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Prospective SPGs

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"April 14th 1944

Confirmed: Chief of the GBTU USA, Major General of the Tank Engineering Service, Alymov

Plan of the 3rd Department of the GBTU USA for April-May 1944

Work
Executor
Due date
Controlling the completion of 100 mm D-10S gun installation into the SU-100 at factory #9 and the Uralmash factory.
Konev
May 1st, 1944
Organizing and performing large scale trials of the SU-100 from the first batch.
Konev
June 1st, 1944
Taking part in SU-152M trials with an OBM-143 gun and giving conclusions.
Ryabtsev
May 1st, 1944
Controlling the installation of and participation in trials of the 122 mm high power gun into the ISU. Giving conclusions.
Ryabtsev
May 15th, 1944
Controlling the production and testing of the 85 mm high power gun.
Konev
June 1st, 1944
Organizing and execution of trials of the SU-85 (GAZ). Giving conclusions.
Volgushev
May 15th, 1944
Controlling experimental work at factory #38:


·         Testing the installation of the 122 mm howitzer into the SU-76M
Afanasenkov
May 15th, 1944
·         Correction of defects of the SU-37 discovered during proving grounds trials.
Vasilevskiy
May 1st, 1944
·         Organization and execution of SU-37 trials after the prototype is improved. Giving conclusions.
Vasilevskiy, Volgushev
May 20th, 1944
Organization and execution of proving grounds trials of the SU-37 produced by factory #40. Giving conclusions.
Vasilevskiy, Volgushev
May 15th, 1944


Via Yuri Pasholok.

Light SPGs with Big Guns

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The SU-76M SPG, armed with the ZIS-3 76 mm gun, was the second most numerous vehicle in the Red Army. This gun was one of Grabin's best, and had very respectable characteristics. Nevertheless, the idea of installing a more powerful gun was persistent, and some variants, such as the SU-85B, came close to entering production. However, the Red Army never received its domestic Marder.


Getting rid of an unneeded gun

The idea of creating a tank destroyer came up at the stage of developing the SU-12 and SU-71, the SU-76M's direct predecessors. This vehicle was supposed to receive the M-42 45 mm anti-tank gun. However, the development of this vehicle did not progress past development of tactical-technical requirements. Meanwhile, Grabin's other gun, the 57 mm ZIS-2, appeared and disappeared from SPG armament requirements regularly.

An experimental prototype of the SU-57, May 1944.

The ZIS-2 and its tank version, the ZIS-4, came up once again in the spring of 1943, after trials of a captured Tiger tank. The ZIS-2 was one of the few Soviet guns that could penetrate the German tank from the front, as well as the side. Even though the range would have to be very close to defeat the Tiger's front armour, the ZIS-2 was put back into production.

The idea of developing a tank version of the ZIS-2 came from the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). Grabin and factory #92 displayed their initiative. Mass production began alongside production of four prototypes used to arm T-34 tanks. While tanks with the new guns were being tested, the factory built over 150 of these guns. The ZIS-4 was also tested on the experimental SU-74B SPG. Compared with the variant developed in 1941, this ZIS-4 was easier to produce/

The first phase of the Battle of Kursk concluded right as the T-34s with the ZIS-4 arrived for testing. It became clear that the ZIS-4 was no longer suitable as armament for tanks. The Germans brought a number of new vehicle to battle, including the Panther, which had an upper front plate that could not be defeated by the 85 mm AA gun. The future of the ZIS-4 seemed bleak.

The fighting compartment remained nearly unchanged.

ZIS-2 production continued, but ZIS-4 production was shut down. However, factory #92 jumped the gun, and 154 ZIS-4 guns collected dust at factory #183's warehouses in Nizhniy Tagil. 12 more guns produced in 1941 were also stored at factory #183 since its evacuation from Kharkov.

Needless to say, the gun wasn't getting any better with time. Requests were sent to deal with this rusting junk. The GAU and GBTU were in a difficult spot. The 57 mm gun was still valuable in battle, but they had no future in the tank forces. By late 1943 the decision in favour of 85 mm guns had already been made. The solution was using the ZIS-4 to arm SPGs.

Since only the gun barrel changed, the sight was the same as on the ZIS-3. The testers did not approve of this.

The story of the long-suffering guns continued with more initiative, this time on behalf of the design bureau of the Molotov GAZ factory. This design bureau developed an SPG named "57 mm self propelled gun" in April of 1944. The commonly used index SU-57 appeared much later, in September of 1944. GAZ didn't reinvent the wheel. The SU-76M design was unchanged, only the barrel was replaced. Considering that the ZIS-2 and ZIS-3 had many interchangeable parts, this was not an issue.

Interestingly enough, some documents claim that the SU-57 development was GAZ's initiative, others claim that it was designed in agreement with the GAU and GBTU. There is also a third version of the events. A document dated April 24th, 1944, says the following:
"Based on personal discussion between the Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Marshal of Artillery comrade Yakovlev, and the People's Commissar of Medium Manufacturing, comrade Akopov, the Gorkiy Automotive Factory was instructed to build an experimental 57 mm anti-tank SPG consisting of the oscillating part of the 57 mm anti-tank gun model 1943 installed on the SU-76M self propelled gun chassis.
Since this task is very urgent, I ask you to order the production of an experimental prototype by May 1st of this year and its immediate delivery to the Experimental Artillery Scientific Research Proving Grounds for trials. The ANIOP has received orders to perform trials within three days."
Considering that the trials program was signed on April 27th and trials performed on May 1st-4th, it's hard to claim personal initiative.

A production SU-76M with serial number 404855, from April 1944 production, was used to produce the prototype. Its first trials took place on April 30th at the factory. 25 shots were fired, 20 of them with increased charge. The ANIOP fired 270 more shots, 107 of them were using the increased charge. The precision of the HE shell was deemed satisfactory, but the precision of the AP-T shell was not satisfactory. This was not the problem with the SPG, but the gun. Similar issues were pointed out at the ANIOP during trials of the ZIS-2 in the fall of 1943. Results with the subcaliber shell was better.

Aimed rate of fire was 10 RPM, maximum rate of fire was 15 RPM. The testers did not like the sights. The SU-76M did not receive the entire ZIS-2 gun, but only the barrel. The ZIS-3 panoramic sight, poorly suited for firing at moving targets, was still used. The fighting compartment, partially open from the rear and the sides, was also criticized.

The second variant of the vehicle. Periscopic observation devices are installed on the roof.

The experimental SPG passed trials, but a number of changes had to be made. Instead of a panoramic sight, the telescopic 10-T had to be installed. An electric firing mechanism with the trigger located on the elevation flywheel handle was needed. The fighting compartment also had to be entirely enclosed. The roof was to be built from 5-8 mm thick steel, the sides would be 15 mm thick. The crew would exit through a two piece hatch in the rear.

The GAZ designed a second prototype, having taken these requirements into account. The existing prototype was converted instead of making a new vehicle. The fighting compartment changed the most. It was now entirely closed. The mass was reported to be the same as the SU-76M, which is doubtful. It likely grew by about half a ton. Periscopic MK-4 observation devices were installed in the roof to improve visibility. The armament was changed in accordance with the requirements.

The fighting compartment was fully enclosed.

The prototype arrived at the Gorohovets ANIOP on June 29th, without blueprints or documents. It went though firing trials on the next day, but stopped, since the ANIOP had a more pressing task. Due to issues with fuel, trials were paused between July 5th and 28th, and were only completed on July 30th. The SPG made 358 shots, 113 of them with increased charge. The rate of fire and precision did not change. The precision when firing at moving targets was worse, but this had to do with the fact that the firing was performed according to firing tables for the 85 mm gun, since that was the scale that was applied to the 10T-15 sight.

Firing trials revealed that it was possible for bullets to enter the fighting compartment.

There were few benefits from the conversion. The enclosed fighting compartment was liable to fill up with fumes. Nevertheless, the Artillery Committee decided that the vehicle passed trials. A GKO decree that accepted it into production was drafted in September of 1944. 165 of these vehicles were scheduled to be built at the GAZ in the fourth quarter of 1944.


This was when the Self Propelled Artillery Directorate (USA) of the GBTU started to actively oppose the introduction of the SU-57. A list of drawbacks was composed, for instance the insufficient armour of the vehicle. Attempts to push production through continued until 1945. By then the SU-57 was completely useless, especially considering that the Molotov GAZ factory designed a much more powerful SPG by mid-1944.

Moving to a medium caliber

In the summer of 1943 it became clear that the penetration of the ZIS-2 was no longer enough to combat newest German tanks. The SU-85 GAZ SPG was designed and built at the Molotov GAZ factory under the direction of N.A. Astrov in late 1943. This vehicle was a further development of the GAZ-74 SPG, with not only a more powerful weapon, but thicker armour. At a mass of 14.5 tons, the front armour was 82 mm thick. Trials took place from January 3rd to March 8th, 1944, and completed successfully, but further development did not take place.

This was the consequence of A.A. Lipgart's resistance to Astrov's product. In late 1943, the chief designer began a quiet (and sometimes not so quite) fight against military production at GAZ. Andrei Aleksandrovich was not a saboteur: he merely had the rebuilding of the factory for peacetime needs in mind. Furthermore, the GAZ-75 was a radically different vehicle, and the factory would have to be seriously reconfigured to build it. Since SPG production had to be increased, implementing the GAZ-75 into production would not have been possible.

A special test bed for testing performance at a mass of 12 tons.

Attempts to continue improving the armament of light SPGs did not die with the GAZ-75. The factory's design bureau decided to design an improvement to the SU-76M instead of a whole new vehicle in May of 1944. This work became possible due to the attitude of the Military Acceptance department, chiefly Engineer-Colonel Okunev. The new project was indexed SU-15A. The index GAZ was not used, since the chassis was the SU-15M, which was developed by factory #38's design bureau.

SU-15A development was headed by Astrov, I.V. Gavalov became the lead engineer. Igor Valentinovich often had to solve difficult engineering issues in his career, and this was no exception. A gun that was initially designed for medium and heavy tanks had to fit into a light SPG.


Several variants were laid out in May of 1944. The simplest was chosen: the 85 mm D-5S-85 was installed into the existing SU-15M hull. The gun mantlet was similar to the one used on the GAZ-75. The rear of the vehicle was changed. The lower rear plate became vertical to increase the space inside the fighting compartment. Since the mass increased to 12 tons, the suspension would have to be reinforced. The front and rear road wheels received leaf springs for additional cushioning. Rails were installed instead of return rollers.

The SU-85A at the factory, August 1944.

To ensure the ability of the light chassis to carry the D-5S-85, this system was installed on an ordinary SU-76M in May of 1944. Firing trials showed satisfactory results. This vehicle was shown to the Marshal of Armoured Forces, Fedorenko, who approved it.

Lieutenant-General Vershinin asked the Molotov GAZ and factory #9 to develop another SPG in late May of 1944. The 122 mm M-30 would be installed in the SU-76M. Instead of GAZ, factory #38 took on this project, as they had been working on a similar topic since April. Alas, the work was cancelled in July of 1944 in connection with the move of factory #38 from Kirov to Kharkov, to the grounds of factory #75. Not even a draft was completed, unlike the OSU-76 and ZSU-37, which were transferred to factory #40. The light self propelled howitzer died before it was properly born.

However, the SU-15A was built, and lived a turbulent life. However, this vehicle had every chance of vanishing before its completion. The GBTU suggested that the work on the "SU-85 on the SU-76 chassis" be stopped, since the SU-76M satisfied all requirements for this type of SPG.

The fairly large D-5S-85A fit into a rather small chassis.

The fate of the vehicle, now named SU-85A, was precarious indeed in June-July of 1944. A torrent of correspondence flowed between the People's Commissariat of Medium Manufacturing and the GAU. The fate of the SU-85A was decided in late July of 1944, when the chairman of the Artillery Committee, Lieutenant-General Hohlov, indicated that this direction was an important one in his letter. The GBTU gave up. An order was signed on August 2nd to perform factory trials.

By that point, the SU-85A prototype had been completed. Its mass was slightly higher than calculated, 12.2 tons. Instead of the D-5S-85, the SPG had another gun: the D-5S-85A, built at factory #8. Since the 85 mm rounds were bigger, the SPG only carried 42 of the. However, this was all relative. The SU-85, which was much larger, carried only 48 rounds. The SU-85A used a refracting TSh-15 telescopic sight, which was easier for the gunner to use. The wheel base of the experimental SPG was widened by 40 mm, and the torsion bars were thickened.

Initially the commander's observation device opening was sealed. This photo shows that the gun was shifted to the left.

The vehicle travelled for 612 km in factory trials, 360 with a standard engine and 252 with a turbocharged one. The new engine was needed, since the mass of the SPG increased by 1.5 tons. The average speed was 30 kph on a cobblestone highway and 20.8 kph on dirt roads with the original engine. The turbocharged engine did not change the speed on a highway, but the speed on dirt roads increased to 21.3 kph. The installation of leaf springs was the correct decision. It was especially necessary at high speeds. Where the SU-85A could reach a speed of 30 kph, the SU-76M could not accelerate past 20-22 kph.

Initially, the vehicle suffered from growing pains. Some elements of the running gear had to be replaced. However, they were replaced to increase reliability, not because they broke. The exception was a splitting of a road wheel tire on the right side due to a vulcanization defect and tearing off the rivets on the front right track stop.

The SPG from behind. A tarp is installed.

The next stage was proving grounds trials, which took place from September 8th to September 20th. It was planned that the vehicle would travel for 1000 km, but the actual distance was 1.5 times as much. The issue was that the right final drive broke after 570 km of travel as a result of poor thermal conditioning of the gears. Trials restarted after the repairs. As a result, the overall distance was 1570 km. 690 km was travelled on a highway, 880 more on dirt roads.

Instead of a turbocharged engine, the SU-85A used an ordinary GAZ-203. The top speed was 44.3 kph. On a highway, the average speed was 32.1 kph, and 18.4 kph on a dirt road, about the same as the SU-76M. Fuel expenditure was also within normal range: 97 L per 100 km on a highway and 169 L on dirt roads. Off-road performance was also the same as on the SU-76M.

The fighting compartment of the SU-85A.

The fighting compartment was worse. The layout of the commander's station was not the best. The observation device was moved forward and up, making it hard to see to the left and the right, and impossible to look backwards. The observation slit in the front of the hull was sealed, which made it harder to see. The gunner's new workspace was much more comfortable, but due to the new layout of the ammo racks, he got in the way of the loader. The front rack (which was the main one) was positioned in front of the gunner, and the loader could not access it without his help.

The gun was also poorly balanced. Dust raised by the vehicle got inside the fighting compartment and made it impossible to work. The system to disengage the gun clamp without existing the vehicle worked poorly.

The performance of the SU-85A was similar to that of the SU-76M.

Nevertheless, the commission deemed that the SU-85A passed trials and recommended it for adoption into service. However, changes would have to be made to the gun and fighting compartment to correct the drawbacks that were revealed.

However, the GAU Artillery Committee had a different opinion. According to their conclusions made on October 31st, 1944, the SU-85A failed the trials. It was pointed out that the vehicle (called SU-85-GAZ) had a number of issues with the fighting compartment and the D-5S-85A gun. A good number of the complaints were fair. There were indeed substantial problems with firing, especially at moving targets. The vehicle was not sufficiently stable during firing. The gun also had its problems, offering excessive resistance to recoil.

The mobility characteristics of the SU-85A were satisfactory. The problem was with the gun and fighting compartment.

The verdict was to continue work on the SPG, but launch a parallel program to develop a gun that was more suitable for such a light chassis. Astrov questioned this decision on November 5th, 1944. According to him, the issue was not with the chassis, but with the gun. Astrov called a number of conclusions made simply ridiculous. For instance, the "ineffective" firing on the move was better than what the SU-76M showed. The complaints about low precision during peak rate of fire trials also seem strange. A gun can either display peak rate of fire or peak precision at any given time. Astrov asked to re-examine the conclusions in his letter, since according to him they had a large number of mistakes. He brought "heavy artillery" with him, the GBTU USA, which was pro SU-85A.

SU-85A at the NIBT proving grounds after improvements, January 1945.

The fighting between two organizations did not change the fact that the vehicle needed work. The D-5S-85A system that was installed in the prototype also ceased production along with the SU-85M. The second SU-85A prototype was built with the drawbacks corrected and the use of the ZIS-S-53 gun.

Meanwhile, work on the initial prototype continued. The vehicle had travelled for 2635 km by the end of 1944. The gun made 844 shots, 473 of them with increased charge. The gun was redesigned and balanced. A number of changes were made to the chassis. The casemate was fully enclosed from the rear and sides. A large rear hatch was added, but it was not very comfortable to use. The new casemate did not radically improve protection, but helped with dust getting into the fighting compartment. The commander also received a front observation device. The gunner's observation devices changed as well. The mass grew to 12.3 tons as a result.

The running gear changed too. The crown of the drive sprocket had 13 teeth instead of 15. The track stops changed. The left final drive with an increased rate of critical turns received a tubular half-axle. The rear plate was reinforced near the area where the tow hook was attached. A bracket for holding an unditching log was added.

The commander's observation device in the front of the hull was returned.

The converted SU-85A was sent to the NIBT proving grounds in Kubinka for trials, where it was tested from January 6th to January 19th. There, it drove for 1028 km (511 on a highway, 330 on dirt roads, and 187 off-road). Even in winter conditions, performance was similar to that of the ordinary SU-76M. The increase in mass did not noticeably impact reliability. The average speeds were recorded as 29.2 kph on a highway, 22.1 kph on a dirt road, and 17.1 kph off-road. These characteristics were similar to the ones demonstrated by the SU-76M. The highest grade the SU-85A could climb was 25 degrees. After that, the tracks could not grip the frozen dirt.

The rear of the vehicle changed most noticeably.

Firing trials did not go as well. The Artillery Committee's complaints were well founded. The D-5S-85A gun was suitable for the SU-85, KV-85, and IS-85, but not for the light SPG. It was not easy to solve the problem with high recoil resistance. The result of firing trials was predictable. While the SU-76M and SU-85 suffered nearly no displacement in the axial plane, the SU-85A was moved back by 380-457 mm if brakes were not applied. The amplitude of oscillations was also high. The vehicle slightly turned to the left after firing. The precision remained satisfactory. The aimed rate of fire was 6 RPM, same as on the SU-85.

Firing at moving targets 1.5 km away was possible, but difficult due to issues in correcting fire. There were also issues with the gun mount. The Belleville springs deformed after 200-300 km of driving, which increased the force needed to aim it to 12-15 kg. Backlash in the aiming mechanisms was still present. Splash entered the fighting compartment as a result of firing on the gun mantlet with an MG-42. 

The fighting compartment of the improved vehicle.

The conclusions of the NIBT proving grounds were similar to those given previously. The SU-85A chassis was reliable, but the gun needed to be replaced. A radical change to the SPG was unavoidable.

Too late for mass production

A decision to build a second experimental SU-85A was made in late 1944, but factory management was not in a hurry to carry it out. A whole new gun needed to be designed for this SPG out of the ZIS-S-53 tank gun. In addition, the factory carefully reviewed the results of the trials at the NIBT proving grounds. There were plenty of complaints regarding the SU-85A, not just the D-5S-85A. It was clear that the SU-85A was at its end. The vehicle carrying the new gun would have to be radically different.

SU-85B SPG, late March 1945.

Work on a new vehicle began in March of 1945. However, "new' is a strong word. The SU-85A chassis was taken and merely changed. Since the end of the Great Patriotic War was drawing closer, factory management decided to save some money. Tension between the "peaceful" and "military" factions at the factory was also rising. Astrov was being given work that had nothing to do with the army. An indicator of this relationship was the drilling machine based on the GAZ-67B chassis meant for planting trees.

Not just the gun, but the fighting compartment changed. This improved the crew's working conditions.

The SU-85 had already travelled for 4320 km since the start of its trials. The SU-85B weighed in at 12.4 tons, and thus demanded the more powerful GAZ-15B engine. The power output was 160 hp, giving 12.9 hp/ton. The power to weight ratio of the SU-76M was 12.96 hp/ton. The engine also received a T-70 style removable bulkhead. Changes were made to the transmission as well. Due to new control rods, the effort on the levers was reduced from 27 to 15 kg. Reinforcing the final drive gears increased reliability.

SU-85B at the Gorohovets ANIOP. The gun has a ZIS-3 style two-chamber muzzle brake.

Another factory from Gorkiy took part in the development: factory #92. The design bureau, led by A.I. Savin, produced a number of guns, including tank guns, such as the LB-1 100 mm tank gun. The gun designed for the SU-85B was initially indexed ZIS-1s, and later received the name LB-2.

It was proposed that the gun would be based on the ZIS-S-53, but the design changed during its composition. The biggest visible change was the introduction of a single chamber muzzle brake. Its addition resulted in the gun being more noticeable when firing, but it was the lesser of two evils. Trials showed that the muzzle brake reduced the recoil resistance by 5.2-6.4 tons. Considering that excessive recoil resistance was one of the problems with the SU-85A, a reduction of nearly three fold was a significant improvement. The length of the recoil decreased to 500 mm.


The rear was also significantly reworked.

The SU-85B could have ended up with a different gun. The NKV assigned work on designing an 85 mm gun for the SU-76M to the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB). In turn, they requested a production SU-76M. It is not clear what happened, but the TsAKB did design a gun in the end. This project was indexed S-68. Sadly, no blueprints survive, but judging by the description, the S-68 differed little from the SU-76M's stock gun mount. A number of changes were introduced into the casemate to house the enlarged gun. The S-68 also had a muzzle brake, but the recoil length was much greater, 900 mm. One advantage was its lighter weight. The oscillating part of the S-68 weighed 895 kg, the same part of the LB-2 weighed 1390 kg. The LB-2 was installed in a frame, but the S-68 was installed on a pintle. Instead of a TSh-15 telescopic sight, the 10T periscopic sight was planned. The S-68 was supposed to carry 40 85 mm rounds.

The project remained on paper. The GAU and GBTU rejected it in the summer of 1945, as it was inferior to the LB-2.

The main ammunition rack became secondary.

Like the SU-85A's gun, the LB-2 was shifted to the left. However, the shift was lesser: 125 vs 175 mm on the D-5S-85A. The sight was the same: TSh-15 refracting telescope. The gun mount and casemate were changed again. The changes were more noticeable from the rear. Instead of a short hatch, a proper door was added, which also doubled as a five round ammo rack.

The visibility also improved. The commander received a new observation device in the front of the casemate with a prism similar to the one used in the American M4A2(76)W tanks. The periscopic observation devices also changed. Finally, the complaints about the ammunition rack were taken into consideration. Out of 43 rounds of 85 mm ammunition, 24 were located in the main rack in front of the gunner. The rest lined the right side of the casemate and the rear. This improved the loader's work.

The loader used up shells stored along the rear of the casemate first.

The transformation of the vehicle into the SU-85B was complete by March 28th, 1945. Factory trials followed. The vehicle travelled for 300 km between March 28th and April 5th. Its gun fired 30 shots. 70 more were made at the ANIOP proving grounds on April 7-8th. The reduced recoil resistance did its job. Now the shaking experienced during firing no longer bothered the commander and gunner. The situation with shifting aim during firing was improved. The precision was deemed satisfactory. The peak rate of fire was 11 RPM, practical aimed rate of fire was 10 RPM. The protection of the fighting compartment against frontal machinegun fire improved.

Trials of the V-13s monobloc barrel.

The next stage also took part at the Gorohovets proving grounds, on April 20-25th, 1945. 604 shots were made in this period and the vehicle travelled 502 km. The practical rate of fire was established to be 8-11 RPM, depending on which rack the loader used. Maximum rate of fire was measured as 12 RPM.

It turned out that, unlike the SU-85A, the SU-85B could successfully fire at moving targets at ranges of 900 meters and greater. The SU-85B also fired on the move well, although the fumes that exited the muzzle brake made it more difficult. A 20% hit rate was achieved when firing at the move and 85% from short stops. The stability when firing was 1.5-2 times greater than on the SU-85A.

A second, composite type of barrel.

The SU-85B passed trials. No serious defects were discovered. Trials that took place at the NIBT proving grounds between April 25th and May 3rd were also successful. The vehicle drove for 1004 km and fired 800 rounds. It was remarked that the SU-85B was easier to steer than the SU-76M, easier to work in, and had slightly higher speed. Even a defect in a drive sprocket did not mar its image. The SU-85B was recommended for mass production.

Discussion regarding starting production at the Molotov GAZ factory began in early April. Factory management expected it to take 1.5-2 months to prepare for production, which would mean starting to put out the SPG sometime in June. However, the Molotov GAZ factory began nothing short of a purge of "tankers" on May 9th. The SU-85B essentially died in the early summer. A report by senior military representative Okunin describes the situation in colourful words.
"This month, the composition of the tank design team continued to change. Deputy chief designer, comrade Astrov, left GAZ and moved to the position of chief designer at the KIM automobile factory. The core of tank designers left the design bureau. There are only a handful of designers left to support present production. Factory management ended all experimental work on combat vehicles. For instance, a group from factory #235 that arrived with a prototype 85 mm gun to test its installation into a SU-76 was not even permitted to enter the factory. The factory categorically refuses to continue any experimental work on SPGs."
The visitors from factory #235 came because production of the gun for the SU-85B was planned at the factory. However, this was not a gun with a monobloc barrel. Factory #235's equipment did not allow for production of this type of barrel. The problem was solved on a third project for installation of an 85 mm gun into the SU-76M. The design bureau at factory #235 produced several guns for SPGs by March of 1945, including the 85 mm B-13. The system, designed under the supervision of K.F. Fedorenko, had similar characteristics to the LB-2, including recoil length. The project was  approved, but frozen after successful trials of the LB-2. Now it was needed once more. 


Trials of the SU-85B with the V-13s gun began on August 4th, 1945, and continued until September 6th. 1195 shots were fired, 550 of which had increased propellant charge. A monobloc barrel arrived at the Gorohovets proving grounds, and used to make another 424 shots. Both showed satisfactory lifespans.

However, the time was spent in vain. The GAZ did not wish to hear a word about SU-85B production. Factory #40 was slowly wrapping up production of the SU-76M. The GBTU was already dreaming of something more. Requirements for a 25 ton SPG that would be impenetrable to the 88 mm Pak 43 were composed in late 1945. It would be armed with an 85 mm gun with a muzzle velocity of 900 m/s. Presumably, a 400 hp engine was being designed at factory #40 for this SPG specifically. However, this wishlist ended up with nothing. After nearly a decade and a half, on August 6th, 1958, the Soviet Army adopted the light SU-85 SPG, most frequently known by the unofficial name ASU-85. It was designed at factory #40 under Astrov's direction.

Production Trials

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To establish the qualities of the mass produced T-34, three tanks were picked out at the end of 1940 to be run through large scale trials, including 3000 km of driving, gunnery, and communication tests. The conclusions outlined a number of issues with the design, but only because the Red Army had high hopes for this tank. It was already clear that the T-34 was going to be an exceptional fighting machine.

"Conclusions
  1. Due to its armament, armour, type and power of engine, and cruising range, the T-34 must be the prevailing tank in the Red Army’s system of armament due to the wide range of possibilities of tactical use of this tank. The design of this type of tank must be especially thoroughly polished.
  2. The T-34 does not meet modern requirements for the class of tank for the following reasons:
    1. Its firepower cannot be fully realized due to the observation devices, defects in gun installation and optics, cramped fighting compartment, and uncomfortable ammunition rack.
    2. The tank has sufficient engine power and top speed, but the performance of the tank is calibrated incorrectly, which reduces the tank's speed and mobility.
    3. Tactical use of the tank far from repair bases is impossible due to the reliability of the main clutch and running gear.
    4. The reliability of communication displayed in trials is insufficient for a tank of this class, which is caused both by the 71-TK-3 radio and its installation in the T-34 tank.
  3. In order to correct the aforementioned major defects, it is necessary to:
    1. Widen the dimensions of the turret and fighting compartment to resolve issues with the installation of gun and optics.
    2. Redesign the ammunition racks.
    3. Replace the existing observation devices with improved ones.
    4. Rework the main clutch, cooling fan, gearbox, and running gear.
    5. Increase the warranty period of the V-2 engine to a minimum of 250 hours.
    6. Increase the range and reliability of communication by installing a radio with a greater range and improving the installation.
Scientific and Technical Advisor to the Proving Grounds Chief, Military Engineer 1st Class, Glukhov
Chief of the 1st Department, Military Engineer 2nd Class, Sych
Chief of the 1st Section, Major Gerkevich
Accountable executor, Military Engineer 2rd Class, Medoviy"

"Tommy Gons"

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"From Washington
#11115, 11116
00:45 August 14th, 1941
#3

Immediate priority
To: Stalin, Molotov, Shaposhnikov
  1. The American government officially asks if we need submachineguns currently used by the American military (the so called "Tommy gons"), as well as ammunition for them, and in what amounts. The caliber is 11.53 mm, weight 3.5 kg, effective range of 400 m, the length is about the same as the PPD, top rate of fire is 500 RPM. Three types of magazines: 20, 50, 100 rounds. Muzzle velocity around 300 meters per second. The cartridges are the revolver type. Looks like the Americans have a large stock of this machinegun. It might be good for arming reconnaissance units, paratroopers, cavalry, motorcyclists, and partisans. I request your instruction for the volume of the order.
  2. In the same official way (in writing), the American government asks if we need all-terrain  4x4 reconnaissance cars. The exact type was not named, but it is produced by Ford (300 units per day) top speed of 65 kph across bad terrain, 1/4 ton tow capacity, 45 L of fuel capacity, 6 gears forward and 2 reverse, 24 cm clearance, armed with one 7.62 mm machinegun and carries 1200 rounds of ammunition, can be used by reconnaissance, communications, patrols, as a commander's car, a tractor for a 37 mm gun, or for carrying ammunition. Costs around 1000 dollars. I repeat that I am not sure that this is the exact type that will be sent, but I request your instructions regarding purchasing cars of this type.
  3. The American government asks us about the required number of trucks and medium tractors (likely gas fuelled, as is it the most common type here).
August 14th, 1941
Golikov, Umanskiy"
"To Washington
#8184
Sent 19:40 August 15th, 1941

Urgent
Enciphered

Umanskiy, Golikov

1. Agree to take the "Tommy gons" submachinegun, about 2-3 thousand rounds per gun or more. We can accept 10 thousand or more units. If they can give more, say 20 thousand, we will gladly take them. We also agree to take 5000 units of the Ford reconnaissance vehicle.

2. We are in great need of armour for tanks, as was previously communicated by me to Umanskiy and Lukashev. Push this matter through urgently, as the production of our tanks depends on supplies of armoured plates.

Stalin"

RGASPI 558-11-385 pp.111-113

Expert Opinion

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"Report on the development of the new A-20 tank at factory #183

The A-20 is began development at factory #183 in December of 1937 by designer Koshkin.

Information obtained by the UNKVD of Kharkov oblast reveals that Koshkin is conducting sabotage in the development of the tank. This was confirmed by the former director of factory #183 Bondarenko (convicted), from whose confession it can be seen that Koshkin was intentionally sabotaging the design of the A-20 tank from the very beginning on the orders of an anti-Soviet right-Trotskyist organization.

Instead of first designing the hull of the tank to be sloped and bulletproof, Koshkin did the opposite: first drafted the components and designed the hull so he would not have to change the components. As a result, the hull of the tank was not sloped, but straight, which reduced its qualities. However, Koshkin, knowing that the requirements were to make the hull sloped, only sloped the part above the wheels (upper hull). This "improvement" introduced a number of drawbacks, including:
  1. Production of the hull is now more difficult and more expensive.
  2. The hull increased in weight by 1.7 tons and lost robustness.
When designing the A-20 tank, Koshkin ignored valuable advice of his designers and workers on how to lighten the tank. As a result, the work on the tank is late, and the design is very complicated, causing the following:
  1. The weight of the new tank is more than that of the BT-7 by 3 tons and more than the required weight by 1.7 tons.
  2. The armament is only increased by one light machinegun compared to the BT-7, which can easily be installed on the BT-7. The ammunition capacity is smaller than on the BT-7.
  3. The range of the tank is equivalent to that of the BT-7, and smaller than that of the BT-8.
  4. The hull is straight instead of sloped, which does not make the tank bulletproof.
  5. The final drives are overloaded, and the tank is difficult to access for repairs.
When the ABTU discussed the design, they mostly discussed the tactical requirements for the tank and did not pay attention to the design, which resulted in it being accepted. The ABTU and Main Committee required the tank to be ready for May 1st, 1939, but Koshkin convinced the ABTU to postpone the deadline to June 15th of this year, and the tank will not be provided for trials until October.

Based on the aforementioned facts, we propose to check the design of the A-20 tank with a special commission from the ABTU and the Main Committee.

Chief of the 6th Section, 1st Department NKVD GEU, Senior Lieutenant of State Security, Obruchnikov


Deputy Chief of the 6th Section, 1st Department NKVD GEU, Senior Lieutenant of State Security, Safonov"


Victory

None More Frightening than the Cat

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German industry created three armoured vehicles during WWII that had a significant effect on tank building worldwide. The appearance of the Tiger made Allied tanks obsolete. The few Ferdinand SPGs that were built introduced serious changes into the Soviet tank program. The third tank was the Panther, and its influence was comparable to that of the Tiger.

The tank was a quite unpleasant surprise for the Red Army and its allies when it made its debut at Kursk. Despite its deficiencies, the Panther is a good candidate for the best German tank of the war. The Panther was superior to the Tiger in terms of armament and frontal protection, and was made in significantly higher numbers. Many tank designers were looking at the Panther when they were making the next generation of medium and heavy tanks.

Debut on the southern flank

The Pz.Kpfw. Panther Ausf.D was Germany's answer to the T-34. Its production began in January of 1943. However, development began long before the T-34 was encountered, back in 1938.

The mass of the tank that was to replace the PzIII kept growing. Initially, it was slotted into the 20 ton weight class. In the fall of 1941, much to the protest of Reichsminister of Armament Todt, the limit was raised to 30 tons. However, the struggle was futile: in March of 1942, when the VK 30.02(D) and VK30.02(MAN) projects were reviewed, the Panther's weight limit was set at 35 tons. When built in metal, MAN's prototype was even heavier than that.

Due to the changing requirements for protection of the front of the hull and turret, the mass of the new tank was estimated to be 43.4 tons by December of 1942. In practice, the combat mass of the. Panther Ausf.G was 44.8 tons, at the level of heavy tanks. The Panther ended up being twice as heavy as the PzIII.

Panther Ausf.D tanks lost by Grossdeutschland division near Karachev, August 1943. The vehicle in the background was likely disabled by a mine, the vehicle in the front was destroyed by its own crew.

The increase in mass without a revision to the suspension and drive train did not go unpunished. MAN created a progressive tank, but it had a large spectrum of design flaws. This was because of the ever-growing requirements for protection. The Panther's chassis had completely exhausted any reserve for modernization before it even entered production. This did not seem like a problem in early 1943, but later it turned out that the Panther's chassis could not bear an increase in protection or firepower.

The overloaded chassis had a significant effect on reliability. Frequent breakdowns were a headache for German engineers and tankers. Reliability reached an acceptable level by the fall of 1943, but issues cropped up after that as well.

This tank was captured nearly intact. Either the engine or the gearbox broke down. An attempt at an evacuation was made, but the tank was abandoned.

The Panther's debut took place on the southern flank of the Kursk salient. The Panther's issues with reliability combined with the Red Army's well organized defenses. At the start of the German offensive, the 10th Tank Brigade had 200 Panther Ausf.D tanks. By 8 am on July 5th, 16 had broken down. After two days of fighting, less than a quarter were still running. By the evening of July 7th there were only 7 combat ready tanks in the brigade. In later fighting the number of functional Panthers was between 25 and 45 units.

The heavy losses were in part due to improper use of the tank. The Panther had a very tough front, but the sides were no problem at all for 76 mm guns or higher. The Panthers took heavy losses from flanking fire. There were cases of Panthers being knocked out by even lighter weapons. In one of the battles in the evening of July 5th, a group of 7 Lend Lease M3 light tanks managed to knock out 5 Panthers, losing only 2 of their own. Many new tanks were lost for technical reasons. The engine and suspension were the weakest links. By July 21st, out of 200 tanks the 10th Tank Brigade initially had, 41 were capable of battle. 85 were in need of repairs, 16 were shipped back to the factory, and 58 were lost irreparably.

Panthers managed to deal serious damage to the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov. The widespread damage to the suspensions of German tanks is largely due to the work of Soviet sappers. It's hard to call the Panthers' debut a failure. Despite their unfinished state, the Panther proved that it can deliver a powerful blow to the enemy in favourable conditions.

A medium tank with the mass of a heavy

Soviet intelligence learned that the Germans were receiving a new tank in May of 1943. However, the initial information was vague. One of the intelligence summaries for May of 1943 mentions:
"...a super-powerful "Panda-S" type tank with a high speed and more powerful armour and armament than the Tiger"
The first more or less legitimate information on the Panther was obtained from the British on July 9th, 1943, when the Battle of Kursk was already underway. However, it arrived before information about the Panthers came in from the front lines. Even in the summary composed on July 20th, 1943, the Ferdinand is already present, but not the Panther.

The first intelligence information about the Panther. It came to the USSR from Britain.

Study of German tanks used in Operation Citadel began on July 20th, only a week after the Red Army's counteroffensive. Out of 31 Panthers that were examined, 22 were knocked out. All of them were penetrated in the side or rear armour. No penetrations of the front were discovered, which was unfortunate news. A captured tank with the turret number 441 was shot up right on the battlefield. The result was the same: the 76 mm F-34 gun could not penetrate the front armour.

Soviet documents called the Panther a heavy tank from the very beginning, due to its high mass. The British also classified the Panther as heavy. One of the captured Panthers (turret number 433) was sent to them.

Tank #824, NIBT proving grounds, August 1943.

At least two entirely intact vehicles were sent to trials: #824 and #732. Three more tanks that were knocked out, R01 (a commander's tank), 445, and 535, were used for penetration trials. At least two more tanks (#521 and #745) were sent to an exhibition of trophies in the Culture and Leisure Park in Moscow. Tank factories also received captured Panthers.

The position of the turret in the center of the hull made the Panther a more stable firing platform. However, this layout resulted in a significant increase in size and mass.

Tank #824 was used for mobility trials. The same vehicle was studied at the NIBT proving grounds after August of 1943. The tank was captured on July 17th near Novoselovka village by tankers of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, commanded by Major General S.M. Krivoshein. The tank's odometer read 452 km travelled, not an insignificant distance for such an unreliable tank.

The joint of the front plate is visible.

It turns out that the captured vehicle could operate on Soviet B-70 gasoline. Mobility trials began on August 8th and finished on October 5th, 1943. Over this time, the tank travelled 58 km on a highway and 162 km on dirt roads. Its engine ran for 13.9 hours. Such a small amount of driving is explained by the tank's low reliability. The tank had to be towed back to the proving grounds thrice, which took up another 36 km. All this while the tank was driving in dry weather and without ammunition.

The driver's vision slit and radio operator's gun port are open.

The testers managed to accelerate the tank to 50 kph. They remarked on the good maneuverability and fortunate design of the planetary turning mechanism with a servo drive. Average speed on a highway was 35 kph. Issues arose when driving on dirt roads, where the tank broke often. Because of this, the average moving speed was 15.8 kph, but the average technical speed was 11.4 kph.

12 breakdowns occurred during the trials. The least reliable component was the engine, which was deemed unfinished. The Germans themselves admitted this drawback. Guderian, the general inspector of the German tank forces, admitted that the Panther's engine only became capable of driving for 1000 km in the fall of 1943. Soviet testers deemed the Panther less reliable than the PzIII or PzIV.

The captured tank had a non-standard toolbox and wading equipment installed.

The NIBT proving grounds staff classified the tank has heavy, and therefore compared it to the heavy IS-2 tank. The mass of the IS-2 was greater than the Panther's by one ton. It surpassed the Panther in size only in total length. The length of the hull, however, was 130 mm longer than the IS-2, it was also 360 mm wider and 180 mm taller. The ground pressure of the German tank was higher.

The German tank surpassed the IS-2 in power to weight ratio, but there was a downsize. The Panther required 595 L per 100 km to drive on a dirt road, while even on a snow covered dirt road the IS-2 required only 440 L per 100 km.

Testers mentioned that there was not a significant difference in speed between the IS-2 and Panther. German documents confirm this. The claimed average speed of the Panther while driving on dirt roads is 20 kph, while the IS-2's was 18 kph. The difference was more obvious on the highway. The IS-2 had an average speed of 27 kph, 8 kph lower than the German tank's.

The big rear of the tank made an excellent target.

The 75 mm KwK 42 L/70 received high praise at the proving grounds. A muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s made it dangerous for even the IS-2. Practice showed that it was even more dangerous than the 88 mm KwK 36 gun used on the Tiger. The Panther also had a subcaliber armour piercing shell with high penetration. Testers expected German subcaliber ammunition to be effective at 500-600 meters in older guns, but in the Panther it remained useful out to 2 kilometers. Due to good placement of aiming mechanisms, good sight, and electric firing mechanism, the rate of fire of the Panther reached 6-8 RPM.

The Panther's fighting compartment was fairly cramped.

Testers evaluated the gunner's seat highly, as it allowed him to work normally. However, he only had the telescopic sight to look through, and had to rely on the commander's orders when shifting fire. The commander did not fare as well. On one hand, he had a cupola, which permitted him all-round vision. On the other hand, the visibility was worse than from the PzIII. The greatest increase in dead zones was in the front and to the right, to 16-18 meters. The commander's station became cramped, which limited his movement. In practice, he could not nothing but observe the battlefield and direct the crew.

Visibility from the Panther. The tank proved inferior to the PzIII and PzIV in this respect.

The loader was even less lucky. He had no observation devices at all. The gun could only quickly be reloaded from the ready racks. One of them fit 3 rounds and was placed behind the loader. A second 3 round rack was installed on the floor of the fighting compartment. The third, fitting 18 rounds, was in the sponson. Significant issues arose when using any other ammunition racks. The main racks, located along the perimeter of the fighting compartment and in the sponsons, were only accessible if the turret was turned in a certain way. Some of the ammunition was only accessible with the aid of other crew members.

Ammunition located in the tank. Only about one third was accessible to the loader with the turret turned forward.

In general, the fighting compartment was worse than on the PzIII. The turret was bigger than on the PzIII, but was very narrow, and had to fit in a sizeable turret basket and much larger gun. The tank ended up significantly larger than its predecessor, but more cramped.

The visibility suffered as well. Only the commander could observe the battlefield properly, the gunner and loader didn't even have vision slits. The tank was inferior in visibility, significantly so, to even Soviet vehicles. This explains the many case where Panthers were knocked out from the flanks. Instead of three pairs of eyes, only one could observe the battlefield.

Drivetrain and dimension diagram.

The suspension received a high grade. Testers pointed out the good design of suspension elements, which, in their opinion, were well laid out. The centralized lubrication system was pointed out as desirable on domestic designs. The torsion bar suspension with two parallel torsion bars per road wheel was also commended. According to the testers, this kind of suspension provided for smooth travel, providing the torsion bars were tough enough.

A diagram of the suspension that impressed Soviet testers.

The Panther received a high overall grade. Soviet testers considered the vehicle a tank destroyer, capable of fighting armoured targets from long distances. There were good reasons for this evaluation: good frontal protection and the location of observation devices. The power to weight ratio, smooth suspension, and powerful armament were listed as advantages of the tank.

Tendency to ricochet

Soviet specialists paid close attention to the design of the German tank's hull. The thickness and slope of the armour plates set it apart from its predecessors. Even though the Panther's layout was significantly different from that of the T-34, it was clear that the Soviet medium tank was an inspiration.

Due to the placement of the transmission in the front of the hull, it ended up long and tall. The hull was 20 cm taller and a meter longer than on the T-34.

Turret and hull armour diagram. A number of values are overestimated by 5 mm.

The front of tanks was better protected than their sides and rear almost since the inception of tanks. By 1941, the increase in the thickness of side armour on German tanks stopped. The standard was 30 mm. On the PzIII the front armour was 50 mm thick by this point, while the PzIV had 80 mm by the fall of 1942. Meanwhile the thickness of the turret armour was still only 50 mm.

The new German tank had a much greater difference in protection. The upper front plate was 80 mm thick, the lower was 60 mm thick, both at an angle of 35 degrees. This radically increased the protection of the hull. The thickness of the sides grew insignificantly to 40 mm. They were now placed at an angle of 50 degrees. Theoretically, this offered protection from Soviet 45 mm guns. However, production of 45 mm guns with a 69 caliber barrel began in 1942. Allied anti-tank gunners chiefly used 57-76 mm guns, which did not have any issues with armour of this thickness, even at an angle.

Joints used in production of the Panther hull and turret.

The joints used in production of the Panther were of great interest to Soviet specialists. Previously, German tanks had their plates joined with butt welding. The Panther's plates were joined with an interlocking tenon joint. This was not revolutionary. Several factories that made T-34 tanks used this joint. However, the T-34 used a different tenon, and only in some places. The Panther had this joint in most connections on the hull and turret.

The tenon joint increased the strength of welded connections. After studying the German method, these joints were implemented in a number of Soviet tanks. IS-2 tanks with a straightened front plate used this joint, as well as the T-44.

Penetrations made by subcaliber ammunition fired from the 45 mm gun at 100 meters.

Naturally, the first thing that the GBTU cared about was what could be used to destroy the new German beast. Several tanks were shot up at the NIBT proving grounds between December 1st and 14th, 1943. The first tank to fire was a T-70. The testers did not even try the front armour, but fired at the sides. The results were interesting: the sloped side armour could not be penetrated from even 100 meters, but the flat side could be penetrated from 500 meters. Panthers were supposed to have this armour covered by 5 mm spaced armour, but it was often missing. The 45 mm gun could penetrate the rear from 300 meters and the side of the turret from 400 meters.

The tank was also fired upon by subcaliber armour piercing shells. The gun mantlet was penetrated from 100 meters. It was cast, which reduced its toughness.

The side armour of the Panther was vulnerable to 57-76 mm guns at a range of up to a kilometer. Combined with poor visibility, this became a leading cause of many losses of Panther tanks to flanking fire.

The 6-pounder gun installed in a Churchill III tank was also not tested against the front armour. The side of the hull and turret could be confidently penetrated by the British gun from 900-1100 meters. The 75 mm M3 gun on the American M4A2 Sherman tank could confidently penetrate the side from 700-900 meters. The Soviet 76 mm F-34 gun could confidently penetrate the side from 1000 meters. 

Impacts from firing at the front armour with an 85 mm D-5 gun. No penetration was achieved at even point blank range.

The D-5 gun used in KV-85, IS-1, and SU-85 vehicles was the first gun used against the Panther's front armour. The results were quite unpleasant. It turned out that the armour was not penetrated from even 100 meters. The sloped front hull caused ricochets. Penetration was only achieved by striking locations weakened by previous hits or by hitting the joint between the upper and lower front plate. However, hits by 85 mm rounds began to destroy the weld seams. It was clear that the idea of replacing the D-5 was a correct one.

Penetration of the front armour from 1400 meters.

The replacement for the D-5T was the 122 mm D-25T gun installed in the IS-2 heavy tank. The first shot from 1400 meters penetrated the armour. These trials gave birth to the myth that the round penetrated the front of the tank and knocked out the rear plate. What really happened was that, when shooting at the side of the turret of tank #535, the shell penetrated the left side and broke off the right armour plate, throwing it backwards by several meters.

The result of hitting the Panther with a 152 mm round fired from the ML-20 gun.

When hit with a 152 mm shell fired from the ML-20 gun installed in an ISU-152 SPG at a distance of 1200 meters, the round ricocheted from the upper front plate, but this did not matter. A 360x470 mm breach was formed in the tank's armour, which was guaranteed to put it out of action. Another tank was hit in the side of the turret. This shot formed a 350x370 mm breach in the side armour. The shell then exploded inside the turret, leading to partial destruction.

The results of these trials show that the Red Army already had measures against the German beast in late 1943. Nevertheless, Soviet specialists made the right calls. The 85 mm gun that was proposed to go into the T-34 was not powerful enough to combat the Panther. It was only capable of penetrating the gun mantlet at a range of one kilometer.

Damage to the front of the tank by a 100 mm armour piercing shell fired from the D-10T gun. At 1500 meters a penetration was not achieved, and the gun had to fire from 1200 meters.

One alternative to the D-5 was the 100 mm gun with ballistics of the B-34 naval gun. Two similar weapons, the S-34 (TsAKB) and D-10 (factory #9 design bureau) were developed. The D-10 won the competition. However, trials showed that the front armour of the Panther could only be penetrated from 1200 meters. Shots fired from 1500 meters could not penetrate the armour.

The 122 mm D-25 gun proved superior. The BR-471 sharp tipped armour piercing shell confidently defeated the front of the German tank from 1500-2000 meters (although ricochets were observed at very long range). A blunt tipped BR-471B shell was tested in the summer of 1944, which increased the effective distance to 2500 meters.

Both sides of the front

Panthers began appearing en masse on the Eastern Front in the fall of 1943. The Ausf.D was gradually replaced with the improved Ausf.A. These tanks were put into production in August and appeared on the front lines in the fall. These tanks became truly numerous and caused a number of issues for the advancing Red Army.

Instructions for fighting the Panther tank, fall 1943.

Initially, the protection of the German tank was underestimated. According to instructions issued in the fall of 1943, the Panther was vulnerable to 85 mm guns, and when shooting at the driver and radio operator hatches, to 57 mm guns. In reality, the Panther was a more dangerous enemy than the Tiger, since it had superior front armour and a more powerful gun.

The Panthers ended up being the first enemy of the IS-1 tank. The armour of the IS-1 was built to withstand the 88 mm gun used on the Tiger, but the 75 mm KwK 42 L/70 was more powerful. The IS tank's armour had to be improved, and even late production IS-2's turret was still vulnerable to the Panther's gun.

Tankers received the same reward for destroying a Panther as a Tiger: 500 roubles. Often the Panther and the Tiger would be mixed up in reports. The Panther, however, often fell victim to even light tanks due to its weak side armour.

A manual for using captured Panther tanks, summer 1944.

Scenarios where captured Panthers were used in the Red Army deserve a separate mention. The first such instances were recorded in the fall of 1943, but they were few. For instance, one Panther was briefly included into the ranks of the 59th Tank Regiment, even though very many new German tanks were captured. This was because of the poor reliability of German vehicles, especially the Panther Ausf.D.

The situation improved somewhat with the appearance of captured Panthers Ausf.A, but the opinion regarding the reliability of the Panther remained low until the end of the war. The Red Army completed a successful series of offensives in early 1944, the reward for which was the capture of many trophies, with a large number of Panther Ausf.A tanks among them. Some tanks were repaired on the spot, but most were sent to the repair factory in Kazan. Complaints were made about a lack of optical devices, which were needed to fully restore the tanks. A brief instruction manual for the captured tank was prepared in August of 1944. They were largely based on the reports on the trials of the Panther tank at the NIBT proving grounds.

Panthers from a captured tank company, 62nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, August 1944.

Captured Panthers were most widely used in the summer of 1944. For instance, the 51st Independent Motorcycle Regiment had a company of heavy tanks, consisting of 5 Tigers and 2 Panthers. Only one Panther remained by the start of the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive, and even it needed repairs. The tank remained in the condition of "medium repairs" all July, continuing to participate in combat. The situation was not unique. Many units of the 1st Ukrainian Front that used these tanks complained about the Panthers' poor technical condition.

Captured vehicles were also used by the 8th Guards Tank Corps. On August 18th, 3 Panther Ausf.A tanks were captured by the 59th Guards Tank Brigade from the 5th SS Tank Division near Jasienica (Poland). On the next day, the tanks were transferred to the 62nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment. By that point, the regiment had 11 IS-2 tanks. German tanks were gathered into a company under the command of Junior Lieutenant Sotnikov and received characteristic emblems of the 62nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment.

Due to their low reliability, Panthers were not used frequently by the Red Army.

Problems with captured Panthers were not only plaguing the Red Army. After the end of the war, a large number of Panther tanks were adopted by the French, who also did not consider them reliable vehicles. Panthers quickly vanished from other armies of the world for the same reason.  The PzIV and StuG 40 did much better comparatively, and fought in all corners of the world until the 1960s.

At the same time, it is not fair to underestimate the Panther. The German tank influenced tank building schools in all countries. For instance, the British Centurion is an analogue of the Panther in many ways. Soviet tank designers also evaluated it highly.




The Myth of the Disposable T-34

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This is a claim that I'm sure many of my readers have seen. It's usually worded something like "the lifespan of a T-34 tank on the battlefield was X hours, so the Soviets saw no reason to produce a tank that lasted X+1 hours". The number varies, but the sentiment is generally the same slight rewording of the "human waves" myth, pushing a narrative of disposable soldiers with disposable weapons sent to die in incredible numbers. However, one would consider it strange that an army whose main breakthrough exploitation tank was so short-lived would not only survive in a war characterized by long and deep armoured thrusts measuring hundreds of kilometers, but excel in it. Even a brief glance at contemporary documents demonstrates that reliability was always an important component of Soviet tank manufacturing.

Let us begin at the beginning, before there was even such a thing as a T-34. When it was discovered that the A-32 chassis was capable of carrying additional weight, the first trials were performed were reliability trials. The A-32 with the additional weight was subjected to a 1230 km march in addition to off-road mobility trials specifically to determine how the extra armour that was planned would impact the function of the tank's mechanisms. 1230 km already sounds like a lot for a "disposable" tank, but this was much less than 3000 km covered by the first A-32 in prior trials. The A-20 was also no slouch, having travelled 4200 km.

As the T-34 evolved into the tank we know today through 1940, reliability of new components was constantly being tested. The V-2 engine, its warranty period set at 150 hours, was tested in a BT-7M tank over a 2050 km march in May. Meanwhile, the T-34 was breaking in its new Hadfield steel tracks links on a variety of surfaces, including the toughest challenge a tank's tracks can face: cobblestones highways. After the 417 km mark was reached, the track links were examined carefully, wear was measured and found that the track lifespan could be improved. Findings were sent to scientists, and the trials continued, since the tracks were still in usable condition. If the tank was simply expected to drive a short into battle and die, there would be no point in putting in any of this work.

When trials of three production T-34 tanks were held at the end of 1940, the engines had finally met their warranty period requirement, but this was no longer enough for the army. A new 250 hour warranty period was now required. Increasing the tank's reliability to new heights was one of the dominant themes of the entire report.

Work continued throughout 1940. Towards the end of the year, the Committee of Defense gave their requirements for reliability in the new generation of tanks: 7000 km of driving or 600 engine-hours in between major repairs. Considering that this kind of reliability was not reached until long after the war, the technical know-how of the committee members may have been lacking, but it was quite clear that the government wanted a reliable tank, not a disposable one.

Unfortunately, as the tanks were prioritized for the army, it was harder and harder to get one's hands on a tank that could be driven to death so that a post-mortem may reveal why it broke down. A plea from factory #75 director Kochetkov shortly before the outbreak of hostilities is rather illuminating about two things: the factory's desire to increase reliability and the expected lifespan for the V-2 engine (150-200 hours) by the summer of 1941.

With the start of the war, the situation naturally worsened. As production was affected by the departure of skilled workers and evacuation of factories, the lifespan of components, specifically the engine, decreased to 100 hours. 100 hours is not that bad of a warranty period, especially considering that's how much Americans were getting out of their R-975 engines in training conditions, but what is made even more clear from the document is that the tanks are clearly lasting longer than their engines. 

As the war went on, the amount of service expected out of every vehicle was not reduced, but increased. For instance, a new gearbox developed in 1942 was put through 3700 km trials, tires made in 1943 were put through 2000+ km trials. When reliability issues cropped up, such as with experimental tracks, these issues were quickly addressed. By 1945 the requirement for the lifespan of track links, an expendable and rather easily replaceable component of the tank, was increased to 1500 km. Similarly, the warranty period of the engine was increased to 250 hours. Recall that this is the warranty period, not the maximum or even average lifespan. The average lifespan by this point in the war was 250-300 engine hours with individual tanks lasting for even longer. Starshina Kharitonov's tank, for instance, surpassed his warranty period by at least 400 km. Senior Sergeant Russkih's tank fought for over 305 hours. Guards Senior Lieutenant Skvortsov's tank gave out at 308 hours. Guards Starshina Perederiy drove one tank for an impressive 370 hours and then 310 hours with no breakdowns in a different tank. These are just a handful of stories.

Being able to drive for thousands of kilometers and hundreds of hours is certainly not the sign of an expendable tank. The government's demand for reliable tanks, the industry's ability to provide them, and the army's ability to put them to good use is evident in contemporary documents.


Compatibility

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"Order of the People's Commissariat of Tank Production
Moscow
February 16th, 1942
#206-ms

Lately there have been cases of individual factories making design and technological changes to components and assemblies of production tanks. Changes are being made without consideration for interchangeability and without preliminary agreements between factories that build tanks of the same type.

This kind of senseless behaviour results in violations of agreed upon blueprints and technical documentation and disrupts the work of repair bases during restoration of vehicles of the same type that are produced by different factories.

I order that:
  1. Tank, hull, and engine factory directors are prohibited from making any design or technological changes in components or assemblies of mass production tanks that interfere with interchangeability.
  2. All changes can only be made with my approval, or the approval of my deputy, comrade Kotin.
  3. Tank factory directors should be warned that changes made to components and assemblies of production tanks that disrupt interchangeability will result in them being tried under wartime laws.
People's Commissar of Tank Production
V. Malyshev"

MP-44 in Combat

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"Translated from German (excerpts)
563rd Grenadier Division
Quartermaster department

Contents: on the use of the "MP-44" submachinegun

Preliminary instructions from the Supreme Command of the Land Forces give the following directions on using the MP-44 submachinegun:
  1. The MP-44 is a weapon that is used to fire single shots (like a semiautomatic rifle) first and as an automatic weapon second. This weapon meets the requirements for automatic weapons of an individual soldier.
    The value of this weapon is contained in the high rate of fire and precision, as well as in the ability to concentrate fire. Its value is best demonstrated when several shooters fire together.
  2. The rate of fire of the MP-44 is 22-28 RPM with single shots (compared to 8-10 with a rifle) and 40-50 in bursts.
  3. Ammunition (pistol bullet 43) can hit a human target at a range of 1000 meters. A helmet can be penetrated from 600 meters.
  4. Trials showed that at ranges of up to 500 meters the MP-44 has superior precision to the model 98k rifle when firing single shots. Even inexperienced shooters performed better with the MP-44 than the rifle.
Chief of Staff [signature]
Translated by Military Translator of the Intelligence Department of the Leningrad Front, Sr. Lieutenant Zinder"

Bunker Turret

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I posted about German bunkers with tank turrets before, but only the drawings. Here are some instructions to go along with them.

"Translated from German
8th Jager Division

January 5th, 1944

21 armoured 38(t) turrets were installed in the division's sector. They are a powerful foundation for a line of defense, impenetrable by a hurricane of enemy fire. 

Jager divisions and the Meklenburg regiment group must immediately provide:
  • Constant care for the turrets. This can be performed by observation post personnel, heavy infantry weapons personnel, and artillery personnel.
  • Constant occupation of the turrets or be able to immediately occupy them when an alert is raised, and be ready for it at all times.
    If the division's own strength is insufficient, soldiers from observation posts, command posts, etc. can be taught how to do it and used for this purpose.
Flooded turrets in the Meklenburg regimental group sector will be restored by the engineer battalion. Report on their use to the division by January 1st, 1944."

In Search of the Perfect Sphere

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The idea of building spherical tanks was born long ago. Spherical tanks were treated as a viable weapon during WWI, but interest in this topic peaked in the 1930s and 40s. Most of the time, work reached the prototype stage, or sometimes only scale demonstration models were built. Nevertheless, spherical machines continued to enchant the minds of engineers. In our time, the "descendants" of spherical tanks are rather common, having lost their drawbacks.

A derivative of the bicycle

Let us take a small trip back in history to understand where spherical machines came from before we dive into discussion of combat vehicles. Strangely enough, the bicycle was the ancestor of the spherical tank. Bicycles that existed in 1817 were radically different from the ones we see today. They had neither pedals nor a seat, in the classical sense, and the bicycle was made from wood. Like it often happens with new technologies, there was no one singular vision of what a bicycle was supposed to look like. The first designs that resemble modern bicycles appeared by 1840.

The first bicycle with the modern layout is not that old. It appeared in 1884, two years after the first automobile. Bicycles of all sorts continued to compete with it in the late 19th century, and the concept of a bicycle with a rear chain-driven wheel that was the same size as the front wheel did not take off immediately.

The Hemmings Monowheel, the first monowheel design.

Bicycles with two different sized wheels were common. A number of them had a large rear wheel that was driven. Others had a large front wheel that also housed the pedals. This layout has not died out, and is still commonly used on children's tricycles.

The penny farthing was the peak of differentiation between the front and rear wheels. These strange devices were the first to be called "bicycles". The penny farthing had a huge front wheel and a miniature rear wheel. The design seems strange and looks uncomfortable, but based on the author's experience, one can quickly get used to it. This type of bicycle had a higher top speed than its contemporaries.

A drawback of this "two coin" scheme (the name "penny farthing" was based on the small farthing and large penny coins) was that the cyclist could easily go over the handlebars in case of sudden braking. Considering that the "penny" was over 1.5 meters tall, this would not end well. One solution was to place the rider inside the "penny" and get rid of the "farthing" entirely. 

Otto Safety Bicycle, the first commercially successful device of its kind.

It's hard to tell who was the first to propose what is currently called a monocycle or monowheel. Four such devices were put on the marker in 1869, and all four were very distinct. It is likely that the father of the monowheel was Richard Hemmings from New Haven, Connecticut. According to the book "The velocipede: it’s history, varieties, and practice", published in April of 1869, Hemmings invented his device in 1867. The vehicle was powered with the hands, which was a drawback, and was built out of wood. Nevertheless, Hemmings' monowheel had all the characteristics of this kind of vehicle. One advanced feature was the protection from mud that was flying off the wheel.

Another ancestor of the spherical tank, the dicycle, appeared in 1869. It was invented by another American, William Mackaraghan from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. His design was much more stable than the monowheel.

The dicycle was the first commercially successful ancestor of the spherical tank. This was made possible by efforts of Eduard Carl (Charles) Friedrich Otto. He developed a very good dicycle in 1879. A year later, it was put into production by the Birmingham Small Arms company (BSA), a future giant in the bicycle and motorcycle market. BSA built 953 Otto dicycles over four years. Each one cost 13 pounds Sterling. The inventor founded the Otto Safety Bicycle Company, which dealt in the sales of dicycles.

Otto continued to perfect his creation, but the popularity of dicycles began to decline. In 1883, BSA put a tricycle into production, which was much more stable and easy to drive. Otto quickly realized that his product had no future and switched to traditional bicycle production.

The Edison-Puton monowheel on display at the technical museum in Sinsheim.

Rapid development of technology at the turn of the century affected these vehicles as well. However, none of the dozens of patents contained any kind of revolutionary breakthrough or radical change.

An inventor by the name of Garvagalia presented a monowheel equipped with an internal combustion engine at an automobile dealership in Milan in 1904. This was the start of the era of equipping dicycles and monowheels with engines. This variant became especially popular. For instance, in 1910 Eric Edison-Puton built a monowheel powered by a 3.5 hp De Dion engine. The vehicle drove well, but had its quirks. Like other monowheels, Edison-Puton's creation had issues with driving at low speeds. The driver also had to have a very high degree of skill. The vehicle had more drawbacks than benefits. It was a bold experiment, but an experiment nonetheless.

Alfred D'Harling's "Aero-unicycle".

Monowheels and dicycles remained popular, despite an absence of commercial success. This was largely due to their unusual looks. The amount of inventors who strived to create a successful design did not decrease. For instance, Alfred D'Harling from Saint-Louis built an monowheel driven by a propeller. This was one of the first vehicles to be featured in Popular Mechanics. The unusual vehicle had a very high top speed, up to 107 kph.

Professor Christie and his vehicle.

Another vehicle that drew close to a spherical tank was built in 1914. Designed by Elsa Christie from Marion, Iowa, the vehicle resembled a monowheel with two auxiliary wheels along the sides. The vehicle had some semblance of a hull, and the extra wheels helped with stability. Christie created his vehicle for racing. Equipped with a Liberty engine, it could reach a speed of 400 kph, but work did not progress past an experimental prototype built in 1923.

By this point, work on this sort of vehicle had progressed far. Military designs also appeared.

Ramming spheres

The first device that could be considered a spherical tank was built in Germany. This vehicle was actually built, not just patented. The Hansa-Lloyd company received an order for a fighting vehicle i 1916. It was ready by February 1917. The vehicle, named Treffaswagen, was a three-wheeled design, but very distinct from Lebedenko's tank. The wheels, 3.3 meters in diameter, took up most of the volume of this 18 ton vehicle. The wheels did not only propel the tank. They also contained machinegun mounts for firing at the flanks. The engine was located in the rear, where a tail wheel also helped in turning the vehicle.

The front of the hull had a gun mount and a driver's seat. The main armament of the Treffaswagen was the 20 mm Tankabwehrkanone Becker M11 anti-tank gun. A later version was supposed to use the more powerful 57 mm Cockerill-Nordenfelt M1888 cannon, which was captured from the Belgians. This gun was also used as armament for the A7V tank.

Treffaswagen on trials. This vehicle is the only spherical tank armed with weapons that reached the trials stage.

Trials of the Treffaswagen took place between February 1916 and March 1917. The tank with a four man crew had to compete with the heavier A7V. Hansa-Lloyd's vehicle lost the fight. The tank was disassembled in October of 1917. It remains the only spherical tank-like vehicle that was not only built, but seriously considered for service. The Treffaswagen was the only such vehicle to receive armament. It was also the first cylindrical tank built. One advantage of this type of vehicle was higher stability in both axes, and ease of driving.

Hugo Gernsback's trench destroyer. 

While Hansa-Lloyd was working on its contraption, spherical tanks began picking up popularity on the other side of the Atlantic. It was driven by Hugo Gernsback, a proponent of technological progress. His magazine, The Electrical Experimenter, proposed all sorts of technologies, including military ones. Gernsback is known as a science fiction author (the Hugo award was named after him), but he was also a talented engineer and the creator of dozens of inventions. He was the first to realize the combat potential of monowheels. Gernsback's first publication on this topic is dated 1915. 

The gyroelectric destroyer and its controls.

Two of Gernsback's projects in this area are quite interesting. One, called "trench destroyer", was a dicycle with a cabin in the middle. It contained the engine, fighting compartment, and driving compartment. This "ferris wheel" could protect trenches from enemy infantry. A year later, in February of 1918, a second design was published. The "gyroelectric destroyer", as Gernsback called it, was a monowheel. The cabin, engine, and driver's compartment were located inside the singular wheel. The armament was moved out to sponsons. The "gyroelectric destroyer" was very close to a spherical tank.

Arsene Pare's "Engine of Warfare" was the first full fledged spherical tank. It was never built, but the principles of his design became common.

The first proper spherical tank was patented by Arsene Pare from Brockton, Massachusetts. The patent application for his "Engine of Warfare" was submitted on May 1st, 1917. Before Pare, all such vehicles were multipurpose. Pare's invention, however, was designed for war from the start. The vehicle even resembled a large grenade. It consisted of a spherical casing that contained another sphere inside of it. Movement was achieved through wheels that rolled along the surface of the outer shell and made it rotate in the needed direction. Internal components were placed as low as possible so that the center of mass was low to the ground. The "Engine of Warfare" was also amphibious, like many other spherical tanks.

Pare's design was a weapon in and of itself. The vehicle could be used to ram buildings or other targets. Hatches for throwing out explosives were also present.

Frank Lautebur's combat vehicle that could also double as a peaceful tractor.

Another weaponized design was a "tractor" proposed by another American, Frank Lautebur, in February of 1918. Lautebur's "tractor" was something in between cylindrical tanks and dicycle spherical tanks. Nearly the entire surface of the vehicle was taken up by wheels. Grousers were installed to increase traction. Since there were two wheels, the vehicle could turn like a tank, which meant that Lautebur's "tractor" didn't have the most common drawback of spherical tanks: difficult control. A "tail" with a wheel was attached in between the wheels to improve stability. If necessary, two vehicles could be connected together side by side.

The USA was home to most spherical tank projects, but other countries produced some as well. A number of patents were issued in Italy. The most interesting one was the "Monocycle vehicle" patented by Karlo Pomilio from Rome. It was a monowheel with a hull that partially extended outwards. This was an unusual tank, but a tank nevertheless. There was no peaceful variant. Gun mounts were to be installed in the front and rear, as well as the sides. In theory, Pomilio's design was supposed to have good mobility, but nobody ever built it. It was far too unusual. The end of WWI also seriously cut the budget for military designs.

Albert Mobare's spherical tank, 1926. 

Interest in spherical fighting vehicles waned in the 1920s. One of the few devices of this type was the "Machine du guerre" patented by Albert Mobare in June of 1926. A platform for the driver, engine, and other components was held in an ellipsoid hull. The "Machine du guerre" had no weapons and could only crush its enemies. The project was never built.

Maximum ricochet

A burst of interest towards monowheels and similar vehicles revived the spherical tank. Creations of English inventor John Archibald Purves triggered this revival. A Ph.D. at the age of 30, the inventor was chiefly involved with optical devices. In the early 30s, he radically changed his direction and began working on a monowheel that could compete with the automobile.

The most refined of the Dynaspheres. This one is equipped with an automobile steering wheel.

Purves filed his patent in September of 1930, but his creations really became popular in 1932. The Dynasphere, as the creator called it, consisted of a large wheel composed of metallic rings. A frame inside the wheel housed the engine and other components. An awning protected the driver from dirt flying off the wheel.

Purves proposed a classic monowheel. The size was anything but classic. The first Dynasphere was over two meters in diameter. The electric motor could accelerate it to 48 kph.

The second type, the most well known, had a number of changes. To reduce the weight, Purves made the wheel from metal and leather. The three meter tall vehicle weighed 450 kg. A 2-cylinder engine from a Douglas motorcycle propelled the second Dynasphere.

The third model, named Dynasphere 5, was even larger. The number in the title indicated that the vehicle could fit 5 people. While the first two vehicles were steered by tilting, the Dynasphere 5 had a traditional steering wheel. An 8 person vehicle was also planned, but never built.

An illustration from an article about a single wheeled tank. Later it will often turn up in documents.

The Dynasphere was not a commercial success, but it led to the revival of monowheels in the public eye. The early 1930s saw the return of the arms race, if only at the experimental level. Popular Science published an article in November of 1933 on a "one wheeled military tank, steered by one man". It described an invention by Angel Garcia Gutierrez from Terrytown, New York. There was nothing unusual about the design at first. The same large wheel with a frame that houses an engine, fuel tank, seat, steering wheel, and other components. However, Gutierrez's monowheel was armoured and armed. The vehicle was covered in armour from both sides. Entrance hatches and observation ports were located on the sides of the vehicle. Each half also had a machinegun in a ball mount. Gutierrez decided to make his vehicle amphibious. The hull was supposed to be buoyant. Extra stability was added through small wheels on each side.

Gutierrez's patent. This was essentially an armed monowheel with an armoured hull.

Gutierrez never built his vehicle in metal, but this publication was noticed outside of the USA. The Red Army received information about alleged production of this vehicle. These news kicked off development of similar work in the USSR. Authors of some vehicles that pitched their inventions during WWII pointed to Gutierrez's work as an example that was followed.

Illustrations of the "Tumbleweed Tank", which became the classic image of a spherical tank.

Popular Science also gave the world another vehicle that became the classic spherical tank. The June 1936 issue has a brief article titled "Novel War Tank Resembles a Rolling Ball":
ROLLING over the ground like a giant ball, a high-speed “tumbleweed tank” proposed by a Texas inventor is a new addition to modern war machines. A spherical hollow steel driving cab is inclosed by a rotating outer shell consisting of two cup-shaped halves fitted with circular traction cleats. Motor-driven gears, mounted on the inner sphere, rotate the outer shells to roll the tank along the ground. Steering is effected by varying the speed of either of the rotating traction shells. Machine guns are fired from the stationary cab through central firing slots and armored turrets at the sides. The heavy driving motor, centrally placed on the cab floor, gives the tank stability and prevents it from rolling sidewise. The inner shell can be sealed against poison gas, while the power plant is completely inclosed to minimize the danger from exhaust fumes. The inventor states that the tank’s spherical shape presents the smallest possible target for enemy bombs or shells, and all but direct hits would glance off its curved sides. 
The blurb was accompanied by a painting of a spherical tank bristling with machinegun barrels. The same vehicle was displayed on the front cover, where the tank was even more powerful. While the driver was handling a machinegun in the article illustration, the tank on the cover had a cannon. 

These images had an impression on the magazine's readers, which included military specialists and engineers. Soviet specialists assumed that the tank on the cover was built and tested. 

Richardson's "battle ball" in reality.

In reality, the illustration was just a variant of the "Autoball and Armoured Ball" invented by Andrew Richardson from Texas. Richardson filed his patent in June of 1932. It was approved in March of 1936, and that is when it came to the attention of Popular Science.

As you can see, there were two projects. The first was a spherical automobile, a much more original design than the Dynosphere. The basis of the vehicle was an aerodynamic hull with doors. It contained a cabin for four passengers, engine, controls, and other components. A bar passed through the center of the hull, which was attached to the outer hull. Unlike the inner hull, the outer hull was not entirely closed. It consisted of several "wheels" with rubber rims. Turning was performed by shifting the inner hull of the Autoball to one direction. The design was fully complete and could have been built, but this was never done.

A spherical automobile was proposed along with the tank.

The second project that made such a noise in the press was much more conceptual. The Armored Ball was radically different from the Autoball. The only thing they had in common was their shape. The Autoball was a monowheel, while the Armored Ball was a dicycle. Andrew Richardson was the first to use this layout for an armoured vehicle. Like Gutierrez, Richardson's design was amphibious. THe overall shape of the patented vehicle was the same as shown in Popular Science. Hemispherical wheels were attached to a central power source. They were equipped with cleats to increase traction, which doubled as paddles in water. Due to the dicycle layout, the Armored Ball could turn in place. The patent does not show any armament, but the description suggests that it should be present.

A spherical tank from 1941. Like with Richardson's device, it was never built.

Richardson's Armored Ball was never built, although it did revive the topic of spherical tanks. One of the advantages of this layout was the increased odds of ricochet when shells struck the hull. However, there were far more drawbacks. Even though the vehicle would not be long, a one-man spherical tank would have a diameter of 2-3 meters. The diameter would have to be even larger if the vehicle had a larger armament and a proper crew.

The installation of armament introduced a number of problems. The gun would have a limited traverse. A rotating turret could not be used. These issues became an insurmountable obstacle for spherical tanks. This type of tank was never built in the USA, even though over ten patents were filed.

Kugelpanzer in Patriot Park.

The Germans built at least one experimental spherical tank. Patriot Park has a vehicle on display known as the Kugelpanzer (a detailed walkaround can be found here). The name was given to it arbitrarily. No one knows who designed and built it. The theory that it was built by Krupp has no evidence to support it. According to the most common theory, it is an observer's vehicle, but there is scarcely enough space inside for an engine and the driver. This is most likely simply an experiment to demonstrate the possibility of building a vehicle in this form factor. According to the documentation, the Kugelpanzer arrived from the Kummersdorf proving grounds.

There are no components left inside, but it is known how it was supposed to work The vehicle was driven by a two cylinder air cooled motorcycle motor. Its power was enough to propel the 2.5 ton vehicle at a speed of 10 kph. A gear train turned the wheels. The rear wheel, controlled by control rods running under the hull, helped with turning. The engine and other components, including the driver's seat, were installed on a platform in the lower part of the vehicle.

One can only guess at the equipment that was installed originally. One thing can be said for certain: work did not progress past the experimental stage. Some people with overactive imaginations draw weapons onto the Kugelpanzer, but this design was unlikely to progress past the prototype stage. The design had one significant drawback. The small wheel would act as an anchor on soft terrain.

Grand Panjandrum, the only spherical tank-like device that was publicly tested during WWII.

Another country that decided to build something similar to a spherical tank was Great Britain. The War Ministry received many proposals for spherical tanks, and a very odd one was built. Initially, the idea seemed sound. The Great Panjadrum, designed by Neville Shute of the Directorate of Miscellaneous Weapons Development (DMWD), consisted of two wooden wheels 3 meters in diameter with a cylindrical hull between them, filled with explosives. The vehicle was propelled via rockets attached to the wheels. The target for the Grand Panjandrum was German fortifications on the Atlantic Wall.

The trials were carried out in public, with photos taken and videos filmed, to ensure that the Germans would find out about it. However, the trials did not go well. The rockets flew off the wheels, after which the Grand Panjandrum became uncontrollable. Even though the design did not move past trials, the Grand Panjandrum made its mark on history.

Elie Aghnides' patent for a spherical combat vehicle.

Elie Aghnides was the luckiest of all spherical tank inventors. Born in Istanbul, the engineer realized his talent in the United States. The Aghnides aerator is still used in faucets today. His success in the creation of filters was also considerable.

The start of WWII motivated him to take up military designs. His first patent was filed in May of 1942. Aghnides proposed an armoured dicycle. Hemispheres on each side had ribs to improve traction, which worked as paddles in water (the tank was also amphibious). One significant difference from Richardson's tank was the presence of small wheels in the front and rear that would not allow the hull to rotate in motion. The driver sat in the front and operated the machinegun that was installed in a ball mount.

A development of Aghnides' spherical tank. The wheels would later migrate to the Rhino in a slightly altered form.

A model of Aghnides' vehicle appeared in pages of popular science magazines, but it was never built. His work was not done in vain. The inventor developed his design further. The Rhino, a joint project with Marmon-Herrington, was the result. The brutal looking machine had impressive off-road performance. Its hemispherical wheels were inherited from the sphere tank. The Rhino remained an experiment, but remains a pretty good example of a successful sphere tank drive.

Frank Maclearty's tank.

American sphere tanks remained on paper. It is not surprising that some creators tried to sell their works abroad. One of these was a design by Frank Maclearty. This vehicle was similar to the Lebedenko tank visually, but built very differently. The vehicle had two massive wheels, each of which was essentially a classical monowheel. Each wheel had its own engine, located as low as possible. The engine and suspension were attached to sprung frame. Another feature that made Maclearty's tank similar to sphere tanks was the installation of gun sponsons on the exterior side of each wheel. The inventor filed his patent in February of 1942, and offered the design to a Soviet delegation in January of 1944. The GBTU reviewed the project and declined. The Department of Inventions had enough similar proposals.

Before its time?

The history of sphere tanks looks like a constant string of failures. It is not surprising, as many technical solutions first come to a dead end. Successful designs do not come immediately. One of the more interesting modern incarnations is the GroundBot, created by the Swedish Rotundus company in 2008. The spherical vehicle with cameras on each side is reminiscent of the spherical tanks. The GroundBot's hull is equipped with grousers, which lets it travel on snow and sand, as well as climb hills. In addition, the device can swim. However, no one is talking about sending it into battle just yet. The GroundBot and analogous GuardBot are built for patrols and observation. However, interest towards this design seems to have died.

GroundBot, the best known modern sphere tank.

There is another descendant of the spherical tanks that is very much thriving. It's called the Segway. Indeed, it is built according to the same principle. Thanks to a system of gyroscopes, the Segway is stable, solving one of the drawbacks of the spherical tanks. The Segway is used by some police forces, so in a way the spherical tank is being used for its original purpose. Either way, it's too soon to put an end to the history of spherical fighting vehicles.


T-34-85 Review

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"Report on the use of the T-34 in combat during the Patriotic War in the 37th Guards Tank Regiment
  1. The S-53 gun installed on the T-34 tank has a number of design drawbacks, such as:
    1. When firing, the electrical firing mechanism burns out, and until the end of the battle one is forced to use the manual firing mechanism.
    2. The recoil break grease nipples break after 1300-1500 shots, which then need replacing. The factory quota promises 2000 shots before replacement.
    3. The DT machinegun, both in the coaxial mount and in the hull, has a very small brass catcher, and there are frequent stoppages because of it. There is enough room to make it bigger both for the coaxial and the hull machinegun.
  2. The present T-34 ammunition capacity is 55 rounds: 5 APCR, 20 armour piercing, 30 HE. This is not enough and only lasts for 1.5-2 hours of battle. As a rule, crews take 30 extra rounds into the tank with them, which get in the way during battle.
    It is desirable to carry 80 rounds of the following type: 5 APCR, 25 armour piercing, 50 HE.
    The ammunition rack can be enlarged by raising the floor rack up by one round. This will result in an increase of 25 rounds. In practice, ammunition capacity is increased in this manner anyway. It is most important to take HE ammunition since the S-53 85 mm gun can knock out a PzIII with HE from up to 800 meters, saving scarcer rounds for other targets. The machinegun ammunition capacity is sufficient. It is usually expended by 70% in a battle.
  3. The following is necessary to arm crews:
    1. Commander: Nagant revolver.
    2. Driver: Nagant revolver.
    3. Gunner: Nagant revolver.
    4. Loader: PPS
    5. Machinegunner: PPS
      Firing small arms from the tank happens rarely. Infantry that storms the tank and tank destroyer groups are dealt with using F-1 grenades.
      Small arms are necessary to defend a knocked out tank and for self defense. One submachinegun is insufficient.
  4. The main types of observation are as follows: until the enemy closes within 400 meters, through the open hatch. During the battle, the commander looks through the commander's cupola, the gunner through the gun sight. The driver is very helpful in tracking targets and correcting fire through his observation devices.
    Targets are mainly marked by radio, tracer shells, and tracer bullets. Target marking with tracers is impractical, since all types of forces use tracers. The most effective way that proved itself in battle was indication of reference points during the battle briefing and then indication of targets in relation to those reference points.
  5. Practical rate of fire in battle reaches 5 rounds per minute. The crew of Lieutenant Bekhnik fired 80 rounds in 40 minutes, but this kind of shooting choked the crew with fumes. The loader, Sr. Sergeant Arapov, was unable for fight for 4 hours.
  6. The maximum speed of firing on the move was 25-30 kph. On August 26th, 1944, near Minzhir, individual enemy units managed to break through the right flank of the brigade and attempted to reach the right shore of the Prut river. Guards Lieutenant Ivanov was instructed to take two tanks, attack the enemy, and push him back to his initial positions. The distance to the enemy was 3 km over flat terrain. Comrade Ivanov scattered the enemy by firing on the move at a speed of 25-30 kph, rammed into the column, and crushed enemy vehicles and armament with fire and  tracks. The fire on the move was effective, and the speed of the tank did not allow the enemy to deploy his guns that were being towed with horses. The use of speed and fire destroyed and disorganized the enemy. The crews carried out their mission. During this battle, the tanks destroyed and crushed 13 cannons, 5 cars, 18 cards, up to 30 horses, and up to 50 soldiers and officers.
  7. Near Minzhir, Guards Lieutenant Gilfanov's crew fired at a range of 2600 meters and destroyed a German PzIV tank.
Chief of Staff of the 37th Guards Tank Regiment, Guards Major Zvyagin."

Lynx or Puma

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"Leningrad Front,
Intelligence Department
October 21st, 1944
#2201ss

To the Chief of Intelligence of the 8th Army

I report on the presence in the German army of a new armoured reconnaissance car armed with a 75 mm gun called "Luchs".

Preliminary tactical-technical characteristics have been established.
  1. Type: heavy, 3-axle
  2. Mass: up to 9 tons
  3. Dimensions:
    1.  Length: 6 meters
    2. Width: 2.3 meters
    3. Height: 3 meters 
    4. Clearance: 0.35 meters
  4. Armour thickness:
    1. Front and turret: 30 mm
    2. Sides: 20 mm
    3. Floor and roof: 10-12 mm
  5. Armament: one 75 mm anti-tank gun model "40" and 1 machinegun
  6. Ammunition carried: up to 50 rounds for the gun, 1500 rounds for the machinegun
  7. Crew: 4
  8. Top speed: up to 40 kph
  9. Cruising range: up to 350 km on roads, up to 170 km off-road
  10. Engine power: up to 160 hp
Chief of Intelligence of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Yevstigneev"

Autocannon Penetration

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Due to a shortage of DShK machineguns, the T-30 and T-60 tanks were equipped with the 20 mm ShVAK autocannon. Despite the larger caliber, penetration was not much more impressive than the DShK was capable of.
"
  • The muzzle velocity of the 20 mm AP-I round (B-3) is 796 m/s and 892 m/s for the round with NB-200 (nitroglycerine gunpowder) propellant.
  • The precision of the ShVAK gun at ranges of up to 1000 m in bursts of 2-3 shots is satisfactory.
  • The TMFP sight scale designed for the 12.7 mm machinegun cannot be used for the ShVAK 20 mm cannon. A new sight scale needs to be applied for the optical and iron sights.
  • Against specific targets (battalion gun, tank, running infantry) firing the 20 mm gun on the move without short stops was ineffective.
  • The armour penetration of the 20 mm ShVAK, same as the 12.7 mm DShK machinegun, is ineffective. Not a single penetration was obtained when firing against 20 mm homogeneous or 20 mm cemented armour placed at 30 degrees from a range of 135 meters, and when firing at 15 mm cemented armour at 30 degrees, penetration was only achieved from a range of 100 meters (firing NB-200 ammunition with increased muzzle velocity."

Not much data, but there's something to compare with a report I posted earlier (CAMD RF 38-11355-832) Unfortunately, this document doesn't cover the 20 mm ShVAK, but does contain data on the DShK. The 12.7 mm DShK penetrates 15 mm of Czech surface hardened armour on a Pz38(t) at 20 degrees from 150 meters 4 out of 12 times and from 200 meters 7 out of 9 times. 

Similarly, 20 mm plates of German armour at 20 degrees in a PzIV is penetrated by the DShK from 100 meters 2 out of 2 times. 

There is also some data on penetration of the 12.7 mm machinegun in a report on the quality of German tank armour (CAMD RF 38-11355-778), which I referred to previously. A tactical diagram of "German light armoured cars and APCs" shows that the sides can be penetrated at an angle of 30 degrees from up to 250 meters and up to 400 meters at normal, but given the various different geometries of German light armoured vehicles, it's hard to make any definitive conclusions.


Interestingly enough, the conclusions state that the data obtained in the report can be used to compose instructions for T-60 tank crews, so it seems that the penetration of the 12.7 and 20 mm guns was still considered equivalent by 1942. Neither weapon was going to be setting any records, but practical trials show that the initial pessimism was a little premature, and the T-60 was far from helpless when facing off against armoured vehicles of its own class.

Penetration data via Dmitriy Shein.

Great Minds Think Alike

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The British were questioning the value of a hull machinegun by 1943. The gun was hard to operate and seemed to offer little actual benefit in combat. It did, however, significantly weaken the tank's armour. By 1944 the Soviets had relegated their hull MGs to fixed mounts operated by the driver, but the main drawback still remained.



"To: Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR, comrade Zernov
CC: GBTU TU Chief, Major General comrade Afonin

RE: hull machinegun on the IS-2 tank

Orders ##158ss and 244ss request the improvement of the front hull armour. This was done by straightening the hull front, increasing the thickness and slope of the front of the turret platform.

However, with the increase of the angle of the turret platform, the opening for the hull machinegun is stretched out. As a result, the right side armour is split (see attachment). Instead of being reinforced, this wall can be considered weakened.

Considering that the design of the machinegun does not allow for aimed fire, we are of the opinion that the presence of this machinegun does not justify the weakening of the hull that it creates.

We consider it necessary to get rid of the machinegun.

Chief Engineer of Factory #200, Nitsenko."

Second Hand

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The SOMUA S 35 tank was well regarded not only in the French army, but in the army of its greatest enemy. Unlike the Pz38(t), the tank did not serve in first echelon divisions, but the Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) ended up being the only French tank that was not converted into SPGs en masse and was used by the Germans and their allies as a tank. It actively fought as a part of independent tank battalions and in armoured trains. Individual tanks lasted until the end of the war.

Unsuitable

297 SOMUA S 35 tanks in varying condition fell into German hands after the French campaign in May-June of 1940. This was more than two thirds of total production. This significant number does not mean that the French did not fight in these tanks. This tank was France's most advanced vehicle and fought until the ceasefire, but not all units had time to enter the fighting before the war was over. The SOMUA S 35 was also easy to repair. The hull was cast in two halves that were bolted together, meaning that it was easy to assemble one working tank from two knocked out ones. The tank itself turned out to be pretty tough. Few German guns could penetrate the armour of this "cavalry armoured car".

A captured SOMUA S 35, put into battle by the Germans immediately.

Despite all the exceptional characteristics of the French tank, the Germans deemed it ill-suited for the role of a medium tank. Yes, the 47 mm SA 35 gun was superior to German tanks guns. The tank was mobile and well protected. However, the drawbacks negated all of these advantages. Only German light tanks had one man turrets, not medium ones. This configuration overloaded the commander with work. The vision from the French tank was far from ideal.

It was clear that the SOMUA S 35 would not be used in first echelon divisions as early as the summer of 1940. However, the first cases of using these vehicles in combat were recorded in June of 1940, before the ceasefire.

This tank was tested at Kummersdorf.

The Germans began to collect captured vehicles on June 10th, before the ceasefire. After the fall of Paris, the Germans began inspections of defense industry factories, including SOMUA. In the summer and fall of 1940, trophies were collected and sent to warehouses, then issued to units.

The Germans planned to form four tank divisions from French tanks of different types, which would be quartered in occupied territories. However, only one brigade with captured tanks (Beute-Panzer-Brigade) was formed by December of 1940. It consisted of the 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Tank Regiments. The regiments were formed in Germany, but they were moved into France by the spring of 1941. Their vehicles did not arrive in a hurry. By March of 1941 all three regiments had ten SOMUA S 35 tanks put together, in addition to other tanks. These tanks were called SOMUA (4.7).

Typical Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) with a German radio and converted commander's cupola.

20 cavalry tanks had been repaired by November 5th, 1941. However, this number only includes tanks that had not been significantly modified. The SOMUA S 35 had to be brought up to German standards at least partially, most importantly its radio communication. The 100th and 101st captured tank brigades had 150 S 35s that went through modernization by November 5th. Like the Pz.Kpfw.B2, these tanks had the top of their commander's cupola removed and replaced with a two door hatch. This at least somewhat improved the situation with observation. One could also use this hatch to enter the tank instead of the hatch in the back of the turret.

Modernized tanks received German Fu 5 radios. A whip antenna was added to the right of the turret, more practical than the French antenna. Converted cupolas and new antennas allow one to distinguish between a captured tank and an original. Some tanks did not undergo cupola conversion. 

The index of the captured tank changed several times.

The situation with the index of the tank in the German army needs to be addressed separately. Instruction D50/12 given on March 20th, 1941, calls the SOMUA S 35 Pz.Kpfw.35 S 739 (f). Later, it was called only Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f), and later still the name was shortened to Pz.Kpfw.35 S. There was another index: Pz.Kpfw.35 Som. (fr) used, for instance, in manual D 658/5 issued on November 9th, 1940.

From Brest to Brest

Captured tanks were primarily sent to units located in France, but they made their debut on the Eastern Front in June of 1941. The role was unusual. A decision was made to include the Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) into armoured trains. Three tanks apiece were added to trains ##26, 27, and 28, and two tanks apiece to ##29, 30, and 31.

A Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) as a part of Panzerzug 30. The hook that holds the tank on the platform can be seen.

Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) were carried on open platforms, sometimes covered with additional armour sheets from the side. They are easy to distinguish from ordinary captured SOMUA S 35 tanks. A special look was added to the front of the hull that was used to hold the tank on the train. The tanks received large Balkenkreuz insignia, including in the front, so they would not be knocked out by their own forces. All of the tanks had three digit turret numbers. The first two numbers indicated the armoured train, the last one the number of the tank. For instance, Panzerzug 28 had tanks numbered 281-283.

Tanks from Panzerzug 28 during fighting for Brest.

Two of the aforementioned armoured trains, Panzerzug 27 and Panzerzug 28, took part in the assault on Brest fortress. Some sources state that the tanks of Panzerzug 28 were destroyed within the first days of the war, but these tanks fought alongside the 45th Infantry Division until at least June 27th, 1941. By this point, the infantry also obtained a couple of captured T-26es and armorued cars. Photos taken around Brest show the tank with turret number 282, and later photos of Panzerzug 28 show tank #283.

A captured tank with turret number 271. NIBT proving grounds, summer-fall of 1942.

The Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) might not have been assigned to tank divisions, but certainly didn't sit idle in the rear. The French tanks fought for a fairly long time as a part of armoured trains. In this respect, they were no worse than the Pz.Kpfw.38(t), by virtue of their heavier armour and armament.

The second tank with turret number 273. Later it was put on display at the exhibit of captured trophies in Gorky Park.

Pz.Kpfw.S 35 (f) numbered 271 and 273 from Panzersug 27 were captured by the Red Army in 1942. The circumstances of their capture are not known, but they ended up on the GABTU proving grounds, located in Kazan at this point, by the fall of 1942. Unlike most other captured tanks, they were not put through mobility trials. However, they were used in some trials. These tanks were referred to as "Somua French tank" or "SOMUA medium tank". 

Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) with turret number 271, seen from the rear. Note that the cupola has not been converted.

A brief technical description of the vehicle was composed. Individual components and assemblies were studied. A track link was studied, but caused little enthusiasm. The hull and turret were also studied. The armour was measured as 44-45 mm, it was not possible to determine it exactly, as the armour was cast. The idea of a cast hull assembled with bolts was interesting conceptually, but Soviet industry had little to gain from it. The armour composition was not considered interesting due to a large amount of expensive nickel and molybdenum.

The armour diagram, composed by Soviet specialists.

The most interesting was the firing trials. The SOMUA S 35 got a unique chance to get revenge on German tanks for 1940. It turned out that the 50 mm thick front armour of the StuG III Ausf.B could be penetrated without problem from 300 meters. Out of two hits from 400 meters, one resulted in a penetration. It was stated that the round "penetrates the armour but does not go off". Trials showed that the Germans did not fully protect their tanks with 50 mm of armour, especially considering that the gun on the SOMUA S 35 was not the most powerful French 47 mm gun.

50 mm of armour turned out to be no problem for the 47 mm SA 35 gun at a range of 300 meters.

The use of these tanks was not just limited to armoured trains. The 211th Tank Battalion based in Norway had 16-17 of these tanks at different times. By October 1st, 1944, only 13 remained. The G.K.N. tank company with three Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) was also based in Norway, as well as the 25th Tank Division, with 15 of these tanks.

Another 15 Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) tanks were assigned to the 214th Tank Battalion, which was formed on January 15th, 1942, and located in Finland.

The war for the 211th Tank Battalion began in July of 1941, when it was based in Finland. The battalion claimed 24 Soviet tanks destroyed in July, with 6 of its tanks lost in battle (4 permanently) and 10 lost to mechanical causes. A Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) shown in newsreels dated summer 1942 is likely from this battalion.

A Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) knocked out somewhere near Leningrad, August 1942.

In the fall of 1944, Finland signed a peace treaty with the USSR. The Lapland War between Finland and Germany began. The 211th and 214 battalions fought here. 211th battalion tanks received a coating of Zimmerit by this point. The biggest problem for German tanks was the Red Army, not Finland. Captured tanks ran into the 38th Guards Tank Brigade, armed with T-34 tanks. On the evening of September 9th, 1944, a battle broke out near Mikkolahti-Kuolajarvi. Three Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) were destroyed, a portion of the rest was abandoned by the Germans. A tank with turret number 121 and serial number 10672 was among those captured. Before fighting for the Germans, it served in the French 3rd DML (light mechanized division). It was delivered to the NIBT proving grounds and is currently on display at Patriot Park. 

Tank #121 from the 211th Tank Battalion, captured on September 9th, 1944. Today this tank can be seen in Patriot Park.

The situation in France was calm for a very long time. The occupied territory was located deep in the German rear. The 201st Tank Regiment, which was a part of the 100th Tank Brigade, was used as a training base. The 211th Tank Battalion that was sent to Norway was trained within this unit. Later, the 301st Tank Regiment was included into the 100th Tank Brigade. In the second half of 1941, the 201st Regiment was included into the newly created 23rd Tank Division. The characteristic insignia of the 201st Regiment was preserved, but it was joined by the Eiffel Tower insignia. The 23rd Tank Division was sometimes called the Paris Division. However, these tanks did not go east. When the unit was sent into battle, their tanks were replaced with German ones.

As of August 5th, 1942, the 100th Tank Brigade had 29 Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f). 21 of them in running order.

A tank from the 23rd Tank Divsion on parade in Paris, 1942.

French tanks were replaced with German ones in many units before they left for the front. There were, however, some exceptions. The 1st Battalion of the 202nd Tank Regiment was sent to Yugoslavia in September of 1941 with 18 Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f). These tanks had thick armour and decent armament, and so showed themselves well in fighting against partisans. The battalion was renamed 202nd Tank Battalion in January of 1943. By then it had 16 Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) tanks, 8 of them in running order. By the summer of 1944, the battalion still had 6 combat worthy tanks of this type.

Another Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) from the 23rd Tank Division. The stylized K on the turret is the insignia of the 201st Tank Regiment.

A number of Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) tanks were converted into commander's tanks. The general principle was the same as with the Pz.Kpfw.38(t). A large rail antenna was installed over the engine deck, and additional radio equipment was fitted inside the tank. The armament was preserved.

Training tanks were also built on the chassis of the Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f). For this, the turret platform was removed and the driver's compartment was altered.

Pz.Bef.Wg on the Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) chassis.

The decent fighting characteristics of the Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) meant that the Germans did not convert them into SPGs. About 60 tanks were turned into heavy artillery tractors. This conversion was similar to those performed in training tanks. Either the turret or the turret platform could be removed. The armoured parts were used to strengthen the defenses along the Atlantic Wall.

An artillery tractor. 60 SOMUA S 35 were converted this way.

There were 67 Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) left in France by May of 1943. 43 more were used in Yugoslavia, 33 in Norway, and two on the Eastern Front. These tanks showed themselves well in 1941-42 anti-partisan campaigns, which guaranteed a lengthy service in Yugoslavia. Here the tanks fought alongside police and SS formations. According to photos, the turret of one of the tanks was used on a Ustaše armoured train.

Yugoslavian partisans gradually equipped themselves with anti-tank guns, and knocked out German tanks stopped being a rarity. At least one Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) was captured in working order. It was converted to carry a 6-pounder gun from an AEC Armoured Car Mk.II, which was supplied by the British. This was the most powerful gun ever installed on a SOMUA S 35 chassis. The front of the turret had to change significantly to allow for this conversion.

A Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) equipped with a 57 mm gun from an AEC Armoured Car Mk.II by Yugoslavian partisans.

A fairly large number of tanks was available in Normandy when the Allies landed there. For instance, the 22nd Tank Regiment (former 100th) in the 21st Tank Division had 34 of these tanks, 23 of which were in running order. Another ten Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) were used by the 205th Tank Battalion. The 206th Tank Battalion, which fought against the Americans near Cherbourg, had the same number of these tanks.

This is how the Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) looked in 1944.

The Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) was clearly obsolete by the summer of 1944. Theoretically, it could still fight enemy medium tanks, and was still definitely a powerful opponent for lighter vehicles. In practice, however, these tanks had few chances to show themselves. By the fall of 1944 there were very few Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) remaining on the Western Front. All of these tanks were either captured by the Allies or destroyed. Individual tanks remained in use into the spring of 1945.

New and old masters

Like other captured tanks, the Germans transferred some Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) to their allies. Two tanks were given to Hungary in 1942, where they received registration numbers H-034 and H-035. These tanks were used in anti-partisan roles in the Ukraine. Six tanks were included into the Bulgarian army in 1943, but ended up with the Germans again a year later.

SOMUA S 35 and Renault R 35 given to Italy by the Germans, spring 1941.

The Italians raised the question of supplying Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) tanks to them in early 1941. The French tank was very interesting to them, since it was clearly superior to the Italian Carro Armato M 13-40. The Italians hope to receive 50 of these tanks and a number of Renault R 35 to create a tank regiment.

Like the Germans, the Italians prepared a manual for the Carro armato S.O.M.U.A.

The Germans only handed over 32 SOMUA S 35 in mid-March of 1941. These tanks received the name Carro armato S.O.M.U.A. in the Italian army. An instruction manual was prepared in September. The tanks received registration numbers 4401-4410, 4437-4439, 4549-4566, as well as 4421 and 5145. The Italians received ordinary SOMUA S 35 tanks without German radios and with original commander's cupolas. They were only repaired and painted.

A Carro armato S.O.M.U.A. from the Italian army.

These tanks were included in the 131st Regiment in July of 1941. The tanks were equipped with Italian tools and... it was as if their service froze. Plans to send the mixed tank regiment to North Africa remained plans. The problem was that the Germans only sent Italy the tanks, not spare parts, which they had a shortage of themselves. The Carro armato S.O.M.U.A. was like a briefcase without a handle: too valuable to drop, but too hard to carry. The tanks were there, but they could not be used without spare parts. In late 1941 the tanks were "banished" to Sardinia, where they remained without having ever seen battle. The regiment was disbanded in 1943.

One of the few changes made to the SOMUA S 35 in Italian service: new tools.

After the conclusion of fighting in June of 1940, a portion of SOMUA S 35 tanks remained in the French army. The Vichy government managed to get permission to quarter the 12th Autonomous  African Hunter Group (12e GACA, 12e groupe autonome de chasseurs d’Afrique) in Senegal under the pretense of defense from the Allies. 23 SOMUA S 35 tanks hidden from the Germans were sent there in November of 1941. Later, the 12e GACA was renamed to the 12th African Hunter Regiment (12e RCA, 12e régiment de chasseurs d’Afrique), which sat in silence in Senegal for over a year.

Its time came in early 1943, when France was completely occupied. The tanks were included into the 19th French Armoured Group by February 20th, 1943. It was very heterogeneous: there were Valentine III tanks, Light Tanks M3, and GMC M10. The SOMUA S 35 fought in the brigade until May of 1943. Four of them were lost irreparably over this time. Soon the French got new Medium Tanks M4A2. Some crews affixed SOMUA manufacturer plates to their new tanks. The tanks landed in Normandy with these plates. 

Tanks from the 12e RCA. These tanks fought in Tunisia.

Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) tanks gradually returned to their former masters as France was liberated. In addition, a number of these tanks were successfully hidden from the occupants. The French managed to recreate a whole tank unit with these recovered tanks, the 13th Dragoon Regiment. It included 17 SOMUA S 35 tanks. However, the squadron that used these tanks was quartered in Cognac and did not take part in the fighting at first.

SOMUA S 35 during the fighting for Royan.

The French cavalry tanks went into battle for the La Rochelle port in the spring of 1945. The squadron attacked Royan, in the south of La Rochelle, on April 14th. The squadron fought fiercely until April 20th. Two tanks were lost to mines. An attack by SOMUA S 35 tanks took the city and yielded numerous trophies. The next target was Île d'Oléron, where four tanks landed on scows on April 30th. Their support was effective. The landing force captured 50 guns and 1500 prisoners. This landing was the last combat operation in which the SOMUA S 35 took place. In September of 1945 the squadron was sent to Germany to take part in the occupation force. The unit remained here until April of 1946, when it was disbanded.

The 13th Dragoon Regiment lost three SOMUA S 35 tanks in April of 1945. The damage was not fatal.

The tank's active career led to only four survivors that remain today, all of them the German Pz.Kpfw.35 S (f) type. This can be established by the distinctive antenna port. Only the tank that was at one point on display at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds retained its original cupola, but the antenna port indicates without a doubt that the tank had a career in the German army.


T-34s vs Tiger

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Report
On military trials of T-34 and T-34-85 tanks against the T-6 "Tiger" tank
2nd Tank Battalion, 63rd Guards Tank Brigade
June 16th, 1944

1. The 2nd Tank Battalion fired the guns. The battalion commander, Guards Captain Chirkov, was directed by the brigade commander, Guards Colonel Fomichev, in the presence of the deputy commander of the 10th Guards Tank Corps, Guards Colonel Belov, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, and the senior officers of the 18th Army.

2. Firing was done against a German Tiger tank from 400, 600, 800, and 1300 meters.

The 76 mm ZIS-5 gun was fired from 600 meters. The armour piercing shell was used. 18 shots were made, 16 hit. Target: the side of the tank. Diagram of the impacts:


Explanation:
  1. Shots ##1,2, and 3 hit the turret. No penetrations were made, but big dents were formed.
  2. Shots #4-16 made large dents in the hull.
The 76 mm ZIS-5 tank gun was fired from 400 meters. The armour piercing shell was used. 10 shots were made, 10 hit. Target: the side of the tank. [Translator's note: the above diagram was used for this test and the previous one].

Explanation:
  • Red colour: complete penetrations
  • Blue colour: dents
The 76 mm ZIS-5 gun was fired from 300 meters. The subcaliber armour piercing shell was used. 2 shots were made, 2 hit. Target: the side of the tank.

Explanation: Shot #1 marked in yellow hit the turret ring and jammed it. Shot #2 hit the gun mantlet and destroyed the gun.

The 85 mm gun was fired from 600 meters. The armour piercing shell was used. 5 shots were made, 3 hit, one ricocheted. Target: tank front. Diagram of the penetrations:


Explanation: #1-4 were complete penetrations. The driver's observation block was knocked through. The rounds exploded inside the tank and it caught fire.

The 85 mm gun was fired from 1300 meters. The armour piercing shell was used. 4 shots were made, 3 hit.

Explanation: all shots (blue colour) left dents.

The 85 mm gun was fired from 800 meters. The armour piercing shell was used. Two shots were made, two hit. Target: tank side.

Diagram of the penetrations:


Explanation: Shot #1 went through completely. The shell blew up inside the tank. Shot #2 made a penetration in the upper part of the side armour.

The 85 mm gun was fired from 1300 meters. The armour piercing shell was used. 3 shots were fired, 2 hit. Target: tank side.

Explanation: Shot #3 penetrated completely. The shell blew up inside the tank. Shot #4 (blue colour) made a dent.

Conclusions:
  1. The crews are well prepared for firing at enemy tanks. 
  2. The officers and tankers of the 18th Army saw in practice that the Tiger should not frighten a skilled tanker and that it burns just like any other enemy tank.
  3. The T-34-85 can penetrate the side of the Tiger from 1000-1300 meters. If the penetration is not complete, then the crew of the Tiger will still be knocked out with fragments of their own armour. The tank's mechanisms and sights are destroyed.
  4. The most vulnerable parts of the tank are the suspension and the armour behind it, side armour, and driver's observation device.
  5. The T-34 tank armed with the 76 mm ZIS-5 gun can penetrate the Tiger from the side at a range of up to 400 meters. At a range of over 400 meters, dents are formed that often knock out the crew.
Commander of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade, Guards Colonel Fomichev
Chief of Staff of the Brigade, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Baranov
Commander of the 2nd Tank Battalion of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade, Chirnov."

News from Finland

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"On April 8th, 1944, a prisoner was captured near Ashtakhma lake with a photograph of the German "Amphibian" car on him. The prisoner indicated that 66 "Amphibian" cars arrived from German to Finland and were assigned to the 6th SS Grenadier Division. The photograph is attached. A description of this vehicle can be found in report #0235 for 1943.

A sketch of the "Amphibian" car, as described by prisoner of war Kurt Hamberger





1942 Lineup

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"Wundsdorf Tank School
March 1st, 1942

Which Russian tanks will you encounter in 1942?

A significant amount of obsolete tanks:
  1. Ford armoured reconnaissance car
  2. T-37 amphibious tank
  3. T-26 light tank
  4. BT (Christie) light tank
  5. T-28 heavy tank
  6. T-35A heavy tank
Modern tanks:
  1. T-60 light tank
  2. T-40 amphibious tank
  3. T-34 heavy tank
  4. KV-1 heavy tank
  5. KV-2 heavy tank

"BA" Ford armoured car

This is an obsolete 3-axle armoured car with 12 mm of armour (no armour on the bottom), slow speed, and poor off-road mobility. Crew of 3. Armament consists of a 4.5 cm gun, which has the same penetration as the German 3.7 cm gun. Has a radio.

T-37 amphibious tank

An old license built clone, weighs about 3 tons, top speed of over 40 kph on land and 7-9 in water, has insufficiently thick armour of 10 mm all-round. Armament is very weak, only one machinegun.

T-26 light tank

A 10 ton tank, a clone of the British Vickers Armstrong 6 ton tank. Russia built many series of this tank, initially with two turrets, later with one. Armament is good, consisting of one 4.5 cm gun and 1-2 machineguns. Some variants have a flamethrower instead of a cannon. Armour everywhere is thinner than 20 mm, easily penetrated by our anti-tank guns. Has a radio.

Distinctive features: has a "pocket" under the turret in the front, rail antenna on the right side of the chassis (looking from the front).

BT light tank

This tank is similar to the Christie tank, and is very fast. It can move without tracks. Removing the tracks and turning on the wheel drive takes 3/4 hours. Thanks to a large turning radius (37 meters) the use of the tank in reconnaissance roles is limited. On a normal width road turns have to be made by engaging the reverse gear. The armour is insufficiently thick. Armament: 1 4.5 cm cannon, two machineguns (in the rear of the turret).

T-28 heavy tank

This heavy tank is an obsolete design, with a lineage dating back to German tractors. The data in Hegel's book is partially wrong. The engine (a copy of a BMW engine) can develop up to 500 hp of power. The 28 ton tank has a top speed of 30 kph. A weak point is a very light clutch. The tank is very massive (7.25x2.78x2.75 meters). It is often confused for the 52 ton tank. The armour is only 30 mm in the front and 20 mm elsewhere. Armament is strong: a 7.62 cm cannon and 3-5 machineguns.

The 7.62 cm gun with a short L/16.5 barrel is obsolete. Some types use a semiautomatic L/24 gun that is approximately the same as the German 7.5 cm gun.

As the 3.7 cm Pak could penetrate the armour of this tank in Finland, the Russians thickened it to 53 mm by adding extra armour in the front. The tank was unreliable to begin with thanks to its clutch, and the additional weight reduced its reliability to the limit of usefulness.

Distinctive features: 3 turrets.

T-35A heavy tank

A colossal tank 10 meters in length, 3.47 in height, and weighing 45 tons. This was a vehicle made for Red Army parades. Due to its enormous size, it was confused for a 60 or even 120 ton tank during the Eastern campaign. The tank has 5 turrets. Armament is as follows: short 7.62 cm gun and 1-2 machineguns in the turret, 2 neighbouring turrets have one 4.5 cm gun and coaxial machinegun each. The other two turrets have one machinegun each. Five turrets consume so much weight that the tank only has 30 mm thick armour, and can be penetrated by anti-tank guns and tank guns at any distance.

Intermediate types called T-35B with 4 turrets have never been captured or seen.

The T-35C was also encountered in the Eastern campaign. It was considered dangerous in the Finnish campaign because of its 60 mm of armour. The width of the tracks is over 60 cm. The tank has two turrets. It appears that the Russians stopped development of these types.

Distinctive features: 5 turrets.

All aforementioned types of tanks are considered obsolete. They seem to be no longer produced, but are still present in significant numbers. Their armour does not meet modern requirements. Heavy tanks have a strong psychological effect, but not on those who are familiar with them.

Remember: any Russian tank with more than one turret is worthless! We can penetrate it!""

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