, to built T-34 turrets. Alas, factory #200 had no such press. For this reason, by April 29th a different modernized hull variant was prepared. The front was now cast in one piece (part 240-50-141). The observation device and deflector were welded into it. Since the effectiveness of cast armour was lower than welded, its thickness was increased to 100 mm in the top section and 130 mm in the bottom. Changes to this part triggered changes of other parts of the hull, for instance the turret platform (part 240-50-Sb.127). The new part (240-50-Sb.166) had a narrower joint with the cast front section.

The hull with a welded front before and after firing. The maximum range of penetration with the 88 mm gun was reduced to 450 meters, but the weld seams cracked when hit.

On May 10th, 1944, UZTM and factory #200 received letters from the People's Commissar of Tank Production Malyshev on delivery of hulls with straightened fronts to the NIBT proving grounds. However, no work was done on this in May. Production began in July and trials were carried out in September of 1944. By this time production of the modernized IS-2 had been underway at ChKZ for two months and the first tanks with the new hull already arrived at the front. 

Firing trials showed that the welded front plate is impervious to 75 mm AP and APCR ammunition at all ranges. The lower front plate could be penetrated from 1.5 kilometers. The situation with the 88 mm Pak 43 installed on the Ferdinand SPG was more dire. The upper armour could be penetrated from 450 meters, the lower from nearly 4 kilometers. The design of the weld seams was also criticized, as they cracked when hit.

The cast front hull performed better. In some conditions it was impenetrable even for the Pak 43 even at point blank range.

The cast hull front produced by factory #200 was a different story. The factory was instructed to move to a cast design, but never did this. The factory didn't want to make the change, and more importantly could not do it. Trials showed that it was not necessary anyway. The upper front hull was not penetrated by the Pak 43 in most cases even at point blank range (in most favourable conditions it could penetrate from 255 meters). The lower part of the front hull was penetrated by the Panther's gun, but at a much lower range: 785 meters. The weld seams performed better, but there were still some complaints. The observation device was more vulnerable, but it turned out to be smaller than the old observation port and performed well. 

The IS-2 became what the Panther was for Soviet medium tanks: only penetrable in the lower front plate or the turret from the front.

The drawback of improved protection was reduced visibility for the driver. The disappearance of the splash guard resulted in the observation devices being splashed with mud while driving off-road or on dirt roads.

A significant drawback of the new front hull was the reduction of visibility for the driver. with a closed observation port the old IS-2's driver could see in a range of 9 degrees vertically and 40 degrees horizontally. With the port open his vision range increased to 27 degrees vertically and 75 horizontally. The new observation device provided 13 degrees of vision vertically and 30 degrees horizontally. The dead zone in front of the tank was 12 meters long. This drawback was compensated with two MK-IV observation devices, but they had a dead zone of 10 meters. The driver's vision definitely decreased. However, the dead zone on UZTM production hulls was less than that on factory #200 production hulls.

The Object 701 had a similar drawback. It is no surprise that as of late 1944 this type of observation device was done away with.

Work at full power

Even though preparation for production of the modernized IS-2 fell behind schedule, hull manufacturers started getting ready for the new order in June. According to decree #244s of the People's Commissar of Tank Production, factory #200 was instructed to produce four hulls with a straightened front and new turret platforms. UZTM began producing new hulls in May. According to ChKZ's correspondence, the first IS-2s with a straightened front and new turret platform were delivered in July.

UZTM's hulls triggered some complaints. All hulls had incorrect openings drilled for MK-IV observation devices and the suspension stops. The factory had to correct this, which resulted in decreased production volumes. The first complaints about reduced visibility began to come in in July.

One of the first IS-2's with a straight front hull. The hull was produced at factory #200, but the turret was produced either at UZTM or Mariupol.

The change to the front hull did not change the name of the tank. The name "IS-2 model 1944" was a post-war creation. The name IS-2M also has no connection with reality. The real IS-2M appeared in the late 1950s.

ChKZ reports do not differentiate between the two tanks. Occasionally the new design is called "IS-2 with a straightened nose". It's worth mentioning that some new tanks received old hulls as late as August of 1944. Production fully switched to tanks with the new hull on September 1st. Most of these came from factory #200.

Tank with serial n umber 240-408102 produced in August 1944. It has the opposite heritage: the hull was produced at UZTM, the turret was produced at factory #200.

ChKZ was behind schedule in August, and so work on August's batch only began on August 9th and ended on September 6th. The first tanks began to arrive at the acceptance workshop on August 11th. To speed up production shifts were extended to 18 hours and even security guards and firefighters were used in the assembly process. ChKZ reached the necessary production volume of 250 tanks per month in August.

Despite these extreme conditions, military acceptance testing reported that quality increased. The first tanks with no defects at all were delivered in August of 1944, making up 16% of the overall delivery. Defects that were spotted were low priority: bolts not completely screwed in, rough finish, etc. The new designs included better fitting transmission access hatches, locks for the emergency exits. Hulls produced by factory #200 even had special deflectors to prevent the hatches of those exits from being torn off.

Handrails were first introduced on UZTM turrets in early 1944, but the two-row variant dates to the summer of 1944.

ChKZ first made use of a fourth supplier in August of 1944. This was the Hammer and Sickle factory in Moscow. Its participation in IS-2 production is nearly unknown. According to initial plans made in May 1944, the factory was to deliver 30 turrets to equip UZTM hulls each month. The situation turned out differently. Only two turrets were cast in May, three were delivered in June. 18 turrets were delivered in July, and 9 were sent to UZTM. Serious production began in August of 1944, when Hammer and Sickle delivered 31 turrets, 23 of which were sent. Production plans for 1944 did not envision more than 30 turrets per month. With a total quota of 210 turrets in 1944 Hammer and Sickle cast 152, of which 131 were accepted and 103 sent to the customer. To compare, Mariupol factory was instructed to make 925 turrets, cast 978, and delivered 922.

In addition to UZTM, a small number of Hammer and Sickle turrets made it to factory #200. One tank with this combination of hull and turret can be seen at the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (serial number 240-412481, produced in February 1945).

Production of turrets at the Hammer and Sickle factory in 1945 was miserly. 25 turrets were delivered in January, 10 in February, 4 in March. In Mariupol 97 turrets were delivered in January, 104 in February, 73 in March, 54 in April. Production of IS-3 turrets was scheduled to start in May, but in reality the factory switched to T-44 turrets.

A Hammer and Sickle factory turret that survived to this day. A characteristic horizontal mold line can be seen.

Turrets built in Moscow were similar to those produced at UZTM or Mariupol. Like turrets produced in Sverdlovsk, the Hammer and Sickle turrets had no casting number. Nevertheless, it is easy to tell them apart. UZTM turrets received ribs around the rear machine gun mount, which were not present on Moscow or Mariupol turrets. In addition, Moscow-made turrets had a straight mold line that ran horizontally along the turret and cannot be confused with any other sign. Moscow turrets also had a very coarse texture since they were cast in earth.

The same from above. Like UZTM turrets, turrets produced at Hammer and Sickle had no casting numbers in the rear.

The work to streamline production made at UZTM in the summer of 1944 began to give fruit in September. In addition to meeting the quota, military acceptance staff at the factory remarked that production went much smoother than in August. The SB.2 assembly workshop finished production by September 29th and delivery by the 30th. The number of tanks delivered without defects reached 57 units. However, there were problems with some components, and the factory worked at correcting them. For instance, the situation with track links was difficult. IS tanks were supposed to transition from using stamped two-piece tracks to tracks cast from 27SGT steel. It turned out that these tracks often did not meet the 1000 km warranty requirement, and so stamped tracks were still common on the IS-2 and ISU. The biggest problem was the track pin eyes, which often tore. A new design was developed in September of 1944 which gave good results. However, this didn't change the production situation radically, and IS tanks and SPGs continued to be equipped with both cast and stamped track links.

Trials of the DShK AA mount on an IS-2, December 1944.

Another issue was the road wheel axle cover. Trials of new road wheels with a grease nipple were performed in September of 1944. The NKTP ordered that this change be introduced into production, but the process was delayed since a new assembly line had to be set up. The V-11 engine also never made it onto this tank, but was used on the IS-3.

A travel clamp was added to the upper rear plate on September 1st. As of September 20th the tanks received a new inertial started with a SI-40 motor. Reinforced return roller carriers and locks on the emergency exit hatch were introduced in September as well.

The AA MG could work against both air and land targets.

The situation with heavy tanks in Chelyabinsk continued to improve in October. Of 250 IS-2 tanks delivered in October 1944 70 had no defects at all, and only 76 had more than 5 defects.

Work on improving the driver's vision was also underway. Two solutions were developed by mid-October. The first variant had a wider observation slit, and the triplex moved forward by 50 mm. The MK-IV observation devices were also moved. This solution reduced the dead zone to 6 meters and improved vision to the sides. The second proposal included an observation port and was not even considered. Based no correspondence, the first variant was approved, but never put into production, although the MK-IV periscopes were still moved forward in practice. The situation with vision improved, but the issue was not completely resolved. An extra observation device was installed on the IS-2M.

Top to bottom: stamped 35HG2 steel track link, experimental stamped TVM steel track link, experimental cast KDLVT steel track link.

The factory delivered 250 vehicles again in November. Most of the work was done in the second 10-day period. ChKZ finally had a buffer of 50 sets of parts to begin December production in a timely manner. There were still issues with tracks. 18-20% of cast track links had defects, as well as 10% of stamped ones. 16-19% of road wheels had defects. However, the quality was increasing. All five vehicles sent to warranty trials completed them without serious complaints.

The quality of welding seams at UZTM drastically improved by spring of 1945.

Further changes to the design were slight, except one made in November. On October 14th, 1944, Stalin signed GKO decree #6723ss "On installation of high caliber DShK AA machine guns on IS tanks and SPGs". In November 25 IS-2s were the first to receive DShK AA guns. The first AA gun mount was tested in early 1944 on the Object 244 (Object 237 with the 85 mm D-5T-85BM gun) but the design was too bulky. The new mount was much more compact and well built. It could easily be called the best AA gun mount of the war. The machine gun was installed on a pintle that was attached to the commander's hatch. Unlike foreign designs, the Soviet mount had a counterweight system and a sight that could be covered up during travel. Variants of this AA gun mount were installed on Soviet AFVs for decades. 125 IS-2s received this mount in December and all new tanks and SPGs received it starting in January of 1945.

IS-2 tanks produced between February and June of 1945 looked like this.

The military acceptance staff noted that the increasing capacity of ChKZ allows it to produce up to 600 tanks and SPGs per month instead of the current goal of 500. However, there were still issues in December. Introduction of AA mounts resulted in a shortage of ball bearings. Issues with track links continued, and work on new links began again. The quality dropped, not a single tank passed the 300 km test run. Issues of factory #200 where volume of production of hulls and turrets dropped significantly compounded these problems.

Issues with the AA mounts continued into January 1945. There were not enough collimating sights and DShK machine guns. However, out of 250 IS-2s 216 passed acceptance trials on the first try, a very good result.

Stamped track links remained in production until the end.

In February ChKZ began to prepare for production of the Kirovets-1 heavy tank, later accepted into service as the IS-3. 8 tanks were assembled in February, but they were not officially recorded, since they needed a lot of work. This did not stop design work from continuing. New cast and stamped track links were tested in February of 1945. They were made from TVM and DVLVT steel, the latter was used to make a lighter track. It turned out that stamped TVM tracks perform the best, but even cast KDLVT track links gave a lifespan of 1600 km. To compare, 32.4% of production 35HG2 track links broke during a 1600 km test run.

Introduction of new track links dragged on, but another important change was made on February 1st. MDSh smoke bombs were installed on the upper rear plate. The IS-2's look was finalized in February of 1945.

Mounts for MDSh smoke bombs can be seen on the upper rear plate.

250 tanks were accepted in March, but a drop in quality was once again noted. Production began to wind down in April due to the start of production of the long-awaited replacement, the IS-3. Even though out of the 25 assembled vehicles in April none were accepted, the decline of the IS-2 began. 230 tanks were delivered in April, 155 in May (along with the first 100 IS-3s). The last five ChKZ IS-2s were delivered in June of 1945.

The price of the tanks dropped. In early January 1945 the price of one IS-2 was 280,000 rubles, in the second quarter of 1945 the tanks cost 250,000 each.

In total ChKZ delivered 3385 IS-2 tanks from December 1943 to June 1945. The last 63 tanks were delivered in June. Only one IS-2 remained at the factory for lengthy trials. In October of 1945, instead of handing off this tank (it needed major repairs) the factory delivered an extra IS-3.

Made in Leningrad

The story of the IS-2's production wouldn't be complete without mentioning how they were produced at the Leningrad Kirov Factory (LKZ). The decision to renew production of heavy tanks in Leningrad was made in May of 1944. This was linked to the success on the front. The Red Army completely removed the blockade of Leningrad in January of 1944. The front lines moved away from the city at a rapid pace after 900 days of encirclement. On May 26th, 1944, Stalin signed GKO decree #5959ss "On organization of IS tank and hull production, on the restoration of the metallurgy manufacturing at the Kirov and Izhora factories in Leningrad". The first 10 Leningrad-built IS-2s were awaited in October, 20 in November, 25 in December. Production was expected to reach 50 tanks per month in the first quarter of 1945. The decree also revived the Izhora factory, which would supply LKZ with hulls and turrets.

Work on equipping a turret for the fourth IS-2 tank produced at LKZ, late March 1944. The turret was built either at UZTM or Mariupol.

This decree had an impact not only at ChKZ, but at factory #200 and other institutions where engineers were evacuated from Leningrad. The production process was upset at factory #200, and this reflected on their output. 

However, a decree and its execution are two different things. Leningrad not only lost about one million people during the blockade but was also largely destroyed. The Kirov factory, despite remaining active during the blockade, was heavily damaged. Most of its equipment was evacuated. The Izhora factory became a battlefield. Among others, the 72nd Independent Machine Gun Artillery Battalion commanded by reserve Lieutenant G.V. Vodopyanov and composed of former factory workers fought here.

The situation was a difficult one. The NKTP understood this, and the decree also instructed that equipment should be sent to the Kirov and Izhora factories, but the factories were not ready for production in the summer or fall. As of September 25th workshop MKh-3 at LKZ was still partially destroyed and in need of serious repairs. The remainder of the factory's workshops were in similar condition. Equipment was in a poor state. 54 new machines (including 26 imported) arrived at the factory. One IS-2 was assembled from components sent from Chelyabinsk. It was tested, but not accepted.

An IS-2 accepted in March of 1945. The tank has a turret built at factory #200.

GKO decree #6706 was published on October 14th, 1944. According to this decree, LKZ had to deliver its first five IS-2s in December of 1944. Even this deadlines was impossible. By November 15th, 1944, the MKh-3 workshop had 160 various machines, but only 15 were set up. According to the factory's military representative Engineer-Colonel Rumyantsev, these machines were being used in vain. The factory prepared torsion bars for two months, but not a single one was delivered. It was not possible to complete them without sufficient half-stock. Steel furnaces, casting and rolling workshops, and the forging shop were ready to go. The factory had 11 thousand workers, but the military representative complained that nothing was done to begin production. The situation did not improve in December. It's not surprising that not a single IS-2 was shipped from Leningrad in 1944.

An IS-2 tank assembled at LKZ is bring prepared for acceptance trials, April 6th, 1945. As you can see, the front of the hull is the old type. All IS-2 tanks assembled at LKZ had these hulls.

The light at the end of the tunnel only lit up in the spring of 1945. The factory finished its first five IS-2s in March. One of them was the tank assembled back in September of 1944. As strange as it sounds, all tanks built in Leningrad in 1945 had a summer 1944 design. All of these tanks had old style hulls and turrets built before the summer of 1944. Since the hull production was not set up locally, leftovers from factory #200 were used. These tanks also turned out to be very expensive, 350,000 rubles per unit. Documents from April indicated that the final delivery of the tanks will only take place in June. It seems that LKZ management understood that delivery of IS-2 tanks was not going well and ISU-152 production was doing much better.

Only 10 IS-2s were built in Leningrad: five were delivered in May, the March production tanks were only delivered in June. Heavy tank production finished after that. A second manufacturing base for heavy tanks never took off.

Tanks in the 7th Guards Army

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"To the Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the 7th Guards Army

Summary of experience of using tank armament in the Patriotic War

1. Range and means of fire

A typical rate of fire for tanks firing from standstill in defense or from ambush is 600-800 meters. This range allows fire to be precise and allows for knocking out the target with several shells even if it is moving straight at the shooter.

Firing on the move when attacking a defending enemy should done done from all weapons after the tank breaks away from our infantry. The rate of fire should be maximum without regard for hitting. In this case, undershooting is better than overshooting. Keep firing like this until the platoon or even the whole formation enters enemy lines, then finish off strongholds with precise fire.

2. Rate of fire
It is hard to establish the rate of fire. In practice it is 4-6 RPM, a well trained crew can give 8-9 rounds per minute, but this costs great effort and cannot be held up for long, especially on the T-34 tank.

3. Expenditure of ammunition
It takes about 2-3 armour piercing shots to destroy an enemy tank from ambush. About the same amount of HE is spent destroying a dugout that does not have anti-tank cover.
When fighting anti-tank guns, fire on the move with HE from 2-3 tanks. All three tanks should fire off 15-20 rounds in total.

4. Firing on the move and from short stops
Firing on the move is done at 16 kph. Firing from a short stop is only done when the target has been spotted in the following order: command to the loader "AP" or "HE", wait until the response "Ready", order to the driver "Short". The driver brings the tank to a stop without switching to neutral. After a fire he resumes moving without an additional command.

5. Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance of targets on the front lines and, if possible, deeper within enemy lines is performed during observation and setting of objectives based on terrain.

6. Fire correction
Fire correction is often done based on observing the burst of the shell.

7. Expenditure of ammunition
When fighting a non-defending enemy in a medium fortified terrain, ammunition expenditure reaches 25-30%. In case of very tough defense and the infantry falling behind the tanks, the tanks can spend up to 80% of their ammunition returning to their infantry.
It is suggested that as much ammunition as possible should be carried. For instance, one T-34 can fit up to 150 rounds of ammunition. In cases where our infantry has not yet fortified its defenses our tanks have to spend several days with it without being able to obtain supplies.
Tanks usually restock in regions not observed by the enemy, where the ammunition is carried to in trucks. The crew only has to load it into the tank.

8. Misfires
Misfires are caused by:
  • Cannon: failure to extract the casing (has to be extracted by hand).
  • Machine gun: sticking or tearing of the casing.
It is impossible to answer the rest of the questions that were posed, as the commanders of our regiment have little experience in battle (95% of tank company commanders had not participated in battle).

Chief of Staff of the 167th Independent Tank Regiment, Captain Galonyuk"

APCR and HEAT Instructions

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"Artillery HQ of the 25th Rifle Corps
May 23rd, 1944
#[illegible]378

To artillery commanders of divisions. Copy personally for the 77th Guards Rifle Division

I send out a copy of instructions issued by the GAU KA regarding the use of 76 mm subcaliber ammunition, 76 mm HEAT, and 122 mm HEAT.

The Corps Artillery Commander orders that:
  1. The instructions are to be taught to all artillery personnel of the units (for the appropriate caliber) before May 27th, 1944.
  2. Personally check the knowledge of these instructions by officers on May 27th, 1944, and report on the results of the check.
  3. Subcaliber and HEAT ammunition must always be stored with the guns and kept in reserve against tanks and SPGs. Do not permit firing at other targets.
Chief of the Artillery HQ of the 25th Rifle Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Solodilov"

"To commanders of artillery of Fronts, Regions, and Independent ARmies

As of July 1943, the Red Army received 57 mm and 76 mm APCR ammunition and 122 mm HEAT ammunition. Until tables and rules of firing are developed, these instructions must be followed.

Instructions for use of the 57 mm and 76 mm APCR ammuniton and 122 mm HEAT ammunition.

A. The 57 mm APCR BR-27 shot is designed to be fired from the ZIS-2 57 mm anti-tank gun. 

It is to be fired only at enemy heavy tanks, including the T-6 (Tiger), at ranges of up to 1000 meters. From over 1000 meters it is forbidden to use APCR ammunition. 

Fire using the setting 6 on the armour piercing scale regardless of whether the gun is equipped with the PP-2 or PP-1-2 sight. 

The APCR round fired from the 57 mm ZIS-2 gun penetrates the following amount of armour:

Range in meters
Penetration
At 60 degrees
At 90 degrees
1000
75
95
700
90
120
500
100
140
300
115
160
100
130
175
The casing is labelled UBR-271 P. The ammunition crates are marked "57-ZIS-2 subcaliber AP tracer. Use according to instructions included in the crate."

B. The 76 mm APCR BR-35 shot is designed to be used in 76 mm divisional model 1902/30 guns, both 30 and 40 caliber variants, the USV model 1939 gun, ZIS-3 model 1942 gun, model 1933 gun, and F-22 model 1936 gun, as well as 76 mm tank guns: the model 1940 (T-34) and model 1941 (ZIS-5).

It is to be fired only at enemy heavy tanks, including the T-6 (Tiger), at ranges of up to 500 meters. From over 500 meters it is forbidden to use APCR ammunition. 

When fired from 76 mm guns, the shot penetrates the following amount of armour:

Range
30 caliber gun
40 caliber gun
50 caliber gun
60 deg
90 deg
60 deg
90 deg
60 deg
90 deg
100
95
117
105
128
109
132
300
83
102
89
110
92
114
500
67
83
75
92
79
96

Fire the APCR round at a range of 500 meters with the sights set to the following settings:

Gun
Sight setting
30 caliber 1902/30
3 on the “long range grenade” scale
40 caliber 1902/30
7 on the “long range grenade #1” scale
1939 USV
8 on the “long range grenade full” scale
1942 ZIS-3
6 on the “long range grenade full” scale
1933
7 on the #1 scale
1936 F-22
6 on the “long range grenade full” scale
1940 F-34 and 1941 ZIS-5 tank guns
3 on the “long range grenade” or “armour piercing-long range grenade” scales

The casing is labelled UBR-354 P. The ammunition crates are marked "76 02/30-36 subcaliber AP tracer. Use according to instructions included in the crate."

Notes for sections A and B:

  1. It is prohibited to fire APCR at light or medium tanks while regular AP is still available.
  2. Unlike the ordinary AP shell, the APCR shot has a sharper tip and a body shaped like a spindle.
  3. The APCR round is shorter than the AP round.
C: 122 mm BP-460A HEAT shell for the 122 mm howitzer model 1938. 

Fire the HEAT shell at tanks and other armoured targets with over 100 mm of armour. The best way to use this shell is to fire it directly at a range of under 1000 meters. The casing is marked TG-50 S BP-460A".

Fire the HEAT shell from the 122 mm model 1938 howitzer only with the fourth propellant setting: base charge plus four equal variable charges. HEAT shells are assembled with the fourth propellant charge. On these casings there is a marking "4th charge for HEAT". The crate is marked "122-38g HEAT". There is a notice on the lid that reads "fire according to the memo in the crate". On the rear size there are markings "BP-460A" and "TG-50:. Fire according to table #4.

Range (m)
Sight setting
Trajectory height (m)
Time in flight (s)
Angle of descent (deg, min)
Impact velocity (m/sec)
200
4,7
0.5
0.61
0,31
323
400
8,16
2,0
1.24
1,06
308
600
12,26
4.2
1.89
1,47
297
800
17,36
7.8
2.58
2,30
289
1000
22,47
13
3.50
3,18
278
1200
26,58
20
4.04
4,08
270
1400
32,70
28
4.80
5,01
262
1600
37,82
39
5.97
5,59
254
1800
42,95
52
6.38
7,01
247
2000
47,108
65
7.22
8,08
241
Keep track of the effect of APCR and HEAT ammunition on enemy tanks (especially the T-6) carefully and report the results to the artillery commander and the GAU.

APCR and HEAT ammunition must always be kept in reserve near the guns to destroy enemy heavy tanks."


Identification

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"USSR NKO
Artillery Staff of the 49th Guards Kherson Red Banner Order of Suvorov Rifle Division
January 19th, 1945
#047

To commanders of formations and units

The 1st Mechanized Corps that is operating in the 46th Army's sector is armed with American M4A2 type tanks.

In order to avoid destroying them with our own artillery, the commander of artillery orders that:
  1. All artillery personnel are instructed to study the silhouettes of the tanks of this type based on the attached prints.
  2. The observation post of each battery must have an observer that is excellent at identifying the silhouette of M4-A2 tanks. Equip him with the prints.
  3. After studying the silhouette, pay attention to the special features when viewing it from the side: three pairs of road wheels, when observing from the front: the middle part has the shape of an isosceles trapeze, also pay attention to the shape of the turret.
Attachment: blanks with prints of the M4A2 tank silhouette.

Chief of Staff of Artillery of the 49th Gds. Rifle Division, Guards Major Zhila"

Post-War Rearmament

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"2611-1033ss
June 18th, 1949

On the acceptance of new types of weapons into service with the Soviet Army

The Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees that:
  1. The Soviet Army accepts into service:
    1. The 7.62 mm Simonov semiautomatic carbine model 1945 instead of the model 1944 carbine.
    2. The 7.62 mm Kalashnikov assault rifle model 1947 instead of the model 1941 and model 1943 submachineguns.
    3. The 7.62 mm Degtyaryev model 1944 light machine gun instead of the DPM machine gun.
    4. The 7.62 mm model 1943 cartridge.
  2. The new weapons will be called:
    1. 7.62 mm Simonov semiautomatic carbine (SKS)
    2. 7.62 mm Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK)
    3. 7.62 mm Degtyaryev model 1944 light machine gun (RPD)
    4. 7.62 mm model 1943 cartridge.
  3. The Minister of the Armed Forces comrade Vasilevskiy must present a plan for the re-armament of the Armed Forces with the new weapons within one month.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, I.Stalin
Chief Administrator of the Council of Ministers, M. Pomaznev"

From Sky to Earth

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The concept of an airborne tank appeared in the early 1930s. The creator of this concept was John Walter Christie, who presented a tank that was supposed to get to the battlefield over the air using a discarding airplane attachment. Thanks to a powerful engine and a linkage to the propeller, the tank would not need an aircraft to tow it. This tank, known as the Convertible Airborne Tank M1932, never took flight, but the idea made its way into several countries. Christie himself quickly understood that a carrier airplane is necessary after all. There were two further developments: a plane that could carry a tank either underneath or inside it, or a specialized glider. Both developments were explored in the USSR and abroad. The Germans and British got the furthest with gliders, and the USSR, Germany, and USA got to practical stages with the aircraft approach. This article will discuss the fate of Soviet airborne tanks.

Under an airplane's wing

The fate of airborne tanks was fully linked to the success of airplane building. There were some issues with this abroad. Giant aircraft did exist, but they were very rare and had their quirks. The financial crisis that gripped the world in 1929 played a part. Christie's work slowed down for this reason. He continued to build airborne tanks with exceptional characteristics for their time, but they were not destined to fly. The reason for this was simple: there was no airplane to carry them.

Advertisements for the Christie M1933 Airborne Combat Car and its successors showed the tank carried by the Boeing B-9, but this was a delusion, as even the Christie M1933 Airborne Combat Car was more than three times as heavy as the airplane's maximum load. An unnamed Sikorsky aircraft was also mentioned in the data sheet, but this was also an attempt to pass off wishes as reality. The Americans had no airplane capable of lifting even Christie's 4 ton tank until the end of the 1930s. The situation in other countries was no better.

Christie M1933 Airborne Combat Car shown under a "Sikorsky airplane". This was only a commercial trick.

As strange as it sounds, the nation that had the best results in developing heavy bombers was the one that until recently lay in ruins: the USSR. Soviet aircraft development caught up with foreign powers and then took the first place. One of the symbols of the success of Soviet aviation was the TB-3 heavy bomber, whose prototype (ANT-6) rook off in 1930. The USSR made full use of German developments that had to work semi-legally due to the Treaty of Versailles. In designing the ANT-6, Tupolev borrowed the best ideas of Junkers designs. Four M-17 engines, licensed copies of German BMW-VI, were used. Later, in 1934, an improved version of the TB-3 was built that used AM-34 engines.

Thanks to new engines the bomb load increased to 3 tons. This was about the mass of the lightest Soviet tank, the T-37. The idea of the TB-3 as a tank carrier was tempting, especially since the USSR was interested in airborne tanks. The M1932 Airborne Tank was purchased, but quickly found disappointing. A new direction was chosen: development of a system that could transport mass produced vehicles over the air that could cover Soviet airborne forces with their armour and weapons.

Hooking up a T-37A amphibious reconnaissance tank underneath a TB-3 M-17 using Grokhovskiy's PG-12 system, 1935.

The first developments regarding carrying armoured vehicles by air began in 1932. The first stage was using a TB-1 bomber to transport T-27 tankettes. Large scale work began only in 1934. The first step forward was a development by the VVS Special Military Inventions Design Bureau (OsKonBuro). P.I. Grokhovskiy, its leader, was a leading specialist in the field of hitching systems. A design developed in 1935 and indexed PG-12 was universal. It allowed airplanes to carry cars and artillery, as well as tanks. Special mounts were installed on the tank, which attached it to the airplane.

Three TB-3s took flight in September of 1935 during the Large Kiev Exercises. They carried T-37A tanks, D-12 armoured cars, and trucks. The airplanes landed on specially prepared airstrips, the vehicles were unhooked, crews entered them, and they went into battle. The USSR became the first country to put the idea of the airborne tank into practice.

T-37A attached using the TVD-2 system under a TB-3 AM-34 bomber, October 1936.

The success was only partial in the eyes of the brass. The possibility of carrying a tank through the air was a success, but it had drawbacks. The biggest issue was that landing was necessary. This made the likelihood of losing the airplane much higher and made the deployment process more complicated. Ideally, a system was needed that could allow a tank to be deployed from a low height, as this would have made deployment simpler.

TB-3 en route to the drop zone, Medvezhyi lakes region.

The scientific research department of the VAMM began working on such a system. The Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization was a veritable designer mill. Many designers who studied there went on to become famous. Two young specialists began working on the system dubbed TVD-2. The first of them was A.F. Kraftsev, the initiator of the project. The second was the chief of the design sector of the scientific research department, Military Engineer 3rd Class Zh.Ya. Kotin. The system was radically different from Grokovskiy's design. The attachments were not on the side, but on top of the hull roof, which made disengaging easier. Minimal changes were introduced into the tank and the airplane, which was a big advantage. The PG-12 required more substantial changes. In both cases, the tank was lifted up for attachment using pulleys.

The tank is deployed.

Work on the TVD-2 went quickly. Trials were performed in October of 1936. The tank was deployed into water from a height of 5-6 meters. The idea was that landing in water would be less stressful than on land, but that was not the case. Predicting that a water landing would not be soft, the designers developed three variants of protection for the floor. One was a wooden "boat" lined with sheet metal. The idea was that such a design, attached underneath, would protect the tank as it hits the water. The second idea was a steel sheet attached to the tank's floor. Pine branches were inserted between the floor and the added plate to cushion the blow. The final option was fixing tree branches under the tank.

The tank touches down. Theoretically, it was supposed to float, but it sank.

Three tanks were deployed during trials held at Medvezhyi lakes in October of 1936. On one hand, they showed that the TVD-2 system was a good design, as it performed flawlessly and the 3 extra tons of load did not affect the plane significantly. On the other hand, the landing was not very smooth. The floor of the T-37A tank was damaged in every case, and only the boat attachment helped it not sink. Other attempts ended in the same way: the tank's floor was damaged and it sank. The dropping process was also not easy. The crews had to be well trained to drop the tank from a small height.

The results of one landing. As a rule, this is what happened to the T-37A when it hit the water.

It is largely considered that work on dropping a tank from an airplane was concluded in the fall of 1936, but that is not so. Even Kotin's group continued working until the end of 1937. Work on systems that might cushion the blow when landing in water continued. Additionally, KB #29 began working on an analogous system in 1937. V.S. Vakhminstrov already had a lot of experience with designing systems that were described as "Vakhmistrov's circus". This system permitted the TB-3 to be used as an aircraft carrier. The design turned out quite good, but it was not accepted into service.

A variant of attaching the T-38 developed by KB #29. The tank's hull had to be drilled through for installation.

Vakhminstrov's design was similar to the PG-12. Four attachment points were installed on the tank's hull (the T-38 was planned in this case). They were held on with bolts, so the armour had to be drilled. The ABTU gave its permission, with the note that the openings had to be watertight, as the tank was to retain its buoyancy. Work at the KB #29 on this project began in June of 1937. In November the chief of the ABTU division commander G.G. Bokis gave the order to cease this work at both the KB #29 and VAMM. The reason given was that amphibious tanks were unsuitable for dropping into water. Bokis proposed that the effort should be concentrated in other directions. The first was to transport tanks by landing at prepared airstrips, a return to the PG-12 concept. The second was the idea of transporting a load up to 4 tons by air and lowering it from a height of 6-10 meters on water or land with pulleys. On November 23rd, 1937, Bokis was arrested on espionage charges. On March 19th, 1938, he was executed.

However, this was not the end of the airborne tank concept. Experiments continued in 1939-40, and the hitch was finally accepted into service. In late 1940 the Podyemnik factory began to produce these systems, which were sent to airborne units. 130 units for TB-3 bombers were built by May of 1941. As for Kotin and Kravtsev, their paths diverged in 1937. Kotin became the chief designer of SKB-2. Kravtsev's success in tank building was not as great, but he still made a significant impact.

In different directions

Hitches for the T-37 and T-38 were not the end. The Red Army accepted the new T-40 amphibious tank into service on December 19th, 1939. This tank was better protected, had more powerful armament, and most importantly was heavier. As with the predecessors, the T-40 was to be issued to airborne units.11 T-40s were sent to the 205th Airborne Battalion (Borispol) in March of 1941. The question of air dropping these tanks was a pressing one. According to NKO decree #23ss issued on February 28th, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Machinebuilding was supposed to develop 12 hitches for the TB-7 (Pe-8) heavy bomber with a 4.5 ton capacity for carrying T-40 tanks. 20 hitches capable of carrying a 3.5 ton weight were to be built in 1941 as well. The plans for T-40 hitches were significant: 200 were to be built in all. These requirements were never met.

The GABTU chief, Lieutenant General Ya.N. Fedorenko, sent a letter asking about delays to Zhukov on May 12th, 1941. An investigation gave a simple answer: there were not enough airplanes to satisfy the demands of airborne units. The last TB-3 was built in 1938 and the TB-7 was being put into production with great difficulty.

T-40 amphibious reconnaissance tank. It was supposed to replace the T-37A and T-38 in airborne units.

The airborne tank appeared once more in 1941, but the concept was different. This was no longer a tank-plane, but a tank-glider. For instance, aviation engineer A.Ya. Sherbakov developed a glider that could carry a NATI tankette. According to a letter to acting chief of the 11th Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Aircraft Production P.V. Tsybin, the glider would carry an 1850 kg load and be ready for trials by September. Sherbakov was not alone in his work. An analogous project was presented by TsAGI engineers R.S. Yermonskiy, A.I. Solovyev, and V.I. Matsyuk. This was a significant project with a 33.8 meter wingspan. The takeoff mass was 8 tons, 2 of which were made up by the glider. The tank was drawn very approximately. Its mass would be 6 tons, and the hull performed the role of a fuselage. The tail was attached to the hull.

The biggest requirement was the need to withstand a speed of 100 kph, as the glider took off at this speed. The tank also helped the towing aircraft by reaching this speed on its own power during takeoff. This project was met with disapproval from the GABTU, as no existing tank satisfied these requirements. However, this work came up many times later, especially since a tank glider did become a reality.

Yermonskiy's tank glider, June 1941. This and several similar gliders were rejected.

The T-60 overtook the role of a potential airborne tank by late 1941. The mass of the T-60 reached the same 6 tons that Yermonskiy counted on. However, TsAGI engineers did not take part in the new work. The topic of a tank glider was picked up in December of 1941 by the later famous aircraft designer O.K. Antonov, then the chief designer at the Glider Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Aircraft Production. One T-60 was provided by GAZ in late December of 1941.

Like a number of analogous projects, the glider (indexed KT, "Tank Wings", or A-40) was a removable attachment. The biplane glider was attached in four places to the tank. The driver, who also acted as the pilot, would disengage the tank with a special handle. Antonov planned that the KT would be made from non-deficit materials. The glider was supposed to be as cheap as possible, which was an important parameter for essentially a single use design. The overall mass of the glider and tank was 7.3 tons. The KT had a wingspan of 18 meters.

The KT (A-40) was supposed to look like this, although the real T-60 never flew with a turret.

An experimental prototype of the glider was built in April of 1942 in Tyumen, where the design bureau moved to after evacuation from Moscow. That summer, the tank and its glider were delivered to the VVS Scientific Research Institute in Zhukovskiy (Moscow oblast), where flying trials began. Judging by photographs, the tank's turret and armament were removed to save on weight. The KT was tested on land to ensure that the calculations were correct and the T-60's running gear could stand a speed of 100-115 kph. Three hover flights preceded the real flight. Since no TB-7 was available, a TB-3 with its engines supercharged to 970 hp was used. The airplane, flown by test pilot P.A. Yeremeyev, was also used in the summer trials of the KT glider. It was piloted by the famous test pilot S.N. Anokhin.

The KT before its first and last flight. 

The KT's first and last flight took place on September 2nd, 1942. After takeoff, it turned out that due to significant resistance the airplane could not accelerate past 130 kph, its maximum height was 40 meters. The TB-3 began to overheat and there was no other choice but to disengage the glider. The airplane headed for the nearby Bykovo airport, after which the glider disengaged. It's worth noting that Bykovo was not notified about the trials, so the appearance of a flying tank resulted in mixed reactions from the local AA crews. Anokhin masterfully landed the glider, after which he was promptly detained by airport security. After everything was cleared, Anokhin was released. The T-60 returned to the VVS NII without dropping the glider attachment on its own power. The fault in the failure of the trials was the KT design. In choosing a biplane layout, Antonov reduced the dimensions of the glider, but increased resistance. The glider had many struts and other elements that increased drag.

Further trials with a TB-7 (Pe-8) bomber were planned, but they never took place. The GABTU had a clear picture of what the T-60 was capable of and declined further work on a "winged T-60". However, the idea of airborne tanks lived. For instance, in April of 1943 a request came to the GBTU from N.A. Zhemchuzhin, deputy chief designer at factory #51. He was interested in the mass of new Soviet light tanks, as the idea of loading an airborne tank on a prospective airplane designed by factory #51 came up. The work did not progress past correspondence, and the BB airplane that was supposed to carry the tank remained in sketches.

The finale of Soviet airborne tanks was more the rule than the exception at that time. Analogous work in other countries met the same end. The only nations to use airborne tanks for their intended purpose were the British. However, the uses of the Tetrarch on June 6th, 1944, and Locust in March of 1945 were hardly successful. Airborne tanks were hopelessly obsolete on the battlefield, which the use of the Locust on March 24th, 1945, clearly showed. The only successful use of airplanes to transport tanks was the German use of Messerschmidt Me 323 Gigant transport aircraft to carry light tanks and SPGs. As for the USSR, the idea of building specialized combat vehicles for airborne units came up in late 1943. The first such vehicle, the OSU-76, appeared in 1944.

To The Death

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"Order to the units of the Western Direction #07
July 25th, 1941
Acting Army

On all fronts, the Red Army is offering staunch resistance to the enemy, showing examples of heroism and bravery, delivering crushing defeats to the enemy armies.

However, in several units and formations of the Western Direction there have been isolated examples of cowards, panic-mongers, and those who seek to save their own skin who fled from the battlefield out of imagined fear of enemy aircraft and tanks, without resistance and without engaging the enemy, betraying the army and our great Motherland.


Cowards and panic-mongers cannot be allowed to abandon their weapons and flee from the battlefield, sowing panic in our companies, battalions, and regiments, weakening the units who are fighting.

The parties guilty of these great crimes have been judged and executed.

I order that:
  1. All political command staff and soldiers who value the interests of our Motherland must ruthlessly combat these shameful traitors and explain that leaving one's weapons and leaving the battle without them is a terrible crime. The political command staff must inspect weapons constantly and daily, and promote conscious protection of weapons and military vehicles.
  2. Political command staff are warned that they are now responsible for the condition of weapons and vehicles. Commanders and commissars of units and formations that allow a loss of weapons or vehicles without due cause will face a military tribunal.
  3. Not a single cannon, not a single tank, not a single car, not a single machine gun, not a single rifle can be left to the enemy. No matter how hard the situation is, all personnel must strive to preserve weapons and vehicles. It is not allowed to give in to panic and destroy materiel needlessly. Cannons are powerful and fearsome weapons that must be used in battle fully and to the end. It is only in a completely hopeless situation when weapons and vehicles are about to fall to the enemy that measures to evacuate cannons and vehicles are to be taken. If this is impossible, the cannons and vehicles must be destroyed so that they cannot fall into enemy hands no matter what.
  4. Abandoning a tank must be considered treason. It is better to die in the tank than to leave the battlefield without it.
  5. All commanders of units and formations must form teams to collect weapons. Commanders of divisions, commanders of corps, and commanders of armies must provide conditions in which this order can be carried out.
  6. Military prosecutors of the Western and Central Fronts are instructed to present anyone that violates this order to the military tribunal.
  7. The order should be read and explained to all companies, batteries, squadrons, and crews.
Supreme Commander of the Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko
Member of the Military Council of the Western Direction, Bulganin
Chief of Staff of the Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. Shaposhnikov"




T-54 Delays

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"To the Chief of the GBTU TU, Engineer-Colonel comrade Blagonravov

RE: preparing production of the T-54

Order of the NKTP #217ss given in May 1945 instructed factory #183 to send blueprints of the T-54 turret to factories ##75, 264, 112, 174, and the Ilyich Mariupol Factory within 15 days of issue.

The same order factory #183 was instructed to explore the issue of producing the T-54 and present the NKTP with necessary measures to achieve this no later than August 1st.


The status of preparation of T-54 production by August 7th, 1945, is as follows.

Factory #183 sent blueprints of the T-54 to its subcontractors without changes made after proving grounds trials. As a result, the blueprints can only be used by the subcontractors to give the general idea of a T-54 tank, but cannot be used as technical documentation based on which the design can be produced.

The department of the Chief Designer has not been working on T-54 blueprints. To introduce the necessary changes into the blueprints, it will take 2-2.5 months, i.e. the production will be ready by about October 15th, 1945. Production of the T-54 tank can begin at factory #183 6 months after blueprints are sent to production, i.e. assuming that the department of the Chief Designer will begin working immediately the T-54 will not enter production earlier than the second quarter of 1946.

It is clear that the due date for preparation of the T-54 for production at factory #183 has been missed.

Starting with the second half of June the department of the Chief Designer has been working on other work that is unsuitable for tank designers.

According to order #664 of the factory director issued on July 12th, 80% of the designers are busy outlining and drawing blueprints for parts and assemblies of the American 10 ton Mack truck.

Experimental work on improving the production T-34 tank is also not being performed for this reason.

It is necessary for the government to get involved to ensure that factory #183 performs work on preparing for production of modern tanks and improving the design of the T_34.

Regional Engineer of the GBTU TU, Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Rumyantsev
August 7th, 1945"

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