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KV-3 Mulligan

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"Proposal regarding the decree issued to the Kirov and Izhor factories
  1. The Kirov and Izhor factories propose a new tank instead of the KV-3 approved by USSR SNK and CC or the VKP(b) decree #548-2332ss issued on March 15th, 1941, with increased armour according to USSR SNK and CC or the VKP(b) decree #827-345ss issued on April 7th, 1941.
  2. This tank will effectively be a KV-4 tank in armament, dimensions, transmission and suspension design, engine power, and overall layout, but with thinner armour.
  3. Decree #827-345ss issued on April 7th, 1941 ordered production of KV-3 tanks in 1941 that only differed in armament and armour thickness from the KV-1 and KV-2, so that factories could produce tanks they were used to, with the aim of producing KV-4 and KV-5 tanks in 1942.
  4. I consider it reasonable to leave the KV-3 with 120 mm of armour in the front and 90 mm in the side, armed with the 76 mm ZIS-5 gun, built using KV-1 components, according to attached tactical-technical characteristics.
Chief of the Main Auto and Armour Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, Fedorenko

Tactical-technical characteristics for an experimental heavily armoured KV-3 tank
  1. Purpose:
    1. Combat with enemy heavy tanks.
    2. Destruction of concrete fortifications and heavy engineering structures.
    3. Destruction of enemy artillery and personnel.
  2. Combat mass: 54-55 tons
  3. Armour:
    1. Front plate: 120 mm
    2. Side plates: 90 mm
    3. Turret sides: 120 mm
    4. Roof and floor: 30 mm
    5. Other armour plates: equivalent to the sides of the hull
  4. Armament:
    1. One 76 mm ZIS-5 gun
      1. Horizontal range: 360 degrees
      2. Gun elevation: +25 degrees
      3. Gun depression: -2-3 degrees
    2. DT machineguns: 3
      Of them:
      1. One coaxial
      2. One in the turret bustle
      3. One in the front of the hull
    3. One PPSh submachinegun
    4. One flamethrower
  5. Ammunition:
    1. 76 mm gun rounds: 70-80
    2. DT rounds: 3000
    3. PPSh rounds: 450-500
    4. Hand grenades: 25-30
  6. Mobility:
    1. Top highway speed: 35 kph
    2. Top off-road speed: 20 kph
    3. Maximum grade: 37-40 degrees
    4. Climbable obstacle height: no less than 1.2 meters
    5. Clearance: no less than 450 mm
    6. Ground pressure without sinking: 0.85-0.9 kg/cm²
  7. Engine:
    1. Type: diesel, 700 hp
    2. Fuel and oil capacity must last for 10 hours of driving
    3. The cooling, lubrication, and fuel systems must allow for 10 hours of continuous driving with any engine use within the outdoor temperature range of -40 to +40 degrees.
  8. Transmission and suspension:
    1. KV type transmission and suspension
    2. The tank's brakes must hold it when stopped or when on a grade up to 45 degrees.
  9. Controlling the tank:
    1. Crew: 5: commander, gunner, loader, mechanic in the turret (also assistant loader), driver, radio operator in the front of the hull."

German Heavy Tank Intel

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"To the chief of the operations department
Information #19

Description of new tanks used by the German army

According to information obtained by 10th Army HQ Reconnaissance Department, German tank units are being armed with new types of tanks:
  1. T-6 tank. Mass: up to 65 tons. Speed: 35 kph. Armament: one 88 mm cannon, one 20 mm AA gun in the rear. Four MG-42 machineguns. The tank is armoured with concrete in front and on the sides. The tank had a smokescreen device.
  2. Panther tank: a heavy tank. Mass: 62 tons, 8 meters long and 2.4 meters wide. Crew: 7. Uses an 8 cylinder diesel engine. Armed with an 88 mm cannon and two MG-42 machineguns (one coaxial and one in the rear of the turret). A flamethrower is installed on the right side of the tank. The armour is composed of three armoured plates, between which there is two layers of reinforced concrete.
  3. In addition, POWs claim that new super-powerful tanks named "Nanda" and "Sou" are being built in Germany, which are faster and have improved armour and armament compared to the Tiger.
It is necessary to clarify the presence of the aforementioned tanks in the German army, their design, tactical-technical characteristics, construction of the flamethrower, smokescreen device, and reinforced concrete armour, find out the location of factories that make heavy tanks, and their output, via POW interrogations, inspection of captured documents, and other data. Direct all incoming materials to the Reconnaissance Department.

Chief of the 3rd Section of the 10th Army HQ Reconnaissance Department, Major Vychkov.
June 13th, 1943"

Spare Barrels

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It's no secret that guns have a limited lifespan. Shot out barrels have to be occasionally replaced. Aside from entire tanks, the Soviets received replacement barrels to perform repairs of foreign weapons. The table shows the number of barrels received in the denominator, the number used up in the numerator, the total in the second last column, and the surplus in the last column.

CAMD RF 38-11369-1

The items are as follows:
76 mm howitzer
76 mm gun
75 mm gun
57 mm gun
40 mm gun
37 mm gun
12.7 mm MG
7.62 mm MG
7.92 mm MG
7.7 mm MG
11.43 mm SMG

The Road to SU-76

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The T-50 tank was considered the highest priority platform for light SPGs in the pre-war Soviet Union. However, a proposal for an SPG chassis based on the T-40 amphibious reconnaissance tank was made at a meeting on June 9th, 1941. The idea was quickly abandoned, and, a few weeks later, the USSR was too busy for the T-50 SPG. Suddenly, the first wartime light Soviet SPG turned out to be the ZIS-30, which used the chassis of the Komsomolets artillery tractor. Due to the cancellation of artillery tractors, the idea of building an SPG using T-40 components came out of retirement. The result was a small family of experimental vehicles, such as the SU-31 SPAAG and SU-32 SPG.

Universal chassis

Soviet plans to build 3000 ZIS-30 SPGs were crushed by harsh reality. The Komsomolets was removed from production in August of 1941, and the SPG was left with no chassis. The plan was reduced to only 100 vehicles.

This was only the beginning of issues with mechanization of Soviet artillery. In September of 1941, factory #183 was evacuated to Nizhniy Tagil, and production of heavy Voroshilovets tractors ceased as well. In the fall of 1941, Chelyabinsk stopped producing the S-65 tractor and S-2 artillery tractor. The reason for this was the need to increase KV tank production. Finally, the Stalingrad factory began to think about taking the STZ-5 tractor out of production. The reason for this was the same: increasing tank production, this time, the T-34. In the end, the STZ-5 remained in production, but in reduced amounts. The Red Army Main Artillery Directorate (GAU KA) was in danger of losing mechanized artillery movers.

Draft of the "Chassis 31", May 1942. The vehicle that was built in metal had a similar layout.

The most logical solution at the time was the development of SPGs. GAU didn't reinvent the wheel, and decided to resurrect pre-war plans for self propelled artillery. There were a number of alterations, however, especially for light SPGs.

Due to a lack of alternatives, the idea of a T-40-based chassis resurfaced. However, neither the T-40, not its replacement, the T-30, were in production in November of 1941. The new chassis came from the T-60 tank, which used many identical components. An SPG chassis of this type was included in the plan for 1942. S.A. Ginsburg supervised this project.

On January 29th, 1942, a draft set of requirements was developed for a project of a self propelled chassis based on the T-60.

"
  1. The universal chassis is built, primarily, from T-60 components and assemblies, to be used for the following SPGs:
    1. 76 mm assault gun for support of moto-mechanized forces using the USV or ZIS-5 gun.
    2. Self propelled 37 mm AA gun mod. 1939.
    3. A tank with a 37 mm AA gun in a turret, based on Savin's group project.
    4. A light tank with armour up to 45 mm and a 45 mm gun in a turret with a coaxial machinegun.
    5. An armoured carrier for infantry, munitions, and other purposes.
  2. The top speed of the chassis will be 45 kph, according to gear ratios. For some variants, the top speed may be lowered by altering the gear ratios.
  3. Since the aforementioned designs will be heavier than the T-60, which is already strained for power due to a lack of more powerful engines, a layout must be developed, according to the attached diagram, with two GAZ-202 engines in the front on the sides of the hull, with the driver between the engines and the rear fighting compartment. Each engine works through a gearbox, its own individual clutch, and final drive. The final drives will be joined by a geared or elastic clutch. The latter will be especially developed to withstand shock that may be generated while changing gears. Gas and the gearshift will be joined. The suspension will be the T-60 suspension with five road wheels.
  4. The main armour must be equal to the armour of the T-60, approved for 1942. Calculations of characteristics of the chassis for use with heavier armour (37, 40, 45 mm) of the main vertical plates must be provided.
  5. For self-defense at close range, the crew must be armed with a PPD or PPSh submachinegun and grenades, 700 rounds per submachinegun and 5 grenades per person.
  6. The platform must have a cruising range of 200-250 km."
The initial concept of "Chassis 32" for a 76 mm SPG.

As you can see, the result of the project would be not only SPGs, but a light tank. Ginzburg was gunning to create a replacement for the T-60, the tank that "ate" his brainchild, the T-50, just a month ago. However, the GAZ factory's design bureau, under the supervision of N.A. Astrov, was nearing completion of the GAZ-70, which later became the T-70. The tank was finalized by February 14th, and Ginzburg was too late. Meanwhile, some questions came up regarding the 76 mm SPG.

"
  1. The gun is designed for cooperation with moto-mechanized units in action against tanks, dugouts, fortified settlements, and enemy personnel (with shrapnel).
  2. The mass of the vehicle will be 7.5-8 tons, and the mass of the special trailer will be 3.5-4 tons.
  3. The system will have bulletproof and fragment-proof armour from the front, and partially from the sides. The crew, engine, fuel, and ammunition will be armoured in the same way as on the T-60.
  4. The ammunition capacity must be at least 20 single piece rounds.
  5. The horizontal range must be at least +/- 7 degrees (as much as possible), with a vertical range of -5 to +30 degrees.
  6. The design of the system must allow for firing without special rests (trails).
  7. The crew (including the driver) will be 4-5 men."
The mass and ammunition requirements are puzzling. One can confidently say that it would be impossible to build an SPG with these parameters. The increased number of road wheels per side mean an increased hull length, but further development showed that it would not be enough.

Nevertheless, the first step was made.

Factory #37's courtyard

While work on composing requirements went on, Sverdlovsk was ramping up T-60 production. Factory #37, evacuated from Moscow, initially built tanks out of leftover T-30 parts, building actual T-60s only in February of 1942. On March 9th, 1942, GKO decree #1417 "On organization of production of T-70 tanks at factories #37 and 38" was published. The production of T-60 tanks that was set up with such difficulty had to make way for a new tank.

For obvious reasons, the factory management had a few unkind words with the GABTU. S.A. Ginzburg, who understood what was going on, took the factory's side. On April 12th, 1942, GKO decree #1581 "On production of T-60 tanks at factory #37" was signed. Factory #37 was allowed to produce the T-60 until August.


SU-32 at the factory courtyard, July of 1942.

Meanwhile, in February and March of 1942, consultations and clarifications of requirements for the new light SPG chassis were taking place. Here, the interests of Ginzburg and factory #37 coincided. The factory wanted to preserve production of the T-60, and Ginzburg wanted a platform to bring his developments to life to replace the one he lost when factory #174 was evacuated from Leningrad and T-50 production was cancelled.

The gun at maximum elevation.

Initially, the position of these new allies were very shaky. On April 15th, a plenum of the GAU Artkom took place, dedicated to self propelled artillery. This was the starting point for practical work on Soviet SPGs. Naturally, discussion of light SPGs took place, which was recorded in the plenum minutes.

"
  1. Confirm the correctness of requirements from the GAU Artillery Committee regarding the need for the following SPGs in the Red Army:
    1. Bunker destroyer SPGs
    2. Tank destroyer SPGs
    3. Assault guns to support motorized infantry
    4. Self propelled AA guns to support tank or motorized forces
  2. Consider it necessary to introduce a self propelled howitzer into the Red Army to combat dugouts and enemy personnel.
  3. Consider it necessary to distribute orders to factories to produce the following types of SPGs:
    1. Assault guns:
      1. 76 mm USV or ZIS-3 divisional gun on a universal chassis made from T-70 components. Assign this work to factory #37 with aid from factory #92."
Since the T-70 was already accepted into service, the light tank vanished from lists of experimental work. Due to a lack of need, the munitions carrier vanished as well, and a separate drama developed around the AA tank. As for using the T-70 as a universal chassis, the GAU's requirements were interpreted very creatively.


Unlike on the T-70, the driver of the SU-32 sat on the right.

Without rejecting their assignment, factory #37's design bureau began working on two variants of the chassis side by side. Formally, N.A. Popov acted as the chief designer, but blueprints and correspondence bears another man's name: G.S. Surenyan. The same Surenyan who proposed assault guns on the T-40 chassis in August of 1941.

Based on his activity, Surenyan was one of the main proponents of SPGs at factory #37. It's hard to argue with him: the T-60 had a 20 mm gun, and the T-70 had a 45 mm gun. Both weapons were outdated by 1942, which reduced the tank's value on the battlefield. Instead, production of SPGs with the same armour and more powerful armament was a bright idea. The correctness of this idea is confirmed by its further development: by the fall of 1943, the SU-76 entered production in place of light tanks.

Steps were added in the rear to help the crew enter the fighting compartment.

Officially, the factory's design bureau began work in mid-April of 1942. By late May, calculations and drafts were ready. Assault and AA variants were also worked on at the same time, in two variants: one with the 37 mm 61-K gun, and one with the 25 mm 72-K gun. For understandable reasons, the T-60 chassis had priority. It was indexed "Chassis 31" or "Object 31". K.E. Istomin, an engineer-designer from department 030, was the senior engineer on this project.

In many ways, Object 31 matched the requirements developed in January of 1942. Parallel GAZ-202 engines provided power, the cooling system, gearbox, and clutches were taken from the T-60. In an emergency, the steering system allowed the tank to drive with only one working engine. The gearboxes were connected with one long lever. The suspension was taken from the T-60. The length of torsion bars increased from 1718 mm to 2225 mm, and the number of road wheels increased to six per side.

SU-32 fighting compartment, not exactly roomy. Later vehicles had an enlarged fighting compartment.

According to the project, "Chassis 31" could use a 25 mm AA gun mod. 1940 72-K, 37 mm AA gun mod. 1939 61-K, or the 76 mm ZIS-3 mod. 1942. In all cases, the SPG had a backup DT machinegun. The thickness of armour of the AA variant was 10 mm all around. The assault gun had 30 mm in the front and 15 on the sides and rear. The SPAAG with a 25 mm gun was indexed BGS-1, the 37 mm SPAAG was indexed BGS-2, and the assault gun was called BGS-3. Their mass was estimated at 9500 kg, 9700 kg, and 9900 kg respectively.

The SU-32 received three-colour camo by August of 1942.

The second project was called "Chassis 32" or "Object 32", and consisted of a universal chassis made from T-70 components. Engineer-designer N.N. Efimov from department 030 was in charge of this project. The chassis used the GAZ-203 engine, gearbox, cooling system, and final drives from the T-70 tank. The suspension was taken from the T-70, but since the factory didn't produce this tank yet, the T-60 chassis with lengthened torsion bars was used.

Unlike Chassis 31, Object 32 would use the 76 mm ZIS-5 tank gun. The assault variant of Chassis 31 had higher priority, but SPAAGs were also designed on this chassis. Like with Object 31, it had a DT machinegun as secondary armament. The thickness of the front armour of the assault gun was creater than that of Chassis 31: 35 mm. The AA version was indexed BGS-4, and the assault gun was indexed BGS-5. Their mass was 8700 and 10,500 kg, respectively.

SU-32 became the starting point for later Soviet light SPGs.

On May 22nd, 1942, a technical meeting took place at factory #37, at which both chassis were examined. Interestingly enough, the factory's design bureau was driven by requirements from January of 1942. During the discussion, clarifications and changes were made, since the vehicles did not match them. At the same time, a trials program for Chassis 31 and Chassis 32 was composed.

The T-60 variant had priority, an AA gun version, at that. It's possible that the cause was the choice of weapon for the SPG. The mass produced ZIS-3 was a logical choice, but the ZIS-5 was more compact, and also produced in Sverdlovsk.

SU-31 during demonstrations in August of 1942. The vehicle already has three-colour camouflage.

Factory #37 worked on the chassis, while their colleagues from the UZTM design bureau had a direct connection with the armament. The ZIS-5 mount for the BGS-5 carried the index U-31, and the BGS-2 SPAAG's gun mount was called U-32. Work was supervised by L.I. Gorlitskiy, with K.N. Ilyin and A.N. Shlyakov as chief engineers. The vehicle, indexed SU-31, was a combination of three interests: Ginzburg, as the ideologue, factory #37 as the chassis manufacturer, and UZTM as the gun manufacturer.

For obvious reasons, the SU-31 used more parts from the T-60 than not.

The experimental SU-31 was built in June of 1942. The mobility trials took place that same month. Meanwhile, the idea of using the ZIS-5 tank gun did not find its place. For this reason, the BGS-5 project, the initial source of the SU-32 SPG, changed significantly. Factory #37's hopes that the quickly produced SU-31 would have higher priority were not justified. In addition, GKO decree #1958ss "On production of T-34 and T-70 tanks" came out on July 3rd, 1942, ceasing production of T-60 tanks at factory #37. There was no longer a point to using T-60 components. Nevertheless, the trials of the prototypes were still on.

Maximum gun elevation.

The SU-32 was built in July of 1942. Like the SU-31, it was built from mild steel, 15 mm thick all around. The suspension and driver's hatch were taken from the T-70. The casemate was redesigned to be roomier, which allowed the ammunition capacity to grow to 60 rounds. Just like the prototype, the hull was open from the top, but the size of the opening in the rear was decreased by adding rear plates. To help the crew get into the SPG, handholds and footholds were added.

SU-31 fighting compartment. Later, analogous fighting compartments would be used on other Soviet light SPGs.

The 76 mm ZIS-3 gun on a pedestal mount was used. The gun was installed along with elements of the mount and trails, which made it take up a lot of room inside the SPG. However, the gun could be taken straight from the production line with few changes. A welded shield for the recoil mechanisms was added. A DT machinegun in a ball mount, the same as the one used on the KV-1, was placed to the right of the gun.

Futureproof

Officially, mobility trials began at Kubinka on August 21st. Earlier, on August 18th, the vehicles were demonstrated at the Sofrino shooting range. From August 21st to September 3rd, the SU-31 and SU-32 traveled 630 and 524 km respectively. 490 shots from the 61-K and 205 from the ZIS-3 were fired.

The SU-32 was loaded down to match the weight of a fully armoured vehicle. During trials, both vehicles exhibited frequent track tearing. This problem would be solved by modernizing the suspension like on the T-70B (an arbitrary name, since no name was given to the T-70 with a reinforced suspension in the documents). The trials also showed serious issues with overheating on the SU-32 engine. The SU-31 did not have this issue. The SU-32 also had an inconveniently placed ammunition rack, which slowed down the rate of fire compared to the regular ZIS-3. At an elevation of 25 degrees, the gun shield covered up the panoramic sight, and it became impossible to aim. The addition of armour increased the amount of effort required to turn the aiming flywheel.

SU-31 on mobility trials, late September of 1942.

The following conclusions were made after the comparative trials:

"Mobility trials showed that the SU-32 has the following defects, in addition to weak brakes:
  1. Engine overheating.
  2. Weak gearbox attachment.
  3. The aforementioned defects do not allow the vehicle to be recommended for service in the Red Army.
Considering that the layout of the 76 mm on an SPG in general works satisfactorily, the commission considers it reasonable to produce a trial batch of 6-10 76 mm assault guns, in addition to the 37 mm SPAAG, with the parallel engine placement used in the 37 mm SPAAG, for trials in the active army."

Work on the SU-31 and SU-32 at factory #37 did not continue. GKO decree #2120, issued on July 27th, turned factory #37 into a subsidiary of Uralmash, and it began preparations for production of the T-34. All light SPG designs were passed onto factory #38. Overall direction of the work was still Ginzburg's responsibility.


The off-road mobility of the SU-31 was no worse than that of the T-70.

Trials of the SU-32 ended here, but the situation with the SU-31 was different. Ginzburg considered the layout with parallel engines more correct. As trials showed, these engines overheated less. The fact that the vehicle had two gearboxes that had to be operated with an enormous lever was no obstacle. This is the layout that was used on factory #38's prospective SPG.

Also, the NIIBT proving grounds held comparative trials of the off-road mobility of the SU-31 and T-70. A swamp was chosen as the testing area. Trials showed that the mobility was approximately the same. The SU-31 concept was approved. It's unlikely that Ginzburg could guess that this was going to be the greatest mistake of his life.

Light Paper SPGs

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As with many other Soviet SPGs, the path to the SU-76 was not easy. Initially, the two-turreted T-26 tank would be used as the chassis for an infantry support vehicle. Later, the T-50 joined in the plans. The situation after the start of the war forced the concept of the SPG to change urgently. Instead of a light infantry support SPG, the ZIS-30 appeared, a tank destroyer on the Komsomolets tractor chassis. Designers only returned to the topic of a multipurpose SPG towards the end of 1941. The SU-12, the first production variant of the SU-76, did not come about on the first try. This article tells the story of vehicles that were dead ends, without even being produced in metal.


Bringing in scientific centers

According to surviving correspondence, the first attempt to design a light SPG with a similar layout to the future SU-12 was undertaken in November of 1941. The Technical Council of the People's Commissariat of Armament (NKV) initiated the work. The developer was the combat vehicles department of the Bauman Moscow Mechanical Machinebuilding Institute (modern day Bauman MSTU). 

The light SPG was just one of a series of projects. The situation in November of 1941 put the possibility of mechanizing artillery at risk. Instead of tractors, factories were building tanks. The combat vehicles department, under the direction of G.I. Zaichik, the dean of the "O" faculty, received tasks to mechanize the 203 mm high power B-4 howitzer, 122 mm A-19 corps gun, 122 mm M-30 howitzer, and 76 mm F-22 USV divisional gun. Unfortunately, there are no details about these projects. At the same time, some authors connect this work with the "universal chassis" made with T-60 components, a project curated by S.A. Ginzburg.

On December 4th, 1941, the NKV defined the developers of their self propelled artillery project. Stalin factory #92 was responsible for the weapons of the experimental "moto-mechanized unit support assault guns:. As for the aforementioned universal chassis, the tactical-technical requirements developed by Ginzburg were distributed by the People's Commissariat of Tank Production. Ginzburg, at the time, was the deputy chief of the 2nd Department of the People's Commissariat of Tank Production. According to those requirements, the armament would be either the F-22 USV or the ZIS-5 tank gun.

Self propelled artillery was the responsibility of another organization: the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA). On January 31st, 1942, this organization approved the requirements for a "76 mm assault SPG". According to these requirements, a completely different gun was used: the 76 mm ZIS-3 divisional gun. This SPG would not use the universal chassis. A number of requirements, such as the mass, make this clear. The universal chassis would weigh 7.5-8 tons, while the GAU's SPG would weigh no more than 6.5 tons. The ammunition capacity was also different: instead of 20 rounds, it would be 30 rounds.

Requirements for self propelled AA guns (SPAAGs) appeared a little later. In the first scenario, the 25 mm 72-K AA autocannon would be used, in the second, the 37 mm 61-K autocannon. Interestingly enough, the variant with the 72-K was discarded, as its production stopped, and resumed only in 1943.

The aforementioned topics were moved to factory #37 in February of 1942. As for the light SPG from the Bauman institute, it didn't make it past the preliminary draft stage. Even though the order was given in November of 1941, work on the vehicle, indexed SU-USV, dragged on. The bottleneck was poor availability of materials regarding the oscillating part of the weapon, which slowed down work. The materials were requested in February of 1942, but only arrived in April. Because of these delays, the project was only ready in June.

According to a decision made by the NKV Technical Council on June 17th, 1942, the SU-USV SPG was to be converted to use a new artillery system. The 57 mm I-13-52 anti-tank gun developed by NII-13 was proposed. The name of the vehicle also changed: now it was called SU-I-13-53. Unlike the SU-USV, the tactical-technical requirements for this vehicle survived, which disprove any connection between work done by the Bauman institute and Ginzburg's "universal chassis". The chassis for this SPG was a seriously redesigned STZ-5 tractor. This was not the predecessor of the SU-12, but a parallel branch, and a dead end at that.

In addition, the project was redone yet again after a meeting on September 22nd, 1942. Instead of the I-13-52, a "high power 45 mm gun" was used, and the STZ-5 chassis was replaced by T-70 components with the ZIS-5 engine. This project went through several stages before being closed due to not longer being needed.

The combat vehicles department of the Bauman institute was not the only scientific facility involved with development of light SPGs. After a plenum of the GAU Artillery Committee approved the direction of SPG development on April 15th, 1942, the Scientific Research Tractor Institute (NATI) became involved. On May 4th, 1942, the T-133-B, T-133-V, and T-133-Zh projects were presented to the Artillery Committee. The first two vehicles were 37 mm SPAAGs, and the T-133-Zh was an SPG that carried two mortars. The 7500 kg vehicles would use components from T-60 and T-70 tanks. The T-133-B was equipped with two GAZ AA engines placed in parallel. The T-133-B and T-133-Zh used ZIS-5 engines, installed at an angle.

The T-133-B and T-133-Zh chassis were deemed poor, since they needed the manufacture of new components, but the T-133-B was approved. The chassis was to be used in the creation of a 76 mm assault SPG, SPAAG with 25 mm and 37 mm autocannons, and an SPG with a pair of 120 mm mortars. The experimental prototypes were due in August of 1942, but they were never built.

NATI returned to the idea of building a similar SPG in 1943, but that is a completely different story. The T-133-B project was also connected to the NATI-D tractor, which was launched into production under the name Ya-11. 

Light alternative from Sverdlovsk

The story of light SPG development in Sverdlovsk is far from simple. According to a decree by the Artillery Committee plenum, the prospective chassis must use components of the far more promising T-70, instead of the T-60. The 76 mm ZIS-5 gun also vanished from the list of weapons. Instead, the F-22 USV or the ZIS-3 had to be used. In practice, Sverdlovsk deviated from the Artillery Committee requirements, both in the chassis and the armament.

Cutaway diagram of the ZIK-7-II SPG.

The factory #37 design bureau chose the chassis developed using T-60 components as its priority. The reason for the attention to the chassis, called "Chassis 31" or "Object 31" is simple. Factory #37 was building T-60 tanks, and resisted the implementation of the T-70. Ginzburg supported the factory. This kind of stubbornness had a good reason behind it: the factory had constant issues with GAZ-202 engine supplies, a pair of which was used in the T-70, under the name GAZ-203. This was the reason why T-70 production in Sverdlovsk was postponed.

Nobody forgot the requirements for a chassis that used T-70 components. It received the index "Chassis 32" or "Object 32". On the other hand, its priority was low. The design bureau of the Ural Heavy Machinebuilding Factory (UZTM) also considered it low priority. The ZIS-3, 25, and 37 mm gun mounts were designed with the "Chassis 31" in mind.

The gun mount used as many components of the mass produced ZIS-5 gun as possible.

"Chassis 32" was given away to a second artillery design bureau at UZTM. This was the factory #8 design bureau, headed by F.F. Petrov. Here, the ZIS-3 was not considered as an option for armament. Instead of Grabin's gun, the choice was made to use the ZIS-5 tank gun.

The reason for using the gun, initially designed for the KV-1 heavy tank, was simple. Management in Sverdlovsk was afraid of the situation with tank guns from the summer-fall of 1941 repeating itself. That "artillery famine" caused the development of the U-11 tank gun, based on the 122 mm M-30 howitzer. Some explain this with the need to find a more potent HE round, but the cause is even simpler than that: the M-30 was the only gun that was being built in Sverdlovsk.

The reason for using the ZIS-5 was the same. In early 1942, factory #8 began building ZIS-5 guns, resolving the issue of KV-1 armament in Chelyabinsk. The ballistics of the F-22 USV, ZIS-3, and ZIS-5 were identical. Factory #8's work served as a backup for UZTM, in case of a shortage of ZIS-3 guns.

The gun mantlet was very similar to the one used on the KV-1.

The development of a weapon for the "Chassis 32" assault gun, indexed BGS-5, was given the index ZIK-7 at the factory #8 design bureau. Work began in April, and project documentation was largely ready towards the end of May. M.Ye. Bezusov was in charge of the ZIK-7 project. He also worked on the ZIK-10 and ZIK-11 SPG on the T-34 chassis.

Some technical solutions were similar on the light and medium SPGs. For instance, the casemate of the ZIK-7 was open from the top, to ensure proper ventilation. The configuration of the front of the casemate was similar to that of the BGS-5, but the sides and rear were sloped. The rear plate had a hatch in it.

The casemates of the ZIK-7 and ZIK-7-II were as similar as possible.

Factory #8's design bureau had a very liberal way of using the ZIS-5 gun. The cradle and trigger mechanism were seriously altered, the upper and lower mount were designed from scratch. The gun mantlet was also completely new. It was cast into a very complicated shape. A counterweight was attached to the front of the cradle. This was the biggest issue in the realization of the ZIK-7 project.

While the SU-32 chassis was ready in early June of 1942, work on the armament stalled. B.A. Fradkin, the director of factory #8, refused to produce parts for the ZIK-7. Letters from the GAU and NKV sent in June-July of 1942 were of no help. The design bureau did their work on time, a full set of blueprints was ready, but the project remained on paper.

The ZIK-7 gin mount had noticeable differences.

By early August, it was clear that the situation would not change. Factory #37 was tasked with producing ZIK-7 parts, but, on July 27th, 1942, it was included into UZTM and began preparations for T-34 production. In this situation, the only possible way out was to start working on a simplified version of the SPG, indexed ZIK-7-II. The overall layout of the fighting compartment was unchanged, but the design of the artillery system was seriously altered. Now, the cradle had minimal changes, the sight was taken from the 76 mm mod. 1927 regimental gun, the elevation and traverse mechanisms were taken from the ZIS-5. The gun mantlet also became simpler, partially identical to the one on the ZIS-5 on the KV-1.

As you can see, the engineers who were designing the ZIK-7 took no shortcuts.

The project documentation for the ZIK-7-II was ready by mid-August of 1942. The materials were sent to the GAU Artillery Committee, but the answer that came back on October 15th inspired little optimism. Factory #8's design bureau was late, considering that UZTM already designed the SU-32 SPG with the ZIS-3 gun, and factory #37 had already built it. Another gun was unnecessary. The SU-32 showed itself worse in trials than the SU-31. The Artillery Committee proposed that the design bureau should convert the ZIK-7-II to be more like the SU-31. It's no surprise that the SPG remained on paper.

The ZIK-5 was as similar as possible to the SU-31 SPAAG.

While work on the ZIK-7-II was in full swing, factory #8's design bureau began working on another artillery system. This time, the "Chassis 31" was used. The system was indexed ZIK-5. Instead of an assault gun, it was a SPAAG. It may seem that there was competition between the UZTM design bureau and the factory #8 design bureau, but that was not the case. UZTM was designing an SPG with the 37 mm 61-K autocannon, while the ZIK-5 used a different weapon: the 25 mm 72-K autocannon.

The same vehicle from the top.

Overall, the ZIK-5 project was based on SU-31 development. The fighting compartment armour scheme was similar, the main differences came from the dimensions of the 72-K. The AA gun was installed without any serious changes, minor alterations were made only when absolutely necessary. The fighting compartment contained two gunners and one loader.

The loader's work was a little more complicated, but the ammunition was better arranged.

In September of 1942, the project was sent to the Artillery Committee for approval. The chairman of the NKV Technical Countil, Satel, had high hopes for the ZIK-5. However, with one important caveat: "in the event that 25 mm 72-K production resumes". The production of this AA gun ceased when factory #4 was evacuated, and resumed only in 1943. That fact meant that the ZIK-5 is destined for the archives.

The Artillery Committee also approved the 25 mm SPAAG project, proposing a minor redesign. The gun shield was altered to be like on the SU-31, as was the ammunition storage. Since renewal of 72-K production was not in the books at the end of 1942, the ZIK-5 ended up in the same place as all other factory #8 SPG designs. Later, Soviet SPAAGs were developed with the 61-K in mind.

Assault gun done quickly

On October 19th, 1942, GKO decree #2429 "On production of experimental prototypes of SPGs" was published. According to the decree, Molotov GAZ and factory #38 were tasked with developing and producing a universal chassis that used T-70 tank components. A lesser known fact is that a third competitor was involved.

Factory #92's design bureau had a successful history of SPG development. the ZIS-30, the first Soviet mass produced light tank destroyer, was designed here. Later, work went along the lines of using the ZIS-22M halftrack (ZIS-42), creating the ZIS-41 tank destroyer. The problem was that the ZIS-22M was not at all what Grabin hoped for. The halftrack was a more stable platform than the Komsomolets, but it overheated quickly, and had a number of other drawbacks. 

By the fall of 1942, the ZIS-41 was in jeopardy. It's not surprising that factory #92's design bureau began looking for an alternative platform. They did not have to look long: the solution was the T-70 tank, mass produced at the Molotov GAZ factory. The T-70 had superior stability to the Komsomolets, and its layout was better suited for an SPG on its chassis. The fact that factory #92 and GAZ were in the same city was icing on the cake.

IS-10 SPG, November 1942.

On November 19th, 1942, the NKV Technical Council received a draft project of the IS-10 SPG, designed by factory #92's design bureau. The work was directed by P.F. Muravyov. The SPG was designed to change the T-70 chassis as little as possible. This was achieved, for the most part: the T-70's layout was preserved, and the casemate was installed instead of the turret and turret ring. However, the casemate "stepped up" on the engine deck slightly.

The objective of minimal changes to the T-70 chassis resulted in a very unusual SPG. Factory #92 proposed turning the two-man T-70 into a three-man SPG with a ZIS-3 gun. On paper, the proposed SPG took an interesting form. According to the design, the internal layout allowed the placement of 40 rounds of ammunition for the ZIS-3, and the mass of the IS-10 was only 500 kg higher than that of the T-70. The gun had satisfactory aiming angles. The ZIS-3 oscillating part was minimally altered. The biggest change was the installation of a telescopic sight. In addition, the gun mount had a coaxial DT machinegun.

The view from above shows how hard the gun crew's life would be.

In reality, the IS-10 was not as ideal as described. One look at the draft blueprints is enough to feel compassion for those who were going to fight in this SPG. The casemate overlapped with the engine deck, and removing the engine would not have been an easy task. This was, however, far from the biggest issue. There is a distinct feeling that factory #92 was thinking of anything but crew comfort in 1942.

For example, theoretically, the 85 mm ZIS-25 gun fit into the KV-1 turret, but the loading process would have been a wonder of gymnastics. Compared to the work that the IS-10 loader would have had to do, it was trivial. The poor loader would have had to put in enormous effort to not be clipped by the gun while it was shooting. Even railings didn't help much, as there was simply not that much room for the loader. Reloading the coaxial machinegun would also have been a sight to behold. Such minutia as seats for the loader or the commander weren't even worth mentioning. According to the diagram, the commander stood on top of the ammo rack. Presumably, this made loading easier. Ventilation of the fighting compartment also raised a lot of questions. Judging by the diagram, the designers didn't think about it at all.

The same vehicle from the front. This idea was, wisely, refused.

On November 26th, another letter arrived from factory #92. Factory director A.S. Elyan asked for a T-70 tank, in order to build an IS-10 SPG by December 15th. The answer from the NKV Technical Council was brief. Since GKO decree #2559 "On organization of SPG production at Uralmash and factory #38" was published on December 2nd, 1942, there was no need for another SPG. Since the IS-10 offered no advantages, the project was declined.

Kalashnikov vs. Schmeisser: For the Umpteenth Time

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The installation of a monument to the famous Soviet and Russian arms designer, M.T. Kalashnikov, was followed by a whole chain of scandals. Recently, Yuri Pasholok pointed out an unfortunate mistake that was made by the sculptor, who placed an exploded diagram of a Sturmgewehr on the monument to the creator of the AK. All of this led back to the question that was answered for anyone who is even slightly interested in the history of small arms long ago. Nevertheless, serious flamewars broke out, so it's time to, once again, explain the differences in the two designs, and how it turned out that an unknown sergeant's gun ended up as a symbol of the USSR, which is still relevant in modern Russia.


Intermediate cartridge 

So, what is the relationship between the Soviet assault rifle and the Sturmgewehr? Usually, people with little understanding of the issu,e and people with little understanding in general, focus on the outward appearance. This is understandable: the purpose of the weapons was the same, the era was the same, the layout, due to the similar solutions and purpose, was similar. Except, this layout was in use long before the Sturmgewehr came into existence. Schmeisser was not a pioneer here.

Experimental Lewis automatic rifle mod. 1923. Many technical solutions are similar to those found in the Sturmgewehr and Kalashnikov.

The light machinegun (or automatic rifle) pictured above is a design by an american, Isaac Lewis, in 1923. This rifle was not produced in great numbers, but, at the time, it was very well known, and tested in many countries. If you take out the bipod and the dimensions, determined by the full rifle cartridge, what do you see? The same pistol grip, the same detachable box magazine on the bottom, the same upper gas system, a long stroke piston, and a rotating bolt: hello, AK! 

Let's move onto the round. Schmeisser had nothing to do with the creation of the intermediate round. In 1940, the HWaA (Heereswaffenamt, the Wehrmacht's Directorate of Armamant of the Land Forces) distributed tactical-technical requirements for a new automatic weapon, using a cartridge that was already designed by the Polte company. Work on a special intermediate round began in Germany in 1935, and in 1918 in the rest of the world.

The USSR was fully aware of this work. In the mid-1930s, famous arms designer and historian V.E. Markevich called to produce submachineguns (machine carbines) that used miniaturized rifle rounds, instead of pistol rounds, pointing to .25 Remington as a good starting point. Why did this idea of an intermediate round misfire, both in 1918 and 10-15 years later? Of course, we cannot know the precise reasons, but it's possible to come up with reasonable guesses.

An incomplete collection of intermediate rounds. Left to right: 7.65×32 Mannlicher Carbine (1903); 2 – .351 WSL (1907); 3 – 8×35SR Ribeyrolles (1918); 4 – 7.65×35 Furrer (1921); 5 – .30 М1 Carbine (1940); 6 – 7.9×33 PP Kurz (1940); 7 – 7.62×39 М43 (1943–1947); 8 – 7.5×38 StG.48 (1948); 9 – 7.5×43 CRBA (1949); 10 – 7×43 FN (1949); 11 – 7×49 FN (1952); 12 – 7.9×40 CETME (1950s).

First of all, senior army staff tend to be conservative, and don't like to risk their careers for novelties of uncertain benefit. Most of the generals of the time grew up in the era of rifles with magazine cutoffs, firing in volleys, and bayonet charges. The idea of arming a rank and file infantryman with rapid fire automatic weapoins was a strange idea to most of these commanders.

Secondly, despite the obvious economy in materials and spending on production of each individual round and delivery to the battlefield, the increased consumption of ammunition compared to bolt action rifles would mean increased strain on production and logistics.

Thirdly, by the end of the First World War, the machinegun became an irreplaceable part of the infantry's armament. Using a reduced power version of a rifle cartridge in machineguns, especially heavy ones, meant reduction in firepower against all targets. This meant that the new "weaker" round would have to be used alongside the full strength one, instead of replacing it, which meant more strain on logistics.

A hypothetical ammunition famine was not only a nightmare for quartermasters, but one of the main arguments against widespread use of automatic weapons.

Finally, until the late 1930s, an infantryman's list of potential targets included not just enemy infantry, but also targets like horses, armoured cars, and low flying airplanes. Using a reduced power round could radically decrease infantry's effectiveness aaginst these kinds of targets, which was also unacceptable. For that reason, the USSR chose a semiautomatic rifle as a standard infantry weapon, and the "progressive" Germans stuck with a regular Mauser bolt-action rifle, hedging the infantry's firepower on a single machinegun.

The start of WWII, with its increased mechanization and rapid operations, quickly and decisively showed that, when masses of infantry collide, it's not precision or power of each individual round that matters, but the amount of them fired towards the enemy. According to data gathered after the war, each dead soldier cost thousands, or even tens of thousands of fired rounds. In addition, cavalry was departing from the battlefield, and further development of armour and aircraft made them immune to even the most powerful rifles. To be fair, the Germans understood this in the mid-1930s, which is why they began working on a reduced power round.

SS machinegun crew with a Czech machinegun in Yugoslavia.

The increased popularity of assault rifles in 1943-44 was triggered by the approaching end of Nazi Germany. The excellent MG-34 was expensive and complicated to produce, and its tripod was also complicated. It was also too heavy to use as a light machinegun, as was its descendant, the MG-42. The Germans didn't manage to create an acceptable semiautomatic rifle.

This resulted in an active use of captured machineguns in the Wehrmacht of every imaginable type. The Czech ZB-26 was particularly popular, but the Germans gladly used both French Hotchkisses and Soviet Degtyaryevs. As a result, it was clear by 1943 that German infantry was starting to fall behind in density of fire at the "decisive range" of 300 meters or less against the Red Army, with its PPSh, SVT, and DPM, as well as the Americans, with their semiautomatic M1 Garand and M1 Carbine, as well as the BAR M1918A2. 

Nobody is denying the fact that serious efforts to create an intermediate round in the USSR were triggered by German trophies, captured on the North-Western Front in the spring-summer of 1943, but they proceeded independently. As proof, when Hugo Schmeisser was still trying to come up with a cheaper StG 45 for the Wehrmacht in 1945, the USSR already had prototypes of a whole family of small arms for the intermediate round: bolt action and semiautomatic carbines, light machineguns, and assault rifles.

Experimental Tokarev assault rifle, presented at a competition in 1944.

By the time that the Western Allies visited Herr Schmeisser and offered him a surrender, the USSR already had a series of Sudayev Avtomats ready for army trials, as well as its competitors from Tokarev, Degtyaryev, and many other designers. They managed it without Schmeisser in Izhevsk.

Izhevsk vs. Kovrov and stamping vs. milling

In 1946, another stage of the competition took place in the USSR. This time, Sergeant Kalashnikov took part. By then, he was an employee of the Scientific Research Small Arms Proving Grounds (NIPSVO KA) in Schurovo, where he had access not only to various captured and foreign weapons, made available through the Lend Lease program, but to experimental domestic designs, which were being tested at the proving grounds. In addition, other workers of the proving grounds, experiences and knowledgeable officers, could also share their wisdom with the young sergeant.

What follows is a well known story: after failure in the first round in 1946, Kalashnikov managed to get permission to participate in the second round, and left for Kovrov, the estate of Degtyaryev and his school, to continue working on his AK-47. If you look at a map, Kovrov is located about 900 km from Izhevsk, where Hugo Schmeisser was currently located.

A visual comparison: partial disassembly of the AK-47 and Sturmgewehr.

Naturally, it's hard to believe in the canonical Soviet story about one self-taught sergeant who created an excellent assault rifle from nothing. Of course, he had help, both from the designer A.A. Zaitsev, who was assigned to him in Kovrov, and from proving grounds workers. Kalashnikov (or maybe Zaitsev, it's hard to tell today) boldly borrowed successful solutions from his competitors, most likely from A.A. Bulkin. There was nothing dishonest at hand, especially since any borrowing that led to success was welcomed. Recall that all intellectual property in the USSR belonged to the people, or rather, the government. This process also happened not by personal initiative, but by suggestions from the customer.

It is impossible to detect even a passing influence of Schmeisser's contributions in the creation of the AK-47. There are just too many differences in the layout and individual components. Yes, the AK contained a number of borrowed solutions. There were very few original and completely new ideas in it, exactly the same as in the German design. Don't believe it? Compare the layout of the StG 44 and, say, the Czech ZB-26, created back in 1926. The key here is the technical and engineering solutions that unite the parts and assemblies into one whole, and here, the AK and StG are completely different.

Schmeisser's characteristics, written at Izhevsk. "Due to a lack of technical education, he cannot perform any work. His presence here brought us no value. His psychology is capitalistic, and he has a degrading effect on the other specialists."

Finally, the third act: Kalashnikov comes to Izhevsk in 1947 with his finished assault rifle to set up production. The design of the AK had settled by then. The only thing that the German specialists could have helped with at this stage was setting up mass production using stamping. There was a problem here: the Izhevsk factory was not ready for the required quality of stamping, hardening, and riveting of receivers, and Izhmash employees had to draw up a milled received in 1950. Schmeisser, a man who was dedicated to stamping, was not needed here. As a result, Hugo Schmeisser, Karl Barnitzke, and their colleagues continued to pointlessly earn their salary in the USSR for some time longer, after which they were sent home.

Who did Kalashnikov borrow from?

When talking about foreign influence on Kalashnikov's work, especially his famous assault rifle, it would be much more fair to speak of another Western arms designer: John Garand. The documentation for the SKKP (Kalashnikov-Petrov self-loading carbine) designed in 1944, plainly stated that:

"The Kalashnikov and Petrov carbine was designed following the Garand self-loading rifle pattern, as a result of which, the Kalashnikov and Petrov carbine had a number of assemblies and mechanisms that, in their design and principle of function, are analogous to those used in the Garand self-loading rifle, for example: the bolt locking mechanism, feed mechanism, trigger mechanism, and receiver attachment."

The same report mentioned that such a locking mechanism was already used in Soviet experimental rifles, long before the USSR had the opportunity to study American self-loaders that were received through the Lend Lease program. This only serves to highlight the fact that it wasn't important who came up with an idea, but who was the first to successfully implement it.

It was Kalashnikov's own take on the bolt locking system that formed the cornerstone for future decisions made when designing the AK.

AS-44 Sudayev Avtomat, the conceptual precursor to the AK-47, which chose reliability as the main goal.

As for the borrowing done by the AK, all of the competitors were on even ground here. In addition, published documents allow us to see that some, if not all, instances of copying were done because of suggestions from proving grounds offices. For example, the phrase "altered the trigger design (using layout of Czechoslovak ZH-29 rifle)" appears twice in the list of improvements: once in regards to Kalashnikov's design, and once to describe an entry by A.A. Dementeyv from Kovrov's KB-2. Each designer was welcome to follow these recommendations or ignore them. Before the last stage of the trials, Kalashnikov's list of unimplemented suggestions consisted of three items, his closest competitor, Bulkin, missed out on five, and Dementyev, who came in last, had nine. As you can see, the possibilities were equal for everyone, but the will to follow advice was not.

Finally, concluding the topic of what in the AK came from where, let us mention one more weapon that, while not contributing any solutions directly, is a good candidate for the role of spiritual predecessor: A.I. Sudayev's submachinegun. In its creation during a tender in 1942, Aleksei Ivanovich calculated the gas blowback system's function in such a way as to give it a reserve of energy. This allowed his entrant to surpass all of its competitors in reliability, including G.S. Shpagin's very successful PPSh-2.

Failed competitor of the AK: Bulkin's experimental TKB-415.

Kalashnikov also placed his bet on reliability. Bulkin, his chief competitor, calculated the work of his moving parts such that the recoil was minimised. This let him achieve good precision when firing from unstable positions, but left no energy in reserve for work in dirty conditions. Kalashnikov's entrant was the opposite: the bolt came back with energy to spare. This reduced precision during automatic fire, but resulted in improved function when fouled up.

As a result, Kalashnikov's assault rifle managed to meet the requirements for reliability in the last stage of the trials, and Bulkin's rifle met the requirements for precision when firing in short bursts from a bench. This was not because of any orders from above. Both designers knew that it was impossible to meet all requirements, and chose what to focus on themselves. Mikhail Timofeevich's decision to place his bet on reliability, like Sudayev did before him, was the correct choice. This choice, the choice that made the AK-47 and its descendants one of the symbols of the USSR, Russia, and the second half of the 20th century in general, was made by him, and him alone.

Flamethower Tanks, 1940

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"Report on the current and prospective equipment of tanks with flamethrowers and chemical trailers

1. Mass production

1. Purpose of KhT-130 and KhT-133 tanks:
  1. Burning out strongholds
  2. Destroying personnel
  3. Putting up smokescreens to hide movements of mechanized forces
  4. Can be used to place persistent poisonous substances
2. The following are armed with KhT-130 and KhT-133 tanks:
  1. Independent flamethrower battalions in tank regiments (27 tanks)
  2. Independent flamethrower battalions in tank brigades (51 tanks)
3. Equipment of the Red Army with flamethower tanks as of August 1st, 1940:

In 1938-1940, our industry (NKSM factory #174, Leningrad) produced 700 KhT-130 and KhT-133 flamethrower tanks on the T-26 chassis. In battles with White Finns, 118 vehicles were lost irreparably.

In 1940, 265 tanks were built, 255 for the Red Army and 10 for the Navy. The factory has 165 hulls and 185 sets of chemical equipment, which accumulated due to a failure to meet quota in 1939. The use of this equipment is not planned for this year. Production can commence in the 4th quarter, and People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Kulik, began proceedings with the Committee of Defense on this subject.

It is not possible to increase the range past 50 meters with the existing design with standard fuel mix.

4. Flamethrower on the T-26 tank (vehicle 134)

Purpose: burning out strongholds and destruction of personnel. It is desired to have as 1/3rd of all regular T-26es. 

Our industry produced prototypes of two flamethrower devices for the T-26 tank (vehicle 134), the device was tested and accepted by a military commission.

Presently, improvement of the two devices is being performed after comments made by the commission.

This year, according to a decree by the Committee of Defense #4ss, issued on January 2nd, 1940, a batch of 200 tanks equipped with these devices will be built.

5. Chemical trailer for the BT-7 tank
  1. Purpose:
    1. Putting up smokescreens
    2. Decontamination
    3. Contamination
  2. Chemical trailers will be a part of the independent sapper company of light tank brigades: 20 trailers
  3. The chemical trailer for the BT-7 tank had undergone trials and is being improved by our industry according to comments made by the commission.
    Currently, according to a decree by the government, a batch of 200 trailers will be produced this year, which will be supplied to mechanized units.
    In 1941, production of trailers will continue according to requirements.
6. Goals for 1940-1941
  1. Due to a lack of a flamethrower with a range of over 50 meters, it is necessary to produce 165 KhT-133 tanks in the 4th quarter of 1940 using the stockpiled equipment.
  2. In order to achieve a desired proportion of flamethrower tanks to regular tanks, it is necessary to install flamethrowers on all T-26 tanks produced in 1941.
  3. It is necessary to produce the required number of chemical trailers in 1941 to equip all moto-mechanized units.
2. Prototypes and pilot batches

1. Tactical purpose of flamethrower devices
  1. The flamethrower in the KV tank is designed to destroy enemy personnel behind cover and to combat anti-tank artillery at close range.
  2. Flamethrowers on T-34, T-126, and BT-7 tanks are designed to destroy enemy personnel at close range.
2. Desired proportions of flamethower tanks as a percentage of all regular tanks:
  1. KV tanks with flamethowers: 10%
  2. T-34 and BT-7 tanks with flamethrowers: 20%
  3. T-126 tanks with flamethrowers: 30%
3. Conditions of experimental works as of August 1st, 1940:
  1. Flamethrower for the T-34: the technical project was defended.
  2. Flamethrower for the BT-7: parts for the prototype are in production.
  3. Gunpowder flamethrower with a range of 120-150 meters: an experimental prototype is being tested on the BT-7 tank. If successful, the flamethrower will be used on the KhT-130 and KhT-133 tanks as they are modernized. 
  4. Gunpowder flamethrower on the T-34: draft project was presented.
  5. Flamethrower for the T-126 tank: technical requirements were developed.
4. Scheduled condition of work by the end of the year
  1. Flamethrower for the T-34: production of the prototype and blueprints for the pilot batch will be ready by October 1st, 1940. Military trials will be completed by November 5th.
  2. Flamethrower for the BT-7: production of the prototype and blueprints for the pilot batch will be ready by October 15th, 1940. The factory and military trials will conclude by the end of the year.
  3. Gunpowder flamethrower for the BT-7: the experimental prototype will be finalized by September 15th. The pilot batch may be complete by the end of the year.
  4. Flamethrower for the T-126 tank: a technical project will be finished and reviewed.
5. Plans for 1941 for experimental prototypes and mass production of tank flamethrowers and chemical trailers

I consider it necessary to include the following in the plan for 1941:
  1. Development of experimental prototypes:
    1. Flamethrower for the KV tank
    2. Flamethrower for the T-126 tank
    3. Gunpowder flamethrower for the T-34: a range increase to 120 m is expected, without the need for compressed air.
  2. Pilot batches:
    1. T-34 flamethrower: 10 units
    2. T-126 flamethrower: 10 units
    3. BT-7 flamethrower: 10 units
    4. KV flamethrower: 5 units
    5. T-34 gunpowder flamethrower: 5 units
    6. BT-7 gunpowder flamethrower: 5 units
  3. Mass production in 1941, conditional on state of the pilot batch:
    1. T-34 flamethrower
    2. BT-7 flamethrower
    3. Modernized chemical trailer for the BT-7 and T-34 tanks.
Chief of the Military Chemical Directorate of the Red Army, Major-General of the Technical Forces, Melnikov

Military Commissar of the Military Chemical Directorate of the Red Army, Regimental Commissar, Dmitriyev"

Cromwell Production Intel

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"Report on production of Cromwell tanks

Based on existing information, we can estimate the rate of production of Cromwell tanks.

Cromwell tanks have been built in three varieties since June of 1942: Cromwell, Centaur, and Cavalier. The Nuffield Organization factory group builds 500 tanks per month on average across 8 assembly plants. From the start of production, this group produced 3000 Cromwell tanks.

Another group, according to attached list #2, produces 700-800 tanks monthly at 14 assembly plants. This group built 5500-6400 tanks since the start of production.

In total, since production started, 22 assembly plants produced, approximately, between 8600 and 9400 tanks.

Centers where the tanks were designed and where production is managed from are located in Birmingham. The chief design bureau and production of Cromwell and Centaur tanks is located at the Metropolitan-Cammell Carriage and Wagon Co. Ltd. factories. The chief design bureau of the Cavalier tank is located at the Nuffield Mechanization factory.

Attachment: list #2

K. Olkhovskiy
April 12th, 1943"


SU-26: Blockade Long-Liver

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The start of the Great Patriotic War in the summer of 1941 forced many changes onto the prospective designs of Soviet SPGs. Many branches were cancelled, and work on the ZIS-30 SPG on the Komsomolets tractor platform was urgently started. Until then, it was not considered as an SPG platform at all. However, one SPG that was designed according to pre-war plans was not only built, but mass produced. This is a vehicle best known under the name SU-26. Its real name, T-26-6, was buried deep in the archives.


Obsolete chassis

The Red Army was re-arming in the spring of 1941. Factories were starting up production of new types of tanks. According to plans, the main light tank (support tank) was going to be the T-50. It was replacing the T-26, the Red Army's oldest and most numerous tank. Production began in 1931, and factory #174 delivered its last units in 1941, in parallel with preparation for T-50 production. When the T-50 was only being prepared for production, the army had a large number of T-26 tanks.

Two-turreted T-26 on the Neva Foothold, late 1941. The chassis of these vehicles would be used for infantry support SPGs.

The most critical situation was with two-turreted T-26 tanks. The army received 1626 tanks of this type. By the spring of 1941, the Red Army still had a large number of them. 450 tanks were built with mixed armament: the right turret housed a 37 mm gun, a combination of a naval Hotchkiss gun and the PS-1 gun mount. The same gun was used on the T-18 (MS-1) support tank, and there were issues with shell supplies by 1941. The other tanks of this type only had machineguns.

Both versions of the tank were of questionable value in combat by the start of WWII. Either way, two-turreted T-26 tanks were still used in the Polish campaign of 1939 and the Winter War of 1939-40. Without a replacement, they continued to serve. In 1940-41, many of them were modernized. The air intake on the engine deck was covered with a special shield, protecting it from Molotov cocktails. For example, the Leningrad Military District had 87 tanks of this type by May of 1941.

A reasonable question came up: what to do with these tanks? On May 27th, 1941, a Council of Commissars decree titled "On self propelled artillery" was published, which set the course for SPG development. One of them included a "self propelled 76 mm regimental mod. 1927/32 gun on the chassis of a two-turreted T-26 tank". The scale of production was impressive: 1200 T-26 tanks would be converted into SPGs in 1941 and 1942. The developer of this SPG was, logically, factory #174, a producer of T-26 tanks.

However, the conversion would not happen at the same place. The plan was to convert the tanks at the Vyksa Particle Size Reduction Equipment Factory (DRO), a producer of BA-20 armoured cars. This solution was logical, as factory #174 was loaded with T-50 orders.

According to the decree, factory #174 would receive two KT tank guns. Factory #7 would renew their production. Two prototypes were expected by September 1st. Factory #174 correspondence contains the index of this SPG: T-26-6. Alongside it, development of a 76 mm SPG and SPAAG on the T-50 chassis launched at factory #174.

On June 3rd, 1941, the factory design bureau, led by S.A. Ginzburg, began working on a draft project titled "KT-26 self propelled mount on the T-26 chassis". There was also a "self propelled AA gun on the T-26 chassis", designed on personal initiative, indexed T-26-8. On June 9th, 1941, the T-26 was considered as a chassis for a 57 mm gun armed tank destroyer, but it was declined due to an overloading of the chassis and low ammunition capacity.

On May 24th, 1941, tactical-technical characteristics for a "76 mm self propelled moto-mechanized unit support gun". On May 27th, they were approved by Marshal Kulik, at the time the deputy People's Commissar of Defense. The SPG was designed to combat enemy machinegun nests, light fortifications, and personnel. Effectively, it was a return to the almost decade-old SU-1 concept. This time, the fighting compartment would be half-open. According to requirements, the T-26-6 would have armour in the front, from the sides, and on top. The designers were required to make minimal changes to the chassis. The ammunition capacity of the SPG had to be at least 50 rounds.

The requirements gave factory #174's design bureau a good amount of leeway. This led to a noticeable difference between the T-26-6 and prior SPGs on the T-26 chassis.

Production during the blockade

The start of the Great Patriotic War affected the T-26-6 program as well. Most two-turreted T-26 tanks were lost in the first months of the war. The DRO factory in Vyksa also received additional production tasks, and became too busy to produce an SPG on an obsolete platform. Finally, factory #174 was busy with the T-50, and work dragged on. However, the vehicle, or rather vehicles, on the T-26 chassis were not forgotten.

The first vehicle to enter trials was a completely different SPG, one designed on factory #174's initiative. It was indexed T-26-5, and armed with a 37 mm 61-K autocannon. Sadly, only the text of the trials report survives to this day. According to the description, the SPAAG was very similar to the T-26-6, the only difference was in the armament and armour. The T-26-5 arrived at the Scientific Research Artillery Proving Grounds (ANIOP) on July 19th, 1941. Due to the rush, the gun's armour was made from mild steel, and various elements of the platform were unfinished.

These oversights significantly impacted the results of the firing trials, which took place from July 20th to 23rd, 1941. The beams that held the platform loosened during firing. As a result, the precision of fire decreased, except at certain traverse angles. Overall, the stability of the platform was deemed satisfactory, and the T-26-5 met requirements for a SPAAG.

The factory #174 design bureau received orders to complete the development of the SPAAG, especially the attachment of the gun platform to the chassis. The platform itself cause complaints: during firing, it bent visibly, which impeded the gun traverse. As a result of the trials, a decision to produce 140 of these vehicles was made. There was one caveat: the SPAAGs would be built only if there were tanks suitable for the chassis. This was the main obstacle on the way to production. In reality, only two of these vehicles were built, and both ended up in the 124th Tank Brigade.

Trials of the T-26-5 influenced the design of the 76 mm T-26-6 SPG. Factory #174 was preparing a "duplex", one chassis for two types of SPGs. Changes to the SPAAG forced the design bureau to make changes to the platform attachments. This meant that the draft T-26-6 project underwent some changes as well. The reworked variant was presented to the Military Council of the Leningrad Front on August 5th, 1941.

Since the DRO factory was no longer a suitable production base, an alternative was found. This was the Kirov Lifting and Transportation Equipment Factory. They were already working on tanks: thanks to their heavy equipment, they were working to repair tanks that were damaged in combat. The factory already had KhT-26 and KhT-130 tanks, built on the T-26 chassis. The issue of chassis was solved.

Assembly of the T-26-6 at the Kirov Lifting and Transportation Equipment Factory.

On August 11th, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front approved the production of the T-26-6, and two vehicles were already complete by the 24th. The result was completely different from prior SPGs on the T-26 chassis, and no longer completely met requirements. The turret and turret platform were removed from the tank, and the driver received a separate cabin. The platform was attached with channel beams along the entire length of the hull. This meant that servicing the engine became difficult, but factory #174's design bureau had no other choice.

The platform carried a pedestal, to which a large turret was attached. Thanks to the pedestal, the turret could traverse 360 degrees. The turret carried a crew of 2. The turret was considered open from the rear, but recently discovered fragments of armour suggest that it was at least partially covered.

There are disagreements regarding the armament. According to requirements, the T-26-6 carried the KT gun. However, the SPG was most likely armed with the 76 mm mod. 1927 regimental gun. This theory is supported by the fact that there was nowhere to get KT guns from. Two DT machineguns complemented the main gun. Hatches were cut in the platform for access to ammunition racks and the engine.

The gun's recoil mechanisms were armoured.

A decision to put the T-26-6 into production was made on August 26th, 1941. Since stores of repaired tanks were low, a decision was made to only convert 12 tanks: 8 flamethrower tanks, and 4 two-turreted tanks. There is conflicting information on how many of these SPGs were actually built. It is frequently said that 12 were built in 1941-42, but this number doesn't mesh with the supplies of these SPGs to tank units in late 1941.

These vehicles went to the 124th and 125th brigades, and later ended up in the 122nd and 123rd brigades. According to the TO&E, each brigade received a battery of 4 SPGs. Even though, in reality, everything might have been different, one can claim with some confidence that 12 SPGs and 2 SPAAGs were in service by early 1942. Production of the T-26-6 did not end there. On June 6th, 1942, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front signed decree #00915, which requested 6 "SPGs on the T-26 tank chassis" from the factory.

There is one nuance here, which confuses historians. There was at least one other factory in Leningrad that bore Kirov's name: the Kirov factory, producer of heavy tanks. By this time, most of it was evacuated to Chelyabinsk, but the remnants in Leningrad kept functioning. Its director was M.A. Dlugach.

As you can see, there is an armour plate in the rear of the turret.

Due to the confusion, some insist that the SPGs were produced there in 1942. This was not the case. The assembler of the SPGs was still the Kirov Lifting and Transportation Equipment Factory. Director B.N. Boykin was responsible for the assembly. For a number of reasons, the Front's order was not completed, and the first secretary of the Leningrad Municipal Committee of the VKP(b), Zhdanov, repeated his order on July 1st, in decree #001025. This time, he clarified: the SPG would be built on the chassis of T-26 tractors.

By August 1st, two SPGs were still under construction. From the looks of it, there was cooperation between the two Kirov factories. The heavy tank factory records production of 5 "mounts for guns on the T-26 tractor chassis" at a cost of 44,900 rubles per unit. Most likely, the heavy tank factory produced the components, and the lifting equipment factory assembled them.

In battle for Leningrad

The first T-26 SPGs to reach the front lines were the two T-26-5 SPAAGs. They were included in the 124th Tank Brigade. As for the 76 mm SPGs, they only arrived at the brigade in early January of 1942. These SPGs also ended up in the 125th Tank Brigade, from where they were passed onto the 2nd Battalion of the 123rd Tank Brigade. In the brigade's documents, they are recorded as "T-26 tanks with 76 mm guns".

As of February 12th, 1942, the 1st Battalion of the 122nd Tank Brigade had two "SU artillery tanks". On the next day, the battalion assaulted the southern outskirts of Pogostye, as a result of which one SPG was lost. The remaining vehicle was actively used in the battalion's operations.

On March 6th, according to an order from the commander of the 54th ARmy, the tank battalion received reinforcements, including another SPG. Its likely that the vehicle arrived from the 124th Tank Brigade. That brigade lost two T-26 SPGs in battle at Vinyagolovo, including one SPAAG. During an attack by the 122nd Tank Brigade on March 9th, one SPG was knocked out, and it was towed to a disabled vehicle collection point.

The remaining vehicle kept fighting around Konduy common and Smerdynya village. According to the combat records, the combat group had two "SU"s by March 30th, meaning that the knocked out vehicle from March 9th was repaired. On April 2nd, both SPGs were sent for repairs at the brigade's workshop. The damage must have been minor, since both vehicles returned into service on the next day. On April 7th, the 122nd Tank Brigade supported the advance of the 115th Rifle Division, and on the 17th, it was removed from the front lines.

Knocked out SPG, likely from the 122nd Tank Brigade, near Pogostye, winter-spring of 1942.

The SPGs of the 122nd Tank Brigade went into action once more in September of 1942. On the 8th, the brigade supported the 53rd Rifle Brigade. The offensive, initially successful, stalled due to the enemy's increasing resistance. The swampy terrain didn't help, since the brigade constantly had to pull their tanks out of the muck.

On September 11th, the 122nd TBr was reassigned to the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front. A part of the brigade was sent to the region of Tortolovo, while the rest remained at their previous positions with the 53rd brigade. By this point, one "SU" remained, with the 1st Tank Battalion. By October 2nd, the second "SU" resurfaces in the brigade's reports. Both vehicles vanish from the brigade in the end of the month. Theis subsequent fate is unknown.

As for the 124th Tank Brigade, only one SPAAG remained in service by the fall of 1942.

An SPG from the 2nd Tank Battalion of the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade, Leningrad, fall of 1942. As you can see, the vehicle is also camouflaged.

SPGs of this type lasted a lot longer on the Leningrad Front. As mentioned above, the first two "T-26 tank with 76 m/m gun", serial numbers T-8 and T-9, were received from the 124th and 125th Tank Brigades. This happened on January 12th, 1942. On May 5th, 1942, the 123rd Tank Brigade was renamed "1st Red Banner Tank Brigade". By then, the brigade had 4 "SU T-26". They were gathered into an artillery tank battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant, R.P. Kozlov, which was a part of the 2nd Tank Battalion.

Between July 20th and August 5th, 1942, the brigade fought near Staro-Panovo and Uritsk. During fighting at Staro-Panovo, the SPGs destroyed three dugouts, 9 anti-tank guns, a mortar with its crew, 3 MG nests, and up to 50 German soldiers and officers. Lieutenant Kozlov received the Order of the Red Banner for these achievements. Senior Sergeant A.V. Zaitsev was rewarded separately. During fighting on July 22-23, the SPG commander walked through a minefield under enemy fire, directing the path of his vehicle. For this act, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

After the end of combat, the brigade was sent to Leningrad, where it was based near the House of the Soviets.

T-26-6 from the 220th Tank Brigade, Operation Spark, January 1943

Vehicles produced in the summer of 1942 by the Kirov factories ended up in the 220th Tank Brigade. The first "SU battery" is mentioned in the brigade's composition on December 15th, 1942. By January 9th, 1943, the brigade counted four "T-26 SU". In this composition, the 220nd Tank Brigade's SPG battery started Operation Spark, the goal of which was the penetration of the blockade around Leningrad.

On January 16th, the vehicles began the fight for Kirov town #2. The tanks' success was not reinforced by infantry. One "T-26 SU" from the 84th Tank Battalion lost its floor from an explosion, but, according to further records, it was returned into service. The brigade fought side by side with the 142nd Naval Rifle Brigade. By the 21st, its battery had 3 "SU"s, and another one was knocked out on the following day. The SPGs remained with the brigade for a long time. As of December 24th, 1943, the 84th Tank Battalion still had one "T-26 SU". The last SPG vanished from the 220nd brigade in early January of 1944.

Fire correction.

The Leningrad SPGs from the 1st Red Banner Tank Brigade lasted the longest. As of January 1st, 1944, the brigade had three "T-26 SU-76". The SPGs were gathered into Senior Lieutenant M.I. Krasilnikov's tank destroyer battery. The fourth vehicle in the battery was a SU-76M (SU-15M). During battles for Kurgeleva, the battery destroyed 3 anti-tank guns, 8 machineguns, 2 dugouts, 1 trench shelter, and up to 40 German soldiers and officers. Krasilnikov was heavily wounded, but later returned to his post. By January 19th, when the brigade began moving out to positions to attack Krasnoye Selo, only one "T-26 SU-76" remained in its ranks. This vehicle survived the complete penetration of the Leningrad blockade.

On the 23rd, 4 "T-26 SU-76" SPGs arrived from the 12th Independent Training Tank Regiment. The battery kept fighting in the summer of 1944. On June 11th, the brigade fought at Yappilya and Halal, entered Vammelarvi, the location of the HQ of the Finnish 4th Army Corps, on the 14th, and repelled a counterattack. On June 19th, the unit took Kämärä (modern day Gavrilovo), and fought for Wyborg on the next day.

By the end of the operation, the worn down SPGs began to break down. On June 19th, one broke down for technical reasons, and all of them needed factory repairs by June 23rd. They were replaced with SU-76es.

When analyzing the performance of the T-26-6 in combat, we must remember that the Leningrad Front was a world of its own. Even in 1944, T-26, T-60, T-70, and BT tanks were widely used here. Even correcting for that, one must admit that the T-26-6 was effective in combat. These SPGs were successfully used as support weapons, destroying enemy infantry and light fortifications. It is regrettable that the idea of converting old two-turret T-26es into SPGs only came up in the summer of 1941.

Through Adversity to the SU-122

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It was clear by the spring of 1942 that work on a medium SPG on the T-34 chassis with an 85 mm gun in a rotating turret hit a dead end. The result of this work, which started back in the summer of 1940, was the U-20, which the military considered unsatisfactory. The project didn't leave the drawing board. Later, development of Soviet SPGs took a different path. A significant influence was the study of a captured StuG III Ausf. B. Later, factory #592 built a Soviet version on its chassis, called SG-122. It was clear, however, that converting foreign vehicles was not the end.

From tank destroyer to assault gun

One can't say that Soviet engineers decided to copy a German SPG. Soviet and German opinions regarding the tasks for medium SPGs were too different. The StuG III was more of a budget support tank variant, built, primarily, for direct fire. The self propelled version of the 75 mm gun, initially meant for the B.W. tank (future PzIV), had fairly limited firepower. It was suitable for fighting infantry and MG nests, but even light concrete fortifications were too tough for it.

The Soviet military envisioned a much wider spectrum of applications for a medium SPG. It had to fire not only directly, but indirectly, with the ability to confidently defeat light fortifications and dugouts. The M-30 122 mm mod. 1938 howitzer was ideal for this task. By 1942, the Germans also came to the conclusion that the capabilities of the 75 mm gun were limited. This resulted in the StuH 42, armed with a 105 mm leFH howitzer. However, the Germans retained the primary purpose of direct fire, while the Soviet SG-122 had a maximum elevation of 40 degrees.

M-30 122 mm howitzer, the workhorse of Soviet divisional artillery.

On April 14th, 1942, a plenum of the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA) was held, at which a development plan for Soviet self propelled artillery was devised. Among other decisions, the plenum decided to develop a "self propelled howitzer to combat dugouts and concentrations of enemy personnel". Work on creating a "M-30 122 mm howitzer on the T-34 chassis" was given to two organizations: factory #183 (Nizhniy Tagil) and factory #8 (Sverdlovsk). At the same time, a decision was made to cancel the U-20.

Even though this decision did not cancel the SG-122, priority was given to the vehicle on a domestically produced chassis. The decision was a correct one. The amount of foreign chassis was limited, and what little could be acquired came in a heavily worn state. As a result, SPGs on the T-34 chassis ended up in service before the SG-122. Nevertheless, the road to the future SU-122 was far from an easy one.

Draft work

The choice of factory #8 as the developer of the "M-30 122 mm howitzer on the T-34 tank chassis" was a logical decision. This was the developer of the initial SPG on the T-34 chassis, and many of its staff worked on the U-20. Development of the U-20 was headed by F.F. Petrov, who became the head of the factory #8 design bureau, extracted from the UZTM design bureau, in February of 1942.  It was Petrov who developed the M-30 howitzer in the first place.Overall direction of the work was set by T.A. Sandler, the chief designer at factory #8. Two design bureaus ended up being housed in the same building at Uralmash. 

Cutaway diagram of the ZIK-10 SPG, showing off the advantages of the U-11 gun.

Meanwhile, despite the Artkom's decision, development of the new SPG was not easy. Factory #183 effectively quit the development program. It's hard to blame the factory's management. Nizhniy Tagil was ramping up production of T-34 tanks in the spring of 1942. 75 tanks were delivered in January, but by April, 380 tanks were delivered, and 500 in May. The idea of saddling the factory with production of an SPG on top of production of tanks, which continued to grow, was a poor idea, both from the point of view of the factory and the GABTU. The army needed T-34s like the air it breathed. It's not surprising that the prospective SPG was left without a chassis.

There are some issues with the layout of the fighting compartment. As you can see, there is hardly any room to the right of the gun.

Sverdlovsk was also having significant issues with the prospective SPG. When the decision to begin development was made, factory #8's design bureau was already loaded with other work. Development of the 85 mm ZIK-1 tank gun began in March, and the development of the 45 mm ZIK-4 anti-tank gun began around that same time. In the spring of 1942, the design bureau, under Petrov's supervision, began working on a gun mount for the SPG made with T-60 components. The 76 mm assault gun received the index ZIK-7, and it was being designed in two variants. In addition, a 25 mm SPAAG, the ZIK-5, was developed. 

The first documentation for the ZIK-7 project appeared in May of 1942, before work on the medium SPG had even began. The reason was simple: while it was not certain when the T-34 chassis would be available, the light T-60 chassis was being designed right in Sverdlovsk. As a result, work on the medium SPG began only in the summer of 1942.

Perpendicular cutaway of the ZIK-10.

Let us also discuss some liberties taken by factory #8 design bureau staff. Initially, the Artillery Committee received a tank, instead of an SPG. Instead of an SPG on the T-34 chassis, Petrov's bureau designed an artillery tank, equipped with the U-11 howitzer. The reworked system was indexed U-22. Factory #183's design bureau designed a reworked turret to fit it. The T-34 equipped with a U-22 gun was mistakenly classified as an SPG by some researchers, but it is very much a tank.

The U-22 was designed on the factory's own initiative, and caused mixed feelings in the Artillery Committee. On July 20th, 1942, a response was received at factory #8. The project was deemed nonviable, and factory #8 was instructed to run ideas like these past the GAU, to avoid wasting time.

U-11 gun, redesigned for installation into the ZIK-10. A tray has been added to make loading easier.

The creativity of factory #8's design bureau did not end there. Petrov couldn't come to terms with the fact that the U-11 was unused. Work on the KV-9 hit a dead end, and the future of the gun was not promising. The factory already produced a batch of ten U-11s. There were other, better reasons to use the gun. The M-30 required a large pedestal mount, which took up space. The StuG III and SG-122 suffered from the same drawback, as the mount ate up a lot of space in the already cramped fighting compartment. The U-11, designed for installation in a turret, was viewed by Petrov as a superior alternative.

Ammunition layout diagram. It was stored in the same way on the ZIK-11.

After the failure with their artillery tank, factory #8's design bureau focused on the SPG. Or, rather, SPGs. Considering that the U-11 variant will be superior, Petrov gave priority to that variant, which was indexed ZIK-10. The design philosophy was to make as few changes as possible to the T-34 chassis. The project was reminiscent of the KV-7, where the goal was to make as few changes as possible to the KV-1 chassis.

The demand to minimally alter the chassis of an SPG came from the military, and often caused issues. With the ZIK-10, the factory decided on several alterations. For example, the size of the fighting compartment was increased due to reducing the slope of the sides. The U-11, mounted on a frame, was located inside. This solution allows the removal of the bulky pedestal mount, which made the fighting compartment roomier.

Overall view of the ZIK-11 SPG.

Following the requirement to alter the T-34 chassis as little as possible, the designers became its prisoners. The requirement was met, but introduced issues. For example, the front of the hull had a characteristic "step", with the upper part having a slope of only 15 degrees, a questionable decision from the point of view of shell resistance. The hatches in the sides of the casemate were also questionable. The casemate had no roof, which improved ventilation, but introduced a number of other issues.

The ammunition capacity was also low: only 32 rounds.

The addition of a pedestal mount for the M-30 hardly made the fighting compartment any roomier.

Similar issues could be found in the design bureau's other project, known as the ZIK-11. Unlike the ZIK-10, it used the 122 mm M-30 howitzer, as set in the tactical-technical requirements. There were almost no changes to the system compared to the production version. The recoil mechanisms were covered in armour, a new travel lock was added, and a new lower mount, which still used as many parts from the M-30 as possible.

Strangely enough, there was now more room to the right of the gun, but still a risk to be injured, as there was no guard rail.

Even though a pedestal mount was necessary, it was less massive than the one on the StuG III or SG-122. The aim to use the unaltered M-30 meant that the gun had no guard rails. In a combat situation, this would have caused accidents.

The cutaway shows that there is still not much room to the right of the gun.

The design of the casemate was similar to the one developed for the ZIK-10. The layout of the ZIK-11 casemate was more rational. The "step" in the front of the hull had a higher slope. The ammunition capacity was the same as on the ZIK-10, but it was better laid out. The height of the vehicle was 2100 mm, compared to the ZIK-11's 2270 mm. The opening in the roof was also smaller.

Reconstruction of the ZIK-11 in 1:35th scale, made according to factory blueprints by Aleksandr Kalashnik, Omsk.

Both projects were sent to the Technical Council of the People's Commissariat of Armament (NKV), which, for obvious reasons, picked the ZIK-11. Even this vehicle raised a number of questions. The NKV Technical Council composed a list of issues which had to be corrected before the vehicle would enter production. However, development never reached that stage. At that point, Petrov's bureau was working on four SPGs at once. Work on the heavy ZIK-20 progressed the furthest, reaching the stage of a full scale model. As for the ZIK-11, a different fate awaited it.

Gorlitskiy's revenge

While factory #8's design bureau was working on the ZIK-10 and ZIK-11, an important event happened in Sverdlovsk. On July 28th, 1942, GKO decree #2120 "On organization of T-34 production at Uralmash and factory #37" was published. Factory #37 became a part of UZTM, and was renamed to factory #50. Development of light tanks and SPGs at the factory ceased. On September 29th, the factory delivered its first T-34 tanks. Sverdlovsk finally gained an SPG chassis.

Center of mass calculations of the U-35, November 1942

The delays in medium SPG development did not go unnoticed. The deal began to affect organizations outside the GAU and NKV, the customers and operators of self propelled artillery. According to initial plans, factory #8 was supposed to present its project on June 25th, 1942. The date was then moved to August 10th. In reality, the ZIK-10 and ZIK-11 were only presented on September 8th.

The slipping of the deadlines attracted the attention of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel-General of Artillery, N.N. Voronov. A torrent of correspondence erupted between the NKO and the GAU. Voronov reported to Stalin about what was happening. On October 16th, Voronov held a meeting, at which tactical-technical requirements for new SPGs were discussed.

Cutaway of the U-35. Overall, the vehicle was similar to the ZIK-11, but with many improvements.

On October 19th, 1942, GKO decree #2429ss "On production of experimental prototypes of self propelled artillery". The future SU-122 was first on the list.

"The People's Commissariat of Tank Production (comrade Zaltsmann) and People's Commissariat of Armament (comrade Ustinov) must urgently build prototypes of SPGs with a 122 mm howitzer on the T-34 tank chassis, and present them for proving grounds trials, following these deadlines: NKV: November 10th, NKTP: November 20th".

Tactical-technical characteristics for a "122 mm self propelled howitzer on the T-34 chassis" were approved on the same day. They permitted alteration of the side plates, moving the driver, and moving the fuel tanks. On October 20th, by Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production Kotin's initiative, a meeting of the Uralmash SKB took place. The ZIK-11 project was examined once more. The project was approved in general, but a decision was made to rework it based on the new requirements. The biggest change was that the development moved from the factory #8 design bureau to UZTM. A 16 man group was selected from the design department, headed by L.I. Gorlitskiy.

Interestingly enough, the process of transferring ZIK-11 documentation began on October 19th. This was done without permission from the NKV, on the initiative of the People's Commissar of Tank Production. Further work was overseen by Kotin. Naturally, the NKV was hardly pleased with this course of events, but there was no other way to speed up development.

The layout of the fighting compartment improved. Nevertheless, the width was kept to the T-34's dimensions, which made it cramped.

The decision to move the work of factory #8 to UZTM can be called Gorlitskiy's revenge. Factory #8 managed to force the 152 mm SPG on the KV-1 chassis away from UZTM, and now there was a chance to strike back. However, factory #8 was overloaded with work. In addition, on October 30th, it was split up into two organizations: factory #8, which was tasked with development of AA artillery, and factory #9, which worked on howitzers and SPGs. Petrov was transferred to factory #9. In this situation, everyone understood that transferring the work on the ZIK-11 to UZTM was the right decision.

U-35 on trials, December 1942

The reworked ZIK-11 received the index U-35. The design group tasked with its development consisted of specialists that had experience with SPG design. They included N.V. Kurin, G.F. Ksyunin, and K.N. Ilyin, which worked on the weapons for the KV-7 assault tank. Even though GKO decree #2429 set a very strict timeline, the U-35's design was late.

The overall layout was finalized towards the end of November. Some of its elements were borrowed from the ZIK-11, but, overall, Gorlitskiy's SPG was significantly altered - and improved. The idea of a semi-enclosed fighting compartment was discarded. The fighting compartment received a roof with two hatches, as well as a commander's cupola, analogous to the one that factory #183 designed for the three-man T-34 turret. The SPG still had a "step" in the front hull, but the machineguns in the front plate were deleted.

The thickness of the upper front plate increased to 60 mm. The armour of the recoil mechanism was improved, and now allowed turning the gun 10 degrees to the left and right. The bustle that held ammunition in the ZIK-11 was deleted. The gun was also reworked. Most importantly, a guard rail and loading tray, like on the SG-122, were added.

The Sverdlovsk SPG successfully passed mobility trials.

On October 29th, 1942, the GAU Artillery Committee approved the program of trials for an experimental prototype of the SPG. In practice, the deadline for the prototype production was very optimistic. As of November 28th, the vehicle was still under construction. Completion was awaited in early December. The GAU considered this situation caused by "a lack of necessary attention from the factory's management". In reality, UZTM and its subcontractors were overloaded with work. Factory #592, which was building an analogous SG-2 SPG, was also running late.

The same vehicle from the left.

Assembly of the first prototype was finished on November 30th. Trials at the factory proving grounds took place on the same day. The vehicle arrived incomplete: observation devices, the panoramic sight, seats, and ammunition racks were not installed. This was the result of a rush. The aiming mechanisms were not tuned, as a result of which, the flywheels were hard to turn.

The trials started poorly. On the first attempt to load the gun, the loading tray broke. It was removed, so it wouldn't get in the way. The firing mechanism cable broke on the first shot, and the rest were made by pulling on a cord. There were issues with elevating the gun all the way, and with horizontal aiming. When the gun was turned 10 degrees to the right, it was impossible to use the right friction clutch. The installation of the gun also reduced the driver's visibility. After gunnery trials, a significant part of the issues were resolved.

Reconstruction of the U-35 by Aleksandr Kalashnik.

Experimental prototypes of the U-35 and SG-2 were taken to the Gorohovets Scientific Research Experimental Proving Grounds (ANIOP). The U-35 had an advantage, since the SG-2 was built using a refurbished tank, which turned out to be defective. Even at this stage, some issues were found. The mass of the U-35 was higher by 700 kg, and its ammunition capacity was 34 rounds, instead of the required 40. More issues were discovered when the fighting compartment was examined. The overall conclusion says it all:

"The dimensions of the fighting compartment, the placement of ammunition, and crew positions do not only make normal service of the howitzer impossible, but also the safe operation of the gun."

The practical traverse angle to the right was less than 0.5 degrees. The rate of fire was only 5 RPM, instead of the required 10. The commander's seat was uncomfortable, and the visibility through the cupola was limited. The gunner, whose pose during firing was called "unnatural", didn't fare any better. It was also hard to aim. The loader was in danger of being hit by the howitzer during firing, and the breech operator's shoulder was right up against the commander's feet. It was also hard to work the elevation flywheel. The loading was effectively done by only one man, and it was hard to extract ammunition from the racks. The hatches were uncomfortable, and the ventilator did not do its job. Overall, the commission composed a list of 15 items for improvement. The conclusions were as follows:

"The fighting compartment of the Uralmash SPG in this configuration is unacceptable, and must be radically redesigned to correct the aforementioned defects."

As a result of trials, the U-35 was changed. The model shows how cramped the vehicle ended up.

Considering that the UZTM design was much better than the ZIK-11, one can only imagine the verdict that the product of the factory #8 design bureau would have received. The commission concluded that the SG-2 was better than the U-35. There were also issues with it, but largely with the chassis, which, as mentioned above, was defective.

The issue was that, on December 2nd, GKO decree #2559 was published, turning over factory #592 to the NKTP and forming factory #40. Instead of the SG-122, it began producing light T-70 tanks (later replaced with the T-80). This decree meant that it would be the U-35, referred to as the SU-35 in the decree, that went into production. The commission demanded that the U-35 be altered, using the SG-2 fighting compartment layout. Sverdlovsk got to work, and by the end of December, a completely new vehicle was ready, which retained very little from the U-35. Its story deserves a separate article.

Unlucky SPG from Mytishi

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On December 2nd, 1942, GKO decree #2559ss "On organization of production of self propelled guns (SPGs) at the Uralmash factory and factory #38" was signed. It became the final point in the long history of Soviet medium SPGs, which started out as tank destroyers, but turned into assault guns in the spring of 1942. On GKO's orders, the U-35, designed by the UZTM design bureau, was put into production, even though it had not even entered trials yet. This kind of order is explained by the desperate need for these kind of vehicles in the Red Army. Interestingly, instead of Sverdlovsk, Mytishi could have become the center for medium SPG development. The SPGs designed at factory #592 were, at the very least, no worse than those designed in Sverdlovsk.

From the "Artshturm" to a domestic chassis

In the spring of 1942, NKV factory #592, organized at the Mytishi Machinebuilding Factory, was at the front of the pack when it came to Soviet SPG development. While Sverdlovsk tried to polish the tank destroyer on a T-34 chassis armed with an 85 mm gun, Mytishi was working on and SPG on the chassis of a captured StuG III. This was not done on personal initiative, but on orders from the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA). Designed under the supervision of E.V. Sinilshikov and S.G. Pererushev, the 122-SG SPG project armed the German SPG with a Soviet made 122 mm M-30 howitzer. On April 6th, the project was examined by the Artillery Committee, and approved.

By that time, it was clear that the U-20, the long-suffering tank destroyer project on a T-34 chassis, does not meet modern requirements. At a plenum held by the Artillery Committee on April 14th, 1942, the U-20 was finally buried. Instead, the "howitzer SPG for combat against enemy dugouts and personnel concentrations" was chosen. Instead of creating a turreted SPG, the GAU decided to follow the German development path.

SG-122M projet, late June of 1942.

Even though the SG-122 project had a red light, the GAU viewed the use of a German chassis as a temporary measure. The StuG III chassis was the bottleneck in the production process: the SG-122 completely depended on the number of captured tanks at repair bases. It's not surprising that a decision was made at the April 14th plenum to develop an analogous SPG on the T-34 chassis. Two factories were selected as developers: factory #8 and factory #183. The first would design the SPG and supply M-30 systems, the second would build the SPG.

Overall views of the SG-122M. The concept of factory #592's SPG was similar to the Sverdlovsk design.

Factory #592 was not even mentioned at the plenum. No one uttered a word about ending work on the SG-122. In addition, in late April, the GAU instructed factory #592 director D.F. Pankratov to design a "122 mm self propelled howitzer on the T-34 chassis". The appearance of factory #592 among the developers of T-34 SPGs was no coincidence. It wasn't said explicitly, but a second developer was insurance in case work at factory #8 hit a dead end again. In addition, Mytishi was designing an SPG with the M-3- gun anyway. It was logical to use that experience to design an SPG on the T-34 chassis.

Cutaway of the SG-122M. You can see how different the layout is from the ZIK-11.

Work on the design, internally indexed SG-122M, progressed slowly. The numbers of the factory #592 design bureau were increased to speed things up, but the SG-122 was only ready by the middle of June of 1942. By then, there was an alternative to the M-30, directly connected with UZTM and factory #8. In November-December of 1941, they developed the U-11 122 mm tank gun as a weapon for the KV-1 heavy tank.

Despite some theories, it was not designed to boost the firepower of the KV-1, but to resolve the issue of shortages. The 122 mm M-30 howitzer was used for a simple reason: it was the only gun produced at UZTM. Based on this howitzer, a tank gun was designed and tested in a modified KV-1 turret. The  resulting KV-9 tank passed trials, and was about to enter production. Factory #8 received an order for a pilot batch of 10 guns. Even though the project was closed at the GAU's insistence, 10 U-11 howitzers were made after all in April of 1942. The reasonable question of what to do with them came up.

The layout as seen from above was also different.

The first attempt was the development of the U-22 system, the same U-11, but for installation into a modified T-34 turret. The joint proposal by factories #8 and #183 was declined. A more reasonable idea was the inclusion of the U-11 into the prospective SPG development program. Instead of one SPG, factory #592 began working on two. The U-11 variant received the index SG-122U. There was a reason for its development: the M-30 needed a massive pedestal mount, like the one in the SG-122. The pedestal took up a lot of space, and there wasn't exactly a surplus of it in the T-34's fighting compartment. A special cupola had to be introduced for the panoramic sight. As for the U-11, it was attached to a frame, took up much less space, and the telescopic sight didn't need a cupola. There was also no need for a massive recoil system cover.

Reconstruction of the SG-122M in 1:35th scale, made according to factory blueprints. Author: Aleksandr Kalashnik, Omsk.

Drafts of both projects were ready by the end of June of 1942. Overall, they were very similar, excluding the armament. Another big difference was that the SG-122M had a DT machinegun, and the SG-122U had no auxiliary armament. Even though the U-11 design was better, the M-30 variant had higher priority. With all of its drawbacks, the M-30 was in mass production, and the factory didn't even have a sample of the U-11 for more detailed development. It's not surprising that the SU-122M was prioritized.

According to the draft, the turret was replaced with a prism-shaped casemate. The sides of the casemate were widened, to increase its volume. At the same time, the design aimed to minimize changes of the chassis. Unlike the ZIK-10 and ZIK-11 SPGs from Sverdlovsk, both SG-122 variants had completely enclosed fighting compartments. The crew entered and exited the vehicle through a large two-piece hatch in the roof. The issue of visibility was seriously considered, and vision ports were added in the front and sides. According to the design, the mass of the SG-122M was 28.5 tons. The gun could be aimed vertically from -3 to +35 degrees, and horizontally from 7 degrees to the left to 17 degrees to the right. The rate of fire was estimated at 10-12 RPM. The vehicle carried 40 rounds of ammunition.

SG-122U.

As odd as it sounds, the issue with the SG-122M and SG-122U was the chassis. By the end of July of 1942, the situation on the front line caused issues with supplies of T-34s. On July 30th, a letter arrived at the desk of the GABTU chief, Lieutenant-General Ya.N. Fedorenko, from the GAU chief, Colonel-General Yakovlev. He requested four refurbished T-34 tanks for factory #592. A response arrived on July 6th: the tanks can only be issued on orders from the government.

There was another issue with the SG-122U: the factory still had no howitzers. To solve this issue, Yakovlev wrote to the People's Commissar of Armament, D.F. Ustinov. On July 6th, Ustinov gave the order to issue the U-11 howitzers.

Despite the more compact gun, the SG-122U was more cramped.

The situation with refurbished tanks that prototypes of the SG-122M and SG-122U would be built on was different. There was no progress on this issue over the course of a month and a half. Without an answer from Fedorenko, Yakovlev wrote a letter to Molotov on August 18th, 1942, asking for two refurbished tanks. Molotov agreed on August 20th, but this did not help matters much. The factory hadn't received any tanks in August or September. Ironically, by this time, factory #592 managed to get foreign chassis, albeit with significant difficulty. In another world, the production of medium SPGs could have started in Mytishi in the fall of 1942. This situation played a critical part in the fate of the factory #592's design.

Good design, bad production base

Nobody knows how long this situation would have gone on for, if the development of SPGs wasn't accelerated in the first half of October. This was largely caused by the delays with the development of the ZIK-10 and ZIK-11. Unlike factory #592, whose work was slowed down by a lack of tanks, factory #8 had other issues. To be honest, the vehicles designed under F.F. Petrov's guidance weren't as good at the ones designed in Mytishi, but that was not the issue. The design bureau was overloaded with a wide variety of concurrent projects. There were six SPGs alone, not counting towed artillery.

The situation was serious enough to demand personal attention of the People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel-General of Artillery, N.N. Voronov. On October 16th, a meeting was held, discussing the requirements for SPGs. On the 19th, GKO decree #2429ss "On production of experimental SPGs" was published, setting tight deadlines for production of prototypes. After this, the SG-122M project finally moved forward. However, the SG-122U had already died by then. Despite the GABTU's desire to put this weapon into production, the GAU was categorically opposed.

SG-2 during trials. December 1942.

After a long delay, factory #592 finally received a refurbished T-34 tank. This was an STZ tank, which received battle damage and was hurriedly patched up at repair base #1. Later, the condition of the chassis will play a fatal role in the story of the SPG from Mytishi. According to order #541ss from the People's Commissar of Armament, issued on October 23rd, 1942, factory #592 only had a short amount of time to build its vehicle: until November 10th. For a number of reasons, the deadline was missed. As of November 21st, the gun was still being installed, and completion was not expected until November 24th. Things at UZTM were moving even more slowly. By that time, the assembly of the hull had not yet started.

The view from the right shows the bulge that covers the gun.

Factory #592 finished its product earlier than its competitors. As of November 28th, the experimental prototype, indexed SG-2, was completed, and was being prepared for factory trials. Overall, this SPG followed the SG-122M blueprints, but the design of the casemate was different. The draft of the SG-122 had no driver's hatch. The right of the front plate also had to be changed, to protect the oscillating part of the M-30 from the sides. The result was quite complicated, and far from aesthetically pleasing. However, that is not the main requirement for an SPG, and the U-35 didn't look much better.

The commander was placed into the bulge, with a PTK device for observation. In addition, the commander had the use of a 9-R radio set. The issue was that the commander also had to aim the gun vertically. Overall, the decision to move the commander to the front right of the fighting compartment was the correct one, since that allowed better placement of the crew and internal equipment.

Unlike the U-35, the SG-2 kept its machinegun.

The fighting compartment and gun mount were similar to that of the SG-122. The M-30 howitzer was slightly altered, and a tray was added to ease loading. The improved layout allowed the placement of the required amount of ammunition into the hull: 40 rounds. The cupola for the periscopic sight was enlarged. The hatch design was altered. It still had two parts, but one was moved to the rear of the casemate. This made exiting the vehicle and loading ammunition easier.

Another feature of the reworked SG-122M was that its height was only 2120 mm. The howitzer was lowered into a cutout in the front plate. The front plate, as specified in the requirements, was 65-90 mm thick. To compare, the U-35 only had 45 mm of armour.

The casemate hatch, which eased the loading of ammunition, is visible.

The SG-2 arrived at the Gorohovets Scientific Research Artillery Proving Grounds (ANIOP) on December 4th. Issues with the refurbished chassis arose almost immediately. The vehicle drove to the proving grounds on its own, but there were serious issues with the controls after only 5 km. The vehicle had to be towed to the proving grounds by a tractor. A group of specialists was dispatched from the nearby factory #112. Repairs went on for a week, but the issues were never completely solved. As a result, the mobility trials were never performed, and gunnery trials were reduced to 235 rounds.

All of these issues were eclipsed by another one. On December 2nd, GKO decree #2559 was published, which transferred factory #592 from the domain of the NKV to the NKTP, turning into factory #40. The reason for this was the conversion of factory #38 to production of the SU-12. Trials of the SG-2 were performed for completion's sake. Considering that UZTM was already producing T-34s, the choice of the U-35 for mass production was logical. The SPG from Sverdlovsk also had no mechanical issues.

The gun at maximum elevation.

After studies of the fighting compartment and gunnery trials, a different opinion formed. The U-35's fighting compartment performed as poorly as its chassis performed well. The commission explicitly called its layout unacceptable. The fighting compartment ended up cramped, and in some places, dangerous.

The SG-2 fighting compartment left a different impression. It was considered too low (the height was to be increased by 5 cm), and the low location of the panoramic sight made it difficult to work with. The list of required improvements contained 11 items. Overall, the commission ruled in favour of the SG-2, which had undeniable advantages over the U-35. The rate of fire was better: at 7-8 RPM, it was short of the 10 RPM requirement, but it was better than 5 RPM on the U-35. In its conclusion, the commission demanded that the U-35 be improved by using the design of the SG-2.

If not the poor condition of the chassis, the SG-2 could have passed trials. The problem was that the decision to put the U-35 into production was made before trials even began. The Sverdovsk SPG could have lost to its Mytishi competitor, even if Sinilshikov would have had an issue with the chassis for his product.

Lend Lease Impressions: 57 mm M1 Anti-tank Gun

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"57 mm M1 Anti-tank Gun

American 57 mm M1 Anti-tank Gun

The gun has a semiautomatic vertical sliding breech, the semiautomatic mechanism is a mechanical type. The mount has split trails. The gun fires one-piece armour piercing shot (without explosive filler).

The following is a comparison of main characteristics of the American 57 mm anti-tank gun and our 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942, 57 mm IS-1 anti-tank gun, and 76 mm ZIS-3 gun.

Characteristics
45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942
American 57 mm M1 gun
57 mm IS-1 anti-tank gun
76 mm ZIS-3 divisional gun
Mass in battle position, kg
570
1140
1120
1120
Shell mass, kg
1.43
2.85
3.14
6.5
Muzzle velocity, m/s
870
815
900
655
Penetration of a K-2400 armour plate at 90 degrees




100 meters
70 mm
78 mm
98 mm
75 mm
300 meters
65 mm
70 mm
91 mm
72 mm
500 meters
61 mm
63 mm
86 mm
69 mm
1000 meters
51 mm
48 mm
71 mm
61 mm

The American 57 mm anti-tank gun weighs about as much as our 57 mm IS-1 anti-tank gun, but the penetration is significantly less than that of our gun, and is only somewhat higher than that of the 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942, which weighs almost half as much as the American gun.

As a result of trials performed with this gun, it was established that the main drawback is the dependence of the recoil mechanisms on the temperature of the hydraulic fluid (in winter conditions). Until the fluid is heated, the gun will not return to its original position after recoil.

The gun has insufficient clearance, the diameter of the wheels is too small, and the suspension is rigid, which lowers the qualities of the gun on maneuver, especially when pushing it across the battlefield with the force of the crew. 

The design of the gun does not satisfy modern requirements for anti-tank guns, and makes it suitable for stationary defenses only.

57 mm armour piercing tracer shot

Ammunition for the 57 mm M1 anti-tank gun

57 mm armour piercing tracer shot, American make
The results of trials were satisfactory. The shot is a modern design, but it is inferior to domestic 57 mm armour piercing shells due to the higher muzzle velocity of the latter.

Cancellation of the SG-122

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"To the State Committee of Defense, comrade V.M. Molotov
January 3rd, 1943

GOKO decree #2429ss issued on October 19th, 1942, which began domestic SPG development, also approved production of 120 SG-122 122 mm self propelled howitzers on the chassis of the captured German Artshturm at factory #592.

Factory #592, due to a lack of necessary organization, failed to complete this task, and produced only 6 SPGs, fulfilling a separate GAU order.

As of January 1st, 1943, the factory was supposed to have produced 60 units of SG-122, in reality the current state of production is as follows:
  1. Produced and trialled, but not accepted: 8
  2. Produced and preparing for trials: 10
  3. Preparing for howitzer installation: 11
At the time, the idea of building 120 self propelled howitzers with minimal effort, especially without a comparable vehicle in production, was worthy of attention.

The inability to provide spare parts, special training required for drivers, low lifespan of parts (as the were already worn and went through repairs), all of this was a suitable price to pay for offensive self propelled artillery.

Currently, since factory #592 did not provide this artillery in time, and since domestic production of self propelled artillery is picking up, subsequent production of the SG-122, which also requires a new factory (due to the transfer of the factory to the NKTP), is unreasonable.

In reporting this, I ask to present to the Government a proposal to cease the production of the SG-122, limiting it to the completion of the 29 vehicles that were already started by the former factory #592.

GAU Chief, Colonel-General of Artillery, Yakovlev"

"Decree of the State Committee of Defense

Contents: on cessation of production of the 122 mm SG-122 SPG on the chassis of captured Artshturm SPGs and T-3 tanks

Due to the creation of domestic self propelled artillery and considering that captured Artshturm SPGs and T-3 tanks come in heavily worn condition and without spare parts, and can therefore not serve as a suitable foundation for production of 122 mm SPGs, the State Committee of Defense decrees that:
  1. Production of 122 mm SPGs on the chassis of captured tanks and SPGs at factory #592 will cease.
  2. The People's Commissariat of Tank Production (comrade Zaltsmann) may complete the 29 SG-122 SPGs already in progress at factory #592 by February 15th, 1943.
Chair of the State Commitee of Defense, I. Stalin"

KV-1S Costs

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"To the Director of the Kirov factory, comrade Makhonin
Regional GABTU engineer at the Kirov factory, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Kozyrev

Notice #B1-521
October 16th, 1942
  1. In accordance with GOKO decree #2392ss issued on October 10th, 1942, the Kirov factory must produce and deliver KV-1S and KV-8S tanks to the GABTU in the 4th quarter of 1942, in the amounts and according to deadlines outlined in the attached ledger.
    Prices, requirements, and list of equipment is given in the same ledger.
  2. The overall price of deliveries between October 1st and December 31st, 1942, according to the attached ledger, is 177,000,000 (one hundred and seventy seven million) rubles.
  3. The cost of a KV tank, 295,000 rubles, is established by USSR SNK decree #638-328ss issued on May 6th, 1942.
    The cost of a tank is determined as free-on-board at the station, including container and packaging.
  4. In all else, the conditions established in agreement #B1-081 on February 7th, 1942, remain in effect.
  5. This notice is an inseparable addendum to agreement #B1-081, signed on February 7th, 1942.
Attachment: ledger on two pages.

Deputy Chief of the GABTU, Major-General of the Tank Forces, Korobkov

Item name
Technical requirement or blueprint
Amount
Unit cost
Total cost
4th quarter monthly amount
4th quarter monthly cost
KV-1S tank with individual parts and instruments kit for each tank, company spare parts kit for 5 tanks, with armament, optics, and communications equipment listed in the attached ledger.
According to blueprints and technical conditions approved by the GABTU in 1942.
510
295,000
150,450,000
145



42,775,000
170
50,150,000
195
57,525,000
KV-8S tank with individual parts and instruments kit for each tank, company spare parts kit for 5 tanks, individual parts and instruments kit for the ATO-41 and company spare parts kit for the ATO-41 for 5 tanks. Equipped with armament, optics, and communications equipment listed in the attached ledger.
90
295,000
26,550,000
30
8,850,000
30
8,850,000
30
8,850,000
Total

600

177,000,000

177,000,000
Notes:
  1. Each KV-1S must have:
    1. Armament: one ZIS-5 gun, three DT machineguns, three bipods for machineguns, 25 F-1 grenades, one PPSh with ammunition.
    2. Optics: one telescopic T-9 sight, one PT-4-7 tank periscope.
  2. Each KV-8S must have:
    1. Armament: one 45 mm cannon, three DT machineguns, three bipods for machineguns, one ATO-41 flamethrower, 25 F-1 grenades, and one PPSh with ammunition.
    2. Optics: one TMFD and one PT-1 for the 45 mm gun.
  3. All KV-1S and KV-8S tanks have a 10-R radio and a TPU.
  4. Packing is included in the cost."

Light Tank M5: The Peak of Evolution

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Rapid advances in armoured vehicles during WWII meant that even very good designs did not stay at the top for long. This was especially noticeable in American tank building. In 1939, the Light Tank M2 and Combat Car M1 were at the top of technical progress, but they were replaced with the Light Tank M3 by the time the USA entered the war in late 1941. In 1942, the Light Tank M3A1 entered production, but it did not last long as America's main light tank. At the end of 1942, the Light Tank M5 was there to replace it, the last of the descendants of the Light Tank M2.

From aircraft engines to automotive

By the middle of 1940, it was clear that the US would not be able to hide behind an ocean forever. The rapid defeat of France and loss of a large amount of materiel by England in Operation Dynamo was a shock. The situation with drawn out positional warfare of WWI did not repeat itself. It was clear that, sooner or later, the Americans would have to fight. This time, they were destined to become one of the main forces in the new world war.

The American industry was moved to a wartime mode. This influenced the tank building program directly. While tanks were only produced at the Rock Island Arsenal before, now they were built at large factories that were only involved with civilian products before. The first tank of this type was the Light Tank M3, which entered production at American Car and Foundry's plant in Berwick. Previously, it built train cars.

Light Tank M3E2, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, November 3rd, 1941. The tank is loaded down to simulate its full mass.

A rapid expansion of tank production caused several problems, one of which was a possibility of an "engine famine". There was an alternative in the form of the Guiberson T-1020-4 aircraft diesel. It was even installed on production vehicles, but it was never a fully viable replacement option. In addition, the compact and powerful aircraft engines had their drawbacks, as they were difficult to use.

It is not surprising that a search for an alternative began. Linear diesel engines from trucks were explored, but, in the case of light tanks, this work did not progress past the experimental phase. The engine compartment of light tanks proved too small for these engines. As insurance, the Ordnance Committee authorised the use of Cadillac engines with automatic gearboxes in the Light Tank M3, known as GM Hydramatic.

The same tank from the rear. The rear part of the tank was noticeably altered.

The appearance of the luxury car manufacturer in the tank industry was not surprising. First of all, car companies were taking part in tank building more and more often. The widely known GMC M18 tank destroyer, as well as its precursor, the T49/T67, was designed and produced by Oldsmobile, a GM subsidiary. Second, Cadillac was already producing an engine that would have been ideal as a tank engine. Known for its use in the Cadillac Series 42 cars, this 5.7 L V-shaped 8-cylinder engine was in production since 1936. Initially, it had an output of 135 hp, but this number was raised to 148 hp in 1941. Cadillac plants that were not already building army trucks began building tanks.

Full size Light Tank M3A1E1 model, with an altered hull front.

A Light Tank M3 with serial number 752 and registration number U.S.A. W-303740 was taken for experiments. The new engine forced a serious redesign of the engine compartment. A characteristic "hump" appeared, but it had almost no impact on the tank's characteristics. The hump was needed to house radiators. The mass of the tank, on the other hand, grew by 1134 kg. 

Another feature of the vehicle, indexed Light Tank M3E2, was the combination of the engine and gearbox. The engine power travelled to a distribution box, then to the differential, which was the same design as the one used on the Light Tank M3.

Light Tank M3E3, March 19th, 1942. By this point, it was already known that it would enter production as the M5.

Despite the drawbacks of the conversion, the fate of the tank with two engines was different from that of other engine conversions. Two two engines put out a combined power of 296 hp, which compensated the increased mass. The crankshaft from the gearbox to the differential was much lower, which made the turret crew's jobs noticeably easier. Automotive engines and gearboxes turned out to be a lot easier to service. Finally, the issue with overheating, bound to happen with air cooled aircraft engines, disappeared.

A hull machinegun is visible. American generals love to put many machineguns into their tanks.

The advantages of the Light Tank M3E2 were so obvious, that, on November 14th, less than a week after trials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds began, the Ordnance Committee decided to dub the tank Light Tank M4. However, it was not destined to enter production with the same hull design. In October, work on a Light Tank M3 with a new front hull began. This tank was indexed M3A1E1, and work on it reached the full scale model stage. On November 21st, the Committee decided to transfer the work to the Light Tank M4 chassis. The existing Light Tank M3A2 was converted.

The vehicle, indexed Light Tank M3E3, also received the D58133 turret with a stabilizer, hydraulic turret traverse mechanism, and turret basket. The same turret was later used on the Light Tank M3A1. The difference was that this time, the height of the basket was greater, and the traverse mechanism was hidden underneath, thanks to the lower crankshaft.

The same tank from the rear. The production model looked about the same.

The reworked tank entered trials in early 1942. After improvements, only the lower part of the hull and suspension remained from the original tank. Thanks to the sloped front hull, the resistance to shells increased, which the armour thickness remained the same. The front of the hull was removable, to allow access to the transmission. There were some issues with vision, but they were solved by installing periscopes in the hatches of the driver and his assistant. In addition, the seat could be elevated on the march, greatly increasing visibility. The hull sides were also altered, and the hull was now assembled by welding.

Cutaway diagram of the Light Tank M5. The lower crankshaft allowed the increase of the turret basket height and transition of the traverse mechanism to fit underneath the basket. Thanks to this, it was less cramped than the turret of the M3A1.

The tank entered production in this configuration in February of 1942. However, a decision was made to no longer use the index Light Tank M4 in relation to the vehicle. Production of the Medium Tank M4 was starting up around that time, and the tank was renamed to Light Tank M5 to avoid confusion. Another addition was a fixed machinegun in the front of the hull. The Ordnance Committee added it in, since the tank had no sponson machineguns.

Main light tank of the second half of the war

As mentioned above, mass production was arranged at Cadillac factories. One cause for this was that American Car and Foundry was still building the Light Tank M3, which was to remain in production. The USA already entered the war, and their light tanks were fighting the Japanese, with mixed results. The army needed more and more tanks.

Initial production tank. As you can see, the hull machinegun is still in place.

The first tank with registration number U.S.A. W-3046702 left the factory in Detroit in April of 1942. In June, the first tanks of this type were taking part in exercises. The new tanks were received well, since it was easier to use them than the Light Tank M3. However, this did not prevent the Light Tank M3A1 from remaining in production. It was necessary to saturate the army with new tanks, and parallel production of two models with different engines was acceptable.

There were, however, complaints about the tank. The hull machinegun, sticking out like a unicorn horn, was not particularly useful, and it was quickly discarded. There were also issues with removing the transmission, which were later solved by increasing the size of the removable section of the hull.

Light Tank M5 in Morocco, spring of 1943. The fixed hull machinegun is already gone, but the enlarged removable section of the front plate and fan are not yet in place.

In the summer of 1942, General Motors, the owner of Cadillac, began to search for an additional production facility for their tank. This was the South Gate Assembly factory in California. The first tanks left the factory in August of 1942. Another producer of the tank was the Massey-Harris company from Georgia, which previously produced tractors. The first Light Tanks M5 left the factory in July of 1942. Meanwhile, the use of the tank revealed issues with ventilation of the driver's compartment. It was resolved on later vehicles by installing a fan between the driver and his assistant. 2074 tanks of this type were built overall, 1470 by Cadillac, 534 by South Gate Assembly, and 250 by Massey-Harris. 

The later version of the tank can be distinguished by a fan between the hatches of the driver and his assistant. This photo also shows the driver, controlling the tank in travel position.

By the time combat started in North Africa, the 2nd Armoured Division already had Light Tanks M5, as well as individual tank battalions. The 1st Armoured Division also transferred its M3s and M3A1s to the French and moved on to M5 tanks, which illustrates the army's position opinion of this model. M3A1 tanks survived for longer in the Pacific, but were later replaced with M5s.

The Light Tank M5 fought on the front lines until the end of the war. In this case, the crew protected themselves from Panzerfausts with sandbags.

The question of further modernization of the Light Tank M5 was raised in the summer of 1942. It was directly linked to the deep modernization of the Light Tank M3A1, which resulted in the Light Tank M3A3. A noticeable improvement of this tank was an enlarged turret, with a large bustle. The radio migrated from the hull into the bustle. The enlarged turret had a positive impact on crew conditions, and additional observation devices in the roof improved visibility. Naturally, the military wanted to have the improved turret in the Light Tank M5. The M5 with an M3A3 turret was approved on September 24th, 1942, under the index Light Tank M5A1. After the installation of the turret, the vehicle's design was finalized.

The first variant of the Light Tank M5A1. Aside from early sand shields, these tanks had observation ports in the side of their turrets.

Production of the Light Tank M5A1 began in November of 1942, with the Cadillac factory moving to the new model first. A month later, South Gate Assembly and Massey-Harris joined in. It was quickly understood that the addition of an observation port in the turret was a bad idea. The crews rarely used them, and large handles, which stuck out at temple height, did not add to the crew's comfort. Turrets with these ports did not remain in production for long.

The ports were quickly welded over.

The ports were initially welded over, and promptly removed altogether. Around this time, hooks for grousers (spurs) were added to the sides of the turret. These spurs were attached to the tracks in difficult road conditions. 

Massey-Harris production tank, June 1943. This is a mid-production tank.

Rapid production of new tanks allowed to dispose of Light Tanks M3A1 that were still serving in combat units. Additionally, production of a tank with a superior engine meant that the Light Tank M3A3 was no longer needed. The American army did not retain these tanks, and most of them ended up in other countries via the Lend Lease program. In August of 1943, the last M5A1 left the South Gate Assembly factory. In total, it produced 1196 tanks. A third producer was added again in October of 1943: the American Car and Foundry plant in Berwick.

The decision to replace the M3A3 wit the M5A1 turned out to be correct.

The same tank from the rear.

The Light Tank M5A1 transformed close to the end of 1943. A special "pocket" for hiding the AA machinegun was added on the side of the turret. In connection with this, the hooks for spurs were moved to the back and the left side of the turret. A large box for personal belonging was added to the back of the tank. The design of the sand shields also changed, making it easier to service the suspension. These sand shields were not installed on all vehicles. The tank remained in this form until the end of production.

Late production tanks received a "pocket" for the machinegun.

By the spring of 1944, production of the Light Tank M5A1 slowly dwindled. It was clear that this kind of tank was obsolete. However, the tanks that were still in service did not go anywhere. The M5A1 slowly pushed out M5 tanks with less comfortable turrets, although tanks of this type remained in service until the end of the war.

The M5 was the only American light tank that was never sent to the British via the Lend Lease program. The cause of this was the rapid appearance of the Light Tanks M3A3 and M5A1, with better turrets.

A large box for personal belongings appeared on the back of the tank on late production models.

Production of M5A1 tanks in Berwick ceased in April of 1944. They built 1000 tanks of this type. Cadillac ceased production in May of 1944. Overall, Detroit produced 3530 tanks of this type. The last tank was built in June of 1944 by Massey-Harris, which put out 1084 M5A1 tanks. Including the 1196 tanks built by South Gate Assembly, 6810 M5A1 tanks were built between December of 1942 and June of 1944.

M5A1 tanks were used in the Pacific since 1944. This photo was taken during the battle for the Kwajalein Atoll in early 1944.

The M5A1 was not only the most numerous light tank to use Harry Knox's suspension, but the longest serving front line light tank. Its debut was the landing in Italy, and it participated in all major American operations in Europe. Even at the stats of its fighting career, the armour and armament seemed obsolete. Nevertheless, the vehicle managed to do its job as a reconnaissance tank. In addition, the enemy of the Light Tank M5A1 was rarely another tank. There were plenty less protected targets for it to fight. In other words, the light tank could handle any task that was thrown at it.

Tanks used in Normandy, and later, the rest of Europe, had various methods of improving their armour. This photo shows the most common one: bags filled with sand. The tank also carries a device for destroying bocages.

The tanks were used en masse in Normandy and subsequent battles in Western Europe. Around this time, the main enemy of American tanks was infantry armed with Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck grenade launchers. For this reason, the tanks were equipped with improvised protection. Most often, it consisted of sandbags, attached to the front and sides of the hull.

Even though the superior Light Tank M24 entered service, the M5A1 remained the main light tank of the American army until the end of the war.

Stuart VI on the march. Compared to the original, version, the changes are minimal.

The supplies of the M5A1 to the Allies should be mentioned separately. 1431 tanks of this type were sent to Great Britain, where they were indexed Stuart VI. Unlike other tanks sent to the British, the changes made to the Stuart VI were minimal. The most noticeable change was the addition of smoke grenade launchers on the right side of the turret. These tanks were used en masse in Normandy. The appearance of new light tanks didn't mean that old tanks, including the Stuart III, were phased out.

Arrived too late

Unlike the USA and Great Britain, the USSR was cool towards light tanks. Even the modernization of the T-70, which led to the T-80, was more of a half-measure. As for American tanks that were sent through the Lend Lease program, the feelings about them were even more mixed. The cramped fighting compartment of the Light Tank M3A1 added fuel to the fire. Trials of the "M3 light mod. 1942" ended in late February of 1943, and supplies of these tanks ended in April. On one hand, this was because production of these tanks ended. On the other hand, the USSR didn't particularly insist on keeping them coming.

Despite this kind of attitude towards American tanks, the USSR did receive improved M5A1 tanks. As with the M3A1, the tanks were sent through the south route, through Baku. This time, the purchase was not large. According to the agreement, the USSR received five tanks to try out. The first two came in July of 1943, two more in August, and the last in September. A number of documents recorded them as "M3 light", which caused confusion. However, this was specifically the M5A1. The USSR received mid-production tanks: without an AA machinegun pocket, but already without observation ports in the turret.

Light Tank M5A1 with registration number U.S.A. 3047050. NIBT proving grounds, summer of 1944.

The trials program of the Light Tank M5A1 in summer and fall conditions was composed in August of 1943. The vehicle would travel 1000 km in total, 250 on a highway, 500 on dirt roads, and 250 off-road. In reality, the tank was never driven off-road, only on paved and dirt roads.

The tank arrived without a full set of documentation, which led to some incorrect conclusions being made. Instead of the maximum engine power, the nominal power (110 hp x 2) was recorded. This led to incorrect conclusions regarding the power to weight ratio. 15.7 hp/ton was recorded, instead of the real 19.5 hp/ton. The mass was also incorrectly evaluated: 14 tons instead of 15.2

The same tank from the left.

Despite its increased mass, the M5A1 was faster than the M3 and M3A1. The top speed achieved during trials was 60.3 kph, a little higher than the claimed top speed. The fuel expenditure was not much higher than that of the M3: 135 L for 100 km. The average speed of the tank on dry dirt roads was also higher than that of the M3: 23.4 kph. On this terrain, the fuel consumption was 197 L for 100 km. The M5A1 had a total fuel tank capacity of 340 L, which meant that the range increased, despite the higher fuel consumption.

To compare, the Soviet SU-76M consumed 215 L of fuel over a 100 km dirt road trip.

No shipments were made after the trial batch.

The biggest issue with the American light tank in the USSR was that it arrived too late. A number of its characteristics were better than those of the Soviet T-70 tank, and it got rid of the drawbacks of the M3 and M3A1. However, in the second half of the summer of 1943, the fate of light tanks in the Red Army was sealed. Weak armour and armament meant there was no reason to continue using these tanks on the Eastern Front. Instead, production of the SU-76M was launched, which used the same components, but was far more effective on the battlefield. Continued orders of American light tanks were pointless in this situation.

The same tank, driving through a swamp. Spring 1945.

Despite such a disappointing verdict, the Light Tank M5A1 returned to trials in the summer of 1945. The trials were rather unusual: driving through a swamp. The tank drove alongside the Bombarder B-3 (Armoured Snowmobile Mk.I). Trials showed that the tank can drive along the swamp, as long as its tracks do not submerge deeper than 40 cm. Any deeper, and the tracks would slip, and the tank would get stuck. Today, the tank is on display at Patriot Park.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

Medium Tank M3

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The American army had only a handful of medium tanks at the start of WWII. That does not mean that American designers ignored vehicles of this class. In the summer of 1939, the Medium Tank M2 entered production. Only 18 units were built, but it turned out to be the start of a new era for American tank building. The layout of its chassis became the foundation of American medium tanks. In 1940, the superior Medium Tank M2A1 was built, although it was already obsolete at the time. Based on that design, American engineers built the Medium Tank M3, the first mass produced American medium tank. The tank and its modifications only lasted in production for a year and a half, but its unusual looks made it a landmark of tank design. There are many opposing opinions about the tank, so let us approach it as neutrally as possible.


On a tight timeline

The history of the Medium Tank M3 began on June 13th, 1940. On that day, the Ordnance Committee developed requirements for a medium tank armed with a 75 mm gun. These requirements were composed after studying the war in France. It turned out that the Medium Tank M2A1 no longer met the requirements of modern war.

As odd as it sounds, the Americans considered the 75 mm L/24 tank gun optimal as a weapon. Its armour piercing characteristics may have been far from ideal, but the PzIV was preferred by German soldiers that had to fight alongside it. It's not surprising that the Americans considered the 75 mm caliber more promising than 37 mm.

An improved full-scale model of the Medium Tank M3. The vehicle already lost its turret with two machineguns.

At the time the requirements were composed, the Americans did not have an equivalent of the 7.5 cm KwK L/24. A satisfactory gun was quickly found. In 1937, requirements were composed for a light 75 mm AA gun. This gun was supposed to be used in places where the 76 mm AA gun was too heavy. The French M1897 field gun was used as the basis for the design. Its length was reduced to 31 calibers, the screw breech replaced with a sliding one, creating the 75 mm T6 AA gun.

Trials of this gun went poorly, and the AA gun remained experimental. In the summer of 1940, it was needed once more, but this time by tank designers. The T7 75 mm tank gun was created on its basis. Its characteristics were far more impressive than those of the German 7.5 cm KwK L/24. The closest analogue would be the Soviet L-11 gun.

Final variant of the model, approved by the start of 1941.

The biggest issue that American engineers faced was the placement of the gun in the tank. The T7 did not fit into the existing turret, but their ability to modify the tank was limited. This was because the American army desperately needed medium tanks, and any delay could mean a failure to meet deadlines.

Then, the designers remembered the Medium Tank T5E2, which was being tested in the spring of 1939. The hull gun made their task easier and reduced the amount of conversion work needed. However, the weapon design of the Medium Tank T5E2 could not be called satisfactory. The gun mount had to be redesigned. Even so, the overall concept was considered promising enough by the American military, that the tank was standardized as the Medium Tank M3 on July 11th, 1940, even before it was built.

The first experimental Medium Tank M3, built by the Rock Island Arsenal. Aberdeen Proving Grounds, late March 1941. You can see that the commander's cupola has no observation device from the left side.

The first model of the tank was presented on August 26th, 1940, at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The Medium Tank M3 model was significantly different from the Medium Tank M3 we know today. The chassis of the Medium Tank M2A1 was almost unchanged. The machineguns in turrets in the corners of the hull remained. A hull mount for the 75 mm T7 gun was added in the front right corner of the fighting compartment. Its firing arc was limited, but it was an improvement over the Medium Tank T5E2.

The number of machineguns in the hull did not decrease. A pair of Browning M1919 machineguns was added in the front left part of the fighting compartment. The gun in the turret remained, and a small cupola with an AA gun was added to the top. The front of the hull was now 50 mm thick, and the sides were 38 mm thick.

The same tank, demonstrated to the Ordnance Department.

The reaction of the American military to the model was mixed. The fact that a medium tank could carry a 75 mm gun was good, but the limited aiming arc was a drawback. They wanted the gun to be housed in a fully rotating turret, but there was no such turret at the time. Nevertheless, the Ordnance Committee decided that the tank was an improvement over the M2A1, and was good enough as a temporary measure. A series of 360 of these tans was proposed, during the production of which, a medium tank with a fully rotating turret and a 75 mm main gun could be built.

"Management" inspecting the tank personally.

After inspecting the model, a large number of changes was requested. The machinegun sponsons and turret were removed, limiting the machineguns to a pair fixed in the front of the hull. A radio operator was placed in the front left part of the fighting compartment instead. A large number of changes was made to the fighting compartment. This led to the creation of a second model of the Medium Tank M3. It included all of the requested changes, but was still based on the M2A1. Later, a final version of the model was built, which had a new transmission. Instead of a 5-speed gearbox, it had a 5-speed synchronized gearbox. The transmission elements were also combined into one unit, bolted to the front of the hull. The unit was composed of three parts, which were also bolted together. This layout, designed by Harry Knox, made servicing the tank easier.

The turret was also unusual. Nominally, it housed three crew members, but they occupied the turret basket underneath. It only contained all three when the commander was firing the machinegun in his cupola or when he was sitting in the turret during a march. Many parts of the tank (turret, commander's cupola, gun mount, pistol ports, transmission cover) were cast.

Cutaway diagram of the tank. As you can see, it's not that roomy on the inside.

On August 28th, 1940, an agreement was signed with the Chrysler corporation for production of 1000 Medium Tanks M3. At the same time, the order for 1000 Medium Tanks M2A1 was cancelled. The tanks would be built at the Detroit Arsenal, which Chrysler started building on September 9th, 1940.

The British were interested in the American capacity for building medium tanks. Initially, they wanted to produce Matilda infantry tanks, but it was quickly made clear that the Americans would not cooperate. An idea came up to take the Medium Tank M3 as the base, and built a British tank. This was the birth of the Grant I, or General Grant. British modifications of the Medium Tank M3 and its use in Commonwealth armies will be covered in a separate article. Here, let us only say that turrets for the British and American versions were developed in parallel.

Crew and ammunition placement diagram. The loader of the 75 mm gun was the only member of the crew who felt comfortable.

Technical documentation was mostly ready by late December of 1940. Work on armament and the turret was happening in parallel. The prototype was built by the Rock Island Arsenal. Final changes were made to the documentation in February of 1941, and the first Medium Tank M3 began its first test drive on March 13th. On March 21st, the vehicle arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, where the turret and armament were installed.

Overall, the prototype, registration number U.S.A. W-304191, was not too different from the final model, with the exception of a missing observation device from the left side of the commander's cupola. The mass of the vehicle was 27.9 tons, 1.5 times that of the Medium Tank M2A1. Many laugh at the shape of the American tank, but the Medium Tank M3 was among the best medium tanks in production at the time. It had armour which reliably protected it from the German 3.7 cm Pak, decent mobility, and powerful armament. What is most important, is that it was ready in time.

Hull and engine mixup

While the Medium Tank M3 prototype was being designed and built, the Ordnance Department corrected the production schedule. 360 or even 1000 units was no longer enough. By the end of 1940, the military's appetites grew: every day, 14.5 tanks were expected from factories, 6.5 of which were meant for the British. As production grew closer, the demands grew too: 1000 tanks per month in April, 2000 in July. The final number was even more impressive: 25,000 tanks were awaited in 1942, and 45,000 in 1943. Recall that, at some point, Tukhachevskiy's plan to build 50,000 tanks was considered madness.

The first production Medium Tank M3 during an official demonstration. Detroit Arsenal, April 24th, 1941.

For obvious reasons, plans and reality diverged. The first mass production Medium Tank M3 was completed at the Detroit Arsenal on April 24th, 1941, at which point it was triumphantly delivered to the customer. The tank confidently crossed an obstacle course and broke a thick log in front of a stunned audience.

Time was needed to set up mass production, and the Arsenal alone could not produce 1000 tanks per month. Officially, production began in June of 1941, but acceptable volumes of production were only reached towards the end of the summer. Another factory had to be pulled into the production: the American Locomotive Company (ALCo). To satisfy British requirements, two more railroad companies were included: the Pressed Steel Car Company and Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company.

Assembly of tanks at the Detroit Arsenal.

Improvements to the tank began almost immediately after it was put into production. This was especially true for its armament. In the spring of 1941, work was underway to equip the tank with vertical stabilizers, and not just the 37 mm turret gun, but also the 75 mm T7, standardized under the index M2. Work on the stabilizer dragged on. Even though the decision to install it it was made in June of 1941, they were only used starting in November. It is easy to distinguish tanks with stabilizers by their counterweights. The M6 gun had a counterweight shaped like a long rod under the barrel, and the M2's counterweight was attached at the muzzle.

The presence of counterweights is a sure sign that the tank is equipped with stabilizers.

Work on an improved gun was also underway. The prospective Medium Tank T6 (later M4) would carry a 75 mm T8 gun with a 40 caliber long barrel. The installation of a more powerful gun coincided with some other changes. It turned out that the hatches on the sides were vulnerable to flanking fire. Early M3 guns were installed with tanks that had these hatches, but they were quickly welded shut. Soon after, the hatches were disposed of altogether, leaving only the pistol ports.

One of the first Medium Tanks M3 equipped with the 75 mm gun M3.

Later, the tank received improved bogeys, since its mass grew from all of these improvements. Towards the end of production, the crew was reduced from 7 to 6 men: the radio operator was removed, and his duties were partially carried out by the driver. In 1942, one of the hull machineguns was removed, and replaced with a plug. A toolbox was attached to the front of the hull. The driver received a periscopic observation device for use in combat.

The last of the Medium Tanks M3. As you can see, the hatches on the sides were removed.

In July, production of the M3 ceased. During this time, the four factories produced 4924 tanks of this type, including the Grant I. Most of these tanks were built at the Detroit Arsenal.

Medium Tank M3A1, with a noticeably different hull.

The Medium Tank M3 was not only the first American tank to be built at different factories, it was the first to be produced in many variants. This is especially true of the hull. Like many other American tanks of the time, the M3's hull was riveted. This kind of assembly was simple enough to be used at many factories, but had its drawbacks. The riveting process took a long time, and the rivets were a danger to the crew. When hit with a shell, the inner part of the rivet could chip off and turn into a deadly projectile.

The cast upper hull allowed for better use of the fighting compartment volume, but increased mass.

In June of 1941, the Ordnance Committee began a program to seek out different hull assembly methods. The first of them was casting. The upper part of the hull was cast as a single component. The side hatches became smaller. In addition to simplifying production, the cast hull allowed for more rational use of the fighting compartment volume, but increased the tank's mass to 28.6 tons.

Late production M3A1. It does not have any side hatches.

On October 9th, 1941, the M3 with a cast hull was standardized as the Medium Tank M3A1. The American Locomotive Company (ALCo) was chosen as the producer. Production began in February of 1942. It did not last long: ALCo built 300 tanks of this type before August. Unlike "regular" M3s, tanks with cast hulls were not exported. All of them were used by the American army.

As with other tanks of the M3 family, the M3A1 was initially produced with M2 guns, later replaced with the long-barrelled M3. Analogous design changes, such as elimination of the side hatches and one of the machineguns were also applied to the tank. The M3A1 also served as a test bed for the Guiberson T-1400-2 diesel engine. This air cooled radial engine achieved an output of 350 hp. The trials were disappointing, but 28 tanks were equipped with engines of this type.

Medium Tank M3A2, with a welded hull.

The second alternative to a cast hull was welding. Welded hulls were more promising than cast ones. The shape of the hull remained unchanged compared to the M3, but there was no need to drill holes in the plates for rivets. The welded connection was also stronger. Finally, the cast hull had its own drawbacks. The cast armour was weaker than the equivalent thickness of rolled steel. It's not surprising that welding became the main method of assembly for American tanks.

The M3A2 series was very small: only 12 tanks.

Development of a new modification of the Medium Tank M3 was initiated in August of 1941. The development was done at the Rock Island Arsenal. Trials showed that the idea was correct: the connections became stronger, and the tank's mass dropped to 27,400 kg. The tank was standardized as Medium Tank M3A2 before trials even began. A new factory was chosen to make it: Baldwin Locomotive Works (BLW). The first M3A2 arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds by January 1st, 1942. The factory was ramping up production slowly, and only 12 tanks were delivered by March. At that point, production ceased, since one important change was made to the design.

Cutaway of the Medium Tank M3A5. The biggest change was a new engine and different rear part of the hull.

One of the most important features of the Matilda tank that the Americans took note of was the pair of diesel engines. The Americans had similar engines to offer, primarily the two-stroke air-cooled 6.98 L GM 6-71. These engines were used on "GM Old Look" busses since 1940.

These engines were important for two reasons. First of all, the issues with Guiberson radial engines demonstrated that this type of engine had no future. Second, William Knudsen, the head of the Office of Production Management, understood that there were not enough Continental R975 engines for all tanks. Finally, the GM 6-71 was a reliable and compact design, which allows a pair of them to be used easily.

The Medium Tank M3A3 had a welded hull, unlike the M3A5.

In August of 1941 work on creating an engine based on the GM 6-71 was approved. The pair of engines received the index General Motors 6046. Its nominal output was 375 hp, and maximum output was 400 hp. Medium Tank M3 with serial number 28 was used as a test bed. The mass of the tank grew to 29 tons as a result of the conversion, but the top speed grew to 48 kph. It's not surprising that the Ordnance Committee approved this engine and standardized the tank as Medium Tank M3A5 in October of 1941. These tanks can be distinguished by the reworked rear plate with a characteristic "pocket", and the addition of exhaust pipes.

Late production M3A5. The gun has a short barrel, but already has a stabilizer. The side hatches are welded shut.

Baldwin Locomotive Works was chosen to produce the M3A5, and production was set up alongside the M3A2. Another interesting fact is that another tank was accepted into service in parallel: the M3A3. This was an M3A5 with a welded hull. The M3A5 entered production earlier, in January of 1942. Overall, 591 tanks of this type were built, 185 were sent to Great Britain. As for the M3A3, these tanks entered production in March of 1942, and 322 tanks were built before December. They were also in demand by the British, who received 49 tanks.

A characteristic rear plate allows one to distinguish diesel tanks.

The introduction of the last variant of the Medium Tank M3 was also connected with the engine. Its story begins in June of 1941, when Knudsen visited Chrysler. The reason for this visit was issues with engine supplies. The required rate of production meant that there would be a shortage of Continental R975 engines. A new power plant was needed, meant primarily for Lend Lease vehicles. The automotive company decided to not reinvent the wheel, and produce an engine based on a light 6-cylinder model. The result was the most unusual tank engine of the war: the Chrysler A57 Multibank. It consisted of five engines, connected into a star shape.

Cutaway of the Medium Tank M3A4. The exhaust pipes, directed out of the upper rear plate, can be seen.

On November 15th, 1941, a tank equipped with this engine entered trials. It turned out that this strange design was more than usable. The fuel expenditure was higher than on the Continental R975, but this was a small price to pay for reliability. It is not surprising that the M3 with this engine was standardized as the Medium Tank M3A4 in December of 1941. The first mass production tank of this type began trials at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in February of 1942. These tanks can be distinguished by the lengthened engine compartment and the exhaust pipes in the rear. Of course, the engine needed some work, but it was clear by the summer of 1942 that there was an alternative gasoline engine available.

Production Medium Tank M3A4.

The Detroit Arsenal was chosen as the producer of the Medium tank M3A4, but it didn't stay in production long. By this time, the Medium Tank T6 turned into the Medium Tank M4, and most factories changed over to producing it in the summer of 1942. It's not surprising that production of the M3A4 ceased in August. 109 tanks of this type were built, all of which had signs of late production tanks: 75 mm M3 gun, no side hatches, and stabilizers for both guns. Overall, 6258 tanks of the M3 family were built, quite a few for a "temporary measure".

First wave medium tank

The first shipments of Medium Tanks M3 began in the late summer of 1941. The military awaited these tanks with great enthusiasm, since very few American tank units had medium tanks, and even then, these were obsolete M2 and M2A1 models. Thanks to the rapid rates of production, the Medium Tank M3 began appearing frequently in photographs and on film reels. Of course, the American military understood that they need a tank with a "normal" 75 mm gun (in a rotating turret). Nevertheless, this was a sufficiently modern tank, even with the hull gun.

The tank is driving from the factory to its place of service. The armament is not yet installed.

Let us discuss the hotly debated fighting compartment, or rather, its impressive dimensions. The American designers did not intent to install a tennis court in it. The appearance of such a large fighting compartment was due to the tank's layout. A number of the crew (the 75 mm gunner and loader) had to work while standing. The fighting compartment height had to allow them to do this, which made the hull very tall. Additionally, the large fighting compartment didn't mean that there was a lot of free space inside. Only the loader of the 75 mm gun had sufficient room, and the rest of the positions were rather cramped. The rotating floor and turret basket consumed a lot of internal volume.

The turret held three crew members: the commander, gunner, and loader. The driver and radio operator sat up front. Like on the Medium Tank M2 and M2A1, the drive shaft ran between the driver's legs. Of course, the shaft was covered up, but the feeling of 350 hp spinning underneath you is a very uncomfortable one. The radio operator's experience was also far from calm. He sat on the machinegun ammunition, like a yogi. The hull machineguns to his front also didn't add to his comfort. There were some places in the tank with a lot of room, but, overall, the components were very tightly packed.

These photos were hardly a rarity. The increased mass of the new medium tanks caused bridges to break under them.

The medium tanks sat around with no purpose for the first half a year of the American participation in the war. The specifics of the Pacific theater of war mean that the Light Tank M3 was more suited for fighting there, and the medium tank would have been a hindrance. The main mission of the Medium Tank M3 was training. For this reason, the British ended up being the first to use the Medium Tank M3 in combat. The Americans kept a close eye on "their" tanks, and aided the British whenever possible.

It's difficult to overestimate the importance of the tank as a training aid. When the Medium Tank M4 became available, the Americans already had many crews that were experienced in the use of medium tanks. Considering that the M3 and M4 designs were similar in many respects, this experience was put to good use. 

Preparation for fighting in the desert, summer 1942.

By the fall of 1942, the majority of American first line units were rearmed with the Medium Tank M4A1. Nevertheless, the M3 still saw battle. It just so happened that the 1st Armoured Division, which was the first to receive medium tanks, still did not have new Medium Tanks M4A1 by the summer of 1942. Its 13th Tank Regiment had M3 tanks of various types, both with long barrelled M3 and short barrelled M2 guns. With these vehicles, the division landed at Oran on November 8th, 1942.

A late production M3, burned up during the battle for Tunis, early 1943.

The American tanks didn't have time to meet the French. The face-off between Renault D1 and Light Tanks M3 was not long. The real war began in late November, when the 1st division started fighting in Tunis. The division took heavy losses. Nevertheless, by the time the fighting in Africa ended, it still had 51 Medium Tanks M3 available. These were the main medium tanks of this unit until the end of the fighting.

Of course, the Medium Tank M4A1 was superior, but it's difficult to say that the M3 was a bad tank. The level of protection was about the same, and the difference in height was not very significant. In addition, recall that the British fought in North Africa in these tanks too, and they did not consider it a bad tank. They were replaced with the Sherman II and Sherman III at the earliest opportunity, but only because these tanks were superior. Overall, the Medium Tank M3 was an odd tank, but an effective one.

The 193rd Tank Battalion was one of the few units that used the M3 in the Pacific.

The last place where American tankers used the Medium Tank M3 was the Makin Atoll in the Pacific. The 193rd Tank Battalion stood out here. Against the Japanese, the M3s were, if not kings, then at least confident masters of the battlefield. Japanese light tanks could do very little to the M3. Theoretically, the Americans could have continued using the M3 in the Pacific, but, given the availability of the improved M4, there was no point. In April of 1944, the Medium Tank M3 was deemed obsolete. These tanks continued to fight, but as special vehicles. In other armies, they held on for significantly longer.

Cheating at Statistics 20: British Edition

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The strange fact is that many people these days take German claims for gospel truth is made even stranger by the fact that skepticism was much more rampant 75 years ago.

National Defense RG 24 C-2 vol. 12305 3/REPORTS/2

To put the German claims in perspective, Soviet forces in Kerch numbered 249,800 men at their peak. According to Isayev's research, their actual losses in the spring fighting were 162,282 men, 4,646 guns and mortars, and 196 tanks. It's highly unlikely that the stragglers that continued fighting after the collapse of the front  managed to dig up thousands of tanks out of thin air. If these kind of claims aren't "greatly inflated", then I am greatly looking forward to seeing what the British thought was excessive overclaim. 

SU-122 Cost

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"To UZTM Director, comrade Muzrukov
UZTM Military Representative, comrade Mitrofanov
GAU FPO Chief
NKTP Military Department Chief

Based on GKO decree #2559ss issued on December 2nd, 1942, you are instructed to produce and deliver products according to the attached deadlines, prices, blueprints, and technical requirements in the first quarter of 1943, totaling up to a price of 60 million rubles.

Note: the temporary cost of a SU-35 SPG for the 1st quarter, agreed upon with the NKTP, is 200,000 rubles. The cost of the cannon is not included in the price.

Until the main conditions of delivery are approved, the conditions of delivery will be as follows:
  1. The acceptance of products is performed by the customer at the factory, upon production of the passports, signed by the factory director and QA department head, with a certificate of quality and completeness of the product.
    Upon completion of acceptance, the military representative hands out a receipt (certificate) with a seal.
  2. Accepted products are paid for when the bill is received from the supplier with the military representative acceptance document (receipt or certificate) attached and the date of acceptance stated in the bill.
    NOTE: If the military representative is permitted to accept bills on the spot, the factory can produce a demand for payment and a bill with attached documents for the necessary acceptance by the military representative.
  3. For failing to meet deadlines and deliver products established by this document, the supplier pays the customer a penalty of 5% of the cost of the late product.
  4. For failing to pay the supplier on time, the customer pays a penalty of 0.05% of the cost of the unpaid product per day.
  5. Bills, correspondence, and complaints must be sent to Moscow, 12 Solyanka, GAU FPO, and technical questions must be addressed to GAU UMT and SA.
  6. The customer's account number is #4974 in the Moscow branch of the State Bank, section 18 article 49 of the NKO budget for 1943.
  7. The supplier must confirm the receipt of this letter by telegraph.
GAU UMT and SA Chief, Engineer-Colonel Datsyuk.
January 26th, 1943

Attachment: ledger on 1 page.


Item name
Technical Requirements
Amount
Unit cost
Total cost
Quarter months
Amount
Cost

SU-35 SPG
100 SU-35 SPGs according to blueprints of the experimental prototype.
300
200,000
60,000,000
1
100
20,000,000

2
100
20,000,000

3
100
20,000,000

Total
300
20,000,000



"

How Many Roads Must a Tank Drive Down

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"Order to the forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Army

The commander of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the 1st Belorussian Front indicated in directive #1/04210 issued on December 28th, 1944, that there were cases of tanks moving along paved roads during marches, which leads to their premature destruction.

In order to prevent the ruining of paved roads by tracked vehicles, I order that:
  1. Unit and formation commanders are forbidden from moving their tanks or tractors along paved roads.
  2. My rear echelon deputy must ensure that this order is carried out and report to the Army Military Council about every instance of movement of tractors or tanks to bring the violators to justice.
Commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, Guards Lieutenant-General, A. Radziyevskiy
Member of the Military Council, Guards Major-General P. Latyshev
Army Chief of Staff, Guards Colonel U. Bazanov"

Hammer Time

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Here are some document excerpts regarding the PTRD bolt-action anti-tank rifle, that a lot of modern milsurp collectors might feel empathy with.

"Recent reports from the fronts, regions, and armies remark on cases where Simonov and Degtyaryev ATRs do not work
...
Experience shows that when using PTRs in summer conditions, even when maintaining them according to section 1, there are rifles that do not extract freely. In order to continue use of the weapon, authorize soldiers to apply wooden mallets."

"Experimental PTRD from factory #74. 610 rounds were fired in various conditions, and 189 extractions (31%) had to be performed with a mallet. The report stated "This PTRD works unsatisfactorily in any conditions". Another PTRD from the factory earned the review "This PTRD works exceptionally unsatisfactorily in any conditions". Out of 275 shots, 264 needed a wooden mallet (96%).
The third PTRD managed to surpass that result. "The lifetime of the rifle was 43 shots. Every extraction needed the mallet. After extracting the 43rd casing, the bolt handle fell off."


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