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Tankbüchse 41: Rifle or Cannon?

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Neutral Switzerland understood the fragility of its sovereignty perfectly well during WWII. However, in case of an invasion, the Alpine confederacy expected to go down fighting. In reinforcing its country's army, the Swiss arms industry created a number of interesting weapons, which include the Tankbüchse 41.


After the defeat of France by Germany, the Swiss adopted the idea of the "National Redoubt", presented by General Gisen on July 25th, 1940. In the event of an invasion by the only likely enemy, Nazi Germany, the Swiss army would retreat to the south of the country, into the mountain region, and continue resistance there. The use of the main ace in Germany's sleeve, their tank forces, would be difficult. The Swiss army required a light and powerful anti-tank weapon to block the few tank-accessible passes in the mountains. 

History of creation

The existing 20 mm Solothurn S18-1000 anti-tank rifle was popular on the global arms market, but was no longer satisfactory for the Swiss. They wanted something more powerful. The first realization of this desire was in the development of weapons for light LTH tanks. These Czechoslovak vehicles entered service under the index Panzerwagen 39. In picking a weapon for their tank, the Swiss required superiority over the tanks of the likely enemy, armed with 20 mm guns. Waffenfabrik Bern received an order for a tank gun with an unusual caliber: 24 mm.

Colonel Adolf Furrer, the chief engineer at the Bern factory, designed a semiautomatic gun in a very short timespan, using the Lmg 25 as a basis. The gun was fed from a detachable six round magazine. This solution allowed rapid firing of several rounds, which left no chance of survival for a light tank. To improve the layout, the magazine was inserted from the top.  The coaxial machinegun was placed to the right, and the sight was to the left. A small opening covered with a sprung hatch was added to the roof of the tank turret for reloading.

24 mm Panzerabwehr-Befestigungskanone 38 cannon for fortifications.

The Panzerwagenkanone 38 was produced in very small amounts, since Switzerland only bought two dozen LTH tanks. The version built for fortifications, Panzerabwehr-Befestigungskanone 38, was built in larger batches. Soon, infantry took an interest in the weapon. Its main antitank weapons were the aforementioned S18–1000 (20 mm Tankbüchse 40) and the 47 mm 4,7 Infanteriekanone 1935 cannon, produced under license from the Austrian Bohler company. However, these weapons were unsatisfactory, due to low penetration. The muzzle velocity of the 47 mm gun was only 540 m/s, whereas the muzzle velocity of the French 47 mm gun was 885 m/s. A decision was made to develop a new anti-tank gun. The ballistics were the same a the tank and fortification version, but it was classified as an anti-tank rifle, instead of a cannon, named 24 mm Tankbüchse 41 (or Tb 41 for short).

Design

The biggest difference between the tank and fortification versions of the gun was the position of the magazine. Now, it was inserted from the right, instead of from the top. This allowed the reduction of the gun's height, which made it easier to hide. After the fifth shot was fired and the sixth round was chambered, the magazine ejected automatically. There was no need to rack the bolt after the next magazine was inserted.

24 mm Tankbüchse 41 in combat position.

Like its predecessors, the Tb 41 fired a powerful 24x138 mm round. Thanks to an effective muzzle brake, the recoil was minimized. The muzzle brake was assembled from eight rings of two types: "brake" (Bremsringe) or "blind" (Blindringe). The first type had channels for diverting the gases, the second did not. A combination of rings regulated the force of the recoil. The barrel had 12 right-facing grooves.

The Tankbüchse 41 had an effective muzzle brake.

Breech of the Tankbüchse 41, showing sight and magazine.

The Tb 41 used a short stroke recoil operated automatic mechanism. The gun used a hinged breech block. The charging handle was located on top, above the breech. Two adjustable handles with a trigger were located behind the breech. The mechanisms only allowed semiautomatic fire. The practical rate of fire was as high as 30 RPM.

The rifle was equipped with two sights: an open sight with a protected post and a removable 2.2x optical sight. Both sights were designed for firing at targets up to 1500 meters away.

Tankbüchse 41 on position, using a wheeled mount.

Tankbüchse 41 in transport position on a wheeled mount.

The rifle was fairly heavy. The body weighed 77 kg, and the tripod mount weighed 53 kg. During transport, the body was taken off the mount and disassembled into two pieces: the barrel (39 kg) and case (38 kg). The tripod was converted into a two-wheeled mount, which could be towed by a car, motorcycle, bicycle, or pulled by two soldiers. The anti-tank rifle could fire either from the tripod or the wheeled mount. The tripod allowed to adjust the right of the bore axis from 370 to 650 mm. It was also possible to fire without a mount at all, but laying the gun on a support. Using a special adaptor, the gun could be installed on a mount from the Mg 11 machinegun. Finally, the rifle could be installed in fortifications.

Tankbüchse 41 on a fortification mount from the 47 mm infantry gun.

The Tankbüchse 41 could be towed by a cyclist.

Two new types of ammunition were created for the new anti-tank rifle: the armour piercing 24 mm Pz-G.V. and explosive St-G. Both shells weighed 225 g (the full round weighed 460 g, and were 210 mm long). The first was painted gray, the second yellow. The explosive shell was equipped with an impact fuse. There was also a training 24 mm U-G shell, which weighed 225 g and had a delayed fuse and a smaller load of explosives. The training shell was painted black.

When firing on small shooting ranges, the Lmg 25 machinegun was attached to the rifle using a special holder. The anti-tank rifle was loaded with a special inert "manipulation round" (Manipulierpatrone) and the machinegun was loaded with tracer bullets. When the rifle's trigger was pulled, the machinegun fired off a single shot.

Tankbüchse 41 with the Lmg 25 machinegun attached to the barrel.

The high muzzle velocity (860 m/s in some sources, 900 m/s in others) allowed for effective fire up to 2000 m. The round maintained a velocity of 315 m/s at that range. However, the field manual instructed to fire at tanks from a range of 300 meters. An exception was made for light tanks, which could be fired on from 1000 meters, to destroy the tanks before they could approach the rifle position. As you can see, the document was quite optimistic.

The author has no information on the penetration qualities of the Tb 41.

Service

Deliveries of the Tankbüchse 41 began in May of 1941. Waffenfabrik Bern produced 3581 rifles by 1945. They were mostly sent to anti-tank squads of infantry companies.

The crew of a Tb 41 consisted of seven men. The ammunition carried included 120 armour piercing and 40 explosive shells. A single-axle cart was used to carry it. According to the field manual, it transported two boxes of ammunition (one containing 30 armour piercing rounds, the other 30 explosive rounds). Ammunition was also carried in four backpacks (16 magazines in total, 2 of which contained explosive rounds). Interestingly enough, the explosive round magazine only contained 5 rounds, and was smaller than the armour piercing magazine. This was done so they would not be mixed up in combat. A six round magazine weighed 5.12 kg, and a box with thirty rounds weighed about 22 kg.

The 1943 manual defined the roles of the infantry anti-tank squad as follows:

"The biggest part of the anti-tank defense falls to infantry cannons and anti-tank rifles. They take up the following positions:
  • On approach to settlements, with the objective of defeating armoured cars and tanks that try to flank the position.
  • On outskirts of settlements and inside of them, in locations resistant to tank attacks, with the objective of destroying armoured cars and tanks that broke through, relying on passive anti-tank defenses.
  • In fortified locations in the rear. The objective is to prevent tanks from hitting the rear of the main position. If enough anti-tank rifles are available, they can be used to destroy infantry (put them in heavy weapons and machinegun positions)."
Sufficient amounts of Tankbüchse 41 were available in Swiss units only by 1943. By then, it was clear that the rifle would be useless against modern tanks. On the other hand, the German invasion, which was quite possible in 1940-41, was no longer likely. Removal of the Tb 41 from infantry units began in the end of 1944, although they continued service in fortifications until the 1960s (298 Tb 41s were recorded in Swiss fortresses in 1945). These rifles were not exported. Negotiations about export to Ethiopia in 1951 did not succeed.


Tankbüchse 41 in a P-41 motorboat.

The most interesting chapter of the history of the Tankbüchse 41 was their use in the confederation's navy. In 1940-41, the government decided to form patrol boat groups on several of its lakes. Their main objective was resistance to a possible landing of amphibious aircraft, like the kind the Germans used when they invaded the Netherlands. The groups were initially armed with civilian motorboats, 20 mm Tb 40 anti-tank rifles, and 7.5 mm AA machineguns. Later, in December of 1941, the first two P-41 motorboats entered service. Three of these boats were ready in July of 1943, and three more in April of 1944. With a displacement of 7 tons and length of 12 meters, these boats could reach a speed of 40 kph. The main weapon was the Tb 41, installed in the front. In 1962, it was replaced with a 20 mm gun, but the "Uri" (a civilian motorboat pressed into service, and the prototype for the P-41 project) kept its Tb 41 until 1971.

The Tankbüchse 41 appeared at a dangerous time for Switzerland. Even though the gun never served in combat, it played its part in the rearmament of the Swiss army, becoming its first mass anti-tank weapon. From a technical point of view, the Tankbüchse 41 was an intermediate weapon, larger than a regular anti-tank rifle, but not quite a fully fledged anti-tank cannon.

Tactical-technical characteristics of the 24 mm Tankbüchse 41 anti-tank rifle:

Caliber, mm
24
Mass, kg
77
Mass with wheeled mount, kg
132
Mass of a loaded magazine, kg
5.12
Mass of one shell, g:
Armour piercing
225
Explosive
225
Mass of one round, g
460
Length of the body, mm
2520
Length of the barrel, mm
1515
Full length in travel position on wheeled mount, mm
3270
Height in travel position on wheeled mount, mm
600
Maximum height on tripod mount, mm
835
Muzzle velocity, m/s
860
Rate of fire, RPM
30
Maximum effective range
2000


Schwere Feldhaubitze 18: Heavyweight Senior

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The German 150 mm heavy s.F.H. 18 heavy howitzer left a mark on the history of artillery. Developed in secret, given a made up name, combining excessive weight with excellent ballistics and reliability, this gun was one of the main pillars of German artillery in WWII, and continues to fight to this day in the Syrian Civil War. How did its history begin?


According to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany could not have more than seven infantry and three cavalry divisions after March 31st, 1920. The total size of its military could not exceed 100,000 men, including officers and civilians. The total number of officers, including staff, could not exceed 4000 men. The General Staff was disbanded, and could not be restored in any form. Conscription was outlawed, and the army could only be staffed with volunteers.

A German parade in Warsaw, fall of 1939. A s.F.H. 18 on a horsedrawn carriage is seen. The carriage carrying the barrel is seen in the foreground, the carriage in the background is carrying the mount. The wheels are completely metallic.

Artillery was greatly limited. Each infantry division would have one artillery regiment of three squadrons of 12 guns each, two of which would have cannons, and only one would have howitzers. The caliber of the guns was limited, in addition to their number: the limit was 105 mm light howitzers. 

The Germans were prohibited from developing any new types of armament, but work was secretly restarted outside of Germany. Heavy artillery was also forbidden, with one exception: the fortifications at Königsberg. It was permitted for a small number of heavy guns to be kept there, namely 150 mm model 1913 field howitzers (15 cm s.F.H. 13), one of the most common type of heavy weapons in the German Imperial Army.

Officially, 12 s.F.H. 13 howitzers were kept, with 400 rounds of ammunition each, but the Germans secretly kept more, including 210 mm mortars. This allowed for preparation of artillerymen and creation of a backbone of the future Wehrmacht heavy artillery force.

150 mm s.F.H. 13 and its crew.

An oversight commission was left in Germany to ensure that the treaty was followed, consisting of 337 officers and 654 soldiers. The commission prohibited the development of new weapons, and even closed Krupp's R&D branch, a leader in its field. The Germans restarted the work in, literally, the next town over. The commission left Germany on February 28th, 1927, after which there was no reason to hide.

Old howitzer, new tricks

According to the secret plan for reviving the German army, the amount of artillery would triple. Each regiment would grow into three, and new guns had to be developed, which met the requirements of the time. The old s.F.H. 13 was no longer suitable, and Krupp and Rheinmetall joined forces to develop a new heavy field howitzer, indexed s.F.H. 18 (schwere Feldhaubitze, heavy field howitzer) to maintain secrecy several months before the commission left. This kind of index would mislead any observer into thinking that the gun dated back to WWI, and was not a new development.

A design group that also worked on new artillery systems for the future Wehrmacht was given the task. Work took three years. By existing classifications, the s.F.H. 18 was a gun-howitzer. The barrel was designed by Krupp, and the mount by Rheinmetall. With a barrel length of 29.5 calibers, the muzzle velocity increased by almost 1.5 times, from 365 m/s to 520 m/s. The range increased from 8500 m to 13,300 m.

The s.F.H. 18 in combat position. Top: maximum gun elevation. Bottom: 0 degrees elevation.

The new mount, unlike old systems, had split trails and three resting points, approaching cruciform mounts in its characteristics. The mass of the s.F.H. 18 grew by almost 2.5 compared to the s.F.H. 13: from 2135 kg to 5512 kg, but the firing arc also grew, from 5 degrees to 60 degrees. The s.F.H. 18 mount could also be used for the 105 mm K18 gun (10 cm schwere Kanone 18). 

The weight of 5.5 tons meant that the barrel and mount had to be transported separately. The heavy weight forced the designers to omit the gun shield. The gun was meant to fire from rear positions, and the need to fire directly would only arise in an emergency. In these cases, it was also permitted to fire with the trails joined, but the vertical and horizontal aiming angles were limited.

The gun crew consisted of 12 men. The gun could be towed by horses or artillery tractors. Sets of six horses were used to tow the gun. The horse transport was given a priority, since the army lacked suitable mechanized transport.

s.F.H. 18 prepared for transport by horse. Top: mount carriage. Bottom: barrel carriage. The wheels are fully metal, with iron rims.

The gun was disassembled for transport by horse, the weight of each carriage totalling up to 4 tons. The top speed when towed in this form was 8 kph. The s.F.H. 18 could also be towed by tractors at a top speed of up to 60 kph on a paved highway.

With the appearance of the Sd.Kfz. 7 halftrack in 1938, the gun could be towed without disassembly. The barrel was pulled back to travel position. The top towing speed was 40 kph. If the gun was transported separately, it took 5-7 minutes to bring it back to combat position, a complex process that required eight men. When transported in one piece, it only took 3-4 minutes.

1300 mm fully metallic wheels were used when the gun was towed by horse. When it was towed with a tractor, 1230 mm wheels with solid rubber rims were used.

s.F.H. 18 howitzer with a barrel pulled back into travel position. The gun is towed by a Sd.Kfz. 7 halftrack. The wheels have rubber rims.

The s.F.H. 18 entered mass production at Dusseldorf, at the Rheinmetall-Borsig factory in late 1933. Production continued until 1945. The barrels were supplied by Krupp, and later other companies: Speerwerke, MAN, Dorris-Fullner, and (after occupation of Czechoslovakia) Skoda.

Starting with January 1st, 1934, when a new type of artillery regiment was formed. A fourth squadron, reserved for heavy artillery, was added. The long period of secret development, trials, and improvements did not go to waste: the army received an effective gun almost immediately, nearly free from "growing pains".

Modernization, successful and otherwise

The heavy weight of the gun forced the army to demand a modernization of the gun. From 1935 to 1939, a lightened variant of the howitzer was developed by Krupp and Rheinmetall, equipped with a lighter 23 caliber barrel. This variant received the title 15 cm schwere Feldhaubitze 36 (s.F.H. 36).

Moving the howitzer from travel to combat mode: removing the tail of the mount from the limber.

The barrel of the s.F.H. 36 was 99 cm shorter than of the s.F.H. 18, but the range also dropped by 825 meters, to 12,500 m. A muzzle brake was used to reduce the recoil length. Aluminium was introduced into the design of the mount. The mass in travel position was reduced by 2.23 tons, to 59.6% of the weight of its predecessor. This meant that the gun could be towed by one tractor or a six-horse cart. Production of the s.F.H. 36 began in 1939, but, due to a shortage of aluminium, it ceased in 1941. Very few guns of this type were produced.

Krupp and Rheinmetall received another order in 1938, for a gun with superior characteristics to the s.F.H. 18 and s.F.H. 36. This gun would have a barrel that was three calibers (45 cm) longer than on the s.F.H. 18, but also it would have a muzzle brake. The mass was 100 kg higher in combat position. The gun could fire at at elevation of up to 70 degrees, and the maximum range was 15,600 m. Further improvements included a pneumatic recoil brake, variable recoil length, and increased chamber volume: significant improvements to the s.F.H. 18 without radical modifications. The gun was ready by 1942, but war introduced its corrections: the need to change production, issues with raw materials, and the need to increase production volumes meant that this design was dead on arrival.

s.F.H. 36 howitzer from Die Wehrtechnische Studiensammlung im BAAINBw.

During preparations for production of the s.F.H. 40, Krupp produced a number of barrels for the gun. In order to put them to use, they were installed on the s.F.H. 18. This hybrid was called s.F.H. 18/40. The new barrel with an effective muzzle brake allowed the gun to fire up to a range of 15,100 m. The total mass was more or less the same as the s.F.H. 18. 46 of these guns were made in total.

There was another modification of the s.F.H. 18, called s.F.H. 42 or s.F.H. 18/43 in various sources. Some sources claim that the s.F.H. 42 is a renamed s.F.H. 18/40, others consider it a separate variant. This gun was built in very small numbers, and was equipped with a sliding semiautomatic breech, self-obturation, and a chamber that did not require a steel casing. The propellant was loaded into the weapon directly.

In 1942-43, further work by Krupp, Rheinmetall, and Skoda involved using three-trail or cruciform mounts. These mounts allowed for 360 degree fire at elevations of up to 70 degrees, and allowed a range of up to 18 km, while weighing less than the existing mount in both travel and combat positions. However, none of these creations moved past wooden models.
Hummel self propelled gun. The muzzle brake of the s.F.H. 18 is clearly visible.

The last noticeable modernization of the s.F.H. 18 was the attempt to install a muzzle brake in 1942, which reduced the load on the mount while firing, but it is not known whether or not this modification was widespread. Chamber liners were also introduced. Now, one could fire without worrying about wear from using the maximum charge. The barrel did not have to be entirely replaced, and the liners could be swapped even in battlefield conditions. The modernized gun was indexed s.F.H. 18M. The Panzerfeldhaubitze 18M auf Geschützwagen III/IV (Sf) Hummel, Sd.Kfz. 165, or Hummel, famously used this weapon.

In the hands of victors

After the war, Skoda modernized the s.F.H. 18 to match the needs of the Czechoslovak army, and modified the gun to work with Soviet ammunition. The gun was renamed 152 mm houfnice vz. 18/47. A new barrel with a muzzle brake was installed on the s.F.H. 18 mount. This modification served until the late 1980s, and a number of these howitzers were used for installation into the vz. 77 DANA (Samohybná Kanónová Houfnice vzor 77) self propelled howitzer.

Czechoslovak 152 mm houfnice vz. 18/47, Lešany military museum.

During WWII, the Red Army captured several s.F.H. 18, and the GAU performed trials. The results of the trials highlighted the following elements as deserving of attention:
  • The method of attaching recoil mechanism shields to the breech.
  • The method of attaching a hydraulic recoil mechanism inside a pneumatic one.
  • The lower mount design.
  • The suspension design.
  • The elevation mechanism flywheel, located on one of the trails.
However, the overall conclusions were negative:

"The gun is insufficiently simple, due to complex mechanisms, difficulty in finishing some parts, and many riveted connections. This makes it unsuitable for mass production. However, it is incorrect to call it complex from a production standpoint."


Shells and casings of the s.F.H. 18.

Tactical-technical characteristics of the s.F.H. 18 howitzer:


GAU data
German data
Caliber
149 mm
149 mm
Barrel length
30 calibers
30 calibers
Maximum range
13,325 m
13,325 m
Minimum range
4000 m
-
Muzzle velocity
210-520 m/s
520 m/s
Vertical firing arc
0–45°
0–45°
Horizontal firing arc
60°
60°
Number of variable charges
8
8
Mass in combat position, without trails
5180 kg
5512 kg
Mass of the mount carriage
4000 kg
-
Mass of the barrel carriage
4095 kg
-
Rate of fire
6 RPM
4 RPM

Penetration: British Edition

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On March 31st, 1944, a demonstration of various British vehicles was held at the Lulworth proving grounds in Great Britain. The usual fare of British and American tanks were accompanied by something a little more exotic.


Comparative firing demonstrations means that we might get another penetration table done to one standard, like this one! Unfortunately, we are not so lucky, and the KV-1 only has the muzzle velocity recorded.


There are some interesting comparisons that can be made here nonetheless. Let's compare the numbers for tank guns present in both tables. The Tiger's gun penetrates 102 mm of armour at 1000 meters at a 30 degree angle, and 84 mm in the same conditions by Soviet standards (interestingly enough, the penetration at normal is almost the same). The KwK 40 from the PzIV penetrates 83 mm vs 60 mm by Soviet standards. Here, the penetration at normal is still significantly less than the British value. The German data disagrees with the British as well: according to them, the PzIV and Tiger's guns penetrate slightly less in these conditions, 82 mm and 99 mm respectively.

The British guns also perform significantly differently. By Soviet standards, the 6-pdr only penetrates 39 mm, while the British credit it with 53 mm of penetration. Same as the KwK 36, the gun does not performs close to British expectations when the plate is placed at normal. Interestingly enough, the gun had a higher muzzle velocity when tested in the USSR (837 m/s vs. 830 m/s). According to Soviet trials, the 17-pounder could penetrate 100 mm at 1000 meters and 30 degrees, versus the British 120 mm figure, which dispels the notion that Soviet-derived penetration values are lower than those in foreign tables because they are calculated.

The American 75 mm gun has a lower muzzle velocity (590 m/s vs 618 m/s on the British table), but once again falls far short of  the Soviet standard: 63 mm in the UK, 39 mm in the USSR. 

Improved Tractor

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"To the Chief of the 3rd Departmetn of the GAU UMT
Engineer-Major comrade Bozilenko

On the issue of trials of the ATZ-3T tractor

I inform you in this letter that the ATZ-3T tractor, designed and assembled at the ATZ on the 1TA tractor base was subjected to factory trials and drove for 400 km along various roads and mountain terrain. The tractor was assembled by means of mounting new components on an altered chassis of a prior experimental tractor. The gearbox and other transmission mechanisms, suspension, and other components were taken from an existing tractor without changed, and had already worked for 700 hours. The altered components of the tractor worked well, without breakdowns or defects, and are in good condition even now.

In the future, we plan to continue factory trials along a 500 km course, which will include obstacles.

The ATZ-3T tractor has the chassis of the armoured HTZ-16 tractor, which works reliably under heavy load, and the overall vehicle, both in layout and weigh distribution, differs little from the STZ-5 tractor, which is well studied in trials and usage.

The following changes were made to the layout of the ATZ-3T compared to the STZ-5, which improve the performance of the vehicle:

The cabin was moved backwards, as a result of which the whole engine is outside of the cabin, and all of its parts are easy to service, like on the agricultural tractor. Three men fit in the cabin, unlike 2 in the STZ-5, and there is no gases and high temperature like the in the STZ-5. Since the seat is located closer to the center of gravity, oscillations of the tractor don't shake the driver as hard as on the STZ-5, which, when coupled with the lack of gases and lower heat in the cabin improves the driver's work environment and reduces fatigue. The advantages in the ATZ-3T were achieved by removing the toolbox from the truck bed and using it all to place the crew or cargo. The truck bed has flip-up seats for 4 men near the front side. Four more can sit on the removable plank seat.

The factory's chief designer notes that, in the future, implementation of several improvements based on performed trials, including changing of the layout by means of moving the fuel tank from the front of the cabin to the rear, and lengthening the length of the contact surface, will improve the conditions for the people in the cabin and the truck bed, improve the mobility of the tractor, and reduce, compared to the STZ-5, load on the rear road wheels, which will increase the lifespan of the ball bearings.

The aforementioned changes are currently being worked on, but I nevertheless consider it possible to produce the tractor in the way that we built it and supplying the army with it, with later improvements being made after gathering experience in production and usage.

It is necessary to perform trials with the participation of GAU UMT representatives in order to accept these vehicles for service with the Red Army.

Since the vehicle has an engine, transmission, and suspension from sufficiently tested 1TA, T2G, STZ-5, and HTZ-16 tractors, and since the Red Army is desperately in need of vehicles of this type, I ask for your direction to organize trials with my participation to compose an evaluation and reach a conclusion regarding accepting the tractor into service with the Red Army.

Senior Military Representative of the GAU at ATZ, Engineer-Major Horoshavtsev
October 15th, 1943"

Pak 43 Problems, Round 2

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Issues with the size and weight of the Pak 43 came up before. The slightly smaller and lighter Pak 43/41 had the same issues.

"Use of 88 mm Pak 43/41 (towed) during mobile combat operations

Data in instruction 18/9 issued on June 27th, 1943, "directions on applying and using the 88 mm Pak 43/41 (towed) can only be used on stabilized sections of the front, and proved themselves in this respect.

On the other hand, experience in recent battles shows that the weapons are only of limited usefulness in mobile warfare, and one should not follow the aforementioned instructions.

The causes for this are as follows:
  • The mass of the Pak, 4.3 tons, and height, 1.9 meters, as well as the bulky and unarmoured motorized transport significantly limit its mobility on the battlefield.
  • There is not enough time to set up a firing position.
  • Large guns can seldom be hidden from enemy observation, especially from the air.
  • These guns are especially helpless against infantry attacks, under powerful horizontal fire.
For these reasons, this valuable weapon has high losses, both in materiel and personnel, which are not compensated by achieved results. These losses can, and should, be easily avoided. This is only possible if the following conclusions are made, given the limited mobility of the weapons on the battlefield:

It is necessary to cease the use of the 88 mm Pak (towed) in front line mobile warfare, especially to cover the retreat of infantry, since the use of these guns in this way leads to senseless losses.

88 mm guns are only useful in mobile warfare from specifically prepared locations in so called fortified regions, possession of which is decisive (railroad junctions, important highway crossroads, fortifications in front of bridges, river crossings, etc.)"

These instructions were issued on April 10th, 1944, so it looks like it took the Germans a while to figure out the glaring issues with their latest wonder weapon.

Full Auto SVT

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"Conclusions on the proving ground trials of 7.62 mm automatic rifles, converted from semi-automatic rifles, with 10-15 round magazines showed that:
  1. Groups at 100 meters when firing in bursts increase by 3-3.5 times.
    At 300 meters, only 25-30% of the bullets strike a 3x3 meter target.
    At 500 meters, up to 30% of the bullets strike a 3.5-4 meter target.
    While shooting with a 15 round magazine, grouping gets worse, and it is difficult to fire while prone due to the protruding magazine.
  2. When shooting at targets, only the first bullet hits.
  3. The ability to aim is limited to 50 shots over the span of one minute. After that, the barrel overheats, and a mirage effect is achieved, which impedes aiming.
  4. The automatic rifle jams:
    1. With thick grease: 2-4% of the time
    2. With dry parts: 12-14%
    3. In dusty conditions: 14-50%
    4. While aiming up or down: 8-12%
  5. The barrel life is 6000 rounds when firing 50 rounds per minute, after which the rifle was allowed to cool. Continuous fire brings the life down to 150-200 rounds.
As a result of trials, it was concluded that:
  1. Is is not viable to create an automatic rifle from a semi-automatic one by modifying the trigger group.
  2. It is only possible to aim with such an automatic rifle when using a thickened barrel and lightened bipod.
  3. When converting a semi-automatic rifle to fully automatic by only modifying the trigger group, its combat usefulness decreases to less than that of a submachinegun.
Conclusions
  1. Due to the decreased combat usefulness, conversion of a semi-automatic rifle to a fully automatic one is not rational.
  2. In order to reach required density of fire with a high probability of hitting the target, it is better to use submachineguns, which have the advantages of simpler production, higher reliability, compactness, high magazine capacity, larger stocks of ammunition, etc."

Pz.Kpfw. Löwe: The German Lion

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During the Third Reich, the German tank building school was defined, in part, by monsters such as the Maus and E-100. However, the German system of armament from the 1930s had no superheavy monsters like these, and no heavy tanks at all. In the second half of the 1930s, the plan was to have two types of light tanks and two types of medium tanks. How did Germany end up with monsters like the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe, and how were they developed?


Bigger and fatter support tanks

The German heavy tanks program began in January of 1936. Heinrich Kniepkamp approved the development of a B.W. (verstärkt) (support tank, reinforced) 30-ton class tank. Henschel was chosen to develop the chassis, with Erwin Aders at the helm. Partially, the tank was designed by Kniepkamp himself, as he personally designed the suspension layout.

This project was unlucky from the very beginning. The development of the German heavy tank program did not go according to plan. On March 12th, it was renamed I.W. (Infanteriewagen, infantry tank). On April 28th, the more familiar index D.W. (Durchbruchswagen, breakthrough tank) was set. In September of 1938, the D.W. evolved into the VK 30.01, keeping its hull design, but receiving a new suspension with interleaved wheels.

Initially, the heavy tank would have a 600 hp engine, which would leave its mobility at the level of a medium tank. In reality, the D.W. received a 280 hp Maybach HL 120 TR engine, and the VK 30.01 received a 300 hp Maybach HL 116. This was just the beginning of the metamorphosis of the tank, which had some unexpected branches.

One of these branches was a tank that could have become the first superheavy vehicle of the Third Reich. Its godfather was General Walther von Brauchitsch, who was appointed to the post of the commander in chief of the Wehrmacht's land forces on February 4th, 1938. On November 24th, 1939, he gave the order to design maximally protected La.S. (PzI), La.S.100 (PzII), and B.W. (PzIV) tanks. They were designed to break through powerful fortifications in Europe, which were in no short supply. In January, Henschel received an order for another reinforced PzIV variant. The tactical-technical requirements described a tank with the dimensions of a PzIV, but with a mass of 65 tons and 80 mm of armour, capable of reliably protecting from the Pak 38 anti-tank gun. The tank's top speed would be 20-25 kph.

Jentz and Doyle's research also mentions the A.W. (Artilleriewagen, artillery tank) project. Little is known about this vehicle, but the superheavy tank would have 100 mm of armour, which would protect it from the 88 mm Flak 18. Data on its mass ranges from 80 to 100 tons. Its armament would consist of a 105 mm howitzer with a barrel length from 20 to 28 calibers.

This is what the S.W. was intended to look like originally. This reconstruction by Hilary Doyle shows how the hull would be disassembled for transport. The turret is a placeholder, in reality the tank would have received a new turret made from scratch.

Initially, the project was indexed S.W. According to the requirements, Krupp engineers planned for three kinds of armament. The S.W. turret model presented in April if 1939 had room for a more powerful gun than the 7.5 cm KwK L/24. The first alternative was the 75 mm KwK L/40, with a muzzle velocity of 685 m/s. This gun was developed for the heavy 30-ton tank, and was supposed to be able to confidently defeat French FCM 2C family heavy tanks. It was eventually discarded, as it was decided that a 24 caliber long gun was good enough to defeat enemy fortifications.

The second alternative was a 105 mm gun with a 20 caliber barrel and a muzzle velocity of 420 m/s. This weapon was more powerful than the 7.5 cm KwK L/24, but had its drawbacks. The ammunition would consist of one piece, which would make the loader's life in the small turret difficult. In addition, racks for the large rounds were harder to position in the hull. Krupp's engineers didn't think of adding a large turret bustle.

VK 30.01 turret in a fortification, summer of 1944. The VK 65.01 would have had a similar turret, but with 80 mm thick armour.

After deliberations, the 6th Department of the Armament Directorate settled on the 7.5 cm KwK L/24. This happened in late June. Earlier, in April, Krupp received an order to produce a S.W. turret from mild steel. The turret was supposed to have a hydraulic traverse mechanism.

As for the chassis, Henschel's engineers came up with a strange design. The 30 ton weight limit was not arbitrary. There were very harsh limits, which came from, in part, the need to transport the tank by rail. As a result, the designers had to come up with a system where the tank would be transported in three pieces. The chassis was a further development of ideas used in the D.W. and VK 30.01. The shape of the hull was similar to that of the 30 ton tanks, but it was longer, and a machinegun turret was added to the front.

The suspension was similar, but changes were made here as well. The number of road wheels grew to 10 per side, and their diameter decreased. This was done to better spread out the weight of the tank. As with the D.W. and VK 30.01, a torsion bar suspension was used. A 600 hp Maybach HL 224 engine, designed in 1938, would be used in the tank.

Final design of the VK 65.01. According to documents, it was made from mild steel.

On September 1st, 1939, the Inspection of Motorized Forces issued the order for a pilot batch of the VK 65.01 heavy tank. Another index was used to refer to this tank: Pz.Kpfw.VII. 8 pilot tanks would be built, with armour supplied by Krupp. The VK 65.01 project continued to develop: according to a contract signed in March of 1940, the final variant of the turret looked like the VK 30.01 turret, but with thicker armour.

Work continued actively in the summer of 1940, but the project was at risk. First of all, there was nothing to assault. Czech, French, and Belgian fortifications were defeated without any assault tanks. In addition, experience from the French campaign showed that tanks heavier than 30 tons should be avoided, since bridges would not be able to hold them.

As a result, work on the VK 65.01 began to wind down starting in August of 1940. The first German superheavy tank only reached the stage of assembly of the hull from mild steel, which was done in mid-1941. Work on the turret stopped even earlier: in October of 1940. As for the A.W., the tank shrank down to the VK 36.01 in July of 1940. The VK 65.01 died, only to be reborn as an even more monstrous project.

Superheavy King of the Beasts

The first information that the development of German superheavy tanks restarted came from a Soviet intelligence memo, issued on March 11th, 1941. The memo was dedicated to "the direction of development of the German armed forces and changes in its composition". Among other information, it contained the following section :

"3. Heavy tanks.

According to information, which still needs to be confirmed, the Germans are starting to build new heavy tanks.

Type
Weight
Armament
Armour
Type V
36 tons
75 mm gun and 2 machineguns
Up to 60 mm
Type VI
45 tons
75 mm gun, 20 mm gun, and 3 machineguns
Up to 70 mm
Type VII
90 tons
105 mm gun, 2 20 mm guns, and 4 machineguns
?

In addition, the Renault factories are repairing 72 ton French tanks, used in the war in the West. According to information received in March of this year, which still requires confirmation, Skoda and Krupp factories are starting production of 60 and 80 ton tanks."

Of course, the information in the report is somewhat skewed. However, it was not completely wrong. The Type V and VI were the VK 30.01 and 36.01, which were also sometimes called Pz.Kpfw.VI. As for the 90 ton Type VII, recall that the VK 65.01 had that index. The 90 ton mass didn't appear from nowhere. According to documents dated April 4th, 1941, Krupp was working on a chassis that was only called "Sfl". No reliable data survives about this chassis, but it was supposed to carry a 149 mm L/40 gun.

This document, dated April 4th, 1941, makes one of the first mentions of the future VK 70.01.

It was clear what kind of chassis this was in November of 1941, when a new index appeared as the gun carrier: VK 70.01. The new heavy tank was first discussed at a meeting on October 4th, 1941, with the participation of Erich Wolfert, Krupp's chief engineer. The mass of the tank was estimated at 75 tons. It also was sometimes called Pz.Kpfw.VII.

Daimler-Benz MB.507 diesel engine, initially planned for installation into the tank.

The requirements for the VK 70.01 were ready for November 1st, 1941. According to them, the combat mass was set at 73 tons. The hull and turret armour would be 140 mm thick, and the sides would be 100 mm thick. The crew would consist of 5 men, three of which would be in the turret. the Daimler-Benz MB.507 engine, designed for LS torpedo boats, would propel the tank. Compared to the marine version, its power was slightly reduced. At 2200 RPM, it output 800 hp, and at 2400 RPM, 1000 hp. In the first case, the expected top speed was 40 kph, in the second, 43.6 kph.

The most powerful tank gun to be considered for installation in a German tank. No work was done past calculations.

The armament is worthy of additional discussion. As mentioned above, the initial plan was to use a 149 mm L/40 gun. According to correspondence, it would use separate ammunition, but single piece ammunition was originally planned. The weight of one round ranged from 43 to 50 kg. The expected muzzle velocity was 750 m/s. 

On November 8th, the issue of an even more monstrous gun was raised. The length of its barrel increased to 52 calibers, and the muzzle velocity increased to 890 m/s. We can only guess what kind of tank this gun was supposed to fight against. For some reason, this gun was later assumed to be the armament for a tank destroyer on the E-75 platform. In reality, the weapon is older than the chassis by 2.5 years, and this tank destroyer only existed in the form of approximations of the chassis's mass reserves.

Aside from a 149 mm gun, Krupp began working on a slightly less monstrous 128 mm gun. According to requirements issued on November 11th, 1941, the VK 70.01 had to be able to penetrate 180 mm at 60 degrees from 1000 meters. Two variants of ammunition were prepared for the prospective 128 mm gun by late December. The first was 1313 mm long, the second was 1593 mm long. The muzzle velocity was the same for both: 840 m/s.

The 105 mm L/70 gun was the main weapon of the VK 70.01 by the spring of 1942.

While the armament was being discussed, the VK 70.01 continued to evolve. By mid-December, the mass of the tank grew to 90 tons. This was a hard limit, since it was set by the weight capacity of railroad platforms. The first draft of the VK 70.01 (blueprint W 1648) was presented at a meeting on January 21st, 1942, to the Krupp technical director Erich Muller, Wolfert, and Sebastian Fichner, the chief of the 6th Department of the Armament Directorate, among others.

The presented project was slightly different from the initial requirements. The mass was 82 tons, and the top speed decreased to 35 kph. The thickness of the armour also decreased: the front was 120 mm thick, and the sides were 100 mm thick. Finally, the armament changed: the 128 mm gun vanished temporarily, the 149 mm gun was still under discussion, and the draft had a 105 mm L/70 gun. Like the 128 mm gun, it originated from an AA gun. The muzzle velocity was 965 m/s. During the discussion of the project, the engine was replaced: now the 800 hp Maybach HL 230 would be used, which was to enter production at the start of 1943.

The VK 72.01 was an attempt to create a lighter VK 70.01. As you can see by the numerous corrections, there was no consensus regarding the armament of the tank, or even its name. This document contains both "Pz.Kpfw. Löwe" and "Pz.Kpfw. VII"

Turbulent discussion of further development continued through February and March. The 128 mm gun returned, but now with a barrel length of 50 calibers. Nevertheless, the 105 mm gun was still considered optimal. The military was inclined to reduce the weight of the tank by thinning out the armour in the front to 100 mm and the sides to 80 mm, the same as on the VK 45.01.

This rush was triggered by German fears that, after the KV-2, even more powerful Soviet tanks would come from the East. German reports that 100 ton tanks are being built in the Urals were picked up by Soviet intelligence. The Germans were in the same state of panic as the Soviet military brass in the spring of 1941 after hearing about the 90 ton Type VII heavy tank. Based on plans made in late January-early February, the VK 70.01 would enter production by April.

The canonical Pz.Kpfw. Löwe, blueprint W 1661, dated April 7th, 1942. The front of the hull is formed from one curved plate.

The idea to reduce the weight of the tank evolved into the VK 72.01, which was finalized on March 5th, 1942. The 72 ton tank had "lighter" armour. Initially, it was supposed to carry either a 128 or a 149 mm gun. Later, the armament was changed to a 105 mm L/70 and 149 mm L/37. No data on the engine was specified, but the crew was increased to 6 men. Later, the data on the VK 72.01 was repeatedly changed. This is when the name Pz.Kpfw. Löwe was used, as well as Pz.Kpfw. VII. The VK 70.01 and related projects had a whole litany of indexes. Documents continued to refer to it by different names.

Hilary Doyle's reconstruction of the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe, viewed from the front. As with the VK 30.01, there are many questions regarding the commander's placement in the turret.

The situation with the "canonical" Pz.Kpfw. Löwe looks just as curious. It became so just because blueprint W 1661 is the only one that is still available in graphical form. It's dated April 9th, 1942. The 90 ton tank was still equipped with the Maybach HL 230, but its top speed was reduced further, to 23 kph. The armour and armament was the same as on the W 1648 project. There was also a lighter variant of the tank with 80-100 mm of armour that weighed 76 tons. The top speed increased to 26.8 kph.

Several features of the tank give cause for interest. For starters, the turret would be cast, a rarity for German tanks. The placement of the commander's cupola raises many questions. According to the draft, the commander would be sitting on top of the gun breech. Finally, the front plate was curved. Krupp's engineers planned on making the front of the tank in one part, just like on early T-34s. This was a common solution for Krupp at the time: the first (120 ton) Typ 205 Maus, as well as both variants of the Typ 180, had curved front plates.

The mouse that killed a lion

This was not the end of the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe's transformations. From March of 1942, a new player entered the superheavy tank develoment game, Porsche K.G. Ferdinand Porsche's team received an order for a 100 ton weight class tank. Like his competitors from Krupp, Porsche's engineers selected the 40 caliber 149 mm gun as the tank's main weapon. One alternative was a 128 mm L/50 gun.

One of the variants of the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe, dated April-May 1942. This tank has a 105 mm gun and a rear turret. As you can see, the front plate of the hull is curved.

Despite the competition between Krupp and Porsche K.G., there was cooperation on a number of issues. In either case, the contract for producing hulls and turrets would go to Krupp. Turrets for Porsche's tanks were also designed in Essen.

In turn, Porsche's design bureau designed engines, among other things. Draft W 1662 appeared on April 23rd, which listed Porsche K.G.'s engines are alternatives for the tank's power plant. A pair of diesel engines would produce 840 hp.

A turret designed by Krupp in May of 1942 for the 15 cm KwK L/40. It would likely have been installed on the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe if a decision was made to use a gun this powerful.

Several more variants of the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe were presented by Krupp in May-June of 1942. At least one had its turret in the rear. Until recently, that tank was assumed to have the 149 mm L/40 gun, but later it was discovered that this model was armed with a 105 mm gun. As for the 149 mm gun, it was only finally settled on in the second half of May. The issue was that it would not have fit into the stock turret. Given the 1.5 meter long cartridges, it would be impossible to load it.

Sadly, the final blueprints, including W 1670, have not been discovered yet, but it is likely that the turret was the same as on the first variant of the Maus. The similarity is expected, since the designer was the same. This turret had a turret bustle that solved some loading issues. Either way, by June of 1942 it was clear that the days of the Pz.Kpfw. Löwe are numbered. Porsche's project was clearly better and had a clearer future. On July 20th, 1942, the Lowe project was closed. Nevertheless, Krupp did not give up, and so the Tiger-Maus project was born. However, that is a whole different story.


Exhibit with a History

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The German Tiger tank currently on display in Saumur is one of only six tanks of this type that survive to this day. Out of the six, the history of this one is the most interesting. This tank fought with two armies on both sides of the front, and had its own personal names.


In German hands

The Saumur Tiger left the Henschel factory in the middle of May of 1944. Its chassis is number 251114, the 1114th Tiger to be built, and its turret serial number is 250857. This is a tank from the late production series, the main feature of which was steel road wheels.

The Saumur Tiger, photographed on display at the Munster tank museum. Like in Saumur, the tank was on display here on narrow transport tracks. Wide combat tracks are stored below.

In late May, the shiny new Tiger was included into the newly forming 102th SS heavy tank regiment. The vehicle was sent to the 1st company, 1st battalion, and received the tactical number 114, according to the last digit of its serial number. SS Oberscharführer Wilhelm Schmidt became its first commander.

The battalion fought actively against the Western Allied forces in Normandy starting in July of 1944. The specifics of the Saumur Tiger's career are not known, except for the last 24 hours of its time in the battalion. From the words of a direct participant in these events, the commander of the 1st company, SS Obersturmführer Alois Kalls:

"Our tanks were fighting in the middle of Falais, next to the cathedral, and only retreated to our lines outside the city under orders, after nightfall. The cornerstone of the German defense was broken, and the front began to crumble. 

Early on August 18th, we received verbal orders, and began an overall retreat from Willi to Vignats, south of Fresné-la-Mère. We arrived at our destination at 3:00 am and took up a section of the front to the north of the city, right next to the SPGs on our left flank. During the day, British tanks and infantry occupied La Hoguette. After reporting this to the combat group HQ, we received new orders, left our positions immediately, and approached the railroad embankment near Nécy. Tank #124 from the 1st company was knocked out, and we towed it to the outskirts of L'Abbaye. We covered the north-western exit from the city with two SPGs, which forced the British tanks to retreat at around 17:00. 

With darkness, we received new orders to immediately retreat and arrive to the checkpoint 500 meters east of Vignats. The knocked out tank was destroyed with an explosive charge and two armour piercing rounds, and blew up. Having arrived at the checkpoint at 00:30, we received new orders. We were to break through Vignats to Nécy with an extra supply of fuel on our engine decks, fuel up tanks from the 1st company, and retreat with them to a hill near Nécy.

Tiger commanders who encountered the Allies at Le Fournet: Arthur Glagow, Martin Schroif, and Alois Kalls.

At 2:30, we set out on a dangerous nighttime journey through enemy territory with two 200 Litre barrels of gasoline strapped on behind the turret. A single tracer bullet was enough to fail the mission and destroy the tank and its crew. We set out at full speed, and reached our comrades in an hour without a scratch.

After fuelling up, our little tank group began to retreat to the north-west, as ordered. At 05:15, with first light, we encountered a British anti-tank position at the road. While both sides tried to deal with the surprise, our tank passed the guns and continued along the road at full speed. Schroif, who followed us, opened fire on positions that we didn't notice, and who started firing on us with tracer bullets, but then received two direct hits.

The radio operator and driver were heavily wounded. The third tank (#114, commanded by Unterscharfuhrer Arthur Glagow -author's note) who was following Schroif too closely rammed into his rear at high speed and could not disengage. This happened in seconds. Schroif, wounded in the head and leg, leapt out of his tank and made his way to the cover of the bocage, and further across the field, to German positions. Two crewmen were taken prisoner by the British, except the loader, who managed to do the same thing as Schroif.

Map showing the route of Alois Kalls' Tigers on August 18-19th, 1944.

A few minutes later, when other tanks did not catch up, we stopped and decided to return, to see what was holding them up. As soon as we turned the corner, we saw such fireworks, that to continue would be madness. On armour piercing shell from an anti-tank gun hit the turret, another hit the hull, bursts of machinegun fire whipped the armour. Something could happen at any moment. A clear and precise order was given by the commander: "Tank, stop! Tank, forward! March!" The tank stopped so suddenly, that we were slammed against the side, then tore forward, engine roaring. The driver's lightning fast reflexes that drove our 60-ton monster saved our life more than once!"

These events unfolded at a place called Le Fourneau, 500 meters west of of Breux. The British describe them in the combat journal of the 2nd battalion of the Monmouthshire Regiment as follows:

"At about 06:00, we heard the roar of tank engines from the north. Some of us decided that these were Shermans, but the roar was lacking a ringing that was characteristic of Shermans. Several minutes later, we saw three German Tigers. We opened fire from everything we had, but they passed unharmed through D company and reached the intersection, which was defended by C company and the battalion HQ.

Le Fourneau intersection, modern day. The Tigers from the 102nd battalion were coming from the direction of Necy.

The road was blocked by an artillery observer's armoured carrier. The Tiger rammed it and flung it against the wall of a shed, until there was enough room to get by. Then the Tiger attacked the commander's carrier, which was left by its crew in a hurry. When the road was open, the Tiger continued on through B company's ranks. A clever radio operator warned the company, and we soon heard three loud bangs. The battalion HQ decided that the Tigers opened fire with their 88 mm guns, but, several minutes later, the commander of B company got on the air and informed us that, sadly, one tank got away.

He was being coy. The first Tiger managed to bypass a Hawkins grenade trap near the HQ, but the second activated two of them and drove off into the ditch. The third Tiger, driving at top speed like the rest of the tanks in the group, rammed into the tank that was immobilized in front of him, which, by that point, also took a hit from a PIAT. Its gun barrel penetrated the stowage container on the turret of the second Tiger. Even through the grenade did not penetrate the armour, the crews of both tanks abandoned them in a hurry. The survivors were captured."

Bretagne aka Colmar

The French Interior Forces (Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur – FFI) began forming when the liberation of France started. In early March of 1945, the Besnier Independent Squadron  (L'escadron autonome Besnier) joined them. The squadron was commanded by Captain Guy Besnier, who finished the Versailles tank school in 1939.

The squadron was armed with German vehicles, abandoned during the fighting in France. From January to March of 1945, vehicles that could be repaired and put back into order were searched for in all of France. This was not a simple task, as most of the vehicles were disassembled, and remains of the crews had to be extracted from many.

The earliest photograph of the Saumur Tiger. The French put the tank into working order and scraped off the crosses from the sides, but the turret still bears the original 114 markings.

Scroif and Glagow's Tigers were not left without attention. They became known in early January of 1945. A father-son mechanic duo, Roger and Jean Lecourtier, as well as Bernard Verier, put the tank into working order after a month of work. French tricolour insignia was added to the sides, and the tank received a traditional "geographic" nickname: Bretagne.

Aside from the Tiger, the squadron included two Panthers, 11 PzIVs, one Marder, two StuG III, one Jagdpanzer IV, and various transports. Like the Tiger, these vehicles bore French insignia and received French names. One of the Panthers was called Dauphine, some of the PzIVs were called Île-de-France, Poitou, Normandie, Flandre, Vendée, Anjou, Alsace, and the Marder was called Lorraine.

Top: Bretagne in the Besnier Independent Tank Squadron. Bottom: Dauphine the Panther, and three PzIVs: Alsace, Vendée, and Anjou.

Until the last day of the war, Bretagne the Tiger fought in the FFI to liquidate the encircled forces south of Saint-Nazaire. 

On June 20th, 1945, the Besnier Squadron was included into the 6th Cuirassier Regiment as its 2nd squadron. The regiment was sent to Germany, as a part of the French occupation force. Instead of tricolour roundels, the tanks received French flags. Bretagne was repainted, and renamed to Colmar. Initially, the squadron was quartered in Baumholder, but it was moved to Morbach in late October of 1945, which is 50 km to the east of Trier. 

Colmar during service with the French occupational force in Germany.

In March of 1946, the 6th Cuirassier Regiment was disbanded, and the tanks and other vehicles were sent to the reserve armoured vehicle service (ERGM/EB, modern day ETAMAT) in Nevoy, near Gien.

Photo of Colmar, with the dent in the upper front plate, which was the result of the collision with Martin Schroif's Tiger on August 19th, 1944.

Later, in 1950, the tanks and other vehicles were sent to a storage facility belonging to the Satory AMX company, where the Tiger spent 30 years. In 1977, it was passed on to the newly formed tank museum in Saumur. In 2002, the Tiger was temporarily moved to the tank exhibit in Munster, after which it returned to France, where it is on display to this day.

Tiger #241 was less fortunate than #114, but it continues to serve the people.

3 km east of the location of the incident with the Tigers of the 102nd SS heavy tank battalion, there is a small stream. A bridge across the stream can be recognized as the side plate of a Tiger tank. Perhaps this is a pat of Schroif's tank, which was not as lucky as its colleague. 


Sherman Engines

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Things like fuel efficiency and average speed don't really come up much in most tank encyclopedias, which is a shame, since these are very important characteristics in the real world. The Americans, in their investigations of a new engine, were kind enough to provide these figures for a few Sherman tanks for us.

RG 24 C-2 vol 12290 1/TK CRUISER/1

These numbers are interesting on their own, but let's compare them numbers obtained in Soviet trials

The M4A2(76)W consumed 330 L of fuel per 100 km of beaten road driving, or 0.71 mpg. This seems consistent with these figures, falling in between highway and cross-country. The regular M4A2 in the Soviet test performed twice as well (although it had a higher quality road to drive on), even beating out the Western M4A2 in fuel efficiency. 

On the country, the M4A2 consumed 246-268 L per 100 km (0.87-0.9 mpg), depending on the season, and the M4A2(76)W consumed 371-410 L (0.57-0.63 mpg).

The higher fuel efficiency could be explained by the fact that the Soviet drivers just weren't gunning the engine very hard. Even at their fastest, the M4A2 put out 22.4 kph (14 mph) in the winter, and the M4A2(76)W achieved 19.2 kph (12 mph) in the spring, much worse than the M4A2 seen here.

Since the Lee is from the same tank family, let's throw it in here as well, from earlier trials. The tank spent 297 L per 100 km of stone road (0.97 mpg), 440 L on a dirt road (0.53 mpg), and 570 L off-road (0.41 mpg), which is comparable to the tanks seen here. The average speeds were 26 kph (16.1 mph), 17 kph (10.5 mph), and 12 kph (7.5 kph), respectively. Comparing it to its closes relative from the Canadian data, the M4A1, paints the same picture: the Soviet drivers were more fuel efficient, but also slower.

German SPG Intel

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"Information notice #34

Information on enemy armameng

1. German 42 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941

According to information obtained from various sources, the Germans use a 42 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941 

The ammunition of the gun consists of armour piercing mod. 1941 shells with a tungsten carbide core and high explosive mod. 1941 shells.

According to German data, the penetration of the armour piercing shell is as follows

Range (m)
Angle from normal
Thickness of penetrated armour (mm)
300
0
75
600
0
40

According to information obtained by the Transcaucasian Front (prisoner interrogations) the 42 mm gun has the following characteristics:

Vertical range: -8 to +32 degrees
Horizontal range: 44 degrees
Rate of fire: 5 RPM
Mass of the gun in combat: 450 kg

The gun has a semiautomatic breech. The mount has split trails. The gun crew consists of six men. The gun is towed by a car. 

According to British data, the German 42 mm gun has a tapered bore. This is the third anti-tank gun with a tapered bore (detailed information on the 28/20 and 75/55 guns was sent earlier). 

2. German 105 mm SPG

According to data obtained from British sources, the Germans installed their 105 mm mod. 18 gun (10 cm K.18) on an armoured SPG. The high explosive mod. 19 grenade is used for firing (medium charge) and armour piercing Panzergranate Rot (maximum charge). The maximum range of the 105 mm mod. 18 gun with the medium charge is 15600 m. The muzzle velocity of the shell with maximum charge is 820 m/s.

3. German 150 mm assault gun

According to data obtained from British sources, the Germans installed their 150 mm mod. 33 infantry gun on a type II tank (Pz.Kw.II).

German 150 mm SPG

Wilhelm Wise, a German corporal from the 1st battalion, 190th artillery squadron, killed near Voronezh, had a photograph that indicates that the Germans installed a 150 mm gun on an SPG. The photo is attached.

Conclusions

From the attached information, one can conclude that, in addition to developing anti-tank artillery with tapered bores, the Germans are progressing towards more mobile artillery, by installing even relatively high caliber artillery on mobile platforms."

85 mm vs Soviet Tanks

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We saw how the Soviet 85 mm 52-K gun performed against the Tiger, but does the domestic KV-1 do any better?

"Shooting at KV-1 and T-34 hulls from the 85 mm gun

KV-1 and T-34 tanks were fired upon by armour piercing tracer shells from 1500 m. Results are given in table #4

Table #4

Armour plate
Armour thickness (mm)
Angle
Impact angle
Result
KV-1 tank hull
Front
75+30
60
70
Complete penetration of the appliqué armour and main armour. 100x100 mm breach.
Turret rear
75
15
70
Dent 100 mm in diameter and 35 mm deep.
Turret front
75+15+20
0
90
The shell penetrated the main armour, deflector plate, and appliqué armour. Fragments from 20x20 to 100x100 mm were dislodged from the inside. The shell was stuck in the armour.
Turret rear
75
75
90
Complete penetration. 100x110 mm breach. The welding seam was destroyed.
T-34 tank hull
Turret side
60
30
0
The left part of the turret with the observation device slot cracked off. Fragment size was 1400x750 mm.

MG-42 Manual

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"Translation of a German document captured 3 km east of Rosino on December 1st, 1942, among documents of the 10th infantry company, 174th infantry regiment, 81st infantry division.

Directions on shooting from the MG-42 machinegun

The high rate of fire of the MG-42 results in a large consumption of ammunition. Use it with great discipline, and remember the following:

MG-42 as a hand-held machinegun

The high rate of fire of the MG-42 results in difficulty while aiming, due to the shaking after firing. Fire in short bursts. The best amount appears to be 5-7 rounds, as the machinegunner is capable of holding the gun in the direction of the target for that long. After 7 rounds, the dispersion cone deviates from the target, resulting in a larger amount of wasted ammunition.

Conclusion: short bursts with re-acquisition of the target.

In order to prevent the stock from slipping off your shoulder, do the following:
  • Place the bipod well
  • Press the stock firmly to your shoulder
  • Place your feet well
When firing on the move, the machinegunner needs to lean forward. The machine gun must be held by the belt, and must be firmly pressed towards the body with the right hand.

MG-42 as a mounted machinegun

Sustained aimed fire is not possible due to the high rate of fire and shaking of the gun. The dispersion cone moves away after 70 shots. Bursts longer than 70 rounds in length result in a waste of ammunition. Because of this, bursts should be limited to 70 shots, with rapid re-acquisition of the target afterwards. 

The resulting rapid heating of the barrel requires replacing the barrel after 200 rounds. 

In order to impede the shifting of the dispersion cone while kneeling or sitting, it is recommended to place two ammunition boxes on the middle leg of the gun mount.

Signature illegible

Send to:
  1. Army headquarters: 1
  2. All regiments that received MG-42s: 10
  3. All regiments that have not yet received MG-42s: 1
Note: The tactical-technical data on the MG-42 is missing. According to an interrogation from December 4th, 1942 (Bryansk Front), the MG-42 is allegedly a modernization of the MG-34. 

The MG-42 is heavier by one kilogram than the MG-34. Externally, the MG-42 differs little from the MG-34. Allegedly, the rate of fire of the MG-42 reaches 1600 RPM. Verification is required.

Confirmed: Senior assistant of the Chief of the 1st Department of the 3rd Directorate of the Red Army GRU, Colonel Dubenko."

Heavyweight Brainstorming

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During the years of WWII, American industry made excellent light and medium tanks. SPGs built on their chassis were no less excellent. The only field where American engineers encountered misfortune was the development of heavy tanks. Although the Heavy Tank M6 was built, and even entered service, it was quickly left behind. The tank turned out to be too heavy and insufficiently mobile, without a place in American tank doctrine. Nevertheless, work on American heavy tanks never stopped, and projects like the Chrysler K kept coming.

Superheavy tank, American style

Aside from the Ordnance Department and its composite offices, responsible for tank development, armoured vehicles were designed by private companies in the US. The most successful was Marmon-Herrington, the only company who managed to put several of its tanks into mass production. Mostly, these companies worked on light and medium tanks, but, according to correspondence with the Red Army GABTU, at least one company tried its luck with heavies. Of course, its chances of success were negligible, but such a risk often paid off in time of war.

On January 3rd, 1942, the People's Commissariat of Defense received a report from the manager of American department, Zarubin. It informed of negotiations in the fall of 1942 with Anatoliy Shelkin, a representative of the Leake Engineering Company, which, according to Shelkin, developed a large variety of heavy artillery tractors. An experimental prototype of one of these vehicles was shown to Amtorg representatives.

This was the vision of protection for prospective American heavy tanks in March of 1945.

What followed is much more interesting. During their next meeting, Shelkin claimed that Leake Engineering Company had designed a superheavy tank. According to the description, the vehicle weighed 175 tons. Sadly, no drawings were presented. The superheavy tank had 60-130 mm of armour, used "heavy and AA guns" for armament, and carried 6 heavy machineguns. Two steam engines with a combined output of 2500 hp powered this tank.

Shelkin said that the heavy tank would reach enormous speeds, and that the ground pressure would be no greater than that of one person's foot. The Leake Engineering Company used its tractors as a chassis. In case of interest, the company could provide materials on its 175 ton tank. However, negotiations did not move on past the proposal stage, even though information about this tank popped up in Soviet intelligence summaries several times.

By the summer of 1944, the American superheavy tank program was in a state of deep slumber. Its rapid awakening in the second half of July of 1944 was connected with the use of the Tiger II tank. On July 28th, the General Electric company proposed a draft project of the Heavy Tank M6A2E1. An urgent order to convert 15 Heavy Tanks M6A2 to the level of the M6A2E1 was cancelled, when it turned out that the overloaded chassis could not cross even slight slopes.

155 mm T7 gun, proposed for installation in the superheavy tank.

On August 14th, development of the T29 and T30 heavy tanks was approved, armed with 105 and 155 mm guns. meanwhile, starting in late 1944, German prisoners of war revealed that Germany was working on superheavy tanks. Most often, they spoke of the Maus, and even mentioned the place where it was being built: Boblingen. This was the truth, and the often mentioned Doctor Porsche had a direct connection with the development. It's hard to be surprised that the US began to work on its own superheavy tank design.

In March of 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Sumner Brackett from the Armoured Research Medical Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky, conducted a study of prospective developments in armoured vehicles. One can assume that Brackett, a physicist and spectroscopist by trade, based his work on reports and summaries of American armoured vehicle development.

Brackett's result was a report, which was included in the overall report by the Council of Officers on the issues of equipping the US army in the post-war period. The report is dated June 20th, 1945. According to Brackett, the American army needed a 75 short (68 metric) ton tank, with up to 267 mm of armour in the front, and 102 mm thick sides. The 5-man tank would be equipped with a 90 mm gun, capable of penetrating 254 mm of armour from 1829 meters away at 60 degrees.

A 150 short ton (136 metric ton) semi-trailer tank concept.

One of the chapters of this document is intriguingly titled "Super-tank". According to the study, this role would be filled with a tank no less than 150 short (136 metric) tons in weight, with a 105 mm cannon in a fully rotating turret, an automatic loader, and a stabilizer. The thickness of its armour was stated as "highest possible". To make the tank easier to transport, it could be taken apart.

A sketch of a semi-trailer tank was attached, made by Sgt. Covington in March of 1945. The draft development of Brackett's superheavy tank was bold, to say the least. The tank was composed of two sections, each of which had its own engine. The front section contained the fighting compartment, manned by the driver and his assistant. The rear section contained the turret, similar to the one used on the T29/T30/T32/T34 series of tanks. The superheavy tank used a 155 mm gun. Aside from the main turret, a smaller turret with two machineguns was placed above the hitch.

Of course, there was no possibility of a more or less thought out technical project. However, this time the initiative came from the military, and a highly reputable agency at that. In addition, the development of superheavy tanks was included in the military's prospective projects program.

Prospective with a K

The defeat of Germany had a serious effect on the American tank program. Work on the T29 and T30 slowed considerably, as did work on the T28 SPG, which was officially called a superheavy tank at the time. Nevertheless, work continued, and a new argument for their acceleration soon came up.

On September 7th, 1945, at the Victory Parade in Berlin, new Soviet IS-3 heavy tanks were revealed. An especially unpleasant surprise was the fact that not just a handful of vehicles were on display, but 52 tanks. By September of 1945, 250 of them were coming out of Chelyabinsk every month.

A column of Soviet heavy tanks on parade in Berlin, September 7th, 1945. For a decade, these tanks served as a benchmark for development of armoured vehicles in Western countries.

The new Soviet tank that was shown in Berlin triggered a state of, if not panic, then certainly serious worry in the West. The Cold War had not yet started, but yesterday's allies already had cause for conflict. It was not surprising that the issue of America's superheavy tanks resurfaced in November of 1945. This coincided with the appointment of a rather remarkable character as the head of the War Department Equipment Board. This man was General Joseph Warren Stilwell, also known as "Vinegar Joe". During the war, he commanded the forces in Burma. Stilwell earned his nickname due to constant arguments with his allies and a rather harsh treatment of his own troops. Vinegar Joe had significant combat experience, but the fronts on which he fought saw little use of armoured forces, and Japanese tanks were far from what Germany had to offer.

The commission, unofficially nicknamed the "Stilwell Council", worked on a number of topics. Armoured vehicles were among them. Initially, the list of prospective programs included a superheavy tank, but it became one of  Vinegar Joe's first victims. The list that the commission approved on January 16th, 1946, had no superheavy tanks. The requirements for these vehicles were withdrawn, since they had no future.

Tank destroyers were binned shortly after. This decision was made based on experience that showed that the best tank destroyer is another tank. Self propelled guns were reserved for indirect fire and AA roles. The role of tank destroyers would be filled with heavy tanks, which had thick armour and powerful armament.

Model of the Chrysler K heavy tank, May 1946.

The T29/T30 and its offspring became the highest priority in heavy tank development. Nevertheless, work continued on other, less promising topics. One of them was a project, presented for inspection on May 14th, 1946. The author of this project was Chrysler Corporation's tank department. The project, indexed Chrysler K, was partially based on requirements for heavy tanks that were developed in 1945-46.

Despite the mass of designs and real tanks ranging from 70 to 75 short (63.5-68 metric) tons, some specialists were of the opinion that it should be limited to 60 short (54.5 metric) tons. This was the limit that Chrysler's engineers set for themselves. It was not easy to keep the mass under this line, especially since requirements for armour kept rising. It's not surprising that Chrysler came up with an extraordinary solution.

The location of the fighting compartment is the first thing that one sees. It was located in the rear of the hull. This allowed the tank to be shorter, mere inches longer than the M26 Pershing. The driver's compartment vanished. The driver and the other three crewmen were located in the turret.

This was not the first instance of such a solution. The first tank to gain this ability was the Medium Tank T23. Thanks to its electrical transmission, it could be driven from inside the turret, or even from outside the tank, using a remote control. This system was later removed, but Chrysler's specialists did not consider the turret controls as backups. Presumably, practical experiments were performed, and they showed promising results. 

The 105 mm T5E1 tank gun was typical for American heavy tanks of the era.

Moving the fighting compartment to the turret allowed for better placement of the engine and transmission. As with the T23, the Chrysler K would use an electric transmission. Like the drive sprockets, it was positioned in the front of the hull. An unknown 1200 hp engine would put the tank into motion. The mobility of the tank was unknown, but at 20 hp/ton, it could be expected to be even more agile than the Pershing. Overall, the suspension design was similar to that used on the T29/T30, as was the number of road wheels, but the width of the track links increased from 711 to 762 mm. The location of the drive sprockets was different. There were also no return rollers. This kind of layout was more characteristic of late German designs.

The hull and turret were also uncharacteristic for the American school. Unlike other American tanks of the period, which had cast hulls, the Chrysler K's hull was welded. The front and sides of the hull were sloped. The densely packed layout allowed the armour to be increased. According to the design, the front armour was 178 mm thick, and the sides were 76 mm thick. Except the T28/T95, no American tank had so much front armour. The turret also received similar armour thickness, taking an uncharacteristic hemispherical shape.

Vsevolod Martinenko's reconstruction of the Chrysler K.

The Chrysler K's armament was typical for American tanks of the era. Three types of guns were considered: 105 mm, 120 mm, and 155 mm. Chrysler's engineers took the lightest variant, the 105 mm T5E1 gun, which was used on the M6A2E1, T29, and T28/T95 heavy tanks. In part, this was because the number of loaders dropped to one. The increased workload was partially mitigated by a concentric positioning of ammunition.

The auxiliary armament of the tank was much more interesting. The American military had an obsession with hull machineguns since the 1930s. Entire batteries of machineguns stuck out from the hulls of light and medium tanks. On the Chrysler K, this idea was taken to a whole new level. Two Browning M1919A4 machineguns were placed in the front of the hull, and turrets with .50 cal Browning M2HB machineguns were placed in the rear corners. A General Electric remote firing system was used to fire these guns, a variant adapted from the Boeing B-29 bomber. Considering that aiming the hull guns with tracers resulted in questionable effectiveness, the remote control turrets would not be any worse, at least.

Precursor of the technological revolution

Fate was unkind to the Chrysler K. The gradual cutbacks made to military programs after 1946 hit tanks as well. Suffice it to say that the 1200 Heavy Tanks T29 ordered in May of 1945 dwindled to 8 by 1947. In these conditions, Chrysler's project, which required serious investments into development of a whole slew of systems, including an electric transmission, was out of place.

In addition, after conducting trials, the Americans favoured the 120 mm T53 gun, which was too big for the Chrysler K. For this reason, work on the tank only made it to the model stage. Vinegar Joe didn't outlive the tank by long. General Stilwell died on October 12th, 1946.

Placing the whole crew into the turret was a fad among American engineers in the 1950s and 60s, but it was first worked through on the Chrysler K.

Despite its sad finale, the Chrysler K left a mark on the American tank building school. In 1948, the American military decided that the mass of a tank should be capped at 58-60 short (52.5-54.5 metric) tons. The limit kept dropping, and the idea of a mobile heavy tank remained a priority. Tanks, including heavy ones, with the whole crew located in the turret, began appearing in 1952. None of them made it past drafts and models, but the idea persisted. In July of 1967, the MBT-70 entered trials, which finally implemented the idea of a turret-borne crew.

Multiturreted Independence

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Towards the end of WWI, the French reached first place in the heavy tank development race. A little longer, and the FCM 2C would have seen combat. The French created the first breakthrough tank in the world, which combined powerful armament with armour that, at the time, could be considered shellproof. In addition, the French vehicle became the first multiturreted tank in the world, and its main turret was large enough for three men.

In Britain, the runner up trendsetter, took a different path in the creation of heavy tanks: improvement of the tried and true "rhombus" design. It was soon obvious that this path led to a dead end. The next British heavy tank, the A1E1 Independent, gained not just a turret, but five of them.

Five headed dragon

The civil war that engulfed the former Russian empire was a harbinger of war to come. Tanks were used very sparingly, but the few battles they fought were enough to make some conclusions.

Tanks were used in the classical fashion, to break though a line of fortifications, just once during the whole war, during an assault on Tsaritsin (modern day Volgograd). In every other respect, tanks were inferior to armoured cars, which were used much more widely by the warring factions. The nature of the war demanded high mobility, which tanks of the time could not provide.

There were also some complaints about the mobility of fire. Armament placed in sponsons severely limited the gun's traverse. This was not so important in cases of massed attacks, but lone tanks were often captured by infantry.

The A1E1 Independent at the Vickers factory, 1926.

It's hard to tell how much combat in Russia affected further developments, but one thing is certain: the "rhombus" fell out of favour in Britain by the 1920s. The time of hundreds of tanks advancing along a moon-like landscape was over. The army needed new tanks, which were significantly more maneuverable.

The first requirements for a new heavy tank, dated 1922, showed that the British weren't looking for shortcuts on the way to the next generation. According to the requirements, the military wanted a lower tank, but still one without a turret. The main gun was a 3-pounder (47 mm) in the front of the hull. Sponsons with machineguns lined the sides. The engine would be in the rear. The tank had to be able to cross a 2.8 meter wide trench. Largely, this was the same "rhombus", but with a cannon in the front.

Vickers was the only developer of the new tank. The Vickers Infantry Tank No.1 light tank had just entered trials, and was equipped with a novelty: a rotating turret. This tank was only armed with machineguns, but the Vickers Infantry Tank No.2 had a 3-pounder cannon in the turret.

It's not hard to guess that the mobility of fire increased with the addition of a turret. Vickers also understood this, and designed an alternative alongside the vehicle with a hull gun. In March of 1923, the British War Ministry was shown a draft project that was almost completely at odds with the initial requirements. Only the armament and the rear engine matched up. The mention of the Vickers Infantry Tank was not an accident, as the turret was largely copied from that tank. The number of machineguns used by this tank increased to four, but they were housed in small one-man turrets instead of sponsons.

The elongated hull is visible.

Sir George Thomas Backham, Vickers' chief engineer, lobbied for this multiturreted design. He found allies in the Royal Tank Corps. As a result, the initial concept of a low and long tank was discarded.

Meanwhile, the Vickers Infantry Tanks No.1 and No.2 turned out to be failed experiments, and they were replaced with other vehicles. The Light Tank Mk.I, which was quickly renamed to Medium Tank Mk.I, came out in late 1922. In 1925, the improved Medium Tank Mk.II entered production. The experimental Birch Gun SPG was also built in 1924. All of these vehicles affected the development of the heavy tank, indexed A1E1. By May of 1925, when Vickers finished building the model, the vehicle looked very different.

Land battleship

The design of the A1E1, which received the name Independent, was finalized in 1926. Unlike the Medium Tanks Mk.I and Mk.II, which were built at the Royal Arsenal in Woolwich, the experimental prototype was built at the Vickers factory in Sheffield. Assembly was complete in September of 1926. It cost the War Ministry a fantastic sum for the time: 77,500 pounds Sterling. To compare, a single Medium Tank Mk.II cost 8,500 pounds.

Initial configuration of the Independent.

Let us explain why the British needed such an expensive tank. Fierce debates rage on about the value of this tank. Some insist that, for instance, it was going to be equipped with a 75 mm gun, and so on. In order to understand the need for the A1E1, one must look at how the British viewed their mechanized forces.

Two-man tankettes, armed with a single machinegun, would make up most of the force. Their job was to fight enemy infantry. Light (medium) tanks, armed with cannons and machineguns, were one level up. In addition to fighting infantry, they would also destroy enemy tanks. The 3-pounder gun, especially the version with a lengthened barrel, was sufficient for this task. This gun had no high explosive rounds.

Finally, breakthrough tanks, or "battle tanks", were at the very top of the pyramid. The A1E1 belonged to this class. These vehicles were also equipped with cannons and machineguns, but also had thick armour, which protected them from anti-tank guns in addition to machineguns. The thickness of the Independent's armour reached 28 mm, slightly more than that of the Renault NC. At the time, this was enough armour to offer reliable protection from small caliber artillery.

As for these rumours about a 75 mm gun, one must remember that the British army had no gun with this caliber. Just like the light/medium tanks, the British heavy tank used its cannon only to fight enemy tanks. This tank, equipped with thick armour, would burst into the center of enemy defenses, and shower their trenches with fire from its small turrets. Thanks to its long hull, it would easily be able to cross trenches and ditches, clearing the way for smaller tanks. Despite its large mass, it had to be as maneuverable as medium vehicles.

Stepladders were added to help the crew climb up.

Vickers built a "land battleship" to meet these requirements. The running gear was very similar to the one used on the Medium Tanks Mk.I and Mk.II, although it was mostly true for the suspension elements, idler, and drive sprocket. 8 road wheels, coupled into 4 bogeys, were attached to each side. Each side also had a massive idler and drive sprocket. They were positioned just off the ground. Thir job was to absorb impacts when the tank hit a vertical obstacle.

Removable skirts were added to protect the suspension and road wheels. Entry hatches, positioned in between suspension elements, were a distinctive characteristic of this vehicle. Tankers used these hatches very infrequently, since they did not tend to be particularly clean.

Driver's station.

The driver's work conditions were completely different from those of previous British heavy tanks. Compared to the "rhombus" tanks, this was like a spaceship. The designers tried their hardest to ease the driver's job, and make his conditions more comfortable. First, the crewman sat alone, with no one to interfere. A bulge was added to the front of the hull to house him comfortably. Thanks to a special observation cupola, he had satisfactory visibility.

That was not all. An invention of Walter Gordon Wilson, one of the creators of the first tanks, was implemented in this vehicle. This was a planetary transmission, developed back in 1919. The A1E1 was the first tank that used such a transmission. In addition to traditional levers, the driver received a steering wheel, which was used when making gradual turns. Servos also eased the driver's job.

The hull was assembled using rivets, which was traditional for the time. The fighting compartment was protected with 28 mm of armour. In other places, the armour was between 8 and 13 mm thick.

The engine compartment took up half of the length of the hull. Armstrong-Siddeley developed a special V-shaped 12-cylinder 350 hp engine just for this tank. Thanks to this, the power to weight ratio of the A1E1 was over 10 hp/ton. The tank was equipped with a Swiss Winterthur gearbox (modern day RENK-MAAG).

The A1E1 might appear long, but its length was only 7770 mm, less than the famous "rhombus" Mark V tank.

Turret interior.

The main turret of the A1E1, unlike the hull, was much more conservative. As mentioned above, the Vickers Infantry Tank No.2 turret was used as inspiration. The machinegun was removed, which was a little surprising, as the 3-pounder cannon was only meant to fire at enemy tanks. The turret housed three crewmen, and the commander received a special cupola, shifted to the left. A powerful fan, covered by an armoured cap, was located to his right. Like on the Vickers Infantry Tank No.2, the turret was composed of six "slices", with a curved roof attached on top. From the inside, the turret and the fighting compartment were lined with asbestos.

Another novelty used in the British heavy tank was the use of throat microphones for crew communication.

Money devourer

The final assembly of the A1E1 Independent was finished in October of 1926. On November 13th, the tank was first seen by journalists. The tank participated in a demonstration of the achievements of the British military industry, organized for governments of British dominions. The result was certainly impressive. The heavy multiturreted tank drove on, surrounded by tankettes, much like a battleship surrounded by destroyers. 

However, the performance arranged at Camberley concealed serious defects. On one hand, the 29 ton tank showed decent mobility. Its top speed was 32 kph, which was more than the Medium Tank Mk.II could achieve. On the other hand, there was a large price to pay. The 12-cylinder engine was ravenous, and consume almost 2.4 L of fuel for one kilometer of driving. The oil expenditure was also stunning: 10.5 L per engine hour! Small design defects also kept popping up, which had to be corrected.

For starters, support rollers with rubber rims were discarded, and replaced with fully metallic designs. Issues with brake ribbons were solved by using ribbons with a liner made from Ferodo Ltd.'s friction material, widely known as simply "ferodo". In 1928, Wilson designed an improved transmission, which was also installed into the tank. Constant modifications increased the tank's mas to 32.5 tons by 1929.

The A1E1 Independent was not much larger than the medium three-turreted A6E2.

 Meanwhile, the tank had a serious issue that could not be solved. The long hull caused a number of issues. This was not a significant drawback on ordinary roads and flat terrain, but issues cropped up when the tank tried to cross an incline or a wide trench. Suddenly, the tank was lacking engine power, even though the power to weight ratio stayed above 10 hp/ton. The commander could also not command more than one turret, which reduced the tank's effectiveness in battle.

Despite the obvious issues with offroad driving, the British War Ministry kept trying to improve the tank. Its characteristics remained serviceable even in the early 1930s. In addition, too much money was sunk into both the tank itself, and its modernization.

This circus continued until 1935, when it became clear that there was no longer a point in putting any more resources into the Independent. By that point, the A1E1 consumed another 150,000 pounds Sterling, or twice its original price. In total, the tank cost as much as dozens of Medium Tanks Mk.II, while its value on the battlefield was about equal to one medium tank.

Light, medium, and heavy tanks. None of them entered production.

This Leviathan was too expensive to send to the scrap heap. The A1E1 was delivered to the training facility at Bovington. The tank remained a monument to itself until 1940, when it was returned to service. The British lost a large amount of tanks in France, and every tank was valuable. Because of this, the A1E1 Independent returned to active duty. The tank was placed at a crossroads near Bovington, acting as a mobile bunker. Since the Germans never landed in Britain, it resumed its role as an exhibit.

The only A1E1 prototype survived the war, and can now be seen in the Bovington Tank Museum. The vehicle is well preserved, but there is no talk of a restoration, at least not yet.

Despite such a sad ending, the A1E1 Independent was not a complete failure. At the very least, it was the only heavy tank design of the 1920s to be built in metal. In addition, it was the first true multiturreted tank, which triggered a whole generation of armoured vehicles worldwide. The ideas implemented in the A1E1 can be seen in other tanks, including the Soviet T-35. One often hears that the T-35 was a copy of the Independent, but that is not the case. Only the overall concept was inspired, and even then, with many differences.

The Independent had many other technical solutions that were later used in other tanks. This is especially true of the planetary transmission and the layout of the driver's station. The five-turreted tank left a mark on tank design worldwide.


Pak 40 Discovery

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"To the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces, comrade Fedorenko
August 18th, 1942

I report that, according to documents, the German army possesses 7.5 cm mod. 1940 anti-tank guns.

The gun fires regular 7.5 cm mod. 1939 armour piercing rounds, 7.5 cm mod. 1938 HEAT rounds, special 7.5 cm mod. 1940 armour piercing rounds (with a hardened core), and 7.5 cm mod. 1934 HE rounds.
The effect of the armour piercing rounds is as follows:

Against the T-34 tank:
The mod. 1939 shell penetrates the front from up to 500 meters, the rear from up to 1000 meters, the upper side from 1200 meter.

Against the KV (with 7.62 cm gun):
The mod. 1939 shell penetrates the turret armour (75 mm), turret platform, and hull from up to 1000 meters.

The mod. 1938 shell penetrates the aforementioned armour at all effective ranges.

Against the KV with applique armour:
The mod. 1939 shell penetrates the turret armour (100 mm) from up to 100 meters, the turret platform from up to 300 meters.

The mod. 1940 shell penetrates the front armour (90 mm) from up to 200 meters and the lower from plate from up to 400 meters.

Chief of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel Ratov
Military Commissar of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Brigade Commissar Kiselev
Chief of the 1st Department of the GRU 2nd Directorate, Khlopov"


Tiger vs IS

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I've had so many articles about IS-2s shooting up Tigers, it's only fair to do one on the other way around. This IS-2 was lost by the 72nd Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment on May 1st, in Khotymyr. Judging by the amount of impacts on its armour, it didn't give up without a fight.


From the front, we see three hits: two nonpenetrating hits to the hull, one from 1200 meters and one from 1100 meters. A hit to the front of the turret from 314 meters penetrated.


This side shows only one impact: a nonpenetrating hit on the upper side from 1100 meters. The hole in the turret is a pistol port, not a breach.


A closer look at the 1100 m ricochet and a penetrating shot to the side of the turret from 200 meters. The performance of the armour is pretty good. No cracking, the breaches are clean, and, most importantly, the Tigers could only make a kill from suicidally close range. Even at the range where the Tigers were bouncing off the IS-2's armour, the D-25T could literally rip their turrets off

Foreign Aid

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A lot of attention is aimed at the numbers for Lend-Lease aid received by the USSR in WWII, but what about the aid received by the Russian Empire during WWI? Despite being a much less discussed topic, the numbers are, in some cases, much greater than the LL ones. RGAE-413-12-8605 has the info we need.


Item
Unit
Import to Russia
 1914-1917
Import to the USSR
 1941-1944

  1. Aircraft (various)
units
11,000
15,641

  1. Aircraft motors
units
17,000
7,159


  • 76 mm cannons
  • Cannons of all calibers
units
5,625
-
-
10,654

  1. Bomb launchers and mortars
units
1,352
283


  • Machineguns (various)
  • AA machineguns
units

mounts
42,398
-
-
2,601


  • Rifles (various)
  • Submachineguns (various) and AT rifles
units
units
2,461,000
-
41,150
126,300

  1. Shells (various)
millions
15.7
49.9

  1. Cartridges (various)
millions
983.0
1,388.1

Infantry Sweet Spot

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The Valentine infantry tank was the most common British tank of WWII. Like the Matilda, it didn't last long as a front line tank in the British army, but commander versions and SPGs on the chassis made it to Germany. Its career in other countries was even more eventful. The Red Army used them until the end of the war, and they were widely used in the Pacific theater of war. In some nations, these tanks served as training tanks until the 1950s. What was the history of the creation of this extraordinary tank, and how did the first modifications of the Valentine serve?

Intermediate variant

One interesting quirk of the Valentine's history is that the British system of armament did not envision such a tank. According to requirements from the War Ministry, two types of infantry tanks were to be built. One was armed with machineguns, weighed about 6 tons, and would be crewed by two men. These requirements formed the foundation for the Infantry Tank Mk.I. The second type of tank would be armed with a cannon and have a crew of four men, three of which were housed in the turret.

Leslie Little, a brilliant engineer, overshadowed by John Carden and Vivian Loyd.

The Vickers-Armstrongs design bureau worked on the Infantry Tank Mk.I under the direction of John Carden. Leslie Francis Little, an employee of Carden and Loyd since the company's beginning, played the role of lead engineer. The company, already absorbed by Vickers-Armstrongs, ceased to exist after John Carden's tragic death in December of 1935. Vivian Loyd tried his luck in another field (and created the Loyd Carrier), and Little became Vickers-Armstrongs' chief tank designer.

Little's position caused the loss of the contract for development of the second infantry tank to the Royal Arsenal Woolwich. Of course, there was a competition. Overall, Little opposed the concept that evolved into the Infantry Tank Mk.II Matilda. It was clear that a three-man turret would raise the mass of the tank. This also meant that the tank would need a more powerful engine, and British industry had issues in that regard. Finally, a bigger and heavier tank means more metal, more investment into production, and a higher cost. Little's prediction was right: 2987 Infantry Tanks Mk.II were built between September of 1939 and August of 1943. That sounds like an impressive number, until you consider that six factories were involved in its production.

The first Infantry Tank Mk.III, registration number T.15946, Elswick Works, April 1940.

Little was not opposed to the idea of an infantry tank armed with a cannon. However, he wanted such a tank to be smaller, lighter, have a two-man turret, and minimal use of cast parts. This kind of tank turned out to be cheaper and easier to produce.

Little began working on such a tank on his own initiative in 1937. Two tanks were taken as the basis: the infantry A11 and cruiser A10, accepted into service under the index Cruiser Tank Mk.II. Little took the overall shape of the hull from the A11, and adapted it for a larger turret. The wedge shape of the front hull was deleted, and two hatches on the sides replaced one on the top. This solved the issue of entering the driver's compartment that plagued the A11. The suspension of the A10, suitable for an infantry tank, was taken with nearly no changes. The mass was estimated at 16 tons. Initially, the two-man turret contained a Czech ZB 60 high caliber machinegun.

The same tank from the rear. Initial production tanks had the same air intake in the rear of the turret.

The project was presented to the War Ministry on February 10th, 1938. The British tried to "improve" Little's creation by proposing that the turret should fit three people and that the armour should be 75 mm thick. All of those changes were rejected by the creator, who understood that they would increase the mass of the tank and nullify its advantages. One of the compromises that Vickers accepted was the installation of a 2-pounder cannon and a coaxial machinegun instead of the ZB 60. The thickness of the side armour increased from 50 to 60 mm. The idea of a commander's cupola was rejected, since it increased the mass. On March 24th, Vickers presented a model of the tank that had a Gundlach periscope instead of a commander's cupola.

The first Infantry Tank Mk.III at the Mechanical Warfare Experimental Establishment in Farnborough.

Initially, this bickering caused the War Ministry to reject the project, unofficially named Valentine. The tank never received an A index, since it was an external project. Little was not too disappointed, since this was hardly the first time that the British military rejected one of his tanks.

Time set things straight. In the spring of 1939, the military returned to the Valentine project. One of the causes was that work on the Infantry Tank Mk.II was taking too long. Additionally, it became clear that the design of the Infantry Tank Mk.I was not that good.

The turret of the Infantry Tank Mk.III sans roof. As you can see, there is not much space inside.

On April 4th (other sources say April 14th), another model was presented. It appears that Little decided to taunt the War Ministry. He made a three-man turret, but with a 1270 mm wide turret ring. In the end, common sense won, and the military accepted a two-man turret.

However, the "improvements" did not end here. A proposal was made to cover up the suspension with skirt armour, like on the Infantry Tank Mk.II. The idea was rejected, since the onboard ammunition storage would have to be reduced to 50 rounds to maintain the weight at 16 tons. The use of the  Fowler Coulter Plough was rejected as well, since Little couldn't guarantee a top speed of 25.6 kph.

One can only envy Little's courage. If not for the upcoming war (the British had no illusions about this), the Valentine would not have made it past the model stage. This is one of the few cases in British tank building where not only did an external project get accepted, but without any of the military's "improvements". 

This photograph demonstrates the design of the chassis and suspension. The Canadian Valentine VI is pictured, but the hull and suspension were identical to the British variant.

One Cruiser Tank Mk.II was loaded to 16 tons to check if the suspension would hold out. Trials showed that it functioned normally. This served as a green light for production of the Infantry Tank Mk.III. The name "Valentine" temporarily vanished. To be clear, the name had nothing to do with Valentine's Day or "John Valentine Carden".

AEC A189 engine used on the Valentine I. The military insisted on using a gasoline engine, and then suffered from their choice.

However, the War Ministry had its revenge. The first contract, T7221, for 125 tanks, signed on June 29th, 1940, was signed not with Vickers, but with the Metropolitan Cammell Carriage and Wagon Company (MCCW). However, in practice, MCCW was essentially a division of Vickers-Armstrongs. Contract T7222 was signed on the same day with Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company (BRC&W) for 125 tanks. As for contract T7220 for 50 tanks that went to Vickers-Armstrongs, it was only signed on July 1st, 1940. The Elswick Works factory was used for production.

Tracks and engines switcharoo

In reality, a delay of two days meant nothing. The first Infantry Tank Mk.III was built by Elswick Works anyway. The vehicle with registration number T.15946 was completed in April of 1940, and it was sent to the Mechanical Warfare Experimental Establishment in Farnborough. Overall, its design was identical to the model. It received a two-man turret with a 2-pounder gun with a coaxial BESA machinegun, as well as a 2" breech-loaded mortar. The suspension was identical to that of the Cruiser Tank Mk.II, aside from the tracks, which were widened to 356 mm.

Another significant change was the engine. Vickers supported the use of a diesel engine, but the War Ministry insisted on a gasoline one. As a result, the tank was equipped with an AEC A189 9.64 L 131 hp engine, which was designed for use in busses. This engine gave the tank 8.18 hp/ton. This was not an exceptional value, but it was enough to give the tank a top speed of 25.7 kph.

The new tanks replaced the Cruiser Tank Mk.II on the assembly line.

Trials gave a satisfactory result, and a green light was given for mass production. Contract T7220 activated on July 12th, 1940. Elswick Works delivered 7 tanks in the first month. These tanks were the most expensive: 14,900 pounds Sterling each. To compare, the first 10 MCCW Valentines cost 11,600 each, and the price dropped to 10,400 after that. MCCW completed its first tanks on August 1st, 1940, and BRC&W began its production on August 3rd. 101 tanks were delivered in the 3rd quarter, and 236 tanks in the fourth.

Little was absolutely right: three factories built nearly twice as many Infantry Tanks Mk.III by the end of the year than Infantry Tanks Mk.II at six. The upcoming war forced the government to increase the contracts to 275 tanks from Vickers and 200 from BRC&W.

The last 100 Infantry Tanks Mk.III looked like this. They were equipped with new track links and Infantry Tank Mk.III* type engine compartment vents.

Early Infantry Tanks Mk.III had a number of differences from later ones, since the tank was changed during production. One of the differences was the air vent in the back of the turret. Initially, its design was poor. The tank was meant for fighting in warm countries, and thus had a plethora of air intake openings. The powerful engine cooling system circulated the air. However, the number of openings in the turret roof meant that the tank was vulnerable to Molotov cocktails.

The air intake in the back of the turret was an even worse idea. It turned out that one could fit a whole hand into it, or worse, a grenade. During production, its shape was altered. However, as study of the tanks in the USSR proved, the issue was not completely resolved.


The AEC A190 diesel engine replaced the unreliable A189 in production. Tanks with this engine were indexed Infantry Tank Mk.III*.

Another traditional headache for infantry tanks were swapping of track links. Unlike the stamped links for the Infantry Tank Mk.II, the Infantry Tank Mk.III used cast track links. Issues arose not only from poor quality casting, but low traction off-road. The track links were complicated (especially their connection). Two pins were required to connect them, and not two halves, like in later types. The pins were pushed through two connectors. This system was unreliable and broke constantly.

Towards the end of Infantry Tank Mk.III production, stamped track links finally appeared, which were later used on early Infantry Tanks Mk.III*. They had better traction with terrain, but the unreliable connectors remained. Predictably, these track links did not last long in production. They were quickly replaced with cast "skeleton" tracks, which were more reliable and simpler.

Early Infantry Tanks Mk.III* with stamped track links. The design was not the most reliable, and they did not last in production too long.

Changes were made to the hull as well. The Infantry Tank Mk.III used a complex, but effective, system of air intakes in the engine compartment. This allowed the engine to receive air, while being impervious to Molotov cocktails. The first variant of shutters was ineffective, and it was later replaced. The muffler cover was also altered. Towards the end of production of the first batch, the mesh design was replaced with a simpler and more reliable solid plate.

Types of track links used by Valentine tanks in 1940-42.

The biggest change in the tank's design happened towards the end of 1940. The use of the tank revealed many issues with the AEC A189 engine. The engine was quite unreliable. Something had to be done. A solution was quickly found: the A190 engine, still an AEC product with bus ancestry. At 9.65 L, it put out 131 hp, largely the same as its predecessor. More importantly, it was much more reliable.

The engine was put into production without delay. As a result, the number of Infantry Tanks Mk.III built for the first contracts was less than planned: only 308. Elswick Works produced 175 tanks of this type (T.15946-T.16120), MCCW produced 66 (T.16221-T.16264 and T.20419-T.20440), and BRC&W produced 67 tanks (T16356-T16421). The AEC A190 modification received the index Infantry Tank Mk.III*.

Like the Matilda, Valentine tanks were equipped with the Parrish-Lakeman Mounting.

Thanks to the nearly identical dimensions of the A189 and A190, the later versions of the Infantry Tank Mk.III and Infantry Tank Mk.III* were identical externally. The only way to tell them apart is by registration numbers. Early vehicles had stamped tracks, which were later replaced with cast skeletal tracks.

Another major change during the tank's production was the radio. Initially, the tank used the Wireless Set No.11 with a rather complicated antenna mount. In the second half of 1941, it was replaced with the more compact and reliable Wireless Set No.19. It remained a standard for British tanks until the end of the war. It was also installed on American tanks that were sent to Britain through the Lend Lease program. The antenna mount was also changed with the introduction of the Wireless Set No.19. It was moved to the turret roof, towards the rear wall. A hatch for discarding spent shell casings was introduced at the same time. It also doubled as a pistol port.

Valentine II tanks from the 6th Armoured Division, September 1941. The later tanks have ports on the left side of the turret.

The Infantry Tank Mk.III* was the most common variant of the tank. 316 vehicles were delivered in the first quarter of 1941, 372 in the second, and 407 in the third. In total, 1493 vehicles were produced, 350 by Elswick Works, 494 by MCCW, and 649 by BRC&W. This was a record for British tanks, which was only beaten by the Cromwell IV. Not surprisingly, this version became the most common among tanks fighting in North Africa.

The tank was renamed in the summer of 1941. Since new versions were developed, the old index became inconvenient, and the tank was named Valentine. The Infantry Tank Mk.III became the Valentine I, and the Infantry Tank Mk.III* became the Valentine II. Around the time that the Valentine II index was introduced, the tank received an additional fuel tank on the left fender.

Diagram of the GM 6004 engine.

This modification was quite good. Nevertheless, towards the end of 1941, it departed from the scene. The engine was to blame. AEC, the manufacturer of the engine, was overloaded with orders, and could not keep up with growing tank production. Second, Lend Lease was not just a source of tanks. A suitable engine was found overseas. This was the two-stroke 6-cylinder General Motors 6-71 diesel. The military version was indexed General Motors 6004.

The 6.98 L engine was used in GM busses. What's more important, the dual variant was proposed for M3A3, M3A5, and M4A2 medium tanks. This variant had a nominal power of 188 hp and a maximum power of 205 hp. For the Valentine, the power was reduced to 138 hp. This was quite enough for an infantry tank.

Late Valentine IIs and Valentine IVs looked identical.

The GM 6004 engine variant entered production in the fall of 1941, under the index Valentine IV. The jump with indexes should not be surprising, as another vehicle already received the index Valentine III, and it will be covered in a separate article. It was built at the BRC&W factory, which did not build Valentine IVs. It's worth mentioning that Birmingham started to distance itself from Valentine tanks, since the Cromwell became higher priority in 1942.

As for the Valentine IV, it had no external differences from late production Valentine IIs. Aside from the engine, the new variant received a new gearbox, which was good news for drivers. Until then, the tank hard a 5-speed Meadows Type No.22 gearbox. The Valentine IV used a 5-speed Spicer synchronized gearbox, which made the lives of drivers easier.

The vehicle had an extra fuel tank on the left side.

The introduction of the Valentine IV mixed up production contracts yet again. Some of them had to be altered. There were also financial changes: now, the price of the unit was separated into the price for the tank and the price of the engine and transmission. For instance, contract T9824 with Vickers, signed on May 31st, 1940, proposed the production of 300 Valentine I. Later, they were replaced with Valentine IIs, and finally split between 250 Valentine IIs and 50 Valentine IVs. The Valentine II cost 11,000 pounds Sterling per tank. The Valentine IV cost 7210 for the tank and 4490 for the engine and other components.

The Valentine IV was not built in fewer numbers than its predecessor. Only 660 tanks were built, 425 of which were built at Elswick Works and 235 at MCCW. Most of them (520 units) were sent to the USSR. This process lasted until 1944, and many of the tanks were used. By 1942, the Valentine V had higher priority.

Wrong theater of war

The first recipient of the Infantry Tank Mk.III was the 21st Tank Brigade, which started receiving the tanks on August 3rd, 1940. They replaced the obsolete Medium Tank Mk.II, which temporarily returned into service with the start of the war. The rapid rate of production allowed the brigade to be fully equipped by mid-September.

After that, tanks began to arrive in the 6th Armoured Division, formed in September of 1940. The next recipient was the 8th Armoured Division, formed on November 4th, 1940. Then, the tanks filled the 11th Armoured Division, formed in March of 1941. From the spring of 1941, the Valentine I was replaced with the improved Valentine II. By the end of June of 1941, 203 Valentine I and 569 Valentine II tanks were issued. The 6th Armoured Division had 324 Valentine tanks, and the 8th had 290.

Tankers of the Polish Tank Brigade swear an oath. January 1942.

My mid-August, the number of Valentine Is dropped to 180, and the number of Valentine II tanks grew to 696. The 6th, 8th, and 11th Armoured Divisions remained in Britain as reserves, and they were not sent out into battle for a long time. The Polish Tank Brigade, which received 24 tanks, was also in reserve.

Tanks of this type were perfectly suited for fighting in Europe. Even though the threat of German invasion was gone by mid-1941, the collection of infantry tanks was not out of place.

A typical set of desert equipment, installed starting in the summer of 1941.

The first unit to use the Valentine in combat was the 8th Royal Tank Regiment, in November of 1941, during Operation Crusader. Practice showed that the use of infantry tanks in the desert was, if not a mistake, then a questionable endeavour. This theater of war favoured quick cruiser tanks, and slow infantry tanks became a tempting target. The German and Italian forces were saturated with powerful anti-tank artillery, which meant that the tank's armour was less decisive than imagined. However, it was clear that the Valentine surpasses the Matilda, especially when it comes to maneuverability.

The same tank from the rear.

The same thing was observed in the winter of 1942. On one hand, tankers complained about the weak gun and cramped two-man turret. This explains the priority of Valentine III and V tanks. On the other hand, tankers of the 44th Royal Tank Regiment remarked on the Valentine's superior speed compared to the Matilda. The smaller size was not just a drawback, but a benefit, since a smaller target is harder to hit.

It's hard to be surprised that the Valentine served for longer than the Matilda. In the Battle of El-Alamein, the Matilda already departed from the front lines, and were mostly used as minesweepers. Meanwhile, the 23rd Tank Brigade had 135 Valentines of various types. The 8th Armoured Division, which arrived in Egypt in June of 1942, had the same tanks. The 6th Armoured Division also turned up in North Africa, but it quickly swapped its Valentines for Shermans.

The Valentines proved their worth in the desert, but this theater of war was unsuitable for this kind of tank.

Tanks that were shipped to North Africa underwent preparations. The first tanks received special racks for fuel cans, which were later replaced by an external fuel tank. Sand shields were attached to the fenders, which significantly reduced the amount of dust kicked up during movement.

Valentine tanks remained in service at home for a long time. This photo shows vehicles of the 6th Armoured Division, which kept using them until the summer of 1942.

The Valentine fell out of favour after the fighting in North Africa. It's worth pointing out once more that this theater of war was ill suited for these tans. In Tunis, especially in places that were not deserts, the Valentine fought better. However, the British already made up their mind. North Africa was the last place where these tanks went into battle in the front lines.

The use of the Valentine II in Burma in 1942 also went poorly. The heavy armour was not needed against the Japanese. It also did not prove useful in Madagascar in May of 1942, when Vichy forces knocked out several Valentines with 75 mm field guns. One must also mention New Zealand, which received 98 Valentine II tanks. They did not get to fight, but Valentine III-V tanks that New Zealand received did.

British Tank for Soviet Infantry

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On September 29th, 1941, the first regular Arctic convoy departed from Britain to the USSR. It was indexed PQ-1. On October 11th, 11 transport ships arrived at Arkhangelsk, where they delivered 193 Hawker Hurricane fighters and other military cargo. Among it were 20 Matilda III and Valentine II tanks. So began the delivery of the Valentine tank, which became the most numerous British tank in the Red Army. 

Difficulties with initial shipments

The USSR had very little information on what kind of tanks were produced in Great Britain up until September of 1941. For example, in a report dated September 17th, 1941, it is claimed that Vickers makes an 80 ton heavy tank. According to this document, the factory produced one such tank per day. To put it mildly, this data has some inaccuracies. This situation was largely caused by the degree of secrecy that the British maintained.

In reality, the Elswick Works factory at Newcastle-upon-Thyne, belonging to Vickers-Armstrong, was building Valentine II infantry tanks at the time. The Soviet military acquired information about them only towards the end of September. Initially, Soviet documents referred to them as "Mark 2 "Star" (Valentine)". The first shipment of tanks to the USSR was expected to contain 20 vehicles of this type.

New information about British vehicles became available by late September of 1941. According to the report, the "infantry tank MKIII" was the latest design, and it was based on the "cruiser tank MKII". It was also specified that the tank was called "Valentine" in the British army. After a Soviet commission began working in England, which contained officers from the Red Army GABTU, more precise information was sent back to the USSR.

A celebration dedicated to the shipment of the first Valentines to the Red Army. BRC&W factory, September 28th, 1941.

Unlike the first shipment of light Tetrarch tanks, which contained both new and used vehicles, all Valentine tanks that arrived in the USSR were brand new. A celebration dedicated to the shipment of the first tanks was held on September 28th, 1941, at the Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company. I.M. Mayskiy, the Soviet ambassador in Great Britain, took part in the proceedings.

The Valentine tanks from the first two shipments belonged to this factory. They were built starting in June of 1941 according to contract T9867, which ordered 300 tanks with registration numbers from T.17385 to T.17684. There were no differences between vehicles destined for the British army or the Red Army. The tanks were also similarly equipped.

A diagram of faults, pointing out the ventilation openings in the turret.

Training of crews for the British tanks began on October 15th, 1941, at the Kazan Courses of Armoured Force Improvement (KUKS). Ironically, they were directly connected to the Osoaviakhim Technical Courses (TEKO), more commonly known as the "KAMA tank school", where German tankers studied 10 years beforehand, and German Grosstraktor and Leichttraktor tanks were tested.

A group of 22 men (2 British officers and 20 NCOs) arrived with the PQ-2 convoy, who were sent to organize repair workshops. On October 29th, a brigade consisting of 6 British instructors arrived at Kazan. They did not spend much time here. On November 11th, the course commander Colonel N.M. Kononov stated that the knowledge transfer was completed and there was no need for further assistance from the British. By the middle of November, 120 crews were trained. They received instructions on driving and maintenance, which were hurriedly translated into Russian.

As for the tanks themselves, they were sent from the ports to Gorkiy (modern day Nizhniy Novgorod). Military acceptance posts were organized at Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, and they quickly found themselves busy.

Valentine II on trials, Kazan, December 1941

The lack of differences between the tanks shipped to the USSR and to the British army caused a heap of trouble. The British forgot that winter is different in different places, and transport along the northern route introduces its own problems. The first convoy arrived during a relatively warm time, but PQ-2's tanks caused a major headache. Out of 84 Valentines, 27 were "defrosted". The issue was simple: water was used as coolant, which, naturally, froze at low temperatures. 20 batteries were also "defrosted". 

Another problem was that several tanks were transported on the deck, and they were splashed with water. Interestingly enough, the instructions that arrived with the tanks indicated that the tank should be fuelled with gasoline. The British were too lazy to rewrite the instructions for the Valentine I, which had the AEC 189 gasoline engine, while the Valentine II had the AEC 190.

The tank kept its maintenance markings.

There were also issues with equipment. Some of the tanks did not arrive fully stocked. For instance, 35% arrived without a tarp. Most tanks lacked a technical log, and their toolboxes were not sealed. Some of the tanks lacked Thompson M1928A1 submachineguns and Bren guns. Spare barrels were missing, and each tank only came with 5-6 ammo loads.

The GABTU did not know that the British only had armour piercing ammunition for their Valentines. There was a theory that there were HE shells, but the British did not send any. There was also a rumour that the British had an AP shell with an explosive filler. The situation with armament was so serious that the Soviets ended up building a Valentine II rearmed with the domestic 45 mm cannon.

The tank had an AA mount for the Bren gun, known as the Lakerman Mount.

The British tanks also had plenty of design flaws. Track pins broke often in November of 1941. Only three spare pins were included in the parts box, while a week of use would lead to 4-8 broken pins. The cause of these breakdowns was the insistence of British instructors that the tracks should be stretched too tightly. After a tank with slacker tracks was tested at KUKS, the wear on the track pins was drastically reduced.

Another issue was that the smooth track links provided little traction packed snow and ice. As a result, the tank's off-road mobility dropped drastically, and there was a danger of slipping into a ditch when driving on icy roads. Spurs were developed at KUKS, but they did not show themselves well: after a 15 km march, the road wheel bearings of the tank with spurs began to overheat. Instances of the rubber rims of the drive sprocket slipping off were also common. The tank was not immobilized, but the noise from the tracks increased noticeably.

A pistol port in the side of the turret distinguishes the Valentine II from the Valentine I.

Using gas oil instead of water as coolant solved the problem of freezing temporarily. As there were no spare batteries, a proposal was made to use domestic ones. There was also an issue with the starter. Its method of installation meant that it only worked reliably on level ground.

Finally, the tank was vulnerable to Molotov cocktails. Instead of a fan, the Valentine II had a plethora of openings in the turret. The strangest feature was an opening in the rear of the turret that was large enough to fit a whole hand. There were also quite a few of them in the roof of the turret.

Unsuitable for low temperatures

The NIIBT proving grounds also took part in the study of the British tank. Due to the approaching front lines, it was evacuated to Kazan. For over a year, the city became an important center for Soviet tank building. This is where trials of foreign vehicles took place. The Valentine, or "English tank MK-III*", was no exception. 

The racks on the rear are meant for British two-gallon (9.09 L) cans.

The tank with registration number T.17482 was chosen for study. The testers had a lot of work ahead of them. Aside from the trials, they had to compose a detailed technical description and write brief repair and service instructions. The tank arrived at the proving grounds in December.

The wide hatches provided convenient access to the engine.

The technical description was composed first. It's hard to call it brief. Out of the 122 page long report, 79 were about the tank directly. In addition, crew conditions and functions of individual components were studied. A study of the driving compartment revealed that it was comfortable for people of medium height, but tall tankers found it cramped. The inability to adjust the seat lengthwise was considered a fault. Since the clutch pedal was located too far back, it was most comfortable for drivers of medium height to operate the tank. 

The effort it took to drive the tank was considered reasonable. It took 35 kg to operate the side clutches, 65 kg to operate the brake pedal, 70 kg to operate the clutch, and 1.5 kg to operate the gas. The Soviet specialists liked the location of the instruments, which were split between two panels and were easy to read.

It was also easy to access the cooling system, but the heavy hatches took several men to open.

The size of the turret allowed the commander and the gunner to fit in easily. However, according to the author's personal experience, it is somewhat cramped. It's worth pointing out that NIIBT testers and GABTU specialists considered the gunner to be the commander, but that was not the case. As with American tanks, the Valentine's commander also acted as the loader, in addition to his other duties. The turret traverse mechanism and vertical aiming with a shoulder stock were considered comfortable.

Ammunition storage diagram.

The gunner and loader's stations were considered well thought out. However, the Soviet testers did not like seats themselves. They could be raised, but the size of the seats was too small, plus the gunner had no back. The large hatch was large enough to allow men in winter uniforms to get in. The ventilation system was deemed effective. Air came in through various openings and was sucked away by the engine fans. However, with such powerful suction, it was very cold in the fighting compartment.


Wireless Set No.19, the main British radio used during the war.

Mobility trials continued from December of 1941 to March of 1942, with some breaks. Overall, the tank travelled 1210 km, 971 over a highway and 239 off-road. The quality of the highway was rather inconsistent, sometime turning into more of a direction, as it was covered with 30 cm of snow. Since British oil was rejected by KUKS, the tank was filled with domestic oil of various grades.

Application of winter camouflage was a part of the trials. If nothing else, the Valentine looked much more fierce.

The tank reached a speed of 32 kph on a flat segment, 8 kph higher than its rated top speed. The average driving speed was 14.1 kph, and the average technical speed was 12.9 kph. Mostly, the tank drove in 4th gear, occasionally shifting into 5th, or 3rd for snowy roads. 140 L of fuel and 2.2 L of oil were expended for every 100 km of highway driving.

Off-road driving in the snow.

The tank was not driven along dirt roads, since its tracks were wider than the road. If the snow was deep enough, the tank bottomed out. Other than that, the tank had few problems during off-road driving. The average speed when driving across 30-70 cm deep snow was 10.4 km. The tank expended 182 L of fuel and 3.7 L of oil for 100 km. The tank drove in 3rd gear, with the driver sometimes switching to 2nd or 4th.

Crossing a snow obstacle during comparative trials.

One of the biggest issues of many tanks was that the engine began to overheat in difficult conditions, even in the winter. The Valentine had the opposite problem: it overcooled. It is not known how realistic this is, but, according to Soviet testers, the tank's cooling system was excessive in such a cold.

The testers had to perform experiments to try and lower the efficiency of the cooling system. Experiments showed that the easiest way to do this was to cover the radiators with a tarp, plywood, or some such material, to lower their throughput. The radiators were to be covered at temperatures of less than -5 degrees. The lower the temperature, the larger the surface that had to be covered. The testers also encountered the aforementioned problems with coolant.

Crossing two snow obstacles. The tank needed 14 minutes to get across.

The tank lost traction when driving on packed snow, and drivers had to be very careful in these conditions. The poor traction showed up in other ways. The tank could not climb a slope of over 12 degrees, and the maximum tilt was only 17 degrees. The maximum climbable slope in conditions where the tracks could retain traction was 25 degrees.

Issues with track links also plagued the vehicle on trial.

There were also separate trials, which were performed from January 27th to February 5th, 1942. Aside from the Valentine II, a PzIII Ausf. H, a T-34, and a Matilda III took part in the crossing of snow obstacles. A 1.7 m tall, 2 meter wide at its tallest section, and 3.5 meter overall wide obstacle was crossed by the Valentine from the third try, in second gear, without a running start. The T-34 could cross the same obstacle in 1st gear without a running start on the first try.

After that, the tanks attempted to cross two snow obstacles, 1.7 m in height, 4 m wide at the tallest part, and 5.5 m wide in total. The Valentine II took 14 minutes to make the crossing with a running start. It took 10 attempts to cross the first obstacle. The engine constantly stalled due to low power. The Matilda III crossed the obstacle in 21 minutes. Its engine also stalled. The PzIII took 16 minutes to cross the obstacles, taking 8 tries with a running start. As for the T-34, it had to negotiate three obstacles instead of two. With a 100 meter running start in second gear, the tank crossed all three obstacles in 10 seconds.

Armour diagram composed at NII-48 in 1942.

The next stage of the trials exonerated the Valentine. As mentioned above, a 12 degree slope was a much as it could climb. As for the Matilda, it could not climb even that much. The PzIII could not do so either. Overall, the trials showed that the winter mobility of the Valentine and PzIII were similar.

Hull joint diagrams.

The NIIBT proving grounds judged the Valentine positively as a result of these trials. Specialists classified it as a medium tank, which combined powerful armour with relatively light mass and small size. The gun was deemed to be adequately powerful. Trials against the PzIII and Pz38(t) showed that the gun could penetrate enemy tanks, except for the applique armour. The weapon was equivalent to the Soviet 45 mm gun.

The testers appreciated the 50 mm mortar in the gun mantlet. The visibility was deemed adequate. The low speed of the tank was deemed a drawback. Overall, it was judged superior to the Matilda III.

Mess in the north

The first Valentine IIs were sent into battle in late November of 1941. They were issued to crews of the 136th, 137th, 138th, and 139th Independent Tank Battalions. Since the battalions were formed in a hurry, the tankers had minimum experience with their vehicles. The issues with coolant and poor performance on ice exacerbated the situation. The units took losses, and complaints about the tanks piled in. However, this is a normal situation for any vehicle that goes into battle for the first time.

A knocked out Metropolitan-Cammell Valentine II. According to documents, this tank was sent to the 36th Tank Brigade on January 13th, 1942. Most likely, it was lost during the battle for Kharkov in May of 1942.

The issues that cropped up were resolved in cooperation with the British. They reacted swiftly to complains that there were no spare parts. On November 22nd, 1941, convoy PQ-3 arrived in Arkhangelsk, which delivered 317 tons of spare parts, in addition to 50 Valentines. General Frank Noel Mason-Macfarlane, the head of the British Military Mission in the USSR, played a key role in the acquisition of contacts. British instructors and translators were sent to Kazan, Gorkiy, and Arkhangelsk to facilitate cooperation. The next convoy, PQ-4, delivered another 700 tons of parts.

The British learned from their mistakes, and began to fill their tanks with antifreeze (60% ethylene glycol and 40% water). New types of lubricants were introduced. The issues with batteries were solved in a similar fashion. Each Valentine was shipped with 520 rounds of ammunition (about 8.6 loads), which solved the problem with a lack of ammo. The responsiveness of the British Military Mission and cooperation with Soviet specialists resolved the issues that were uncovered during usage.

Inventory is a whole separate matter. Until November 28th, 1941, it was not kept at all. Even manifests of arrivals were kept sporadically. Satisfactory records only began to appear in December, and even they had some nuances. For instance, the list of recipients was missing the 136th Independent Tank Battalion, which allegedly only had Matildas. In reality, not only did it have "Valentins" (as they were sometimes called), but also lost them.

The problem was that official delivery documents could sometimes only contain the first recipient. After that, the tank could be sent anywhere. In 1941-42, this was the normal course of events. The actual recipient can often only be found through the specific unit's records, assuming there was a regular record of arriving and departing tanks and crews. Transfer of tanks from one unit to another only complicated matters, and it was a routine procedure during the war.


A typical delivery record. Soviet quartermasters could distinguish various modifications of tanks. The record also demonstrates the condition in which tanks arrived in the USSR by the summer of 1942.

Nevertheless, GABTU's records and delivery records from Arkhangelsk allow us to determine what kind of tanks arrived in the USSR in general. It is impossible to establish the precise numbers of every type of Valentine that arrived. It was normal to produce different modifications within the same contract. In addition, Valentines were built at three factories, which makes determining precise numbers even harder.

It's considered that Valentine IV tanks, which had the American GMC 6004 diesel, only began arriving in the USSR in 1942. The delivery records disagree. According to them, the 131st Independent Tank Battalion was sent 7 Valentine IV tanks, which were built at Elswick Works for contract T1284 13 (WD numbers T.47098-T.47343). At the same time, the 131st ITB was sent Valentine II tanks, produced by Metropolitan-Cammell for contract T9866 (WD numbers T.27421-T.227720). The Valentine II tank on display in Patriot Park belongs to this series. Contract T9866 also covered the production of 86 Valentine IV tanks.

Tanks produced at Metropolitan-Cammell for contract T2009 (WD numbers T.32471-T.32720, 81 Valentine II and 149 Valentine IV tanks) began arriving in the USSR starting in late January of 1942. According to official data, the USSR received 161 Valentine II and 520 Valentine IV tanks. 25 and 71 were lost on the way, respectively. In reality, this number is somewhat inaccurate, since Valentine IIs can be seen among Valentine IV shipments and vice versa. Despite some domestic historians' claims, military acceptance could tell the difference between various modifications, especially later in the war.

Elswick Works Valentine IV, 1944.

After an initial wave of negativity, more detailed information on how the Valentine handled itself in combat began to arrive. As it turned out, the Valentines (also sometimes called MK-III or MK-3 in the Red Army) performed decently in the winter. The tanks could drive in second gear through 40-45 cm deep snow, whereas Soviet T-30 and T-60 small tanks could not drive in those conditions at all. The guns performed flawlessly, but a lack of HE shells reduced their effectiveness. There were also complaints about BESA ammunition belts jamming. The engine had to be kept running for 4-5 hours a day to remain serviceable in the winter.

The longer the tanks remained in use, the less complains there were. They were mostly used as light tanks. In this respect, they had their advantages over the Soviet T-60 and T-70, as well as the American M3 light. They fell behind on the highway, but caught up when it came to off-road driving.

The Valentine had a noticeable advantage: its armour. Despite the rather primitive assembly method (rivets), 60 mm of armour was a serious argument on the battlefield. As a result, the Valentine was the last light tank to be received by the Red Army in large amounts. The Valentine was the most numerous tank the was shipped to the USSR in 1942. Some of these tanks continued to serve into 1944.

17-pounder vs. 17-pounder

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The CACRU (Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement Unit) ordered a few 17-pounders for training. A 17-pounder is a 17-pounder, right? Well, it turns out, not so much.


The tank guns aren't really the same as the towed guns. But maybe they could still be used for training...


Or not. The MkI guns received and MkIV guns in use by the Sherman Vc tanks (the tanks the gunners would be using) are different enough for the training to not be applicable.


At the very least, we get a detailed breakdown of the differences between the two versions of the gun. 


Seems like a pretty convincing argument. However, war is war, and you have to do with what you have, rather than what you want.


Department of National Defense RG 24 C-2 vol 12260
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