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T-34 Turrets at Factory #112

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"Overall direction of turret modernization during the war

The design of the turret was changed significantly (see fig. 143).
  1. In December of 1941, turrets 34.30sb-7 and 34.30sb-8 were cancelled, and turret 34.30sb-12 was introduced.
  2. In January of 1942, turret 34.30sb-12 was cancelled and turret 34.30sb-12-1 was introduced.
  3. In March of 1942, turret 34.30sb-12-1 was cancelled and turret 34.30sb-12 was introduced.
  4. In June of 1942, turret 34.30sb-12-12 was introduced.
This rapid change in turret likely indicated that the type of turret was unsatisfactory, and the design was only deemed satisfactory after introduction of a new turret with a commander's cupola in 1943 (see fig. 145).

In December of 1943, a turret with a 1675 mm turret ring bearing base and D-5 85 mm gun was put into production according to blueprints from the head factory.

During the production of this turret, our factory did not introduce significant changes, with the exception of altering the top of the turret and the roof to match the capabilities of the casting plant.

In January of 1944, our factory once again designed a widened turret ring turret (1600 mm) for an 85 mm ZIS-S-53 gun. The turret differed from the D-5 turret by its dimensions, size in the front, hatch locations, commander's cupola, protection, and internal layout. The amount of seats and observation devices remained the same, with the exception of the sights, which were replaced with the TSh-15 refracting sight. This sight has advantages over other types of sights in the fact that the lens is rigidly attached to the cradle carrier and the eyepiece is attached to a ball and socket joint, which allows the gunner to observe the target uninterrupted, regardless of the gun's position. (Although the eyepiece does move, but the movement is so insignificant that it has no practical bearing.)

Initially, after moving to the 85 mm ZIS-S-53 gun, the factory was forced to install D-5A guns in existing turrets due to a shortage.

In order to retain the internal equipment layout of the D-5A, the turret was rationalized. For example, the gun kept its TMFD sight, the MK-4 was used instead of the PT-4-15 periscopic sight, the gun mantlet was widened by 105 mm, but overall the equipment was left without change.

The head factory modernized the turret designed by factory #112 in July of 1944, increasing the front armour to 90 mm, and the sides to 75 mm, gradually transitioning to 52 mm. The cast gun mantlet was thickened to 90 mm in the horizontal with gradual decrease up and down. Otherwise, the turret retained its factory #112 design components.

The modernized turret with thickened walls was introduced at our factory in August of 1944 (see fig. 146).

The head factory later introduced a commander's cupola rim thickened to 75 mm from 52 mm, which was introduced by us in September of 1944.

An optical TPU-8T sight was introduced for the radio operator's machinegun in December of 1944 in order to increase precision of fire.

The 1944 mass production turret had a two piece hatch on the commander's cupola, which was difficult to open due to the weight of the pieces. In addition, the front half housed the MK-4 periscope, which made exiting through the hatch difficult. Our factory raised the issue of changing the hatch design and replacing it with a one-piece hatch, and such a hatch was introduced in March of 1945 (see fig. 147).

At the same time, new ventilation was implemented using our factory's blueprints. The layout with two extractor fans in the rear did not clean the air completely satisfactory with an 85 mm gun when hatches were closed. The change in ventilation consisted of one extractor fan installed in the front, above the gun breech, and the other was left in place, but changed to intake. As a result, the air kept moving through the fighting compartment, keeping gases away from locations occupied by the crew.

In addition, a new ammunition rack was put into production using our factory's blueprints. Instead of 12 shells, the simplified rack fit 16 shells in the turret, and its more comfortable design improved the rate of fire of the tank.

In accordance with NKTP orders, the factory designed tanks with single-use firefighting equipment, which were tested in combat.

In the future, the issue was approached in greater depth, and experiments with multiple use automatic fire extinguishers were performed.

Due to the increased weight of the modernized turret, a defect was observed where the turret ring rail was deformed. During factory trials, the turret took great strength to traverse, which led to exhaustion of the crew and reduced precision of fire.

In order to correct this, our factory introduced technical requirements and a method of hardening the turret ring rail and lower turret ring. The hardened rails were tested first on experimental vehicles, then on production vehicles, and fully proved themselves."


Tractor Trials

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"Trials were performed from June 15th to July 10th at the GANIOP. Corps and high power artillery was used in the trials. 

During the trials, the tractors traveled:
  • TD-18 tractor, with a B-4 203 mm mod. 1931 howitzer (in armed condition): 100 km
  • TD-14 tractor: 200 km, of those:
    • With a Br-10 trailer (the barrel of a B-4 howitzer): 100 km
    • With a 152 mm mod. 1937 gun-howitzer: 100 km
  • HD-10 tractor, with a B-4 203 mm mod. 1931 howitzer (in armed condition): 100 km
  • HD-7 tractor: 225 km, of those:
    • With a 152 mm mod. 1937 gun-howitzer: 100 km
    • With a 152 mm mod. 1938 howitzer: 100 km
    • With a Br-10 trailer (the barrel of a B-4 howitzer): 25 km
  • D-6 tractor: 225 km, of those:
    • With a 152 mm mod. 1937 gun-howitzer: 100 km
    • With a 152 mm mod. 1938 howitzer: 100 km
    • With a Br-10 trailer (the barrel of a B-4 howitzer): 25 km
During trials, the TD-18, TD-14, HD-10, HD-7 exhibited average speeds of 7-9 kph, while the D-6 achieved 11-12 kph.

During trials, the engines, transmission, and suspension components worked satisfactorily. No significant design or production defects were noticed.

The measurement of power of the winches installed on the tractors was established by dragging out guns or SPGs that were stuck in swamps or deep pits. It was established that:
  • The TD-18 and HD-10 tractors can tow 18 ton loads.
  • The TD-14, HD-7, and D-6 can tow 13 ton loads.
Based on these trials, the GANIOP made the following conclusions:
  1. International model TD-18 and Allis-Chalmers model HD-10 tractors can be used to tow heavy guns, such as the 203 mm B-4 howitzer.
  2. International model TD-14, Allis-Chalmers model HD-7, and Caterpillar model D-6 can be used to tow artillery systems weighing up to 8 tons.
Having read the report on trials of American tractors, the 16th Department of the GAU Artillery Committee made the following conclusions:

It is possible to use American tractors to tow the following kinds of artillery:
  1. High power artillery systems, up to and including the B-4 in both separate and assembled states, can be towed by the International TD-18 and Allis-Chalmers HD-10.
  2. Corps artillery up to 10 tons in weight can be towed by the International TD-14, Allis-Chalmers HD-7, and Caterpillar D-6 tractors.
Deputy Chair of the GAU Artillery Committee and Chief of the 16th Department, Lieutenant Colonel Zhevanik

Senior Assistant to the Chief of the 16th Department, Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Getmanov"

Lend Lease Impressions: Bazooka

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60 mm rocket launcher AT M1

60 mm rocket

60 mm anti-tank rocket launcher

Proving grounds trials showed unsatisfactory results, specifically:
  1. Low muzzle velocity (89 m/s).
  2. Complex rocket design and sensitive detonator.
  3. Unreliable function of the launcher at temperatures less than 10 degrees Celsius.
  4. Fire is ineffective at a range of over 100 m due to an insufficiently flat trajectory and poor precision.
  5. Low rate of fire.
  6. Danger when firing the weapon while shouldered. Due to the rocket charge continuing to burn, it is possible to burn the shooter's hands and face.
Trials showed that the 60 mm American anti-tank rocket launcher cannot be accepted for use by the Acting Army, and further purchase is unreasonable.

3,000 rocket launchers were shipped in total, and only 4,260 rockets, or about one and a half rockets per launcher."

Mosin Suppressor

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"This suppressor, designed by comrades Barnas and Glinin, has a cigar-like shape (see photo #1) and consists of two parts, connected with a tread at the point of the suppressor where the diameter is the largest.

Photo #1 shows the suppressor."

Trophies from Galicia

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Starting with the late 1930s, testers in Kubinka began receive foreign vehicles from all corners of the world to try on for size. The first to come were trophies captured in Spain during the civil war, but the floodgates opened in 1939. The first to come was the Japanese Ha-Go tank, and Polish vehicles came after that. One of them was the TK-S tankette.


Rapid onslaught

On September 17th, 1939, the operation known as the Polish Campaign began. Effectively, this was a reconquering of territories lost during the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1921. Colonel P.S. Fotchenkov's 24th Light Tank Brigade was among the attacking units. By 18:00 on September 17th, reconnaissance elements from the brigade reached Ternopol, and tanks burst into Lvov at 2:00 on September 19th. At the same time, the Germans reached the other side of Lvov. In the confusion, a battle between Soviet tanks and German anti-tank guns broke out. The result was two burned out armoured cars and one knocked out BT tank. The Germans lost three anti-tank guns.

Aside from Soviet and German units, at least one Polish unit equipped with tracked armoured vehicles was present in the are: the 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade of Stanislaw Maczek. This brigade was the first of its kind in Poland. It met the start of WWII new Krakow, and fought the Germans. After several days, the brigade was recalled and sent to Lwow. It was included in the city's defenses.

This is what TKS #137 looked like when it arrived at the NIIBT proving grounds for trials. December, 1940.

After the Red Army began its progress towards Lvov, Maczek received an order to break through towards Hungary and not engage in active combat against the USSR. Soon, a large number of the brigade's soldiers ended up on Hungarian soil. Abandoning their vehicles in Hungary, the Polish soldiers and officers made their way to France, where they fought the Germans in May-June of 1940. After leaving France, the Poles ended up in Great Britain, where they formed the core of the 1st Polish Armoured Division, formed under Maczek's command in February of 1942. By then, he had received the rank of Major General.

As you can see, the tankette was without armament.

On October 5th, the personnel of the 24th Light Tank Brigade began to get settled in their new base of operations. A day later, a unit of 152 men was formed to collect captured vehicles. Among them were 10 Polish TK-S tankettes, although that number seems to include C2P tractors, which were built on the TK-S chassis. A portion of the tankettes were found on the territory of the barracks where the 6th Tank Battalion was quartered (Lvov, Shevchenko Street, south of the Yanov cemetery). Later, one of the garages of the 4th Mechanized Corps was placed here. Other tankettes were captured during a raid on Tomaszew, where a large number of Polish vehicles that were knocked out in the fighting on September 18-20th were collected.

Aside from the emblem of the 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, the side of the vehicle bears the slogan "Szwadron śmierci" (Death Squadron).

Captured TK-S tankettes were among the most common types of armoured vehicle (along with the TK-3) in the Polish army. As with the Soviet T-27 tankette, its design was based on the British Carden-Loyd Mk.VI. Just like with the Soviet tankette, the Polish design was seriously altered. Effectively, the only part left from the initial Carden-Loyd Mk.VI was the suspension, which was improved by the addition of leaf springs. Everything else in the TK-S was new. The hull was much roomier, the placement of the armament was better, and instead of the weak Fort T engine, the Poles installed the Polski FIAT-122. The result was a modern (for the mid-1930s) and rather mobile design.

However, by the end of the 1930s, the TK-S was already obsolete. Design of an improved small tank, the PZInї (4TP), began, but it was never put into production. 24 TK-S were converted into tank destroyers with 20 mm cannons, but there were no such vehicles among the ones captured by the 24th Light Tank Brigade. These tankettes were present in Tomaszow, and were even used by the Germans, but none fell into the hands of the Soviet trophy squad.

For training purposes

The Polish vehicles were sent to the Scientific Research Institute of Armoured Vehicles (NIIBT) proving grounds in 1940. Judging by the correspondence, the vehicles were not in working order. In total, three TK-S tankettes were delivered to Kubinka, called TK-3 in the correspondence. The description in the write-off act, dated January 14th, 1941, clearly shows that it is not an earlier version of the vehicle. According to it, the serial number of the tankette was 109, and the registration number was 1621, which pegs it as a TK-S from the second production batch of 85 tankettes. This tankette was used for spare parts to restore the other two.

One of them, serial number 128 and registration number 1640, was also from the second batch. It is not known where it went, but it is no longer listed in the proving grounds inventory in April of 1941. The second, serial number 194, registration number 1724, was from the third production batch of 63 vehicles. This tankette was built on July 27th, 1936, and was used by the 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, which is indicated by its insignia on the side. The vehicle also had its own name: Szwadron śmierci, or Death Squadron, named after Polish cavalry units in the war of 1919-1921.

An AA mount for the machinegun was attached on the right.

As said above, the Polish engineers took the design of the British Carden-Loyd Mk.VI tankette when designing the TK-S, and radically altered its design. It was not surprising that the NIIBT staff studied it thoroughly. However, it had to be repaired first, since it did not arrive in running order. Using another TK-S as a source of parts, it was able to move again, but it was not restored completely. THe technical description, composed during the trials, serves as evidence:

"The hull of the tankette has a bustle in the front right with a mantlet for installation of armament. On this tankette, the armament was absent. According to information received, this type of tankette uses various armaments: Hotchkiss machineguns, large caliber machineguns, and small caliber cannons.

A pintle mount for a light machinegun is attached to the tankette's hull on the right side. To fire at aircraft, the gunner must exit the tankette."

Soviet specialists did not pay any attention to the Gundlach periscope while studying the TK-S and the 7TP. During the study of the tankette, its presence was only remarked upon, and a short description was composed for the report on the 7TP. However, this device was probably the most interesting part of the tankette.

Gundlach's telescopic sight, most famously known as the Vickers Tank Periscope Mk.IV, or just Mk.IV, was the best tank periscope of its time. It provided good visibility and the ability to rapidly swap out a damaged block. The British were the first to copy it, and tank designers in other countries followed suit. The USSR missed it, only catching up in 1943. Interestingly enough, it received its Soviet index, MK-IV, not after its British name, but after the MK-IV tank that it was installed on, the Churchill.

The convoy light was lost, and replaced with a Soviet one.

The hull of the Polish tankette did not impress the NIIBT staff. On one hand, it was built from scratch, and was superior to not only the British original, but every other Carden-Loyd Mk.VI variant. Unlike the other tankettes, its crew did not feel like it was driving a sardine can, and the hull was fairly roomy. The commander and the driver had good visibility, and wide hatches made it easy to enter and exit the vehicle. On the other hand, its miniature size still did not allow placement of the engine in a separate compartment, and it had to be placed in the fighting compartment. The fuel tanks were also here, as there was nowhere else to put them.

Diagram of the hull, which includes the thickness of the armour.

The armour was increased to 10 mm in the front and 8 mm on the sides, which protected from rifle caliber bullets from a few hundred meters. This kind of armour could still be penetrated with a heavy bullet at point blank range. However, the Poles had no illusions about the armour of these vehicles, and production ceased in the spring of 1937. The steel that the hull was made from also did not interest Soviet specialists.

Unlike the T-27, where the amount of road wheels per side grew to 6, the Polish engineers did not lengthen the contact surface, even though it could have improved stability of the vehicle. However, the suspension still was not a direct copy of the British one. While the British tankette supported the track with a wooden beam, the Polish tankette had four return rollers per side. A central leaf spring carried the bogeys, which improved the crew conditions, especially off-road. The drive sprockets received removable crowns, which made the running gear easier to service. When the sprocket broke on the British tankette, it had to be swapped out. On the Polish tankette, only the crown had to be changed, which was much faster and simpler.

Diagram of the suspension.

Aside from an inspection of the tankette, it was also put through brief winter trials. The tankette drove for 127 km on the highway, and 18 more on a dirt road. The average movement speed was 21 kph and 12 kph respectively, and fuel expenditure was 48 and 70 L per 100 km. Snowy dirt roads were impassable for the tankette. Trials were discontinued. Even though the tankette was repaired, it was still heavily worn.

The following conclusions were made as a result:

"The TK-S tankette was the main type of reconnaissance tank in the Polish army. The "Death Squadron" insignia on the side indicates that it was used by cavalry units. The tankette was built according to the Carden-Loyd prototype, but has several changes made due to the use of Polish automotive components, which improved the design.
...
The TK-S tankette is only of academic interest to our tank industry."

Analog to the Komsomolets

Aside from the TK-S, a C2P (Сiągnik 2-tonowy Polski, 2 ton Polish tractor) arrived at Kubinka. This vehicle was designed at the PZInї (Państwowe Zakłady Inżynierii, National Technical Institute) under the direction of Janusz Lapuszewski. Even though it was based on the TK-S design, the tractor was still radically altered. Aside from a different hull, made from mild steel, the C2P had a longer contact surface due to moving the idlers further back. The characteristics of the Polish tractor were similar to those of the Soviet Komsomolets light artillery tractor, aside from the armour. The purpose was different too: while the Komsomolets was designed to transport the 45 mm anti-tank gun, the Polish vehicle was the transporter fro the 40 mm wz.36 Bofors gun.

Captured C2P on trials, winter 1940-41.

Production of the four-man tractor began in 1937. One batch of 196 tractors was produced, the size of the second is unknown. The total number of C2P tractors built can range from 196 to 270 vehicles. The C2P chassis also served as the chassis for the TKS-D tank destroyer, 2 of which were built. Both vehicles ended up in the same 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, but were lost before it was relocated to Lvov.

A copper plate with the registration number was attached to the front of the tractor.

Sadly, the serial number of the C2P that arrived at the NIIBT proving grounds was not found. As with the TK-S, the vehicle arrived in nonfunctional condition, and the proving grounds staff had to repair it. In correspondence, it was referred to as "PZInї tractor", since that is what it was called on the registration plate. After restoration, the vehicle was sent to mobility trials, driving for 118 km on the highway and 30 km on a dirt road. The average speed on a highway was 29 km, 26.2 km with a trailer, and 11.6 kph with a trailer on a dirt road. The fuel expenditure was 41, 75, and 102 L per 100 km, respectively. Trials had to be interrupted for the same reason as with the tankette: the vehicle was worn out, and it was impossible to drive in deep snow.

The crew of the wz.36 gun sat on the right. In general, the AA gun crew consisted of 7 men. There was also no room for ammunition.

The design of the C2P was similar to that of the tankette. The engine was also placed in the middle of the hull, but now it could fit four crewmen, instead of two. The driver sat to the left, and three passengers sat on the right. The ones in the back sat facing each other. They could travel in relative comfort, since the design of the vehicle included a tarp. However, the vehicle that ended up at the proving grounds didn't have one. Even though the tractor was slightly heavier than the tankette, the average speed was higher, due to the superior design.

The driver's station was to the left of the vehicle.

Overall, the vehicle did not impress the NIIBT staff, but there was one element that drew attention to itself. Unlike the TK-S, where the final drive was identical to that of the British vehicle, the C2P had a planetary design. It was placed in the front of the vehicle, behind the clutch brakes. This design received a separate mention in the conclusion.

"The PZInї has a notable internally placed planetary final drive. Its placement allows for removal of unnecessary final drive casings, which improved the clearance and off-road performance of the tractor."

The list of vehicles at the NIIBT proving grounds for April of 1941 does not include the "PZInї tractor". The tankette with serial number 128 is also missing. As for tankette #194, it was deemed technically functional, and placed in a museum. This TK-S was one of the few museum exhibits from the "first wave" that survived the Great Patriotic War. In addition, this is the first pre-war Red Army trophy to survive until today.

As with the TK-S, the rear light was domestic.

At the same time, the vehicle on display at Patriot Park is one of the three representatives of the Polish armoured vehicle family that survived to this day in their initial form. Aside from it, a TK-F tankette survived without serious external changes. It was also used by the 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade. The tankette was passed by the Hungarians to the Ustaše, and it was later captured by Yugoslavian Partisans. Today, the TK-F is an exhibit at the Kalemegdan fortress museum in Belgrade.

The third preserved vehicle is a C2P tractor. A German trophy, it somehow ended up in Spain, where it served at a vineyard. From there, the C2P was bought to be an exhibit at a museum in Obern, Indiana. The museum went bankrupt several years ago, and all exhibits were auctioned off, ending up all over the world. The C2P, painted in Panzer Gray, was bought by Polish collector Adam Rudnicki. He put the tractor back in order, and now the vehicle delights viewers during historical events in Poland.

The internals of the final drives, which were so interesting to Soviet specialists.

Polish collectors and state museums managed to restore a number of tankettes. The aforementioned Adam Rudnicki restored a TK-3, whose casemate had to be built anew. Three TK-S tankettes were found in the same condition (chassis with no casemate), one of which is now in private hands, one in Warsaw, and one in Poznan. A TK-S armed with a 20 mm gun was built up from scrap metal. During restoration of the C2P that arrived from America, Adam Rudnicki restored another tankette from pieces. Another C2P in another collection is waiting for its time.

Swedo-Polish Tank Killer

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Germany invented specialized anti-tank artillery before the end of WWI. It is not surprising that German anti-tank guns became some of the best known in their class. A German gun served as the starting point for the famous Soviet 45 mm anti-tank gun. The use of the German 3.7 cm Pak in Spain triggered the development of tanks with shell-proof armour in the USSR. However, another gun gave an even more powerful impulse to the strengthening of tank armour, built in neutral Sweden. Swedish 37 mm anti-tank guns were also used in Spain, and continued serving until the end of WWII.


Anti-tank bestseller

Located in Karlskoga, the Bofors AB company has a long history. It joined the arms industry in the end of the 19th century. The well known Alfred Nobel gave a strong push to the company in this direction. At the time, Krupp was one of Bofors' chief competitors, as they were supplying artillery to the Swedish army.

The relationship between the two companies took a different shape after WWI. According to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany could not produce or sell new armaments, and cooperation with Bofors was an excellent workaround. The first joint venture between Krupp and Bofors dates to 1919, and, year after year, the cooperation between yesterday's competitors increased. By the end of the 1920s, Krupp owned a third of Bofors' stock.

A captured Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz. 36 Bofors on trials in the USSR, winter 1941.

Both sides benefited from this cooperation. Krupp took advantage of a loophole, which let it skirt around the Treaty of Versailles and develop new armament. The Swedes drew an even larger benefit. The German arms giant was forced to share its developments, and Bofors now had access to foreign markets. Unlike another Swedish arms manufacturer, Landsverk, which only managed to begin tiny shipments of the L-60 tank towards the end of the 1930s, Bofors' name echoed throughout the world, as did the sound of its weapons.

Swedish guns were supplied to many countries around the world, and were no worse than their foreign analogues. On the other hand, some of Bofors' guns were so good, that they themselves became subjects of imitation. Even in the field of tank development, Bofors was luckier than the tank-specialists at Landsverk. Tank turrets from Karlskoga were widely used on Polish 7TP tanks and Finnish Vickers Mk.E tanks.

The same gun from the left. The arrow points to a beam that locks the trails in travel position.

One of the results of this cooperation was a 37 mm anti-tank gun. Both companies worked on anti-tank guns since 1921, but then, the 37-47 mm guns proved unsuccessful. Work in the early 1930s turned out much better results.

The history of the Swedish anti-tank gun is directly connected with the Swedish tank program, which was also influenced by the Germans. Landsverk 10 and Landsverk 30 tanks received turrets that were obviously descended from the turret used on the German Leichttraktor Krupp and Leichttraktor Rheinmetall. The 3.7 Tak gun, designed by Rheinmetall, also migrated to Swedish tanks. However, the Swedes introduced large changes at this stage. The gun, indexed 37 mm K. fm/32, had a vertical sliding breech, unlike the German horizontal design, and had differences in other small parts. Nevertheless, the roots of this gun were definitely German.

The gun from the rear. The pads on which the gunner and one of the loaders lay during battle, are visible.

It was clear that the purpose of a dedicated tank gun was rather narrow. Bofors designers produced a towed infantry variant, the first prototype of which appeared at the same time as the tank gun, in 1932. The towed gun also had the index 37 mm K. fm/32. Largely, it was an adaptation of the tank gun for infantry use, specifically in an anti-tank role.

Towing trials behind a truck.

The design of the gun was vastly different from the German 37 mm gun. The first version had one trail with a special pad. The gunner lay down on it in battle. China bought 13 of these guns in 1933.

An improved version of the gun appeared in that same year, featuring a sloped gun shield. There were now two trails. Denmark became interested in the new gun. In 1933, the Madsen company purchased a license to produce the 37 mm K. fm/32.

A year later, Bofors began trials of a modernized version of the gun, indexed 37 mm K. fm/32-34. Several versions of the gun shield were trialed. As a result, the Swedish army adopted a version with a flip-down lower section, known as the 37 mm infanterikanon m/34.

A gun with the shield removed, showing the aiming mechanisms and mount.

Poland showed interest in the Swedish anti-tank gun in 1935. It was light and powerful, and easily usable in a tank, which was not surprising, given its history. Poland purchased a license to produce the gun under the name Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz. 36 Bofors. 300 Swedish-produced Bofors guns were also purchased.

The SMPzA company (Stowarzyszenie Mechanikуw Polskich z Ameryki) in Pruszków, south-west of Warsaw, was tasked with the production. Polish guns differed little from Swedish ones. The biggest difference was altered tires.

Aside from equipping its own army with licensed guns, the Poles exported them themselves. For example, 24 guns were sent to Spain, where Republicans used them during the Civil War.

Dissembled body of the gun.

Bofors received other orders after the Polish one. 12 guns were bought by Holland in 1937. Interestingly enough, the British made a large order. 250 guns were purchased for Sudan, where they were indexed Ordnance QF 37 mm Mk.I.

The Swedish army bought only twelve 37 mm infanteriekanon m/34, which entered service in 1935. The order for the modernized 7 mm pvkan (pansarvärnskanon) m/38 was much larger. You can familiarize yourself with a gun of this type, preserved in the Swedish Arsenalen museum, here. In total, 491 guns of this modification were purchased, starting in 1939.

Close up view of the muzzle brake. Its presence was a liability, since it revealed the position of the gun during firing.

Bofors' product was the most numerous exported anti-tank gun by the start of WWII. Poland alone had 1200 of these weapons. This kind of saturation had an effect on the flow of battle. The Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz. 36 Bofors and its tank version became the biggest threat to German tanks in September of 1939. As a result of the Polish campaign, the Germans lost 819 tanks (236 of them irreparably), after only a month of fighting. Swedo-Polish anti-tank guns proved to the Germans that protection from 20 mm autocannons, developed after fighting in Spain, was insufficient. It was clear that the armour of tanks needs to get thicker.

Better late than never

The Red Army first met the Swedish guns during the Polish campaign, which began on September 17th, 1939. No conclusions about the combat effectiveness of the Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz. 36 Bofors were made. The reason was simple: there were almost no battles where the gun was used.

A small number of anti-tank guns was captured in battle. There is information that the guns were used by the Red Army in 1941, but the author has no specific details. It is known that Polish guns were used in the Red Army, including in armoured trains, but these were 75 mm guns (effectively, former French 75 mm mod. 1897 field guns).

Semiautomatic mechanism from the right.

The Soviet forces encountered Bofors guns several months later. These guns became the most dangerous enemies of the tanks that were storming the Mannerheim Line. From November 30th, 1939, to March 1940, 955 Soviet tanks were knocked out by artillery fire, 368 tanks were lost irreparably. A large number of these losses came specifically from Swedish anti-tank guns. Dents from their shells were found in the armour of KV and T-100 tanks used in battle.

As a result of the fighting in Finland, applique armour was installed on T-26 and T-28 tanks. At the same time, work on a light tank with shell-proof armour began, which led to the creation of the T-50. The Soviet military clearly saw that the time of tanks with bulletproof armour was at an end.

Upper and lower carriage from the front. One can clearly see that the horizontal traverse flywheel is located on the lower carriage.

Even though the Swedish gun was Finland's main anti-tank weapon, the nearly identical Polish gun was not studied. The Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA) only began to study it in the winter of 1941.

In February-March of 1941, the Gorohovets Artillery Scientific Research Proving Grounds (ANIOP) performed trials of the captured "37 mm Polish anti-tank gun mod. 1936". Aside from a detailed technical description, the ANIOP specialists performed full gunnery trials consisting of 384 shots. In addition, mobility trials were performed, with the gun being towed by a ZIS-5 truck over 200 km.

Trails with the pads removed.

As a result of the trials, the following conclusions were made:

"1. The 37 mm Polish anti-tank gun mod. 1936 is among the newest weapons of modern foreign armies.
...
3. Our 37 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1930 is less satisfactory than the Polish 37 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1936 compared to modern requirements for anti-tank guns.
...
5. The design of the Polish 37 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1936, as well as several individual components (shield, level trigger, recoil brake stem, recoil break grease configuration), as well as the gunpowder propellant, are of interest to our designers and industry."

The wheels were the main difference between the Polish and Swedish anti-tank guns. The Swedish 37 mm pvkan m/38 tires left a characteristic HOHOHO pattern in the dirt.

Meanwhile, the 37 mm mod. 1930 gun, which was inferior to the Swedish design, had nearly vanished from the army. Even the mass produced 45 mm mod. 1932 anti-tank gun was no longer the most modern domestic system. At the end of 1936, a decision was made to produce the modernized 53-K system, known as the 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937, which had the same penetration as its predecessor, but an improved design.

Optical sight.

The penetration, a much more important parameter for an anti-tank gun, was lacking in the Swedo-Polish gun. In comparative trials, the Soviet 45 mm mod. 1932 gun could penetrate 40 mm of armour at 800 meters at normal, and the same thickness at 400 meters at 30 degrees. This was already not enough for the GAU, and, as a result, work was underway on the 57 mm ZIS-2. Shells fired from the 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1932 showed satisfactory robustness.

As for the Soviet and Polish anti-tank guns, their results were much more humble. In the same conditions, they could only penetrate 16-20 mm plates, and the performance of the Soviet gun was better. After penetration, shells fired from the Soviet 37 mm mod. 1930 gun remained intact, and shells fired from the Polish one broke up.

Shells from the а) Polish б) Japanese and в) Soviet anti-tank guns. The likeness between Soviet and Polish shells is not surprising, since they share a German common ancestor.

In their conclusions, ANIOP specialists judged both 37 mm guns as unsatisfactory. Their shells, according to Soviet testers, were only useful against light tanks with about 20 mm of armour. Presumably, the Germans made the same conclusions. After the Polish campaign, PzII tanks gained an additional 20 mm of armour in the front, increasing the total thickness to 35 mm.

Anti-tank guns used by the Swedish army had more impressive characteristics. Trials in Finland showed that they could penetrate 40 mm of armour at 30 degrees from 300 meters. This was achieved by a modernization of the gun, which increased the muzzle velocity. The Swedish shells were also higher quality than the ones produced in Poland.

Gun shield after penetration trials.

Despite the praise of the design of the Swedo-Polish gun, the weapon did not draw much attention from Soviet designers. The Red Army already had a good 45 mm gun, and the 57 mm ZIS-2 that was under development had a radically different design.

The only people to continue development of the 37 mm pvkan m/38 were the Swedes themselves. The result was the 57 mm 3 pvkan m/43 cannon, which looked like an enlarged 37 mm pvkan m/38. This gun had much more impressive penetration characteristics, and was used by the Swedish army for a long time. Unlike its predecessor, it never saw combat.

Captured German guns, Courland, spring of 1945. This shot shows very rare guns: Dutch 3.7 cm fodfolkskanon M.1937,  also known as 3.7 cm PaK 157(d).

37 mm Swedish and Polish guns lasted for a long time on the field of battle. Having evaluated the quality of the guns, Finland bought 10 Polish guns from the Germans, but stopped at that. Presumably, the Finns obtained the same penetration results during trials as Soviet testers. As a result, they preferred to set up their own production, purchasing a license from Bofors. In total, Finland produced 355 guns, which were used until the beginning of 1944.

Romania was more eager to buy former Polish guns. In total, it received 556 cannons, which were actively used in battle on the Eastern Front. The guns that the British bought for Sudan also saw combat. They were often installed on trucks used by special units (LRDG) on raids on North Africa. Finally, the Germans themselves used the captured guns under the designation 3.7 cm Pak (p). The guns were last used in 1945, alongside analogous Dutch guns, which were called 3.7 cm PaK 157(d). However, by that time, these guns were hopelessly obsolete.

Tank Trailers

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"Minutes of a meeting at the 5th Department of the GABTU BTU with representatives of tank units on the issue of trailers for tanks proposed by factories #592 and #112

The meeting was led by the Chief of the 5th Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, comrade Afonin.

Afonin: We gathered representatives of tank units by order from Army Commissar 2nd Class Biryukov to discuss the proposal of engineers from factories #592 and #112 to build trailers for tank riders. [Reads proposal from factory #112 and explains technical issues connected with factory #592's proposal].

These proposals were made during the war with the White Finns, command inspected them and rejected them. Armoured sleds were used back then, which were useful for a while, but when the enemy learned about them, they began to let them through and shot them up from the rear. When armoured shields on skis were introduced, they had the same effect initially. 

We must approach the issue from the technical and tactical sides, from the point of view of usability in combat. Based on our combat experience, we need to voice our opinions regarding the proposal and report to GABTU command, which will make the final decision.

Commander of the 31st Tank Brigade, Colonel Titov: During combat, we saw that the KV tank had a number of weaknesses in its mechanisms: weak main and side clutches, as well as the gearbox, which will not allow us to hook anything to it. It's impossible to attach a 20 ton sled to the KV tank, as it will be unable to pull it. We must reject such a sled. During the assault, tank riders must be protected from submachinegunners, which let the tanks through but open fire at infantry and don't let it move forward. In order to achieve this, the tank needs a small and low (1.2-1.5 meter) armoured trailer that can fit 12-15 men.

A tank brigade needs trailers for the tank rider company, which will need 5-6 trailers. The armour must protect from armour piercing bullets and not shells. My conclusions are thus:
  1. Reject the bulky sleds proposed by factories #592 and #112.
  2. Develop small sleds for tank brigade rider units.
Afonin: Do you think that it's possible to use the hull of a BT tank without a turret or internal components as a trailer?

Titov: The BT tank hull is suitable as a trailer, under the condition that the inside is cleared of mechanisms. There also need to be portholes in the sides for submachineguns and hatches in the sides and the rear.

Assistant to the Commander of the 31st Tank Brigade, Military Engineer 2nd Class Kutukov: The issue of armoured trailers is an important and necessary one. Until now, designers did not think about a number of technical issues. They proposed, and continue to propose, bulky and very heavy trailers that a tank cannot tow.

The KV tank is overloaded, a number of components are weak points. Nothing can be attached to the tank to tow, since it barely propels itself, let alone a 20 ton trailer. I propose that we reject the sleds proposed by factories #592 and #112.

An armoured trailer towed by a tank must have wheels and no turret, with armour that protects from armour piercing bullets, weighing no more than 6 tons.

Commander of the 33rd Tank Brigade, Colonel Chukhin: Tank trailers must consist of light armoured boxes for 15 men on tracks. A firing port must be installed for each rider, so they can fire their submachineguns. This trailer should be made for the T-34 tank or Komsomolets tractor. The trailers proposed by factories #592 and #112 are unsuitable and should be rejected.

Assistant to the Commander of the 33rd Tank Brigade, Major Fadeev: The proposed trailers were poorly designed. They are too heavy to be pulled by a tank. We need to take the BT tank hull with its final drives and use it as a trailer, especially since these hulls are available. These trailers would be useful in urban fighting, where the infantry must be protected from fire from above. The trailer should have side and rear doors, as well as two hatches in the floor.

Military Engineer 2nd Class Frolov: I participated in trials of a sled that was 68 cm tall and fit 6 men. They were taught by a KV tank and loosened by knocking out a wedge from inside the sled. The Auto and Armour Center has such sleds. In the summer, we can weld on carriers to put pipes through that will serve as wheels. An armoured trailer for tank forces is needed.

Technical Assistant of the Commander of the 62nd Tank Brigade, Major Kristin: The proposed trailers are poor, they are bulky and heavy, and must be rejected. The best solution is a BT tank hull with tracks. It must weigh no more than 5 tons. The trailer should have no armament and be towed by a T-34 tank, the KV will not be able to do it.

Senior Military Representative at factory #112, Major Rusakov: We can see that there is a need for a lighter trailer. The most important proposal was the use of the BT tank hull, but it is easily penetrated. If we build a new box, we must build a light one on wheels, without any internal mechanisms.

Conclusions:
  1. The 15-20 ton trailers proposed by factories #592 and #112 are completely unusable, as the KV tank has no weight reserve and the T-34 would be at its limit.
  2. It is desirable to develop a trailer for a T-34 tank that will protect tank riders with the following characteristics:
    1. Mass: 5 tons
    2. Crew: 15
    3. Armour: 13-15 mm
    4. Firing ports:
      1. Sides: 5
      2. Rear: 2
      3. Front: 2
    5. Height: 1.5-1.6 m
    6. Width: same as a tank
    7. Exits: rear, side, floor
    8. Suspension: wheels or tracks
    9. Deployment: from the tank
    10. Tow hook: rear
    11. Visibility: periscopes on the sides, front, and rear
    12. Ground pressure: no more than that of a tank
  3. There will be 5 trailers per tank brigade.
  4. It makes sense to use BT tank hulls without turrets, engine, or transmission, modified to meet the requirements for a trailer.
  5. Include tractors into the tank brigade (one tractor for two trailers) to tow the trailers on the march.
Chief of the 5th Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Afonin
February 28th, 1942"

KV-1S Road Wheels

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"Report on KV-1S Road Wheels

Kirov factory KV-1 tanks used cast road wheels with Г-shaped rims. As a part of the total requirement for weight reduction, the weight of the road wheels would be reduced by changing the shape of the rim. A T-shaped rim was selected, which gave the same robustness at less weight.

Two of the first KV-1S tanks produced at the Kirov factory, #15001 and #15002, with T-shaped road wheel rims, ribs, and round openings in the disks were provided for trials.

During trials at factory #100, tank #15002 traveled 2027 km, and tank #15001 traveled 2025 km. No road wheels were destroyed and no cracks were found. One intact road wheel on tank #15002 was replaced due to a destroyed ball bearing. Currently, both tanks are kept at factory #100. They have traveled additional distances during trials of other components. The road wheels are still intact.

Trials of the tanks finished on September 9th, 1942.

The first mass produced KV-1S tanks were completed by the Kirov factory on August 23rd, 1942. The Kirov factory installed road wheels that were different from the road wheels used on tanks ##15001 and 15002. The disks and rims were thinner, the openings were larger, and had a different shape.

Military QA had to choose: accept no tanks at all, or accept them with the new wheels. A decision was made to test the robustness by striking. The robustness turned out to be sufficient, and the tanks were accepted.

Reliability trials performed at factory #100 in late October to establish the warranty period using KV-1S #15126 showed insufficient mechanical robustness of the accepted road wheels. Over 1007 km of trials, 7 road wheels were lost. The tank was removed from trials on November 4th, 1942.

The Kirov factory's design bureau replaced the road wheels with a reinforced design as a result of these trials. The trials of the replacement road wheels have not been performed yet. I approved the blueprints for the road wheel between October 29th and November 3rd, 1942. These road wheels were installed on tanks from August to December.

Senior Assistant to the Chief of the 6th Department of the GABTU BTU, Engineer-Major Voroshilov.
December 15th, 1942"


Tetrarch Overview

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"Office of the Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the North Caucasian Front
August 9th, 1943

To the GABTU BTU Chief, Engineer-Colonel Afonin

In reply to your inquiry, I report the tactical-technical characteristics of the British MK-7 tank:
  1. Full weight: 8.0 tons
  2. Main dimensions:
    1. Length: 4.0 m
    2. Width: 2.4 m
    3. Height: 2.17 m
    4. Clearance: 0.4 m
  3. Armament:
    1. Cannons: 1, 40 mm
    2. Machineguns: 1 coaxial 7.92 mm (BESA)
    3. Shells: 50
    4. Machinegun rounds: 2025
  4. Armour thickness:
    1. Front: 15 mm
    2. Side: 15 mm
    3. Turret: 15 mm
    4. Roof and floor: 4-6 mm
  5. Number of gears: 4 forward and 1 reverse
  6. Maximum speed on a highway: 60 miles (96 km) per hour.
  7. Average speed on a highway: 30 miles (48 km) per hour
  8. Engine:
    1. Type and power: gasoline, horizontal cylinders, water cooled, 120 hp
    2. Fuel capacity: 150 L
    3. Fuel used: B-70, KB-70
    4. Oil used: MK
  9. Observation devices:
    1. Vision blocks and periscopes: 4
    2. Telescopic sights: 1
  10. Crew: 3
The MK-7 is a light and speedy tank, designed for escorting columns of cars (presumably). The armour is thin and poor in quality, it can be penetrated by fragments of mines. The tank is turned with a steering wheel. The steering wheel is connected to the front wheels by control rods, which break often.

The tank's suspension is equipped with hydraulic shock absorbers. On bad roads they weaken, and if the shock absorber rods break (this has happened), the shock asborbers cannot hold the hull and the road wheels fold in underneath it.

Another design flaw of the MK-7 is the quick wearing down of the 1-2 gears, reverse gear, and final drive gears.

Conclusions:
  1. The MK-7 tank has a high speed due to its comparatively powerful engine (120 hp).
  2. Its weak suspension, gearbox, and final drives mean that it should be used on good (not rocky) roads.
  3. The tank turns poorly, and should only be used on flat terrain where sharp turns can be avoided.
  4. The tank has weak armour (significantly weaker than that of domestic light tanks), which does not protect the crew well.
It is reasonable to use the MK-7 tank to escort convoys when there is a danger of being ambushed by enemy submachinegunners. 

The MK-7 can also be used to pursue and cut off a hurriedly retreating enemy, when his anti-tank defenses are completely upset.

Assistant to the Armoured and Mechanized Commander of the North Caucasian Front, Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Kalinin"

SVT as a Sniper Rifle

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"Description of the issue:

Proving grounds and battlefield tests of self-loading sniper rifles developed by factory #314 based on approved and prototype blueprints revealed unsatisfactory shot groups, and significant deviations of the first and second bullets from the dispersion ellipse.
Both drawbacks are caused by design flaws in the rifle and scope mount.
Attempts by the factory to improve groupings with small design proved fruitless, as reducing dispersion and preventing the 1st and 2nd bullet from deviating too much requires significant changes to the rifle and scope mount.
Since, currently, the 7.62 mm model 1891/30 sniper rifle with the PE scope is being manufactured, and a scope mount for the PU scope for the same rifle is under development, it is reasonable to cease production of 7.62 mm self-loading rifles with the PU scope, provided that proving grounds trials of the model 1891/30 rifle prove satisfactory.

Decisions of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army:
1. Finish trials of the PU scope mount for the model 1891/30 sniper rifle no later than August 20th, 1942.
2. If results are positive, cease production of self-loading sniper rifles starting on September 1st.
3. If the self-loading sniper rifle is removed from production, increase production of model 1891/30 sniper rifles."

Via Andrei Ulanov.

Failed "Laser" Tank

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In the first half of the 20th century, the aircraft industry gathered up all technical and scientific achievements. Airplanes were the first to try out new materials, new engines, equipment, and armament. From time to time, tank designers had the chance to use something that was designed for aviators. The attempt to install the ShKAS aircraft machinegun on Soviet tanks in the mid-1930s was one such occurrence.


History knows many situations where attempts to combine weapons or equipment, initially designed for different branches of the army, ended up producing rather viable results. The 20 mm TNSh gun, inspired by the ShVAK 20 mm aircraft gun and installed in the T-60 tank, is one such example. It was not planned as a land weapon, but ended up in a tank in a very short amount of time.

Any machinegun designed in the USSR during the 1930s was tested for use in tanks, on aircraft, and by infantry. The ShKAS (Shpitalniy-Komaritskiy, Aircraft, Rapid-firing) was no exception. A decision was made to install this 7.62 mm machinegun into a tank. The machinegun, accepted into service in 1932, used a disintegrating metal belt, and was produced in nose, wing, and turret variants. 

ShKAS, wing variant.

Brief characteristics of the ShKAS:
  • Caliber: 7.62 mm
  • Mass: 10.62 kg
  • Rate of fire: 1800 RPM
  • Muzzle velocity: 825 m/s
  • Length from muzzle to charging handle: 935 mm
In 1935, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU), following a request from the Main Automotive-Armoured Directorate (GABTU), worked to design a ShKAS ball mount, alter the machinegun, and install it into a T-37A tank. The result would have been a curious hybrid, a combination of three elements: an amphibious tank with an aircraft machinegun.

In 1936, there were even more plans: AA mounts with the ShKAS were planned for the T-26, T-28, T-29, BT-7, T-35, T-46, the BA-3 armoured car, armoured trains, and the STZ-3 tractor. In addition, it was planned that the ball mount for the DT machinegun in T-28 and T-35 turret would also be replaced by the ShKAS. A new "super-light tank" (no index is given in the document) and standard 45 mm gun turrets (in 1935-36, these would have been cylindrical turrets) with a coaxial ShKAS machinegun. These plans were destined to remain on paper. Trials were postponed until 1937, due to "a lack of funds", and were not revisited on such a grandiose scale.


T-37A small tank at a Kiev Special Military District exercise.

Nevertheless, the ShKAS was installed on the T-37A in time. This was the first mass produced Soviet amphibious tank, based on the experimental T-33, which, in turn, was inspired by the amphibious Vickers-Carden-Loyd M1931. The T-37A was produced in 1933-1936. 2566 vehicles were built before it was replaced by the superior T-38. The tank was crewed by two men, its top speed was 40 kph on a highway, 6 kph in water, and its range was 230 km.

The ShKAS was installed in the turret, replacing the DT, the tank's main armament. The goal of this replacement was improvement of firepower. The tank was built for reconnaissance, and it was presumed that the only combat it would see would be short skirmishes with the enemy, which would need maximum firepower, and therefore a maximum rate of fire.


ShKAS ball mount.

The ShKAS ball mount and cramped dimensions of the T-37A turret allowed it to turn 10°30' to the left and 18° to the right, independent of the turret. The turret itself could rotate 360°.


Aiming the machinegun horizontally, maximum angles.

While the horizontal range was good, the vertical range was much worse. The machinegun could aim between −4° and +22°, which created significant dead zones. It was impossible to shoot at targets too close to the tank, since the machinegun could not depress that far. This meant that enemy infantry could be located right next to the tank without being at risk of being shot by its main gun.

Aiming the machinegun vertically, maximum angles.

There were no issues with sights. The tank was equipped with two of them: an optical "PYa" sight, and a diopter sight, borrowed from the DT mount.

The machinegun was fed from a 750 round box magazine. In addition to that, 2000 rounds were kept in the tank. The full ammunition capacity of the tank totaled 2750 rounds, split into 250 round belts. Three belts were kept in the magazine that fed the machinegun, and 2000 more rounds were kept in box magazines, kept in a special rack of 7. Another box magazine was stored separately.

Ammunition rack.

Ammunition was fed through a flexible metallic sleeve, similar to the aircraft version. This device ensured that the machinegun could fire without stoppages at any horizontal or vertical angle.

The biggest difference from the aircraft version was that, on GABTU's insistence, it was converted to use a cloth belt instead of a disintegrating metal one. The reason for this was simple. It was easier to refill a cloth belt with ammunition, as there was no need to gather up the links again. In addition, there is also the risk of a link jamming something inside the tank. The loading mechanism and receiver were altered to meet this requirement.

Cloth (left) and metallic (right) ammunition belts for the ShKAS machinegun.

The turret was fixed during firing. It could be fixed in 39 different positions. During movement, the turret was locked by an additional travel lock.

Process of replacing a hot ShKAS barrel. All of this had to be done from within a cramped tank turret.

After all that, the ShKAS mount was deemed poor, for a number of reasons: poor vertical aiming angles, poor reliability of the cloth belt, which was sensitive to moisture, swelled up, and tore, as well as caused jams at a high rate of fire. Correcting these stoppages took a lot of the commander's time. The machinegun mount was difficult and uncomfortable enough to use in the cramped T-37A turret as it was. The rate of fire was also deemed excessively high; it was possible to expend all ammunition within 3-5 minutes of battle, even counting the time it took to switch magazines. Finally, the ShKAS needed special ammunition, which could not be provided for both the air force and the tank forces.

Overall view of the T-37A with a ShKAS, 1935.

Imagine a hypothetical nighttime attack of these tanks from water, firing tracer bullets. The effect on enemy morale could be higher than the tank's combat value. 1800 RPM means 30 shots per second, or 30 Hz. The human eye interprets an image as unchanging if it flashes at over 24 Hz. In other words, an illusion would be created that the tank is firing beams. The obsession with science fiction in the 1930s could have made one believe that the enemy was using ray guns, from which there was no escape, and panic would ensue. However, Soviet designers did not rely on that effect.

T-37 and T-38 with ShVAK

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"To OKB-15 director, comrade Shpitalniy

Kaganovich factory (Khabarovsk) plans to arm 400 T-37 and T-38 tanks with a ShVAK gun and a coaxial DT machinegun.

I ask you to take this project under your supervision and urgently send your representatives to the Kaganovich factory.

Consider that, due to the small amount of space in these vehicles, it might be necessary to replace the autocannon's belt feed with a magazine one.

GBTU TU Chief, Engineer-Colonel, Afonin
GBTU TU 4th Department Chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel, Nenarokov"




"To the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Far Eastern Front

To prepare the ShVAK gun on the T-38 tank for combat, I ask you to issue instructions or directions regarding the maintenance of the ShVAK cannon and DT machinegun. The brigade does not have one, and the weapons are not ready for battle.

Chief of Staff of the 77th Tank Brigade, Captain Trazhevnikov
Deputy Chief of Reconnaissance of the 77th Tank Brigade, Captain Zhdanov"


"To the Chief of the GBTU, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Vershinin

To complete the NIBT proving grounds museum, I ask you to ask the Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Far Eastern Front to send the proving grounds one running sample of each of the following tanks:
  • T-26 with a conical turret and conical turret platform
  • BT-7 with a conical turret and small link tracks
  • BT-7 with applique armour
  • BT-7a with 76 mm gun
  • T-38 with ShVAK autocannon
  • Regular T-27
  • Regular T-37
  • Regular T-38
  • An APC on the T-26 chassis
Chief of the NIBT proving grounds, Major General of the Tank Forces, Romanov"

Metamorphoses of an Amphibian Scout

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An unusual modification of the T-38 can be seen in the outdoor display of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This vehicle is distinct from its brothers: instead of one DT machinegun, its turret houses a 20 mm TNSh autocannon and a coaxial DT machinegun. Some Russian historians spread the myth that this tank was experimental. In reality, not only was this not an experimental tank, but these tanks had the chance to fight. This article will cover modifications of T-37 and T-38 amphibious tanks.

Desperate times

The Red Army understood that its amphibious reconnaissance tanks do not fully meet modern requirements in the middle of the 1930s. This became clearer after fighting in Spain. The armour of the T-37 and T-38 only reliably protected from rifle caliber fire at ranges of 400 meters or more, and their DT machinegun was only useful against infantry.

The only advantage of Soviet reconnaissance tanks over armoured cars was superior off-road performance and the ability to cross water obstacles. Realizing this, the GBTU formulated tactical-technical requirements for a new reconnaissance tank, indexed T-39. This tank had improved armour. Later, it transformed into the T-40, which also had improved armament: the 12.7 mm DShK machinegun. This tank was accepted into service on December 19th, 1939, but, for various reasons, only 121 of these tanks were available by June 1st, 1941.

On that date, the Red Army had 2314 T-37 tanks and 1143 T-38 tanks. Like the T-40, they were issued to reconnaissance battalions. From the start of the Great Patriotic War, these tanks often performed the role of infantry support tanks, which they were completely unsuitable for. This must look strange, and even foolish, but, due to enormous losses, any armoured vehicle was worth its weight in gold to the Red Army. The presence of tanks, even these tanks, among infantry bolstered morale.

A number of authors mentions that the idea of applique armour for the T-37 and T-38 came up in July of 1941. Allegedly, it was developed by specialists of the NIIBT proving grounds, a tank with applique armour went through trials, but nothing else happened. For some reason, the NIIBT proving grounds never heard about these experiments. The institute's report for 1941 contains no mention of applique armour. The real story of its appearance is different.

The issue of applique armour for amphibious tanks was raised by the GABTU BTU Chief, Military Engineer 1st Class, N.N. Alamov. Many T-37 and T-38 tanks began piling up at repair factories. His idea was to, instead of simply repairing them, improve their armour and make them into regular land tanks. There was no possibility of improving their armament, as there was barely enough 20 mm ShVAK guns to outfit new T-60 tanks.


The proposal to install applique armour was sent to two people: the Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production, A.A. Goreglyad, and factory #37 Director, G.R. Frezerov. Factory #37 was the developer and producer of the T-37 and T-38 tanks, and Alymov tasked its design bureau with the development of this applique armour. As you can see, none of this matches up with the story where the applique armour for T-37 and T-38 tanks was performed at the NIIBT proving grounds.

The task for factory #37 was approved, and an inquiry regarding progress already arrived on September 30th. According to Frezerov's response, the factory's design bureau was hard at work, in cooperation with repairs base #2, located in Moscow, at 40 Nizhne-Krasnoselskaya St. N.A. Astrov's department specifically was tasked with the development of applique armour.

Calculations showed that the maximum acceptable mass of applique armour for the T-38 was 400-500 kg. As for the T-37, there was great doubt about improving its armour. The tank already suffered from a weak differential, and additional loads could just cause more problems.

Frezerov warned that the factory's design bureau only has time to design applique armour for one tank. Despite concerns about overloading, it was the T-37 that was submitted for trials on October 1st, 1941. The hull received an extra 7 mm of armour on the hull and 6 mm on the turret. Gunnery trials from 50, 100, 150, and 200 meters showed that bullets fired from that distance could penetrate the applique armour, but not the main armour. The commission came to the conclusion that the tank was bulletproof from all distances.


That was not the end. In the middle of November, factory #2 sent in a description of a converted T-37 land tank. The tank lost its buoys, propeller, rotating gunner's seat, and one DT ammunition rack. In return, the tank received additional armour. 6 mm thick armoured plates were installed on the sides, which covered the space from the bogey carriers to the hull rivets. The front and rear of the tank were also covered in applique armour, as did protruding parts of the hull, including the radiator armour. The turret was also completely covered in applique armour.

Aside from applique armour, the document also discusses the issue of rearmament. In the first variant, the tank retained its DT and an ammunition rack for 15 disk magazines. In the second variant, the front of the turret was altered to be similar to that of the T-40. The new turret received a gun mount for a DShK machinegun, and the commander-gunner received a shoulder stock. There was no coaxial DT in this variant, but there was a firing port for it. The DT was held inside the hull. The tank carried 10 boxes with 60 rounds belts for the DShK.

This T-37 weighed 350 more than the stock T-37: the applique armour weighed 400 kg, the DShK and its ammunition weighed 120 kg, and 170 kg of parts were removed. It took 473 man-hours to convert the T-37 into the DShK model, or 316 man-hours for the DT model. Work on armouring the T-38 was not performed due to the strict time limit.

Later, the issue of applique armour for T-37 and T-38 tanks vanished on its own. By the end of 1941, very few of these tanks remained in the army. The T-38s left on the Leningrad Front were needed for amphibious reconnaissance, and did not need extra armour. It is possible that repair factory #2 did have time to convert some tanks. However, this is only a hypothesis, as the author has not seen the factory's correspondence for that period, or photographs of any tanks with applique armour.

Mass rearmament

There are also questions regarding the rearmament of the T-38, which allegedly took place in 1941. The T-37 and T-38 are absent from the list of tanks that needed rearmament in 1941. The NIIBT proving grounds list of experimental work for 1941 also makes no mention of rearmament of the T-38 or applique armour for it.

The claim that two tanks, allegedly called T-38Sh, were present at the NIIBT proving grounds until the end of the war, is baseless. It is known that the NIIBT proving grounds had two T-37 tanks in March of 1942, and had no T-37 or T-38 tanks at all as of August 8th, 1943. These vehicles returned again by June of 1945, but these tanks had regular DT machineguns. The rumours about these so called T-38Sh tanks are based solely on the imagination of their author.


In reality, the first time the issue of rearming reconnaissance tanks was raised was in November of 1941, and the plan then was to use the DShK, not a 20 mm gun. As mentioned above, the process did not go far, and it is not known whether or not even a prototype of the T-37 with a DShK was ever built.

However, it is known when the topic was revisited: in early 1943. The Far Eastern Front had 288 T-37 and 155 T-38 tanks as of July 1st, 1941. A small part of these tanks went westward with Far Eastern units, but the majority remained where they were.

The idea of improving the firepower of these tanks was inspired by the availability of surplus TNSh guns after T-60 production ended. Repair factory #105 in Khabarovsk was tasked with the project, which was called "L.M. Kaganovich State Automotive Repair Factory #105" until 1941. This organization, which continued its work after the war, is known as PAO "Dalenergomash" today.

Mass produced T-38, rearmed at repair factory #105. There are no differences from the regular T-38 except in armament.

On January 15th, a letter from the GBTU (Main Armoured Directorate of the Red Army, created in 1942 after a reorganization of the GABTU) arrived, addressed to OKB-15 director, B.G. Shpitalniy. According to the letter, repair factory #105 received an order for rearmament of 400 T-37 and T-38 tanks. Since there was a danger that the TNSh belt box would not fit into the T-38's turret, a possibility of using a magazine feed was mentioned. The GBTU asked Shpitalniy to send specialists from OKB-15 to Khabarovsk.

A letter sent by the GBTU to the GAU some time later signifies the seriousness with which this project was treated. In it, Alymov asked for 1.5 million rounds of ammunition for tanks that would be rearmed.

The front of the turret had to be altered to install more powerful armament.

Work on rearming the T-37 and T-38 disappeared from the GBTU's radar for some time. This makes the following request by the Chief of the GBTU TU (Technical Directorate), Major-General Afonin, sent on November 27th, 1943, seem rather strange:

"The GBTU TU was informed that the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Far Eastern Front are rearming and equipping their tanks with applique armour. We require information on the amount of work performed.

Please inform the GBTU TU of the following:
1. How many T-37 tanks were reamed with ShVAK guns..."

The gun mantlet was reminiscent of T-30 tanks, equipped with TNSh guns.

Judging by this request, the GBTU simply forgot about the issue of rearming T-37 and T-38 tanks from January to November. In a different place, this could have meant the end of the project, but the Far East was not spoiled by tank supplies that such an important task could be left on its own. Khabarovsk not only adapted the TNSh gun and a coaxial DT machinegun mount for the reconnaissance tank's turret, but put the project into mass production.

Armour of the recoil system from the bottom.

Information from the Far East arrived infrequently, to say the least. Because of this, there is no information about when the design for the installation of the TNSh in the T-37 and T-38 was completed. However, one can say for sure that factory #105 succeeded in this complex task. The new gun increased the mass of the tank by only 100 kg, which allowed it to retain its buoyancy. The repair factory also performed trials, which gave satisfactory results.

Looking into the turret from above.

How many T-37 and T-38 tanks were converted? That question remains unanswered. According to the Assistant Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Colonel Rogachev, 97 T-37 and T-38 tanks were converted by January 1st, 1944. 2 additional T-37s and 11 T-38s were converted in January, and 10 T-38s with new armament were delivered in February. After that, repair factory #105's reports vanish once again. Based on these numbers, we can be certain of at least 120 tanks, but it is possible that there were many more.

There was less space in the turret, but it was convenient enough to work with the new armament.

Fears that the ammunition feed system would have to be redesigned were unfounded. Based on the tank that was preserved at the TsMVS, there were no issues with this. There were also no issues with installation, since the width of the front of the turret of T-37 and T-38 tanks was about the same as that of the T-60. The recoil system armour was also similar to the one used on the T-60. The same could be said for the position of the TNSh gun, DT machinegun, and TMFP-1 sight. As for the gun mantlet, it was closer to the one used on the T-30. 

The TNSh, DT, and sight were positioned in the same way as on the T-60.

The smaller dimensions of the turret were partially compensated by the fact that the amphibious tanks lacked bulky aiming mechanisms. Vertical aiming was performed using a shoulder stock. There was also no turret traverse mechanism: as on the regular T-38, the commander rotated the turret without any flywheels. The ammunition capacity of the DT machinegun was reduced to 1260 rounds (20 disk magazines). The tank carried 4 boxes (240 rounds) for the TNSh in a crate behind the turret.


Vehicles from Far Eastern Front units arrived at the repair factory, and returned there after installation. For instance, the 77th Tank Brigade had rearmed T-38 tanks as of January 1945. There is some doubt about the widespread use of these tanks against the Japanese after August 9th, 1945. Formally, the Far Eastern Front still had 52 T-37 and 325 T-38 tanks as of August 5th, but reconnaissance battalions began phasing them out in June. By the time combat started, the 77th Brigade no longer had any of these tanks.

Theoretically, these tanks also could have been included in the 4th Independent Tank Battalion of the Pacific Fleet, which took part in the landing at Chongjin in Korea. However, documents pertaining to this operation only mention T-26 tanks. It is possible that the battalion no longer had rearmed reconnaissance tanks by the time it saw battle.


There is another mystery in the history of the T-38 with a 20 mm gun, the mystery with which this article began: the origin of the tank in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Fortunately, it can be solved rather easily.

On July 23rd, 1945, a letter was sent to the GBTU Chief, Lieutenant-General Vershinin, from the NIBT proving grounds Chief, Major-General Romanov. In his letter, Romanov asked Vershinin to transfer 9 tanks to his museum, including a T-38 with a ShVAK gun. As you can see, the index T-38Sh was not used in reference to this vehicle. The tank ended up in the NIIBT proving grounds museum, and was passed to the Museum of the Soviet Army in 1965, which is called the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation today.

Even though the vehicle spent a large amount of time outside, it was well preserved. In 2014, a group of volunteers, led by the article's author, restored the tank.

Lend Lease Impressions: Submachineguns

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"11.43 mm Thompson submachinegun M.1928

11.43 mm Thompson submachinegun 

The submachinegun has two types of magazines: 20 round box magazine and 50 round drum magazine.

Significant drawbacks of the Thompson submachinegun include its weight (4.88 kg without a magazine and 7.12 kg with a 50 round magazine) and sensitivity to low temperatures. The 11.43 mm caliber is also high, which limits the amount of ammunition that can be carried (an 11.43 mm round is almost twice as heavy as a domestic submachinegun round).

The following is a comparison of main data of the American Thompson, Reising, German mod. 38 and 40, and our 7.62 mm mod. 1941 submachinegun.

Characteristics
American Thompson submachinegun
American Reising submachinegun
German mod. 38 and 40 submachinegun
7.62 mm mod. 1941 submachinegun
Caliber, mm
11.43
11.43
9
7.62
Length, mm
856
910
835/623*
842
Mass without a magazine, kg
4.88
2.95
3.74
3.5
Magazine capacity
20 or 50
20
32
71
Mass with ammunition, kg
7.12
3.55
4.4
5.4
Maximum range, m
550
274
200
200
Rate of fire, RPM
600
500
400
1000-1100
*Stock extended/stock folded

11.43 Reising submachinegun

11.43 mm Reising submachinegun

Proving grounds trials showed a number of drawbacks, specifically:
  1. Low reliability of various parts (striker, spring, backplate guiding rod).
  2. The magazine is sensitive to dirt.
  3. It is difficult to disassemble.
  4. No spare parts are included.
A significant drawback of the Reising submachinegun is the large caliber, which limits the amount of ammunition carried and makes reloading uncomfortable.

Thompson and Reising submachineguns, supplied by America, are inferior to the domestic and the German submachineguns in maneuver and usage qualities.

To reduce the difficulty of supplying the military with ammunition, and, considering the poor qualities of American submachineguns, the latter will not be issued to the Active Army, and will only be given to rear and auxiliary units. Submachineguns that arrive through Murmansk and Baku will be turned over to the Fronts, as it is difficult to transport them out of there.

Top: M1911 round. Bottom: tracer M1.

11.43 mm pistol rounds had the following issues during trials:
  • Misfire: 6.1%
  • Jammed casing: 2.6%
  • Escaping gases: 0.6%
  • Tough extraction: 0.3%
  • Bullet stuck in gun barrel: 0.2%
An inspection of the exterior of the rounds showed a large number of protruding or sunken primers, as well as looseness. It is also established that the rounds did not come from one batch or one company, but from various years of production (as early as 1934) and companies (4 different companies)."

NKID Political Archive 6-5-348

The ammunition shipped to the USSR with these submachineguns definitely would have soured anyone's first impression.


""ArtKom GAU #12132, Secret

On March 31st, 1942, the shooting range at military base #36 conducted a test of American 11.43 mm pistol rounds, after receiving 3 million such rounds from Murmansk. The tests were conducted by the Senior Assistant of the Chief of the 5th Department of ArtKom GAU KA military engineer 2nd grade Ohotnikov N.S. and Assistant of the Chief of the 5th Department of ArtKom GAU KA military engineer 2nd grade Karagodin G.K., following the program outlined in this document.

The purpose of the tests was to establish the condition of the received rounds. Rounds were taken from 10 crates, 100 rounds each. The results were as follows:

1. External inspection of the rounds

300 rounds were visually inspected. The inspection shows that the rounds have scum on the casings, and dirt in the casing base. Some rounds have a stamp, some do not. Most rounds have primers sticking out, but some have primers sunk in very deeply. 

The bullets are red brass, the casings are yellow brass, but five rounds (1.7%) had a red metallic casing (probably red brass). Most of the cartridges are produced by Remington (with a stamp on the case "REM-UMC.45ACP), but there are others:
  • Western: 6 (2%)
  • WRA Co: 4 (1.4%)
  • FA-34: 2 (0.7%)
  • FA-40: 6 (2%)
  • RA-41: 2 (0.7%)
During visual inspection, the following defects were found:
  • Dented primer: 6 (2%)
  • Ragged primer edges: 40 (13.3%)
  • Impacted primer: 46 (15.3%)
  • Crooked primer: 10 (3.3%)
  • Weakly housed bullet, removable by hand: 1 (0.3%)
  • Total: 103 (34.4%)
II: Testing by firing from a submachinegun

The rounds were fired from a Reising SMG #5073 and Thompson SMG #S-152550. 970 rounds were fired. The following defects were found:
  • Escaping gases (casing ruptured): 6 (0.6%)
  • Tough extraction of the casing: 3 (0.3%)
  • The bullet remains in the barrel (no gunpowder): 2 (0.2%)
  • Misfire (Reising): 59 (6.1%)
  • Misfire (Thompson): 4 (0.4%)
  • Casing stuck on extraction (Reising): 25 (2.6%)
Rounds that failed to fire in the Reising could be fired from the Thompson.

III: Inspection of casings

After firing, 300 casings were examined. The following defects were discovered:
  • Ruptures around primer: 16 (6%)
  • Penetrated primer: 6 (2%)
  • Primer fell out: 2 (0.7%)
Conclusions
  1. 11.43 mm rounds that arrived at Murmansk were produced by various companies, and in various years.
  2. Many rounds have defects, mainly of the primer, which results in escaping gases, rupture of the casing, misfires, poor extraction, and other anomalies.
  3. The received shipment of rounds can only be used after removing 100% of defective items, and even that will not stop escaping gases and bullets getting stuck in the barrel.
"

Via Andrei Ulanov

Dome Turret

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"Red Armyman A.A. Pimenov
Senior Lieutenant E.F. Polushkin
2nd Independent Training Automotive Regiment, Gorkiy

To the People's Commissar of Defense, comrade Stalin

Keeping in mind the important role of armoured vehicles in modern armies, with all due respect to high quality tanks used by our Red Army, which successfully smashes our enemies, the fact that the superiority of our equipment is only relative.

Inspired by our duty to tirelessly serve our Motherland, we, Senior Lieutenant Polushkin and Red Armyman Pimenov, based on our experience in the Patriotic war, tasked ourselves with contributing suggestions to the undertaking of the great Soviet people and their allies in the fight against the dark forces of fascist aggression. 

Our observations show that, despite all of their advantages, our tanks, including heavy KV tanks, suffer from the drawbacks of turret design.

The drawbacks are as follows:
  1. Turrets can be jammed.
  2. They are vulnerable to shells when hit directly.
  3. They can be torn off with explosives.
  4. They do not have sufficient mobility, the quality that allows most effective use of the turret weapons.
In an attempt to rid the tank of these drawbacks, we came to the idea of creating a special tank, which could be called a sphere tank for its shape, but since its production would require significant restructuring of tank production, we settled on improving the turret alone, modification of which should not impact tank production.

The simplicity and other advantages of our design are so obvious and convincing, that we do not include technical calculations, limiting ourselves to our abilities.

In the attached description of the spherical turret, its advantages are outlined, but this is not the complete list. We can also add such advantages as the reduction of height, complete prevention of jamming, and increased protection from shockwaves, which protect the turret from being torn off.

In conclusion, let us add, comrade People's Commissar, that we serve the Soviet Union, and you, our chief, with all that we can serve, with all that we have, with all that we can achieve with our skill.

Believe the sincerity and passion of our Motherland's patriots, thoughts, wishes, and actions, aimed at protection of the Fatherland and defeat of the enemy, believe like we do, in our Party's mission, in Communists, in the mission of the great Lenin, in yourself, and in your leadership.

In our sincere aim to serve the greater good, we are not afraid to show our strengths and our weaknesses. Only these emotions and beliefs directed us in our message to you.

Attachments:
  1. Description
  2. Diagrams on 2 pages


Demolition Tanks

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"April 5th, 1941

Tactical-technical characteristics for design and production of an explosive delivery and deployment device for the T-34
  1. The explosive delivery and deployment device for the T-34 tank is designed to demolish various bunker type fortifications, which can only be approached under the protection of armour, and destruction of anti-tank fortifications.
  2. The explosive delivery and deployment device must be removable and suitable for installation on a mass production tank, by field workshops if necessary.The following changes are allowed by the GABTU, on the condition that they do not impede the tank's function:
    1. Attachment or welding of lugs on the inside or outside of the tank hull, in locations where they do not impede service.
      The size of lugs can be no more than 150x150 mm, with no more than 1-2 lugs per square meter of hull. The form of the lug can be oval or square with truncated corners. The lugs can be attached with shellproof blunt bolts. The lugs must be welded according to standards, with austenite electrodes. The distance between two parallel weld seams must be no less than 100 mm.
    2. Drilling of holes up to 35 mm in diameter. The number of holes can be up to 1-2 per square meter of hull, with no less than 200-250 mm between holes.
      When the device is not installed, the holes must be covered with caps, equivalent in resistance to the hull, which come standard with the device.
      When designing the hull, the first aim must be to retain the hull as is (use existing openings), then to use lugs whenever possible.
  3. The explosives and fuse must be protected with armour during transport, equivalent to the tank's main armour in protection.
  4. The mass of explosives required to demolish a bunker is 300 kg. 
    It must be possible to transport and deploy smaller charges, 50 kg each, designed to destroy dugouts, anti-tank fortifications (ditches, etc), and log barricades. The number of charges carried is 4-5.
  5. The shape, attachment, and delivery conditions must ensure that the explosive charge ends up right next to the wall of the bunker in the optimal position.
    When blasting openings in anti-tank ditches, the device must allow placement of charges on the ground one meter away from the edge of the ditch.
    It must be possible to place a charge on a 45 degree slope, up to one meter in height.
  6. Controlling the deployment of the charge must be done by one person, from inside the tank.
  7. The position of the device and charges on the tank must not impede observation or firing from the tank, and must not reduce the tank's maneuverability.
  8. The charge's armoured cover must remain on the tank after deployment.
  9. The fuse must go off as soon as the charge is deployed. The charge will detonate five minutes after deployment.
    It must be possible to increase the fuse length to 7 and 10 minutes. The timer will be set when the charge is loaded.
  10. The fuse must be simple in design, reliable, and produced from available components.
  11. Working with the charges and fuses during installation and removal must be safe for personnel with average training.
  12. The addition of the device must not make servicing the tank (fueling, oiling, etc), entering the tank, or driving the tank more difficult.
  13. The tank's crew must be able to install the explosive charges and armoured cover on the tank with the aid of simple equipment, designed for this purpose, which will be included with the device.
  14. The total mass of the explosive charge, armour, and device must not exceed 1000 kg.
  15. It must be possible to transport the charge inside the tank and still be able to place it on the target.
These tactical-technical requirements serve as the foundation of design and production of the prototype. Designers are allowed to make changes that improve the function of the device, but only with the permission of the GABTU. Tactical-technical characteristics are subject to review and approval when the design is presented.

Chief of the 3rd Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Afonin
Chief of the 6th Section of the 3rd Department of the BTU, Major Kovalev"


Similar requirements were composed for the KV-1 tank, except the KV's device would carry 600 kg of explosives (or 8-10 50 kg charges), and its mass was limited to 1600 kg.

SMG Showdown

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In December of 1941, the Soviets decided to test a bunch of SMGs. The SMGs were as follows:
"Model 1940" (PPD)
"Model 1941" (PPSh)
Suomi
Bergman BMP-34 #260
Schmeisser 18/28 #77598
Neuhausen
(They also had something called an Esti, but no ammunition for it).


"Firing of the Esti submachinegun was not performed, due to a lack of ammunition for it. 

The results of trials are attached in table 5. Average results are summarized in the following table.

Name
Type of fire
Spread
Group center offset
R100
R50
Horizontal
Vertical
Mod. 1940
Single
24.4
8.1
+17.0
+6.2
Burst
62.0
24.8
+29.8
+2.8
Mod. 1941
Single
17.2
7.0
+16.5
-3.5
Burst
37.4
15.7
+24.3
-2.2
Suomi
Single
17.4
7.0
+12.5
+12.6
Burst
36.3
11.5
+21.0
+2.3
Bergmann BMP-34
Single
16.4
5.9
+13.4
+11.7
Burst
22.9
14.2
+16.6
+4.0
Schmeisser 18/28
Single
20.9
8.5
-13.6
-1.5
Burst
41.3
13.9
-8.8
+0.3
Neuhausen
Single
14.3
6.1
+36.9
+7.7
Burst
21.8
7.1
+25.5
+9.0

The data shows that the best precision, either when shooting in bursts or in single fire, is achieved by the Neuhausen submachinegun.
The worst precision results were achieved by the model 1940 submachinegun."

Via Andrei Ulanov.

Big Dreams, Small Chassis

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Despite the difficulty with which the Soviet T-40 amphibious reconnaissance tank entered production, designers considered the platform quite promising. The T-40 chassis would be used to produce the GAZ-22 artillery tractor, which would eventually replace the Komsomolets. The fact that the T-40 was also seen as an SPG platform was less well known. Most of the designs remained on paper, but at least one was produced in a small batch.

Small tank destroyer

Designers didn't think much about the T-40 until the summer of 1941. Work on the vehicle headed in two directions: improvement of its armament and design of the GAZ-22 tractor. Both projects reached the practical implementation stage, but it is hard to call the results impressive.

The 23 mm PT-23TB SPG (Tank Gun, 23 mm, Taubin-Baburin), designed by OKB-16, was worked on until May of 1941, when Taubin and Baburin were arrested. This happened, in part, due to their own machinations around this gun, which was installed in the T-40, then removed, and sent to be used on the OKB-50 aerosan. However, it did not perform on the aerosan either, since the gun itself was faulty.

Trials of the GAZ-22 showed that the GAZ-11 engine used in the tank is too weak for this role. A proposal was made to replace it with a more appropriate engine, for example the ZIS-16 (turbocharged version of the ZIS-5 truck engine).

Meanwhile, the waves made by the alleged presence of heavy tanks in the German army reached light tanks. Work began on the development of tank destroyers based on both obsolete light tanks (T-26, BT) and the T-50, production of which was just getting started.

On June 9th, 1941, a meeting was held with representatives of the GABTU and GAU. The Chief of the 3rd Department of the GABTU BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class S.A. Afonin, presented his report. Afonin proposed considering the BT-5, T-26, T-50, and the modified STZ-5 tractor as a chassis for a tank destroyer armed with a 57 mm ZIS-2 gun.

The T-26 and BT-5 were rejected outright, since their use would mean low ammunition capacity and an overloaded chassis. The T-50 was seen as the most promising option. As for the STZ-5, it was unsuitable for the task for a wide number of reasons, even though it was quite possible to build an SPG on its chassis

Unexpectedly, a proposal was made to design an SPG using components of the T-40 tank. Even though this was only a proposal, this meeting can be considered the starting point in the history of the SU-76.

The issue of installing a 25 mm AA autocannon in the the T-40 was also raised, but work did not move past the proposal stage. It turned out to be much easier to place the AA gun on a truck bed.

ShIT-72 SPG design, armed with the 25 mm 72-K AA autocannon.

The T-50 had priority in the 57 mm tank destroyer project. On May 27th, 1941, tactical-technical requirements for a "57 mm self propelled anti-tank gun on the T-50 platform" were approved. According to correspondence of factory #174, this vehicle would be indexed SU-51.

However, work did not move past composition of requirements. The start of the Great Patriotic War put an end to any plans for this SPG. The T-40 was also forgotten as a potential SPG chassis. In addition, according to a Council of Commissars (SNK) decree, issued on June 25th, 1941, factory #37 would cease production of T-20 "Komsomolets" tractors and T-40 tanks by August 1st, 1941. Instead, the factory would begin producing T-50 tanks within two months.

By mid-July, a letter was sent to Stalin, bearing the signatures of designer N.A. Astrov and military representative of factory #37, V.P. Okunev. They made their case for why production of the T-50 at factory #37 was a mistake, and proposed production of a land tank on the T-40 chassis instead. Stalin supported the idea, and GKO decree #179ss "On the production of light T-60 tanks at factory #37" was issued on July 17th, 1941. The T-40 chassis returned as a prospective platform for self propelled artillery.

The same vehicle from the front.

Let's make a pause to explain the structure of the design bureau at factory #37. It carried the name "Department 22" or "22nd Department", and a part of it was called KB-1, headed by N.A. Astrov. This KB designed the T-40, T-30, and T-60 tanks. However, G.S. Surenyan was in charge of Department 22 overall. Astrov, the manager of KB-1, was the deputy manager of Department 22, Surenyan's deputy.

Because of a misunderstanding, some researchers write that Astrov replaced Surenyan at the head of Department 22, but that is not the case. Surenyan kept his post in the fall of 1941, after the evacuation of the factory to Sverdlovsk, and until the spring of 1942. While Astrov concentrated on preparing the T-30 and T-60 for production, Surenyan was concerned with other issues, no less important. For example, he took an active role in the modernization of the small amphibious T-38 tank

ShIT-37 SPG, equipped with the 61-K 37 mm AA autocannon.

In the summer of 1941, Surenyan began to develop an SPG on the T-40 chassis on his own initiative. His project, or rather, projects, took final form by late August. On August 27th, he sent an explanatory memo and drafts of an assault-tank destroyer vehicle: ShIT.

Don't think that Surenyan worked on these projects out of boredom. Similar initiative popped up frequently during the difficult early period of the Great Patriotic War. Recall that the T-30 itself was designed on personal initiative. Most of these projects remained on paper, but a few reached mass production. Surenyan's motives are made clear in his explanatory memo:

"The main components of the vehicle, such as the transmission (main clutch, side clutches, final drives) suspension, the engine and cooling equipment, are all borrowed from the T-40 tank. All aforementioned parts are finalized and carefully brought to a condition suitable for mass production (there is full technical documentation available). 
The GAZ-202 engine used in the vehicle is fast, light, reliable in a tank, and is in mass production at the Gorkiy Automotive Factory.
Elements of the T-26 and T-50 tanks (for the 45 mm gun) can be used in the vehicle.
The armoured hull of the vehicle is as simplified as possible, and does not need significant processing. The armoured parts only need to be cut up and welded. Given a small setup for thermal treatment of armoured parts, hulls can be produced at any boiler factory. Processing of all parts can be done on medium type equipment. Types of steel used in the vehicle don't have expensive or rare additives.
...
Production of these tanks would go far to quickly supply the front with well armoured and well armed vehicles. The vehicle fully covers this requirement, and is very light. In combination with other vehicles, they can successfully defeat the enemy.
All variants, due to their small size, are easily camouflaged, difficult to hit, and can be easily transported by trucks. 
I attach overall schematics and ask for your permission and cooperation in building such a vehicle. Experimental prototypes can be ready within a month. I think that mass production of these vehicles should be organized immediately."

The ShIT concept envisioned a vehicle with minimal dimensions, which had shell-proof armour and armament capable of defeating modern tanks. It had to use the T-40 chassis. The minimized size of the SPG can be seen from the fact that the largest of the family would only have a 3200 mm long hull. To compare, the hull of the initial vehicle, the T-40, was 4110 mm long.

In all presented variants of the vehicle, the engine was located in the rear. Components were placed as tightly together as possible.

A larger artillery system forced Surenyan to make the casemate larger and not slope the sides.

The lightest and most weakly armed was the ShIT-72 SPG. Its designation came from its armament: the 25 mm mod. 1940 AA gun, 72-K. Even though this was an AA gun, it could effectively combat light ground vehicles. The small size of the vehicle limited the ammunition capacity to only 100 rounds. However, the PzII, which also had a cannon with AA roots, also had a small ammunition capacity, only 120 shells.

At a weight of 5400 kg, the ShIT-72 would have 60 mm of front armour, 45 mm on the sides, 30 mm in the rear, and a 10 mm thick roof. Not every medium tank could brag about having this much armour. According to calculations, the mobility of the ShIT-72 remained at the level of the T-40.

The second SPG with an AA gun was larger and heavier. It was called ShIT-37, and it was armed with a 37 mm mod. 1939 AA autocannon, also known as ZIS-37, also known as 61-K. The amount of ammunition carried was the same: 100 rounds.

To fit into the vehicle, it was mounted upside-down. The larger gun meant that the height of the hull had to be raised from 1350 mm to 1520 mm. The mass of the vehicle increased to 5800 kg. The armour was the same as on the ShIT-72. Surenyan claimed that the increased mass would not significantly affect the mobility. As for firepower, the 61-K's characteristics were, at the very least, equal to that of the 45 mm anti-tank gun, and it could successfully be used against German tanks of the period.

ShIT-45. The dotted line indicates the dimensions of the T-40 tank, for comparison.

Finally, the heaviest variant was the ShIT-45, armed with the 45 mm anti-tank gun. The dimensions of this SPG were the same as those of the ShIT-45, but, due to the heavier gun and ammunition, the mass increased to 6 tons. In order to keep under that limit and retain mobility of the T-40, the front armour was reduced to 45 mm.

The GABTU did not approve of Surenyan's ideas. on September 24th, 1941, a conclusions was prepared, and it was not positive for the "assault-tank destroyer". The military did not like the overly dense layout, which would have limited crew comfort and reload speed. The overhang of the armament was also received poorly, as it would limit the mobility of the vehicle when driving in the forests and on uneven terrain. It would increase pressure on the front road wheels, which would speed up wear.

Table of characteristics of various German and Soviet vehicles, as well as "assault-tank destroyers".
Type, mass, length, width, height, clearance, gun caliber, # heavy machineguns, # light machineguns, maximum armour thickness, engine power, hp/ton, top speed, maximum grade, ground pressure.

Despite such a short and unfortunate history, the assault-tank destroyer became the first SPG on a light tank chassis that was designed during the war. Surenyan returned to the idea of converting light tanks into SPGs, but these were already vehicles on the T-60 chassis. Later, Surenyan's concept of a light tank chassis with a forward fighting compartment was proposed many times by other designers.

Chassis for Katyushas

The idea of using a T-40 chassis for combat vehicles returned in September of 1941. This time, as strange as it sounds, it was connected with rocket launchers.

Initially, the M-13 and M-8 rocket launchers were mounted on ZIS-6 three-axle trucks. Often, the replacement of the chassis is explained by cessation of production of the ZIS-6 and evacuation of the Stalin factory, but that is not the case. Yes, production of the ZIS-6 ended, but it was possible to install the rocket launchers on trucks that were already produced. This is what happened with ZIS-30 tank destroyers, which used the Komsomolets chassis. Production ended on August 1st, 1941, but installation of anti-tank guns began in September.

The real issue was different. Information about issues with the ZIS-6 chassis began coming in August of 1941. Compared to the stock vehicle, the mass of the rocket launcher grew by several tons, which impacted the vehicle's performance on dirt roads.

To solve this issue, the design bureau of the Compressor factory in Moscow designed M-13 launchers for the STZ-5 tractor, ZIS-42 halftrack, and T-40 tank. The latter was, effectively, the T-30 tank, since that is what the T-40 was called as of August 31st, 1940. According to factory #37's report, four T-30 tanks without turrets were sent to the Compressor factory. Three more followed on the 19th. According to shipments, the use of the T-30 chassis was already decided at this point.

On September 14th, 1941, an experimental prototype of the "M-13 launcher on the T-60 chassis" was sent to comparative trials. Don't let the index fool you: the prototype used a chassis that was completely identical to that of the T-40, with the exception of amphibious equipment. M-13 launchers on the T-30 and STZ-5 were declared favourites after the trials. However, the low clearance made itself known: with mobility comparable to that of the ZIS-42, the M-13 on the T-30 chassis had great difficulty in driving over swamps.

Strangely enough, the military chose the ZIS-42 chassis after the trials. However, another important factor got in the way. The chassis was the most vulnerable from a production standpoint, since it had not entered mass production yet. The STZ-5 chassis won out: it was not as quick, but was available in sufficient numbers. 

The M-13 launcher on the STZ-5 chassis, factory index KS-75, was accepted into service with the RKKA by GKO decree #726ss on September 30th, 1941. According to plans, the first vehicles of this type would be delivered in mid-October of 1941.

This was the reason why rocket launchers were no longer installed on ZIS-6 trucks.

Of course, that did not mean that the T-30 chassis would not be used for other tasks. On September 27th, trials of M-8 rocket launchers on the T-30 chassis began at the Sofrino proving grounds. This vehicle, factory index KS-77, was also designed at the Compressor factory. The M-8 launcher changed along with its chassis: the rails were lengthened to 2 meters, and their number decreased to 12. One burst now consisted of 24 RS-82 rockets, instead of 36.

The T-30 chassis received a new turret platform roof. The turret was replaced by the M-8 launcher, which could be aimed horizontally, as well as vertically. Unlike the ZIS-6 mounted launcher, the T-30 was stable enough to fire without additional trails, which shortened the time needed to set up for firing.


The only available image of the M-8 launcher on the T-30 chassis.

Two vehicles took part in trials, with the only difference being in the design of the rails. The first one had box rails, which were attached to a frame. The design used engineer Gorelik's flip-up explosive gears. The second had girder-shaped rails (like on the M-13), and its explosive gears were designed at NII-3.

The rails and explosive gears of the second vehicle turned out to be low quality, which impacted the trials. Out of 24 charges, only 17 worked during the launch, whereas only one charge failed to go off on the first variant. During precision trials, the situation was reversed: due to electrical problems, the first variant could only fire two times. The second one fired twice more.

The conclusions of the trials were that both variants were equivalent, but the second was put into production. The same GKO decree accepted this vehicle and the M-13 on the STZ-5 into service.

According to GKO decree #726, the first regiment armed with M-8 launchers on the T-30 chassis would be formed by October 15th, 1941. 72 vehicles would be produced in October. In reality, the situation progressed differently. In October, factory #37 managed to deliver only 14 T-30 chassis. GKO decree #752ss "On the evacuation of factories #37, KIM, Podolsk, and the Kolomna factory tank plant". The Kompressor factory only received 21 chassis in total, including those sent for experimental work.

It is worth mentioning the production version of the M-8 on the T-30 chassis differed from the experimental vehicles. A cabin for the commander, also the operator of the launcher, was added to the left of the launcher. The Podolsk Ordzhonikidze factory was supposed to install them, but, due to the factory being overloaded with work, the process dragged on. Eventually, Compressor was tasked with the production of the cabins as well.

As of October 10th, 1941, 15 vehicles were in the process of assembly. As a result of delays with several components, only three M-8s were delivered by November 1st. Later, 10 M-8s on the T-40 chassis appear in documents of the milling machine factory in Gorkiy. Don't let this information confuse you: this is where the T-60 chassis produced by the Molotov GAZ factory ended up.

As for Compressor, it moved on to producing M-13 launchers on the STZ-5 chassis. In the factory's reports for January, two more M-8 launchers on the T-60 chassis are mentioned. It's possible that these were two T-40s. One can confidently talk of three experimental and between three and five production vehicles. Aside from a drawing and some correspondence, no information remains.

45 with a Long Nose

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The history of this anti-tank gun began with work done on personal initiative in December of 1941. Before mass production and service on the front lines, the gun, indexed M-42, defeated several similar weapons in trials, including some that were easier to produce, and became the main 45 mm gun of the Red Army.


NKVD design bureaus, staffed by imprisoned engineers and designers, existed at several Soviet factories during the pre-war and wartime years. Molotov factory #172, located in the Motovilikha suburb of Molotov (modern day Perm), was no exception.

45 mm mod. 1942 gun M-42 in battle.

In early 1942, a portion of the staff of the Special Technical Bureau of the Leningrad oblast UNKVD was used to form the Special Bureau of the 4th Special Department of the NKVD at factory #172 (OKB-172 NKV USSR). N.A. Ivanov became the chief of OKB-172, and M.Yu. Tsiryulnikov became the technical supervisor. Before his arrest, Tsiryulnikov was the military representative of the GAU at factory #8, where the 45 mm mod. 1937 anti-tank gun was designed.

Welcome initiative

In late 1941, workers of the future OKB-172 worked on improving the characteristics of the 45 mm mod. 1932 19-K anti-tank gun (pre-war GAU index P-2243). 

The goal was to improve penetration while retaining the existing round. This was to be done by raising the muzzle velocity from 760 m/s to 920 m/s. Muzzle velocity could be increased simply by loading more gunpowder, but that was impossible the the current barrel. An idea was pitched to install a new barrel with different ballistics onto the same mount. This would make it possible to quickly modernize all 45 mm guns in the field, and continue to use existing ammunition, replacing it with supercharged ammunition in the future.

By February 5th, 1942, the design of the new gun, called M-42 (45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942, GAU wartime index 52-P-243S) was finished, and presented to the management of factory #172, who approved it. All components of the 19-K would be preserved. The barrel was lengthened by 27.5 calibers, and the gunpowder charge was increased from 360 g to 395 g. In order to retain balance, the longer barrel was moved back by 150 mm, and was equipped with a heavier breech. In order for the semiautomatic mechanism to keep working with the new barrel, the mechanism's rod was lengthened, and the loop that joined the handle and rod was altered. The production of the barrel was meant to be as simple as possible. In addition to a new barrel, the M-42 had a new gun shield, thickened to 7 mm.

Blueprint of the modernized gun.

A meeting of the GAU Artillery Committee was held at the end of January of 1942 on the topic of further development of anti-tank artillery in the Red Army. As a result of the meeting, new tactical-technical requirements for the new 45 mm gun were composed. These requirements were distributed to anti-tank gun factories and design bureaus on February 4th, 1942. OKB-172 received a copy on February 13th, 1942. They suddenly remembered their initiative, not a moment too late.

On February 18th, 1942, an explanatory memo was composed on the modernization of the 45 mm gun, with calculations for the new barrel and its production, signed by OKB-172 chief Ivanov. At the same time, the factory's design bureau developed their own 45 mm gun, the M-6, which had a new simplified mount and a new barrel.

M-42 gun barrel blueprint.

On February 24th, GAU representatives at factory #172 informed the chairman of the Artillery Committee, Major-General of Artillery V.I. Hohlov, of work regarding modernization at factory #172's design bureau and OKB-172. The report mentioned that:

"...factory trials of the NKVD OKB variant are scheduled for March 10th of this year. ... The latter variant solves the issue of increasing the gun's power more quickly... The issues of increasing the power of the system and simplifying it are both solved by accepting the factory's mount and NKVD OKB's barrel. I ask for relevant instructions and a schedule of the factory trials."

On February 25th, the chief of OKB-172 wrote to the director of factory #172, A.I. Bykhovskiy, and GAU Senior Military Representative at factory #172, Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Abramov, on the issue of the modernization of the 45 mm gun, highlighting the advantages of his variant of modernization, backed by calculations:

"Calculations prove that the mount of the 45 mm 2243A anti-tank gun allows the increase of the muzzle velocity from 760 to 900-920 m/s by simple replacement of the barrel, without needing a muzzle brake, without overloading. The calculations regarding the modernization of the 45 mm gun presented by the Special Bureau disperse all doubt and prove that the gun can be effectively modernized quite simply..."

Finally, Ivanov pointed out that the modernization surpasses the tactical-technical requirements, and can be performed very quickly. Indeed, the experimental prototype of the M-42 was built by factory #172 by March 14th, after which it went through tuning at OKB-172.

M-42 gun before factory trials.

Factory trials, consisting of towing and firing, took place from March 16th to 26th. At the same time, some components were fine-tuned for required performance and overall system reliability. The M-42 passed factory trials, in accordance with GAU requirements, and was allowed to take part in proving grounds trials.

The new "forty-fiver" goes into production

Government trials finished in early May of 1942. They included firing, barrel lifetime testing, and other parts. Due to increased pressure, the barrel lifetime was 1500 rounds, and the return spring lifespan dropped. Government trials established the ballistic qualities of the barrel: the muzzle velocity of armour piercing and high explosive shells was 885 m/s and 335 m/s respectively. Peak pressure in the barrel while firing armour piercing rounds was no greater than 2900 kg/cm². 

Trials at a range of 500 meters, firing at armour with the robustness coefficient K=2400, was 59 mm at 90 degrees and 48 at 60 degrees. For the 53-K, these values were 43 mm and 35 mm, respectively. 

Testing of the possibility of using the M-42's round in a stock 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 and a unified high explosive round for both guns were also proposed. The government commission's decision as a result of the trials was as follows: accept the modernized 45 mm gun into service with the Red Army, giving it the name "45 mm anti-tank gun model 1942", and begin mass production at Molotov factory #172 and factory #235.

M-42 gun breech.

Blueprints and technologies for mass production had to be worked out by June 1st, 1942. The GAU Artillery Committee had five days to approve the blueprints from factory #172. OKB-172 worked quickly, delivering the project, required blueprints, and all documentation in short time.

However, some members of the commission had a different opinion, partially caused by the state of the competitor, the M-6, which was voiced by the Chairman of the NKV Technical Council, E.A. Satel:

"Since the production schedule at factory #172 will only be ready by May 5-6th, I propose to only produce a trial batch of M-42 guns at factory #172. The size of the trial batch will be established after the factory presents production calculations."

On April 30th, 1942, before government trials were finished, the Red Army Chief of Artillery, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov, reported to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, I.V. Stalin, regarding the need for acceptance of a modernized 45 mm gun into service. A draft of a GKO decree was attached along with the letter, which instructed the People's Commissariat of Armament to begin production of these guns at factories #172 and #235 immediately, building 100 of each gun in May, at the cost of model 1937 guns.

Lower part of the breech.

On May 15th, a letter from Voronov arrived, addressed to the Deputy Chair of the Council of Commissars, L.P. Beria. He reported on the work performed by the Special Bureau of the 4th Special Department of the NKVD on the modernization of the anti-tank gun, the report to Stalin, and the draft GKO decree. He also asked for cooperation in launching the production of the modernized anti-tank guns as soon as possible.

After comparative trials with the M-6 45 mm gun, the M-42 was put into mass production, and a trial batch was sent into the army for field trials.

Kalinin factory gun

A new competitor for the M-42 appeared. This was a design of the Kalinin factory #8, located near Moscow: the ZIK-4 high power anti-tank gun.

In mid-July of 1942, the GAU Artillery Committee received a technical project for a new high power anti-tank gun. The project's goal was to design an anti-tank gun that was as simple as possible to produce, while maintaining and improving the combat parameters of the 53-K gun.

Thanks to the special design of the axle and trails, the ZIK-4 didn't have a lower mount. A welded pipe-like axle was used instead. The axle also contained the suspension elements. The design of the trail joints let the gun balance itself on any terrain.

Overall blueprints of the ZIK-4 gun.

The ZIK-4 had no sector gears or worm gears, and the trigger mechanism, cradle, breech, case, etc. used stamping bending, welding, and casting as much as possible. The ZIK-4 used half as many parts as the 53-K. 190 tool-hours were needed to produce a ZIK-4, compared to 450 for the 53-K and 250 for the M-6. The barrel was also radically simplified when compared to the 53-K.

Using the stock ammunition from the 53-K, the muzzle velocity of an armour piercing shell was 812 m/s (compared to 760 m/s of the mod. 1937 gun). The supercharged round from the M-42 raised that to 844 m/s. However, the Artillery Committee's conclusion, issued on August 21st, 1942, was negative.

"Considering that the ZIK-4 system is inferior to the M-42, which is already entering production, ballistically, and the simplicity of the ZIK-4 is only slightly greater than that of the M-6, and still requires work on production of a prototype, trials, and organization of new production, the 2nd Department of the Artkom considers that work on the ZIK-4 is fruitless, and that all efforts should be aimed at the production of the M-42..."

However, the project was not discarded completely.

"We consider it reasonable to borrow the breech and semiautomatic mechanism design from the ZIK-4, and apply it to the M-6 system. Install the aforementioned components on the M-6 and perform trials."

Conclusions

The M-42 suffered from "growing pains". For instance, the casing sometimes failed to extract when shooting with the stock 53-K rounds. This defect was resolved by altering the design of the breech. There were also attempts to use box-shaped trails, but this design showed itself poorly, and was not put into production. The only novelty that was introduced was the use of wheels without spokes, using a whole stamped disk.

The M-42, the easiest solution to improving the power of the 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937, was better than several other guns, which were simpler to produce. In the end, it was the last Soviet "forty-fiver". It remained in production until the end of the war, and almost 11,000 units were made. The project supervisor, M.Yu. Tsiryulnikov, received an amnesty from Stalin on Beria's request, and had his criminal record cleared on July 18th, 1943.

M-42 gun with metallic wheels on the streets of Berlin. April 1945.

Main characteristics of the 45 mm anti-tank gun M-42 mod. 1942:
  • Muzzle velocity of the supercharged HE round: 335 m/s
  • Muzzle velocity of the supercharged AP round: 885 m/s
  • Muzzle velocity of the regular AP round: 826 m/s
  • Maximum range of the HE shell: 4670 m
  • Barrel length in calibers: 69
  • Number of rifling grooves: 16
  • Type of rifling: constant at 7°9'45
  • Depth of grooves: 0.5 mm
  • Width of grooves: 6.5 mm
  • Width of rifling land: 2.5 mm
  • Vertical arc: -5 to +20°
  • Horizontal arc: 60°
  • Bore axis height: 711 mm
  • Maximum length: 5043 mm
  • Wheel base: 1400 mm
  • Mass (combat): 570 kg
  • Barrel length: 3087 mm/68.8 calibers
  • System length: 4885 mm
  • Rifled barrel length: 2665 mm
  • Mass of the barrel and semiautomatic mechanisms: 167 kg
  • Oscillating part mass: 222 kg
  • Recoil elements mass: 175 kg
  • Recoil length: 650-700 mm


Lend Lease Impressions: 37 mm M3 Anti-Tank Gun

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37 mm M3 Anti-Tank Gun

"37 mm M3 Anti-Tank Gun

The gun has a vertical sliding breech without a semiautomatic mechanism. The mount has split trails, and the wheels can elevate above the ground in battle position. The wheels are equipped with pneumatic tires. The suspension is rigid. 

The following is a table of the main characteristics of the American and German 37 mm guns, as well as our 45 mm mod. 1937 gun.

Characteristic
American 37 mm anti-tank gun M3
German 37 mm anti-tank gun
45 mm mod. 1937 anti-tank gun
Caliber, mm
37
37
45
Barrel length, calibers
56.6
45
46
Mass of an armour piercing shell, kg
0.871
0.68
1.43
Muzzle velocity, m/s
790
745
760
Mass of the system in battle position, kg
405
440
520
Metal usage coefficient
69
44
81
Calculated penetration of K=2400 armour at 60 degrees



100 m
40
31
46
300 m
34
26
43
500 m
30
22
39
1000 m
21
14
32

The table shows that the 37 mm American M3 gun is superior to the German gun in penetration, but is inferior to the 45 mm gun, and is insufficiently powerful for fighting modern tanks.

The breech of the American gun does not have a semiautomatic mechanism, which means its rate of fire is lower than our 45 mm gun. The shield is small and does not fully protect the crew. The lack of suspension makes the gun fragile when travelling.

Overall, the American 37 mm M3 anti-tank gun does not meet the tactical-technical requirements of a modern anti-tank gun.

It is worth noting that, even before the war between Germany and the USSR, the Americans considered their 37 mm gun ill-suited for the role of a modern anti-tank gun, and, due to a lack of other suitable guns, used model 1897 guns to equip anti-tank batteries of infantry divisions. Currently, the Americans produce 57 mm guns, identical to British guns of the same caliber.

In total, 35 American 37 mm guns arrived. They are stored in a warehouse and have not been issued. Further purchase of these guns is unreasonable.

Fig. 16: Armour piercing M51 shell for 37 mm M3 and M5 guns.
Fig. 17: High explosive fragmentation M38A1 grenade for 37 mm M3 and M5 guns.

Ammunition for the 37 mm anti-tank gun:
37 mm armour piercing tracer shot (without explosives or a fuse) with an armour piercing cap, M51
Trials results are satisfactory. The design of the shell is modern, no worse than our 37 mm armour piercing-tracer shot for the 37 mm mod. 1939 AA gun.
37 mm armour piercing shot (without explosives or a fuse) M74
Trials results are satisfactory. The design of the shell is modern, no worse than our 37 mm armour piercing-tracer shot for the 37 mm mod. 1939 AA gun. When using this shot to fire at armour from the American tank gun, the results are no worse than from a domestic gun.
37 mm HE grenade M63 with an M58 fuse
Trials results are unsatisfactory. The grenade is unsuitable for its purpose, destroying personnel when fired at terrain, due to poor performance of the M58 fuse. Using this grenade is senseless.
The aforementioned ammunition is also used in tanks.

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