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New Year, New Engine

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"To the Chief of the 1st Section of the 1st Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 2nd Class comrade Chikov

In response to your request by telephone, I reply with the program of 150 hour trials of the the V-2 S4 engine.

The engine has completed its trials, the trial was passed. Currently the engine is being prepared to be tested again according to the same program.

Attachment: program on 3 pages.

GABTU Regional Engineer, Military Engineer 2nd Class, Fedorov"
January 29th, 1941


Via Yuri Pasholok.


6-pounder, American Style

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The Ordnance Department gave its permission to produce the British QF 6-pounder under license in February of 1941 in order to supply them through Lend Lease. At that point, only prototypes of the gun had been built. Even though the 6-pounder was ready for production in the summer of 1940, the British decided to postpone it for mass production of 40 mm QF 2-pounder guns. This was a logical decision. The British needed to rapidly compensate for the armament lost in France, and six 2-pounders could be made for the cost of one 6-pounder.

Production of the QF 6-pounder in Britain began only in November of 1941, and even then, in a simplified form. The Mk.II gun had a 43 caliber barrel instead of 50 caliber. This restriction was imposed by British industrial capabilities. The Americans, on the other hand, had no such issues, and so they decided to produce the Mk.I with a 50 caliber barrel. This gun was standardized as the Limited Standard 57 mm Gun M1 on Carriage M1. Soon after, the carriage was improved with wheels and suspension of the American type. This carriage received the index M1A1. The index of the gun did not change. The M1A2 carriage with free traverse was produced after September 1942, on British initiative. This carriage allowed the gunner to disconnect the regular traverse mechanism and aim the gun using a shoulder stock, which made it easier to track moving targets.

For the US Army

Having agreed to produce the weapon for foreign needs, the Ordnance Department proposed that a similar weapon should be developed for the American army. The Infantry Department was not a fan of the idea, as they considered that a 57 mm gun would be too heavy to push around the battlefield using only the crew's power. Development of a domestic 57 mm gun, the T2, began anyway in May of 1942. Four prototypes were built. They had a similar barrel and breech to the British weapon, used the same ammunition, but had a different carriage. Two of the guns received hydropneumatic recoil mechanisms from the 75 mm infantry howitzer, two others received springs. The American T1 carriage was wider and more stable than the British one. However, comparative trials performed in 1942 didn't show any noticeable advantage over the M1, which was already in production: 3877 of these guns were produced in 1942. The only thing left to do was to convince the infantry.

The 57 mm Gun M1.

The ill-fated 57 mm Gun T1.

The infantry insisted on keeping the 37 mm M3 gun, considering mobility on the battlefield more important than penetration. The M1 weighed three times as much: 1239 kg vs 414 kg. Only the encounters with German tanks in Tunisia convinced the Infantry Department to change their minds. Shipments of M1 guns on M1A3 carriages began in the spring of 1943. These guns had an American type tow hook, which was tougher and more suitable for towing the guns off-road. Production of guns on the M1A2 carriage for Lend Lease proceeded in parallel. The M2 carriage that made transporting the gun easier entered production in 1944. This carriage had a deployable wheel on the right trail. Finally, the M2A1 carriage was introduced towards the end of production in 1945. It had an improved elevation mechanism. The index of the gun on all of these carriages remained M1.

M1 gun on the M2 carriage.

Only AP ammunition was produced until the end of the summer of 1944. This was the M70 shot with a core of high toughness steel, without an explosive charge (mass 2.85 kg, muzzle velocity 853 m/s) and the M85 shell with a ballistic cap and 42 g of explosives (3.3 kg, 823 m/s). Shipments of British HE ammunition were rare. This made it hard to use the 57 mm guns in support of infantry. Delivery of M303 HE ammunition (2.99 kg, 703 g of explosive, 823 m/s muzzle velocity) began in late summer of 1944. Finally, the M305 canister shot was introduced in January of 1945, which was quite effective against personnel at short range.

The penetration characteristics of the gun weren't bad. At 90 degrees, the M70 penetrated 135 mm of armour from 100 meters, 112 from 500 meters, 89 mm from 1000 meters, and 70 mm at 1500 meters. At two kilometers it could penetrate 55 mm of armour. The M85 had poorer penetration at short range, but better at long range: 73 mm at 1500 meters and 64 mm at 2000 meters.

In total, the USA produced 15,637 M1 guns (3877 in 1942, 5856 in 1943, 3902 in 1944, 2002 in 1945). More than a third (5352) were sent as a part of Lend Lease aid: 4242 to Great Britain, 653 to France, 400 to the USSR, 57 to Brazil. The gun was also installed on the GMC T48 (known as the SU-57 in the USSR). The history of these SPGs is best saved for another article.

Service and combat

The introduction of the M1 gun in the US Army started with some difficulty. While the infantry agreed reluctantly, the cavalry absolutely refused, considering them too heavy. The Airborne tested these guns in the summer of 1943 and also rejected them.

The M1 guns were introduced into the TO&E on May 26th, 1943. Each regiment's anti-tank gun company had 9 M1 guns instead of 12 37 mm M3 guns, arranged into three platoons of three guns each. The company also had a mine platoon with a bazooka in the HQ section. 1.5 ton Dodge WC62 or WC63 trucks were used as tractors. The infantry battalion had an anti-tank platoon in its HQ, consisting of three M1 guns. Like in the anti-tank company, each platoon had three Bazookas and three 12.7 mm machineguns. Instead of 24 M3 guns, each regiment now had 18 M1 guns, and each division had 54 guns.

M1 guns from the 34th Infantry Division on parade. July 4th, 1943, Rabat, Morocco. Since the Dodges hadn't arrived yet, the guns are towed by M3 APCs.

The guns made their debut in 1943, during the Sicilian campaign. Since the 37 mm guns had not yet been entirely replaced, the Americans could compare how the two guns fared in combat. The results were mixed. General Patton wrote:
"If a more powerful round can be produced for the 37 mm gun, then it would be preferable to the 57 mm gun on the offensive. It can be towed by a low 1/4 ton truck, while the 57 mm gun needs a halftrack or a 3/4 ton truck with a high silhouette. Unlike the 37 mm gun, the 57 mm gun can't be moved by the crew off-road."
The greatest complaint about the M1 was still the same: excess weight. The crew was the same as for the M3 gun, five men (commander, gunner, loader, two ammunition carriers). On the other hand, the only armour that was impenetrable for the 57 mm gun was the front of the Tiger and Panther tanks. Their sides could be penetrated from 1000-1200 meters. The first 76.2 mm M5 anti-tank guns weighing 2 tons appeared in Italy in October of 1943, and the M1 suddenly didn't seem so heavy. However, the M5 wasn't used by infantry divisions, but separate anti-tank battalions.

Field manual FM-7-35 " Infantry: Antitank Company, Infantry Regiment And Antitank Platoon, Infantry Battalion" was issued on March 15th, 1944, based on the results of combat in Italy. It prescribed opening fire at tanks with the M1 gun from 750 meters. It also stated that tanks rarely fire on the move and try to find a place to stop where at least the hull was covered. When taking up positions, the commander of the platoon had to pick a place where these dead zones were eliminated. It was advised that the guns should fire as soon as the tanks stop. Knowing of American tactics, the enemy would be motivated to resume movement as fast as possible, which would no doubt reflect on their shooting.

The 57 mm guns had not forced out the 37 mm guns entirely in Italy, but the M1 was the most numerous. 37 mm guns in this region were only preserved above authorized strength. Many commanders kept them around "just in case" when they re-armed.

In the first month of fighting in Normandy, tank encounters were rare. The M1 was usually used as infantry support. Their effectiveness was limited due to a lack of proper shells. One battalion commander wrote:
"We desperately needed HE-frag ammunition for our 57 mm. They were the only weapon the infantry regiment had with a flat trajectory, but the British were the only source of ammunition. Due to a lack of tanks and commonly encountered bunkers, the 57 mm gun was not used frequently."
The first effective use of the M1 in its primary role was recorded on July 11-12th, near Sainte-Mère-Église and Carentan, where the American positions were attacked by the Panzer Lehr division. The anti-tank platoon of the 2nd Battalion of the 39th Infantry Regiment managed to hold the enemy back with the help of some bazooka teams until the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion armed with M10 tank destroyers arrived. The Americans destroyed 16 PzIV and Panther tanks. The effectiveness of the M1 supported by bazookas was confirmed in August at Avranches, where the 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions were subjected to large scale tank attacks.

M1 crew from the 41st Motorized Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Division. Normandy, late July 1944. This unit received camouflage uniforms, but they were retracted in August because of their similarity to SS uniforms.

An M1 gun concealed using field expedient means. 9th Infantry Division, August 1944.

M1 gun in a French town. September 1944.

Further combat in Normandy showed that the complaints about the M1's weight were overstated. The crew could move the gun on their own for short distances if the ground was not too soaked with rain. It was easy to hide the 57 mm guns in bocage country, and transporting the guns was not as hard as 76.2 mm guns.

M1 gun in bocage country.

A gun crew is unhooking their M1 gun from an M2A1 halftrack. Aachen, October 15th, 1944.

Supplies of 57 mm HE began to reach units in August of 1944. According to reports, these rounds only made up 20% of ammunition issued to gun crews until February of 1945, the rest were armour piercing. A small amount of British APCR ammunition was included along with the standard M70 and M85. These rounds could penetrate 160 mm of armour at 500 meters. However, this didn't help in the Ardennes, where the guns received the reputation of "tank bait". Lieutenant Colonel McKinley, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, lost half of his men in these battles, and declared that:
"The 57 mm gun has no place in an infantry battalion. They cannot be delivered to where they are needed. In the last operation, they could not be moved on muddied roads."
A crew from the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, in the mud of the Ardennes. December 17th, 1944.

Losses of M1 guns in the American 1st Army reached 26% in December of 1944 (compared to monthly losses of 6-8% in Normandy). There was a direct correlation with mobility: the heavier 76.2 mm M5 gun suffered 35% losses.

The 57 mm guns were chiefly used as infantry support guns in the final months of the war in Europe, as the Germans only used tanks episodically. Some regiments turned their anti-tank gun companies into ordinary infantry companies, others sent the 57 mm guns into storage, replacing them with bazookas. The finale of the was in Europe was not kind to 57 mm guns. In February of 1945 the decision was made to replace these guns in regimental companies with 17 T26E1 tanks per company.

The M1 was used in homeopathic doses in the Pacific. Only 250 guns were sent here, a tiny drop compared to the thousands sent to Europe. The ability to move guns by hand was even more valuable here, and the 37 mm guns were just fine at dealing with thinly armoured Japanese tanks.

M1 crew from the 152nd Infantry Regiment, 38th Infantry Division, in combat at Luson, May 11th, 1945.

The guns left the scene quickly after WWII. The 75 mm M20 recoilless gun replaced them as the battalion level anti-tank gun. The new regimental anti-tank company TO&E, established on June 1st, 1945, allowed for 9 tanks or SPGs: M36, M4 with a 76 mm gun, or M18. The introduction of heavy tanks into regiments was cancelled, instead they were gathered into a battalion at the divisional level. Nevertheless, some amount of M1 guns still took part in the Korean War.

Both American and South Korean forces used 57 mm guns in the Korean War.





Big Guns

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"To the Chief of the 16th Department of the GAU Artillery Committee, Colonel comrade Zhevanik

I report on the work that I performed during my trip to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk from May 3rd to May 28th, 1943.

1. Kalinin factory #8.

Based on directions by Lieutenant General of Artillery Hohlov, I organized work to design and produce an experimental 85 mm tank gun. To achieve this, I supplied factory #8 with a copy of the tactical-technical requirements and necessary blueprints with the aid of the GAU military representative at factory #9. I negotiated with the factory's director, comrade Fratkin, as well as the chief engineer and chief designer. Based on this meeting, comrade Fratkin gave the order on May 4th to quickly begin work on designing the gun with the aim of completing blueprints by May 10th.

The deadline for production and installation in a tank was set at May 20th, 1943, under the condition that the GAU and NKV Technical Council give factory #8 the contract. Having informed you of this decision and received a promise to confirm the order by ciphertext, I connected the Kirov factory (Major General comrade Kotin) and factory #8 (comrade Fratkin). Comrade Kotin made the decision to produce a turret at the same time as factory #8 was working. To achieve this, Kotin drove with three tanks (2 IS and 1 KV-1S) and a brigade of designers (9), with two oscillating parts of the ZIS-5 gun to make work faster.

Work was fully underway by May 8th, however the NKV (comrade Ryabikov) prohibited comrade Fratkin from producing a prototype, and a ciphertext confirming the meeting results from Moscow never came. On May 10th, after the blueprints were completed and details of its installation in the turret were confirmed, the work at factory #8 ended.

On the factory #8 project, one can say the following:
  1. The design of the gun allows a painless transition to more powerful ballistics (muzzle velocity of 930-960 m/s, maximum pressure of 3000-3100 kg/cm²).
  2. The barrel group is the same as the one on the 85 mm AA gun, but a new rigid rod type of semiautomatic mechanism was developed that can be used on the tank or the AA gun.
  3. Considering the difficulty with the casting plants of the Ural industrial zone, the tank gun was a stamped cradle used on the F-34, which is already mastered by factory #9.
Factory #8 will send the project materials to the ArtKom, but only upon receiving an official request.

2. Factory #9.

Factory director comrade Gonor refused to perform the design work on May 3rd (my day of arrival at Sverdlovsk), as his goal was to further develop 122-152 mm howitzers. However, after the publication of GOKO decree #3289ss on May 5th, comrade Gonor assembled a meeting where it was decided to begin design work according to the tactical-technical requirements issued by the ArtKom in March-April of this year.

The following prototypes were announced:
  • D-5 85 mm SPG gun, now called D5-S-85
  • D-6 122 mm SPG howitzer, now called D5-S-122
  • D-7 85 mm tank gun, now called D5-T-85
  • D-8 122 mm tank gun, now called D5-T-122
Tank guns differ from SPG ones only in the additional mount for a machinegun.

The design of the M-30 howitzer is the basis of all the guns, which led to the unification of all threads, diameter of openings, etc.

On May 22nd, the last day of my visit, working blueprints of all main parts were delivered to  manufacturing and the target date for completing all blueprints was May 25th. Prototypes were expected to be completed by June 15th.

The SPG gun projects were very satisfactory to the Uralmash factory. The design bureaus of both factories work well together. The 85 mm caliber tank gun design was not coordinated with the Kirov factory, but there is still the possibility of installing it into the IS or KV-1S tank.

The advantage of factory #9's designs is that they can most easily be introduced into mass production. With only one type of gun, we can obtain 4 different guns by replacing the barrel, recoil mechanism, and breech.

The 122 mm howitzer breech can easily allow for transition to a 1/4 automatic sliding breech. Design and production of the sliding breech is postponed due to tight deadlines.

3. Uralmash factory

I familiarized myself with and even participated in factory trials of a modernized 122 mm SPG. It is necessary to mention the drawbacks of the SU-122M:
  1. Heavy weight (31.5 tons).
  2. Insufficient visibility.
  3. The screw breech rests on the commander's knees at an elevation angle of 5 degrees.
  4. The design of the gun mantlet is unfinished.
I did some consulting work regarding the design of an 85 mm SPG and took all measures to unite the work of factory #9's design bureau and Uralmash.

The decision of factory director comrade Muzrukov was to develop and produce the following prototypes:
  1. 85 mm SPG on the SU-122 chassis (TsAKB gun).
  2. 85 mm SPG on the SU-122M chassis (TsAKB gun).
  3. 85 mm SPG on the SU-122 chassis (factory #9 D-5 gun).
  4. 122 mm SPG on the SU-122 chassis with a horizontal ammunition rack (factory #9 D-6 gun).
Production of the prototypes is performed according to the director's order #23s issued on May 18th of this year.

Uralmash factory is due to receive TsAKB prototypes in priority order.

Speaking of TsAKB prototypes for the SPG, it is worth mentioning that the cradle needs to be changed. The unaltered ZIS-5 cradle is unsuitable for an SPG due to its width, which means that the front armour would have to be weakened (large opening cut).

4. Kirov factory

We agreed to produce an experimental prototype of an A-19 gun on a SU-152 chassis. The decision was formalized in the minutes. The factory agreed to:
  1. Complete the blueprints and send them to the ArtKom by May 31st.
  2. Produce a prototype and install the gun in an existing chassis by June 15th.
  3. Perform trials jointly with the ArtKom during the period of June 15-20th, gathering sufficient data for the marking of sight scales and composing technical requirements.
I inspected the blueprints of the altered SU-152 fighting compartment made after the commission made its recommendations. The hull was not widened, as that would have increased the mass of the SPG greatly. The ammunition rack and fuel system have been changed to meet the commission's requirements. 

After the trials of the A-19 system, the same hull will be used to test the new ammunition rack and fuel system and be tested by July 5th. Trials will be performed in the amount of one full fuel tank's march and firing of 40 rounds to measure the rate of fire and ease of loading.

Considering that production of IS tanks is coming and the KV-1S will be phased out, the factory prepared two variants of a SU-152 on the IS chassis. Both variants were examined by me and deemed insufficiently satisfactory. A decision was made to develop a third variant. Direction for the work has been given.

The deadlines for this project are: design work finished by July 5th, wooden model completed by July 15th. The decision was formalized in the meeting minutes.

I negotiated with Major General comrade Kotin to develop open top SPGs on the KV or IS chassis mounting the Br-2, B-4, and Br-5 guns. There are already some drafts, but the factory needs:
  1. Tactical-technical requirements.
  2. Blueprints of the oscillating parts of the systems.
  3. Dimensional blueprints of the projectiles and propellant casings.
  4. Firing tables and service manuals.
The project work was done according to the conclusions of the ArtKom plenum dated April 14th, 1942.

Since urgent work on the IS tank will be complete in July-August, we can receive the technical projects of these SPG after that. SKB-2 (Major General Kotin) is very willing to perform this work.

Assistant to the Chief of the 16th Department, Engineer-Major Solomonov"

T-43, Take One

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"For further development and improvement of medium tanks, permit the NKTP and factory #183 to produce two experimental prototypes of T-44 tanks with the following tactical-technical requirements by September 1st [1942]:
  1. Mass: under 32 tons
  2. Armour:
    1. Sides: 60 mm
    2. Front: 60-75 mm
    3. Rear: 60 mm rolled, 75 mm cast
    4. Turret (cast): 80-85 mm
      The turret must have a commander's cupola.
  3. Speed:
    1. Top speed on a highway: 45-50 kph
    2. Off-road: 20-25 kph.
  4. Armament: one 76.2 mm gun.
  5. Ammunition:
    1. 76.2 mm rounds: 60-65
    2. DT rounds: 2000-2500
  6. Crew: 4 (commander/radio operator, loader, gunner, driver).
  7. Engine: 
    1. At a weight of under 30 tons: V2-34 500 hp engine.
    2. At a weight of over 30 tons: V2-K 600 hp engine.
  8. Range: 250-300 km on a highway.
  9. Suspension: torsion bars
Other tactical-technical requirements will be set by the NKTP and GABTU.

The NKTP (comrade Malyshev) and director of factory #183 (comrade Maksarev) must perform trials of the T-44 tank jointly with the GABTU by October 1st of this year, and present a report on the trials to the GOKO by October 10th.

The People's Commissar of Finance is to issue 5 million roubles from the reserve of the Council of People's Commissars to develop and produce the T-44 tank and five-speed gearbox, as well as awards for outstanding employees."

However, the first draft of the T-43 was not to be. Stalin famously struck this entire section out of the draft decree, instructing tank designers to improve existing models instead of chasing after new ones.

Anti-Tank Snipers

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"Translated from German. Truncated.
November 11th, 1943

146th Motorized Regiment, 25th Tank Division
#14143 February 10th, 1943
Supreme Command of the German Army

From experience on the front lines in the past weeks
...
3. Combat of Russian infantry against tank riders

The ability of Russian infantry to fight tank riders, infantry accompanying tanks, and commanders peeking out of tank hatches (using individual snipers) is notable.

Conclusions:
Observation and communications with infantry should be done through hatches in the side of the tank. To keep tight contact between each other, tanks and SPGs used to support infantry must not drive in front of infantry, but among it, or even behind it. Infantry must not bunch up behind tanks, but sweep the terrain, moving in a wide front.

Our infantry must be taught to pick off infantry tank riders, crews that are climbing out, tank commanders peeking out, etc. (train snipers). Infantry must know that the ability to see from a tank's turret is very limited, and the danger for a single rifleman to be discovered is low.

4. Using anti-tank rifles

Offensive experience showed that Russians bring anti-tank rifles to the battlefield in large amounts (by the battalion) and create anti-tank rifle fronts in depth of their defenses. The saturation of Russian infantry with this weapon increased significantly. Russians masterfully use the anti-tank rifle to shoot at weak points of our tanks at close range.

Presently, the anti-tank rifle, used by the Russians en masse, is the main enemy of our tanks. The fewer tanks attack an anti-tank rifle front, the greater the losses, and the greater the odds that the attack will stall. 

Conclusions:
Experience once more conclusively shows that tanks should never be used in smaller amounts than one company (15-22 tanks). Tight cooperation with infantry is even more necessary than before to secure victory.

Infantry and heavy weapons units must be made to understand that, when attacking with tanks, their job is to suppress or destroy enemy anti-tank threats and advance closely with the tanks.

Military Translator of the Intelligence HQ of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Captain Alekseev."

Thick Skin

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"The 38th Tank Brigade with elements of the 266th Rifle Division began an offensive at 5:00 on a front from height 183 to Koshpurovka, overcoming stout enemy resistance at Grushino by 17:00 and capturing the settlement as well as the Karachintsev homestead. The tanks approached Maryevka, the offensive continues.

As a result, the brigade lost: one T-60 tank burned up from fire, one tank knocked out by a mine. 10 MK-2 tanks blew up on mines, of those two had their floor armour torn open and engines were disabled. One tank had its oil tank penetrated, two tanks had their tracks, skirts, and suspension destroyed, one tank had a drive sprocket destroyed, one tank lost a track and took 41 hits, 25 from 37 mm guns and 16 from 20 mm guns, none of them penetrating. 8 of the tanks listed will be restored by the end of May 13th, 1942."

Temporary Reinforcement

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Modernization often starts immediately after a tank is accepted for service and put into production. The T-34 was no exception in this regard. A number of changes to simplify production and improve the tank's characteristics were made in the first year. The T-34 changed even more radically in 1941. For instance, the L-11 gun was replaced with the F-34 gun in March of 1941. There were also plans to improve the armour, but they were only partially realized. Let us discuss the applique armour used on T-34 tanks from 1941 to 1943.

Unavoidable reinforcement

A new stage in Soviet applique armour design began in the spring of 1941. In addition to work on applique armour for T-26 and T-28 tanks, designers received the task to develop applique armour for the KV-1 and KV-2 tanks. This was triggered by intelligence on new types of German tanks that was acquired in March of 1941. According to this information, German "Type V" and "Type VI" heavy tanks were equipped with 75 mm guns capable of defeating Soviet heavy tanks.

Decree #548-232ss was signed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Partyon March 15th, 1941. It required to produce prototypes of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks with applique armour by May 1st and put them into mass production by June 1st. This work was only a temporary solution. In the summer, KV tanks with thicker main armour would enter production. This plan was put into action, but only for the KV-1, as the KV-2 was already overloaded. Even though German heavy tanks did not show up on the Eastern Front in 1941, the idea of thickening the armour was correct.

Blueprints of applique armour for the T-34 turret. The blueprints were approved on June 13th, 1941.

Another one of the Red Army's new tanks received applique armour, the T-34. This happened later and for different reasons, and was not because of the intelligence informtaion.

Two hulls and two turrets were shot up at the Mariupol factory between April 1st and April 12th, 1941. The guns used were the 37 mm Polish Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz. 36 Bofors, 37 mm model 1930 anti-tank gun, two 45 mm model 1937 anti-tank guns, and the 76 mm divisional model 1902/30 gun. It turned out that parts of the hull can be penetrated by 45 mm sharp tipped armour piercing shells from up to 600 meters. The sides were most vulnerable. The front of the hull was the most resistant and even withstoof 76 mm hits, but even it had weak zones.

45 mm thick armour no longer seemed like enough.

Applique armour for the hull. This design was rejected because bolts could be destroyed in one hit from a shell.

This was not news for factory #183's design bureau and the GABTU. Tactical-technical requirements for a "T-34 tank with a T-60 torsion bar suspension" (later T-60 was corrected to T-34-T) were approved on March 5th, 1941. The number 60 stood for 60 mm of front armour. It was already known that 45 mm of armour did not give complete protection from the 45 mm gun.

The story with the reinforcement of the T-34's armour continued in April of 1941. A proposal was made to increase the thickness of all front armour to 60 mm. The floor armour was thickened from 20 to 30 mm. This tank was called A-43.

The issue of reinforcing armour on ordinary T-34s was also raised. Decree #1216-502ss of the SNK and Central Committee "On production of T-34 tanks in 1941" was issued on May 7th, 1941. It raised the issue of producing the A-43 and T-44 (A-44) tanks. The 10th paragraph of the decree is the most interesting in this context.
"It is ordered that:
  1. The People's Commissar of Medium Manufacturing (comrade Malyshev) and director of factory #183 (comrade Makrarev) jointly with the People's Commissariat of Defense (GABTU) are to produce and test two prototypes of T-34 tanks with additional armour of the turret and front plate, 13-15 mm thick, in June. Install applique armour of 500 T-34 tanks already in service by sending out brigades with instruments and materials. 
  2. The People's Commissar of Shipbuilding (comrade Nosenko) and director of Mariupol factory (comrade Garmashev) must produce armour plate for applique armour of two T-34 tanks within two weeks of receiving blueprints from factory #183. 
  3. The People's Commissariat of Defense (GABTU, comrade Fedorenko) must organize bases for installing applique armour on T-34 tanks, equipping them for welding and mechanical work, and supplying auxiliary workers.
STZ and factory #183 are to begin production of tanks with applique armour starting in August of 1941.
The Mariuopol factory is to begin supplying factory #183 with applique armour parts in July of 1941.
Factory #264 is to begin supplying STZ with applique armour parts in July of 1941."

This applique armour did not exist even as a draft at the time this decree was signed. Factory #183 had yet to design them. The armour department of NII-48 was also involved in the work. Some publications claim that the applique armour was developed in May of 1941, but that is not so. According to the summary report on experimental work, the blueprints were still being developed in May. Instead of 15 mm thick plates, the factory used up leftovers from BT-7 production, which were 13 mm thick. By the start of June, it was not yet decided if the armour would be attached with welding or bolts. The factory preferred bolts with a space of 25 mm between the main armour and applique armour. The first trials were performed in May. It turned out that the ballistic limit (the impact velocity of the shell needed to penetrate the armour) increased by 40-55 m/s.

T-34 with serial number 811-28, one of the two tanks that received applique armour.

Documentation on the applique armour was ready by mid-June 1941. As before, the applique armour was bolted to carriers, which were welded onto the main armour. The front of the hull was protected by four plates on the top and two on the bottom. This layout was the simplest to produce and allowed to quickly replace the armour in case it was damaged. The connecting beam did not have additional armour, but there was a variant of the armour developed for tanks without a beam. The turret was reliably protected. Extra armour was installed along its perimeter and protected the turret ring as well as the main armour. The total mass of the applique armour was 1050 kg according to calculations.

This photograph was taken in July of 1941 at factory #183.

As required, two tanks were equipped with applique armour. These were tanks with serial number 0618-7 (1940 production with L-11 gun and no connecting beam) and 811-28 (1941 production with an F-34 gun and connecting beam). This was done in July, not June. 120-140 man-hours were required to convert one tank, which was within norm for this kind of work.

To figure out how this change affected the tank's characteristics, a third tank (#311-25-3) was loaded up to 28.5 tons and tested in spring-summer of 1941. No exceptional issues were discovered after a 1697 km march. However, the general drawback of tanks with applique armour showed itself. The front of the tank dipped significantly when driving on bumpy roads.

Leftover 13 mm thick armour from BT-7 tanks was put to use.

The widespread opinion that the applique armour project was cancelled because of the start of the war is incorrect. Yes, hull production facilities were overloaded, but there were also many issues with the applique armour design. The attachment by bolts was unreliable, as the first hit from a shell would break them off. The design with mudflaps was also complicated. 

The applique armour was to be changed. The armour would be installed without spacing, and would be attached by welding. The sloped sides around the fighting compartment would also receive additional armour. NII-48 also had its complaints. They noticed that the armour does not cover the most vulnerable parts of the front of the tank: the driver's hatch and hull machinegun. However, these components were not covered on any subsequent applique armour design either.

In any case, the design developed by factory #183 was rejected. It would not have gone into production in any case. Both tanks with the applique armour were sent to the front lines. The tank with an F-34 gun even popped up in a front line photo.

Second coming

A lull took place after factory #183's design was rejected in July of 1941. Unlike the KV-1, the T-34 never received thicker main armour. The tank continued to be produced with 45 mm thick plates. The issue of applique armour arose once more in the fall of 1941. This was triggered by the analysis of use of the T-34 in combat and captured German memos on combat with Soviet tanks.

This information coincided with the findings of spring 1941. The front of the tank was the toughest part, but the lower sides could be penetrated by light anti-tank guns from 400 meters and closer. The situation with the 50 mm Pak 38 was even worse. The T-34's side could be penetrated from 700 meters. The 105 mm leFH 18 howitzer could also penetrate the side from that distance.

A proposal was made in October of 1941 to install applique armour along the sides. The sloped part of the side would be covered with a 15 mm plate, the suspension covered with 25 mm thick spaced armour. The turret ring would be protected from the sides and front to prevent jamming. To compensate for the increase in mass, smaller road wheels with internal shock absorption would be used.


In practice, work on up-armouring T-34 tanks went in a different direction. The production of the A-43 was a pipe dream by the fall of 1941, so a decision was made to improve the existing design. Even though results of trials showed that it was necessary to increase the sides of the hull, the front armour of the tank still came under the most frequent attack. It was decided to reinforce that part.

A technical meeting was held at factory #112 in mid-November 1941 to discuss this question. This topic was mentioned several times in the NKTP. On December 25th, 1941, Stalin signed GKO decree #1062ss "On T-34 and T-60 tanks". According to this decree, all T-34 tanks were to be produced with applique armour increasing the total thickness of the front armour to 60 mm from January 15th and 60 mm thick main armour after February 15th.

T-34 tanks with applique armour produced by factory #112. Leningrad Front, summer of 1942.

By this point, three factories were producing the T-34: Stalingrad Tractor Factory (STZ), factory #112 (Gorkiy), and factory #183 (Nizhniy Tagil). Factory #183 remained the chief factory, but by the start of 1942 all three factories were producing noticeably different tanks. Factory #183 began producing a hexagonal turret with some features from the A-43 turret (gun mount, separate round hatches, etc) due to technical difficulties with the old design. The hulls also had their differences. STZ and factory #112 tanks also differed. With time, these differences only increased.

Even though requirements only stipulated increased armour in the front, this layout has applique armour even in the back of the turret.

Factory #183 had their own approach to decree #1062ss. According to a letter sent on January 3rd, only the front of the hull would receive applique armour. The protection of the turret was improved by increasing the thickness of the main armour to 60 mm. Considering that the turret was cast, and that 52 mm of cast armour was considered equivalent to 45 mm of rolled armour, this was not enough protection. In practice, turrets were still cast with 52 mm armour.

Factory #112 developed a scheme where the front of the hull and the front (and partially sides) of the turret were covered with additional 15 mm thick plates. Like the factory #183 design, they were welded on. This design used small sheets of armour.

In Stalingrad, the development of applique armour was taken up by the supplies of hulls and turrets: factory #264. This factory also developed a layout with improved armour in the front of the hull, the front of the turret, and partially the sides of the turret. Recall that factory #112 mainly used cast turrets, and factory #264 mainly welded ones.

A factory #183 production T-34 with applique armour.

Factory #183 was the first to begin producing tanks with applique armour. Production began on January 20th, 1942. Factory #112 began producing turrets with applique armour on February 1st, factory #264 started on February 2nd. By February 17th factory #264 produced about 120 such hulls and turrets. Factory #112 was not doing as smoothly: only 80 hulls and 109 turrets were made. Either way, T-34 tanks with applique armour were being made by the hundreds in February of 1942... but on February 23rd, Stalin signed GKO decree #1333, cancelling the applique armour. The hulls and turrets that were already produced could be used up to make tanks.

An STZ production T-34 tank with applique armour on the hull only. Summer 1942.

Why was the installation of applique armour cancelled? On January 21st, a draft of a GKO decree titled "On production of T-60 and T-34 tanks with thickened and applique armour" moved the due date for starting production of tanks with applique armour to February 10th and the due date for tanks with thickened hull armour and applique armour on the turret to March 10th. After April 1st, all armour would have to be thickened. However, in February of 1942 it was clear that thickening rolled armour is not the way to go. Factories that were overloaded with orders and struggling with production difficulties would not be able to transition to 60 mm plates. As for the applique armour, it took up a lot of time, effort, and resources.

The biggest reason was that the benefit from this armour was not that significant. Leftover hulls and turrets were slowly used up. For instance, STZ tanks produced in the summer of 1942 still had these hulls.

Factory #112 tanks with a "patch" applique armour. This was not an improvement of the armour, but rather correction of defects. The patch covered cracks in the front plate.

Factory #112 had to go back to applique armour. The problem this time wasn't that the armour was too thin, but armour plates that were supplied were defective. These defects were common in 1942, especially when it came to the upper front plate. This was a complicated piece with many cutouts. Because of this, applique armour was installed. These were patches rather than full armour plates, but they spanned the entire width of the hull. It had a different shape than earlier designs and was often made from one large sheet of steel.

Protection from "thermite shells"

The topic of applique armour for the T-34 came up once more in the end of summer of 1942. The Germans began to use a new type of ammunition, HEAT, or as they were sometimes called, "thermite shells". They were first used against tanks in late 1941, but their application was much more common starting with 1942. This type of ammunition increased the effectiveness of short barreled guns on the StuG and PzIV. According to Soviet data, a HEAT shell could penetrate 45 mm of armour from 1000 meters. The use of subcaliber ammunition was also noticed.

A hull and turret of a T-34 tank during trials, fall 1942.

Another unpleasant surprise came from the NII-48. Having analyzed the use of the T-34 in combat for May-July of 1942, they came to the conclusion that 50.5% of hits come at the sides.

The GABTU initiated work to create spaced armour to protect from these kinds of shells. Nobody was talking about applique armour for the front anymore. It was clear that other parts of the tank needed protecting.

Installing the applique armour right up against the main armour gave poor results.

A meeting was held at factory #112 on September 12th, 1942, discussing protection from new types of ammunition. Representatives of the NII-48, factory management, and a representative from the GABTU, Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Burtsev were present. Engineer A.T. Larin from NII-48 proposed placing the applique armour some distance away from the main plate, at least as far as the length of a subcaliber penetrator. As for HEAT rounds, experiments would have to be held. It was decided that experiments with various ways of attaching the spaced armour and various distances away from the main armour would have to be carried out.

Placing the armour some distance away from the main plate proved most effective.

Trials were held at the Gorohovets ANIOP proving grounds from September 25th to October 9th, 1942. Various plates were installed on top of the T-34's main armour, both right up against the armour or some distance away. It turned out that 10 and 20 mm thick screens without any spacing are easily penetrated by HEAT ammunition fired from either the Soviet 76 mm regimental gun or the 75 mm KwK L/24 in a PzIV Ausf.E.

The best results were shown by 5 and 20 mm thick plates installed at a distance of 425-480 mm from the main armour. This combination could not be penetrated. It also turned out that the turret was more resistant to HEAT shells than the sides of the tank, even without spaced armour. A low lifespan of spaced armour was also discovered during trials. A 16 mm thick spaced armour plate was destroyed after two hits from subcaliber shells or three hits from HEAT shells.

A model of spaced armour for the T-34, later built in metal.

After studying the results of the trials, factory #112's design bureau developed a spaced armour project for the T-34 under the direction of V.V. Krylov. Since the plates had to protect the tank from HEAT and subcaliber ammunition, they had to be thick, and therefore heavy. The main proposal consisted of 20 mm thick plates, the heaviest type considered.

The same from the right.

According to the project, the sides, suspension, front hull beam, sides of the turret, and partially the front of the turret were protected. There was also a lightened variant without protection of the turret. Five variants with different levels of protection were offered. The mass of these tanks ranged from 31.8 tons to 32.19 tons. A T-34 without extra armour weighed 28.63 tons.

The spaced armour was held on with bolts combined with Belleville springs. To make working on the suspension easier, the spaced armour that covered it was installed on hinges. If necessary, it could be easily disconnected and flipped up.

The list of proposals included a number of modernizations, including changing of the slope of the main armour. However, they were presented as reserve variants, since no one would change the hull so radically in wartime.

The connecting beam in the front of the hull was protected in this layout.

A compromise was accepted by the GABTU. The 20 mm plates offered better protection, but the increase in weight was too much. 16 mm thick plates were used. The tank would be built in two variants. The first increased in mass by 2622 kg, but both the hull and turret were protected. The second protected only the hull, but was lighter: the mass increased by 1833 kg. In the second case, plates that were 10 mm thick were used in addition to 15-16 mm plates.

A tank with the second type of spaced armour installed.

A report on applique armour was presented to Stalin on November 19th. It proposed building 46 T-34s with applique armour: 23 of the first type and 23 of the second. This proposal was approved. On December 7th, 1942, Stalin signed GKO decree #2594ss, ordering factory #112 to produce these tanks by March 1st, 1943. They were all built in the spring of 1943.

T-34 tank, turret number 232, from the 41st Tank Brigade. This tank had the second type of spaced armour. The tank was destroyed by a hit of a 75 mm shell to the front of the hull.

The tanks were sent to the 139th and 198th Tank Regiments. The Commander of Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army ordered the tanks to the front line to be tested in battle conditions by order #064 given on June 9th, 1943. Units equipped with the spaced armour T-34s were sent to the 41st Tank Brigade of the 5th Tank Corps and 111th Tank Brigade of the 25th Tank Corps. The 139th regiment had 21 T-34 tanks with the first type of spaced armour and 11 T-34 tanks with the second type. The 198th regiment had two tanks with the first type, 12 tanks with the second type, and 18 T-34 tanks from factory #112 without any spaced armour at all.

Tank #100 with the first type of spaced armour. It was destroyed by an 88 mm shell that hit the front of the hull.

A number of suspension and drivetrain defects were discovered during the march to the initial positions, but these defects were also present on T-34s without spaced armour. The downside exclusive to tanks with spaced armour was decreased performance on bad terrain. This happened because mud would get packed between the main armour and spaced armour during turns. Other than that, the spaced armour had almost no effect on off-road performance and maneverability.

Another hit from an 88 mm gun, this time to the side.

Brigades equipped with spaced armour T-34 tanks took part in the fighting from July 25th to August 8th, 1943. By the start of the offensive, the 41st Tank Brigade had 89 T-34s and 10 Valentines. On July 28th, the unit went on the attack to chase the enemy out of Rudnevo. The enemy met the tank attack with fire from tanks, SPGs, and anti-tank guns. The brigade managed to take the village at a cost of 7 tanks. It turned out that the spaced armour resists 75 mm HEAT shells well, but not 75 mm AP shells. Even worse, the Germans were using new 88 mm Pak 43/41 guns. The brigade also took heavy losses on the next day.

Spaced armour in the front of the turret did not protect tank #321 from a 75 mm round.

The 41st Tank Brigade fought its way through 35 km of enemy territory and completed its objective. However, tanks with spaced armour took the most losses. Only 2 tanks with the first type of spaced armour and 5 with the second remained functional. 14 tanks were lost irreparably, 5 required major repairs, and 6 required medium repairs.

The 111th Tank Brigade had 5 functional tanks with spaced armour left. Thanks to fighting in lower intensity battles and having fewer tanks with spaced armour, losses in spaced armour tanks were also less. Two were lost irreparably, two more needed major repairs (all with the second type of spaced armour). Five more tanks (of those, one had the first type of spaced armour) needed medium repairs.

This tank, number 222, was hit by a mine. Four spaced armour tanks were lost to mines in total. One was hit by mortar fire, two were destroyed with Molotov cocktails.

The analysis of damage taken in combat was even more disappointing for the tanks with applique armour. Only two hits each of 50 mm AP and 75 mm HEAT were discovered. Most of the hits (37) came from 75 mm AP, of them 16 hit the sides of tanks, 5 hit the upper side, 6 the front of the hull, and 10 hit the turret. 15 hits from Pak 43/41 guns were counted, 7 in the side, 3 in the upper side, 2 in the front, 2 in the rear, and 1 in the turret. In total, 24 shells his the side and 9 hit the upper side. Yes, the idea of protecting the sides was correct. However, the spaced armour was ineffective against 75 mm and 88 mm AP rounds. The spaced armour was also not enough to resist 50 mm AP.

A captured German Pak 43/41 gun. A number of tanks with spaced armour was destroyed by this type of weapon.

The results of the use of the T-34 with spaced armour in combat were compiled into a report on September 25th, 1943. The authors proposed that the NKTP should develop more reliable protection for the sides of the tanks. However, at that point even heavy tanks were not reliably protected from the Pak 43. This batch of T-34 tanks from factory #112 was the last massed use of tanks with spaced armour by the Red Army. Work on applique armour continued, but remained experimental.

1942 Lineup: New Players

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"Wundsdorf Tank School

March 1st, 1942

Which Russian tanks will you encounter in 1942?

...

When looking at modern types of Russian tanks, you must realize that tanks of significantly high quality have been attained in a surprisingly short amount of time. Special attention is paid to armour and effectiveness of armament. A goal of standardization is obvious, for instance the T-34 and both KV tanks have the same 12 cylinder 500 hp engine.

Weak points include weak clutch casings, gearboxes, and turning mechanisms. The technically advanced shape of the T-34 is notable. The Russians have very good quality armour steel. Curved 75 mm thick plates signify that Russian factories are very well equipped.

Instead of the obsolete T-26, we are seeing large amounts of small modern T-60 tanks. The best Russian tank, the T-34, came out of the BT, and the T-28 and T-35 are being replaced by the KV (Klim Voroshilov) type 1 (7.62 cm gun) and type 2 (15.2 cm gun). An amphibious tank is being produced (T-40).

1. T-60 light tank

This tank is being built in Gorkiy in large amounts. It weighs 6-8 tons. It's very small (3.95x2.30x.175 m), has about an 85 hp engine, and a top speed of over 40 kph. The armour thickness is stated as 25 mm. Armament consists of a 2 cm gun firing 160 RPM. At a glance, the tank can be confused for the amphibious tank (T-40), although it is principally different. Judging by illustrations, it gun is of larger caliber. Intelligence reports that the tank is supposed to be the most common tank in tank companies (30 T-60, 5 T-34). The design and armament indicate that it should be used as a reconnaissance vehicle (like the Pz.Kpfw.II).

Distinctive features: very small angled turret, oscillations of the hull in motion, 4 medium sized road wheels, torsion bar suspension.

2. T-40 amphibious tank

This 5.5 ton tank was the first tank outside of Germany to use a torsion bar suspension. It has a good speed: 40 kph on road and 10 kph in water. Armour is 14 mm in the front, armament is one 12.6 mm machinegun and 1 regular machinegun, which is good for an amphibious tank, but not enough for a battle tank. The T-60 has a similar chassis, size, and other characteristics. It appears that the T-40 proved disappointing. Very possibly the production of the T-40 was ceased in favour of the T-60.

3. T-34 heavy tank (the most dangerous tank in the Red Army).

The appearance of this new type of tank in many varieties and amounts was a big surprise for us.

This is the best tank in the Red Army. Its effective armament, skilfully angled thick armour, and mobility make it a very serious opponent.

The 500 hp diesel (reduced fire risk compared to Otto's engines) moves this 26 ton tank with a speed of over 50 kph on roads. The armament is good, 7.62 cm cannon (L/30.5 or 41.5) and two machineguns. Penetration of the gun is lethal at 1000 m and over. The skilfully composed form makes the tank flat and graceful.

The armour is a very tough rolled metal. The slope in the front is 30 degrees, the sides - 50 degrees, which explains frequent ricochets despite the relatively thin armour. Some variants are equipped with a cast turret, which makes the form of the tank even more graceful. The cast armour is 52-70 mm thick. The armour of the tank is not easily defeated.

From the front it can be distinguished by its sloped sides, from the sides by 5 large Christie wheels.

Light anti-tank guns need to concentrate fire on one track to immobilize the tank. The rumour that it can move without tracks is fiction.

Heavy anti-tank guns or tank guns 5 cm and up: aim at the tracks to destroy them and at the turret bustle with PzGr.40. When aiming from the sides, pick a high point of aim. When the tank is close enough, aim at the machinegun shield below and to the left of the gun. It does not withstand hits from 3.7 or 5 cm guns, but it's a very small target.

Machinegunners: long bursts to the right, under the gun. That is where three driver's prismatic periscopes are located. They are relatively easy to destroy. The driver does not have a vision slit and will be blinded.

From close range, strike at the horizontal engine deck. Throw a grenade bundle onto the mesh. Underneath it are louvres (25 mm thick steel) that can be pushed in with an explosion. THe tank will stop and it will be relatively easy to set it on fire.

At close range, you will see a mesh on the top of the sides, in the rear. Fire with armour piercing machinegun bullets had a good effect.

Distinctive features: a flat, graceful shape. Sloped front and side armour. 5 large wheels. Very long gun.

4. KV-1 heavy tank.

The "Klim Voroshilov" tank was also new. The suspension uses torsion bars like German tanks.

The engine is the same 12 cylinder diesel as in the T-34 tank. The RPM is increased, as the KV-1 weighs 43 tons, and the KV-2 up to 52 tons. The top speed is lowered, up to 35 kph.

The tank is armed with one 7.62 cm gun (L/30.5), which is good, but not as good as on the T-34 (7.62 L/41.5). Machineguns are located in the gun mantlet, rear of the turret, and in some variants in the front. The armour is 75 mm all around. The flat sides are a better aiming point than on the T-34.

After the 5 cm gun proved it could knock out early KV types, the Russians reinforced the armour in some parts. It can be noticed by looking for large bolt heads.

The mobility of this tank is poor. The gears can only be shifted when stopped. The speed of 35 kph does not appear believable. Driver's visibility is poor. The clutch is very lightly built. Nearly all stuck KVs had damaged clutches. The tank is too heavy for pontoon bridges and simple regular bridges.

This tank is not easy to suppress. Few guns can penetrate 75 mm of armour (only 5 cm guns firing PzGr.40 at close range). It is recommended to focus fire on one track to at least stop the tank. At close range, aim at the rounded portion in the upper plate in the rear (this can be done only from the back). That is where the air intake is located, protected by a mesh. A ricochet from armour piercing bullets can destroy the engine. In close combat you can also launch a tracer shell in there. Since there is a deflecting plate installed, aim upwards, into the upper plate.

The upper plate has two round hatches, about 50 mm thick. Firing at them from the Pz.B.41 (for instance from upper floors of houses) is effective. The reinforced types of tanks can be attacked with 5 cm PzGr.40 rounds at close range. Aim at: 1. Front of the turret. 2. Upper hull behind the tool box. 3. Rear part of the hull, under the curve.

In close combat, note the dome-shaped structures on the tanks. They are plugs that can be easily removed from the inside for firing a revolver at close range.

Distinctive features: large size, but only one turret. Wide tracks. 6 medium sized road wheels.

5. KV-2 heavy tank.

This is the only Russian heavy tank with a weight of 52 tons. A 12 ton rectangular turret was installed on the KV-1 chassis. The size is so great that it surpasses the German railroad gauge, and it can only be transported with the turret removed. Russian reports often speak of crushed bridges.

The armament is a 15.2 cm howitzer. Separate loading makes firing slow. 36 rounds of ammunition is insufficient.

The KV-2 can be distinguished by its large box turret. Fight it in the same way as the KV-1. Fighting at close range is easier, since there are more dead zones and the large turret cannot be turned when the tank is tilted."

Via Photonoid.


Experimental Work at factory #183, January 1941

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"February 4th, 1941
#87s

To the Chief of the 3rd Department of the BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Afonin

The following work was performed at factory #183 during January of 1941:

1. Experimental work
  1. Trials of T-34 gearboxes were performed. 2 gearboxes with reduced 3rd gear ratios were installed in January. The first, with the ratio lowered by 14.6%, travelled about 550 km. The second, with a gear ratio lowered by 8%, travelled 340 km. Preliminary trials show that driving tanks with reduced gear ratios is easier than those with production gearboxes. One vehicle's gearbox had its 2nd, 3rd, and 4th gears constantly engaged, where the 3rd gear was reduced by 22.1% and 4th gear by 9.5%. Changing gears was performed using a clutch. The tank with this gearbox travelled for 400 km. In this tank it is easier to engage the third gear than on the production gearbox. No chipping of the gear teeth was observed.
  2. Two new friction clutches with a higher "V" coefficient (1.8) and non-rigid cooling fan attachment are being assembled. Trials of the main clutch and gearbox is delayed by the fact that two experimental T-34s need repairs. One had its engine case burst, the other has gas penetration.
  3. A flamethrower for the T-34 tank is being tested. Five outings have been made. The crude oil-kerosene mixture has a range of 65-70 meters. The flamethrower has a number of defects:
    1. One fuel load lasts only for 4 shots.
    2. There is no cutoff for the stream.
    3. The air clearing valve leaks.
    4. There were cases of ignition failure.
    5. The fuel leaks.
      In this form the flamethrower cannot be installed on a production vehicle. Installing the flamethrower as is will result in a reduction of ammunition capacity and worse working conditions for the crew.
  4. Assembly of heaters for the BT-7M vehicle continued. Delays occurred due to the design bureau putting out blueprints late and the mechanical workshop taking too long to produce parts. The vehicle will be assembled by February 15-20th 1941.
  5. Installation of the F-34 gun in a T-34 is underway, will be complete by February 5-6th.
  6. A number of cooling fans were produced and are being tested. No positive results so far.
  7. A track and lantern gear type drive sprocket are being developed. Will enter trials in mid-February.
  8. Trials of a new ammo rack were performed. The new ammo rack works better than the production one, but a full test of the system by firing off a full complement of shells must be performed. The factory could not perform these trials due to a lack of ammunition.
  9. A new driver's hatch was being tested for comfort of driving and shell resistance. The hatch is incomparably better compared to the production one. The shell resistance needs to be improved.
  10. Substitutes were tested and other issues were investigated.
2. Design bureau
  1. T-34 blueprints are being worked on in accordance with State degrees.
  2. A number of issues to do with the main clutch, cooling fan, tracks, observation devices, etc. were worked on.
  3. A draft project for a deep modernization of the T-34 is being composed.
3. A number of experimental work is being postponed as the factory has not received its credit and there are no approved plans for experimental work in 1941.

Composed by: Military Representative of the GABTU, Military Engineer 3rd Class Baikov
Checked by: Regional Engineer of the GABTU, Military Engineer 2nd Class Kozyrev"

Panther Intel

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"British Military Mission in the USSR
Moscow
July 9th, 1943

To: Major General Dubinin
CC: GABTU Chief

Contents: new German medium and heavy tanks
  1. I present to you the following information that we already communicated to the GABTU. This information comes from prisoners of war and captured documents and has not been confirmed.
    1. The "Panther" tank. This is likely a medium tank armed with a long 75 mm gun. It is said that it was copied from the Soviet T-34. It is said that regular tank companies are being re-armed with this tank. No further information exists.
    2. The "Tiger" tank. This is the German T-6 tank, presumably split into two types, the H type used in Africa and Soviet-German Front and the P type. Nothing is known as of yet on the P type. It is said that it is less satisfactory than the H type.
      Each tank regiment will have a battalion of Tiger tanks in the future.
  2. In addition to this, our letter T/946 sent to the GABTU on July 9th, 1943, contained improvements that were presumably made to the T-6 tank in Germany.
In addition to this, we have no information regarding present or future initiatives. We would be glad to receive whatever fresh information you have.

Representative of the Army Section, British Military Mission to the USSR, [signature]"

Via Yuri Pasholok



Pz.Kpfw.III Replica at the Ontario Regiment Museum

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This tank is not an actual PzIII, but you can hardly tell just by looking at it. The only giveaway was that the tires don't say "Continental" on them. According to the driver, it was built entirely to factory blueprints externally, and only the insides come from the M113 APC. 














Cruiser with a Big Head

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SPGs are hardly a strength of the British tank industry. The country developed the first SPG on a tank chassis, but then the birthplace of tanks fell behind in the creation of self propelled artillery. Suffice it to say that Britain produced half as many SPGs as Canada in WWII (not counting those converted into SPGs from tanks). British SPGs implemented rather unusual design decisions. This was true for their tank destroyers as well, both the Challenger and Avenger.


Results of best intentions

As strange as it sounds, the first step towards the creation of a British tank destroyer was a heavy tank, and not a British one. The Heavy Tank T1, the first heavy tank designed in the United States, was nearly complete by the summer of 1941. Both American and British soldiers awaited this vehicle eagerly. The British programme for creation of a heavy assault tank, the TOG, started slipping. The American heavy tank also looked better than the William Foster & Co. design. The Heavy Tank T1 was lighter, smaller, and faster, with comparable protection.

Only the armament seemed insufficient. Of course, the 76 mm gun with AA ballistics was a good weapon, but the British were working on a more powerful gun of the same caliber, the 17-pounder. Work began on May 13th, 1941. According to requirements, the gun had to penetrate 120-150 mm of armour from 730 meters. The American tank gun was not up to this standard. It's not surprising that at a meeting of the Tank Department on August 22nd, 1941, it was decided to install the 17-pounder gun into the Heavy Tank M1. This proposal turns up in American documents much later, on February 17th, 1942. The Americans declined this proposal. However, the British were already working on another carrier for this gun.

A29 and A30 tank destroyers. The heavier A29 was discarded in favour of the lighter and more mobile A30.

The British tank with a 17-pounder gun began to take shape in the fall of 1941. However, its type and design were the subject of months worth of discussion. Initially, the military wanted to have an infantry tank. Work on the new specification was supposed to happen under the supervision of Oliver Lucas, a key employee of the Ministry of Supply.

Opponents cropped up even at this stage, and they had some ironclad arguments. Jeffrey Berton, another key figure in British tank building, pointed out that such a tank would weigh in excess of 50 tons, and cause issues with mobility and transport.

The engine for this tank was found relatively quickly: the Rolls Royce Meteor, a tank version of the Merlin aircraft engine. This engine was installed into the A27 tank. The version of it with the Meteor engine received the name Cromwell. Around this time, development of an infantry tank on the A27 chassis began. The first variant received the index A28. This was essentially another Cromwell with more powerful armour and skirt armour around the running hear. This project cropped up in December of 1941. At the same time, on December 15th, 1941, the idea of making an infantry tank with a more powerful weapon came up. William Robotam, the head engineer at Rolls-Royce, also the head of tank design, proposed creating a 40-45 ton heavy tank with a 900 hp supercharged engine. The development was given to the Rolls Royce division in Belper. 

The prototype of the Cruiser Tank A30. The turret and gun are dummies.

The draft project received the index A29 and codename Clan. It was ready by the end of January 1942. Belper didn't reinvent the wheel, and the staff there just took the same A27 as a foundation. The length of the hull grew to nearly 7.5 meters, the mass reached 45 long tons (45.7 metric tons). The chassis was lengthened due to the larger turret and improved protection. The hull and turret front were 127 mm thick, the sides were 89 mm thick.

The increased mass forced a change in the suspension. Rolls Royce developed a new suspension. The number of wheels increased to 12 per side, and the number of tracks to four. A Meteor engine supercharged to 700 hp was supposed to generate a speed of up to 48 kph, but this seemed unlikely. A version with thinner armour appeared later, with a mass of only 32 long tons (32.5 metric tons). The suspension remained the same, but the number of tracks was reduced to 2. Their width increased from 280 mm to 406 mm.

Like on the TOG II* turret, the armour was bolted on.

This version also remained on the drawing board. A cruiser tank variant was developed in Belper in parallel. It used as many Cromwell components as possible. The level of rationalization reached 90%, which made it significantly easier to develop. The length of the vehicle increased to 7123 mm from 6325 mm, chiefly due to a larger fighting compartment. The number of road wheels grew to six per side. The running gear of the Cromwell remained, but the track links had to be replaced. This was because of the increased ground pressure that accompanied the larger mass. A track link 394 mm in width was developed, similar to the normal 356 mm wide one. The increased mass later forced a change to the road wheels. Visually, they were no different from the ones used on the Cromwell, but the composition of the rubber was different.

The interior of the dummy turret.

Stothert & Pitt developed the turret. The same company developed the 17-pounder turret for the TOG II* assault tank. Stothert & Pitt also didn't reinvent the wheel, and just changed the TOG II* turret. This allowed them to finish the work quicker and made it easier to produce some of the main components. For instance, the Metadyne electric turret traverse was already tested on the TOG II*.

The deadline for the turret was three months after the start of development, but it was not met. The first Cruiser Tank A30 (also known as the A30 Pilot A) arrived to the Farnborough proving grounds  on July 29th, 1942, without a turret. A wooden mockup was installed for demonstrations. 

Cutaway of the Challenger I.

Trials in Farnborough showed that the tank needs work. The mass of 32.5 tons overloaded the suspension. A decision was made in September of 1942 to reduce the mass to 31 tons. The armour thickness had to be reduced. For instance, the thickness of the internal armour plates around the suspension was reduced from 25 to 14 mm.

A modified prototype entered trials on October 20th, 1942. It travelled for 619 km, 306 on a highway an 313 on a dirt road. The tank had a smoother drive than the Cromwell and controlled well. The trials revealed a large number of defects, chiefly with the suspension.

The fourth production Challenger I. Instead of using bolts, the turret was welded.

The military's appetites grew as the trials continued. The idea of buying American tanks was rejected, and the demand for tanks with 17-pounder guns grew. According to plans made on October 9th, 1942, the British army needed 1150 such tanks (700 issued, 350 in reserves, 100 in training units). After gunnery trials of the second prototype, it was decided to order a batch of 25-30 A30s.

At the same time, the army struggled to determine what kind of vehicle the A30 was. Royal Artillery needed vehicles with 17-pounder guns. Nevertheless, it was decided to classify the A30 as a tank. As for the artillerymen, the development of an SPG on the Valentine chassis began, which later turned into the Archer.

The requirements for the A30 kept changing, which delayed production. New features were implemented in the third prototype, the A30 Pilot C. All three prototypes were made from mild steel.

A top view shows that two fans are installed.

The light in the end of the tunnel lit up in late January of 1943. During an inspection of the second prototype (A30 Pilot B) a decision was made to order a batch of 200 tanks. However, the design still needed changes. The British military figured out that attaching armour with bolts is no longer the most up to date solution. This didn't stop Cromwell turrets from being bolted, but the A30 turrets became welded. Welding was also used in the assembly of hulls. Thankfully Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company (BRC&W) was capable of this. The mass of the A30 began to grow again, nearing 32 tons.

A large hatch in the back was used to remove the gun.

The final decision to build 200 A30 tanks was made at a meeting on February 9th, 1943. They received WD numbers ranging from T.271901-T.272100. However, production did not start quickly. It was clear that the tank would not make it to North Africa in time, so there was no rush. Prototypes continued to be modified with changes that would later be used on production tanks.

The excessive size of the vehicle resulted in the creation of alternative projects. Among those was the "low silhouette A30", which later turned into the Avenger, as well as a cruiser tank with a shortened 17-pounder gun, which later turned into the Comet. In the summer of 1943 the A35 tank was also introduced, which was essentially the A34 (Comet) with a larger turret ring and full-fledged 17-pounder gun. The A40, an A30 with thicker armour, was created in the fall of 1943. While the tankers were playing around with new variants, the artillery branch received its Archers in May of 1943.

In parallel, work was being done to install the 17-pounder gun into the Sherman tank and M10 tank destroyer. Without the Firefly and Achilles, the number of vehicles carrying 17-pounders in the summer of 1944 would have been much lower.

A mid-production tank with thicker front turret armour.

The A30 program turned into a tragicomedy as a result of all these changes. Even though a prototype was ready in the summer of 1942, production of the tank destroyer christened Challenger I began at BRC&W in March of 1944. Cromwell tanks were still a priority, and production of the Challenger I was lethargic at best. 8 were delivered in March, 12 in April, 11 in May, 3 in June. These tanks had a lower level of protection than the Cromwell IV. The cast mantlet of the Challenger I T.271901-T.271940 was only 63 mm thick, while the Cromwell IV had a 76 mm thick front turret. After all the changes, the tank weighed the same 32.5 tons as it did at the start.

Challenger I armour diagram. It indicates at which point the tank destroyer received improved armour.

This kind of position was unsatisfactory. The large tank was an excellent target, but it was still vulnerable to not only German heavy tanks, but medium ones as well. For this reason, tank T.271926 and up received thicker front hull and turret armour. Their mass surpassed 33 tons. 102 mm armour could withstand a 75 mm Pak 40 or KwK 40 shell from medium distances.

Trials showed that mobility of the Challenger I with extra armour did not decrease. This was only confirmed later, but the thicker gun mantlet was put into production in July of 1944. 12 tanks were delivered that month, 22 in August, the same in September, and 19 in October. The first 100 Challenger I were completed by the fall.

The last 100 Challenger I tanks had thicker front hull armour.

Successful trials of the Challenger I T.271926, which drove for 2416 km, were followed with thicker armour. Starting from November of 1944 (WD number T.272001) production of Challenger I tanks with extra hull and turret armour began. 20 were delivered in November, 16 in December, 14 in January 1945, 13 in February, 15 in March, 5 in April. WWII was coming to an end, and delivery of the last A30s lagged until the end of 1945. This kind of result can't be considered as anything but a failure. In addition, only 655 Archer I were produced out of the planned 800. It's hard to imagine what would have happened had there not been a program to rearm American tanks with British 17-pounder guns.

A rare sight on the battlefield

The start of production of the Challenger I coincided with preparations for landing in Northern France. The fighting in Europe would have become the debut of the Cromwell and the tank destroyer on its chassis. However, not a single unit armed with the Challenger I was battle ready by the summer of 1944. Only 34 tank destroyers were ready by the end of June 1944.

The situation with the Cromwell as a little better, but it was not destined to become the main tank of the British army. 860 Cromwells were issued in all, including reserves, while the "basic" Sherman V (Medium Tank M4A4) numbered 1172 units. This did not include the amphibious Sherman V DD (189), commander's Sherman OP (29), 225 Sherman V Crab, and 358 Sherman Vc, more commonly known as Firefly. 

The Tiger didn't seem so big in comparison.

According to the established TO&E, 25% of the vehicles in a tank unit had to be tank destroyers. In reality, this proportion was usually much lower. Typically only 36 tank destroyers were on hand against 233 tanks (excluding ARVs). Cruiser tank regiments in tank brigades had the following authorized strength: 43 Cromwell IV tanks, 6 close support Cromwell VI tanks, 12 Challenger I tank destroyers (61 tanks in all). later, the number of authorized Challengers increased to 15, but this was only on paper. In reality, units armed with Cromwell tanks were forced to use the Sherman Vc.

Challenger I of the 11th Armoured Division. These Challengers were the most successful tanks of their type.

The first unit to receive the Challenger I was the 7th Armoured Division. This was the only British tank division that used Cromwell tanks exclusively. The plans were to issue 45 Challenger Is to the division, but the reality was different: by July 24th the division had just one tank destroyer, and only three by July 31st.

Meanwhile, the 17-pounder was in demand. Combat in June-July 1944 showed that the 75 mm gun was insufficiently powerful against German tanks, especially the Panther and Tiger. The 17-pounder gun could defeat these tanks. The requirement in tanks armed with this gun increased.

Combat in the Netherlands was the real debut of the British tank destroyer.

The Challenger I began entering service en masse in August of 1944. However, their use in battle was still rare. The first such use was registered on August 3rd, 1944, and the effect was mixed. The 5th Royal Tank Regiment faced off against three PzIV and one Panther tank. One Cromwell was lost in this engagement, and a Challenger I fired three shots, missing each time. British tank destroyers had nearly no effect on the battles in Normandy.

The first success came in the fall of 1944. On September 18th, 1944, near Breugel, Netherlands, a Challenger I from C squadron of the 11th Armoured Division managed to knock out a Panther. Three Panthers were claimed on that day by a Challenger I under the command of Lieutenant Egerton from B squadron. Fighting in the fall of 1944 showed that the idea of a tank destroyer was correct. However, the British took too long to produce it, so stories of success were few. This is especially noticeable in comparison with the Sherman Vc, which was entering service by the hundreds. By the end of December, the 21st Army contained 31 Challenger I tanks (21 on the front lines), but 728 Sherman Vc.

This kind of camouflage was common, but the size of the tank reduced its effectiveness.

Even though production of the Challenger I continued, there weren't many more of them on the front lines. At any time, only a few dozen were in service. The 11th Armoured Division received its first Comet tanks in 1945. Their guns were nearly as powerful as that of the Challenger I.

Tank destroyers were used in other Allied units. Most notably, they were issued to the 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade. Plans were made to issue 24 vehicles in the summer of 1944, but the deadline was missed. Czechoslovakian Challengers never fought. The unit only received 22 of them in May of 1945. They replaced Sherman Vc tanks. A similar situation happened with Polish Challengers: 8 tanks arrived into the 1st Polish Armoured Division in April of 1945, and 5 more in June. The use of British tank destroyers in 1945 was rare.

Victory Parade, September 7th, 1945.

Despite such a mixed application in battle, the end of the career of the Challenger I was notable. Tank destroyers from the 7th Armoured Brigade marched through Berlin during the Victory Parade on September 7th, 1945. However, the star of the show was a whole different tank, the Soviet IS-3. The British tank destroyer quickly disappeared from the British army in the post-war period.

Czechoslovakian Challenger I, like the Polish ones, did not fight, but their service was long.

The vehicle did not shine on the export market, but the Challenger I's career was longest abroad. The 22 tank destroyers given to Czechoslovakia towards the end of the war were issued to the 11th Tank Battalion in 1946. The military was reorganized in the late 40s. Since the Challenger I was effectively an SPG, it was issued to the 13th SPG Battalion, where they served until 1951. Later they were put in storage. Unfortunately, not a single Czechoslovakian Challenger I survived. They were all scrapped in 1959. Only two tanks survive to this day. A late model with additional armour is on display at the Bovington Tank Museum. Another one, likely mid-production, can be seen in Overloon. A walkaround of this vehicle can be seen here


To finish, let us recount the story of an unsuccessful attempt to test the Challenger I in the USSR. The Soviets first learned about the "Challenger (A30)" in December of 1944. On January 25th, upon Soviet request, the British sent brief technical details about this vehicle. More details were obtained in April 1945. The British also sent brief service instructions. A single sample was planned, but the British declined to send one in the summer of 1945. However, the USSR received a Comet IA, which was a much more progressive and interesting tank. The reluctance to send a Challenger I was understandable. Production ended, and there was no point in trials of a vehicle that was no longer in production.



The New T-34

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"December 6th, 1940
#77319ss
To Regional Engineer at factory #183, Military Engineer 2nd Class, comrade Kozyrev

The following is a list of changes and additions necessary to add to the production T-34 tank.
  1. Complete battle weight of no more than 26 tons.
  2. Armament: one 76 mm L-11 gun with coaxial DT machinegun, a second DT for the radio operator, and a submachinegun (PPD) in the turret for firing through hatches. Install the F-34 76 mm gun after January 1941.
  3. The ammunition loadout of the tank should be:
    1. 100 76 mm rounds for the cannon
    2. 4500 DT rounds
    3. 500 PPD rounds
    4. 25 hand grenades
  4. Armour:
    1. Driver's cabin: 45 mm at 30 degrees
    2. Front plate: 45 mm at 57 degrees
    3. Sides: 45 mm at 0 degrees
    4. Sloped sides: 40 mm at 40 degeres
    5. Rear: 40 mm at 45-47 degrees
    6. Floor: 20 mm in the front and 16 mm in the rear
    7. Roof: 20 for the fighting compartment, 16 for the engine compartment
    8. Turret sides: 45 mm at 30 degrees
    9. Turret bustle floor: 20 mm
    10. Turret roof: 20 mm
      The gun mantlet and final driver covers should provide equvalent protection to the rest of the hull.
  5. Install the 600 hp V-2K diesel. The cooling system, lubricant, and fuel capacity should allow for 10-12 hours of non-stop work in any conditions a temperatures of -40 to +40 degrees. The air filter should clear the air to a purity of 95% for 10-12 hours in dusty conditions without cleaning. The engine should be startable with an electric starter, a hand cranked electric-inertial starter, or electric and compressed air starter without leaving the tank. The cooling fan must offer effective cooling and work without breaking until the tank goes through major repairs.
  6. In order to improve the conditions of the gun crew and improve control of the tank, widen the turret without changing the turret ring and install a commander's cupola with all-round vision on the roof.
  7. The ammunition rack must be comfortable to use and allow a rate of fire of 6 aimed shots on the move. The elevation of the gun must be within +30 and -5 degrees.
  8. The observation devices of the driver and radio operator must allow for visibility of both fenders, be proof against bullets and splash, be quickly replaceable if knocked out. Determine whether or not a front driver's hatch is necessary. Install observation devices (one per side) used by the driver and radio operator.
  9. Install the KRSTB radio in the front of the tank, but also allow for the 71-TK-3 radio to be installed. Use the folding whip antenna. The intercom must support three people (commander, driver, radio operator).
  10. Allow the installation of a flamethrower with a range of at least 90 meters and fuel stores for 10-12 shots.
  11. The reliability of the tank must allow for 7000 km of travel between major repairs. Final drives and the main clutch must work reliably in any road conditions without deformation of the friction disks. Adjustment of the transmission components must be done no more frequently than every 1000 km of driving.
    The warranty period of the running gear (track links, track pins, road wheels, drive wheels, etc.) is to be at least 3000 km. Use a lantern gear for the drive wheel. Allow for installation of grousers.
All aforementioned changes should be introduced as of February 1st, 1941.

Authorized representative of the Chief of the Red Army BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Alymov
Chief of the 3rd Department of the Red Army BTU, Military Engineer 1st Class, Afonin"

1942 Tactics

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"Wundsdorf Tank School

March 1st, 1942

What tactics will Russian tanks use in 1942?

Throughout the Eastern campaign, the Russians did not attack according to their manuals. We must assume that this will keep happening in the future.

Russian tanks advance in tight cooperation with infantry, since they are subordinate to it. A small group of tanks (5-10) is followed by a group of infantry, which either rides the tanks or is towed on skis. In this way, the Russians do not deliver a concentrated tank strike, but are able to use tanks everywhere.

We must discard the idea that tanks will only attack in regimental-sized fronts. These small groups of tanks can get through terrain that is suboptimal for tanks (thin forest, forest clearings, dirt roads, etc). Anti-tank obstacles several hundred meters from the front lines are pointless in this case, since the tanks already have very close targets.


The German tank destroyer must realize that he is being attacked with Russian tactics, not German ones.

The attack progresses sluggishly. The Russian tanks begin to fire at long range (2000 meters or more) even at assumed targets.

When fighting tanks, they tried to fight at long distances. This is a correct tactic due to their superior weapons. The German tanks need to try and use their exploitation and observation ability to set the range of the battle. Russian tanks move slowly from front to front, covering each other with fire, even in groups of two tanks. Since the observation devices are unsatisfactory, Russians usually observe from the turret with binoculars (shoot them). The roof hatch is often open (throw grenades or shoot from trees). 

The heaviest tanks (usually a KV) will stop during a breakthrough, and lighter tanks will come from the left and right. The anti-tank guns were forced to fire. If they were discovered by the heavy tank, which did not always happen, the tank would not fire, but drive forward to crush the anti-tank guns and scatter anti-tank mines placed in front of the position.

In other cases, first the heavy tank entered the gun position, then attempted to crush the gun, at which point light tanks would attack.

Anti-tank guns that were detected were crushed with tracks. Individual tanks were immediately attacked using close combat weapons.

Reports show that Russian tanks move like they are blind. This can be explained by destruction of the driver's observation device by machinegun fire (make this a priority). 

Russians can attack at night in small groups. The use headlights with the light masked. Experience in the east and trials on proving grounds show that it is hard to hit these lights, it is best to aim at them with a sniper rifle. We must continue to expect to encounter these night tank groups. Lights are installed on tanks with very thick armour, as these tanks will draw enemy fire. Lighter tanks that are flanking it fire at anti-tank guns that reveal themselves with flashes.

If the Russians manage to track an anti-tank gun or similar target with headlights, the tank was aimed in that direction and the light turned off, to crush it blindly with tracks.

The offensive tactic of using small groups can only be defeated by cooperation between different defensive methods.

Tank destroyers: do not fire anti-tank guns one by one, as they will be detected by heavy tanks at ranges where they cannot be penetrated. It will only become a victim of a flanking light tank. It is recommended to use the 3.7 cm gun alongside 5 cm or even heavy (7.5 cm, 7.62 cm, or 8.8 cm) anti-tank guns, and, if necessary, 10.5 cm guns to suppress resistance. 

Firing at a wide area often gives negative results. The ideal field of fire is equal to the effective range. Flanking and hull down positions are very important. It is very important to keep 3.7 cm guns (constantly at night and often during the day) armed with Hl ammunition, keeping them well hidden and opening fire as late as possible, it is rare to be able to make more than one shot.

Armour: for the German tanker, knowing Russian tanks is an issue of life and death. The thickness of the armour and effectiveness of armament must be known in advance. The German tank, when meeting a more powerful opponent, must aim at the tracks and try to slow down the enemy attack to let heavy guns (7.5 cm Hl or 8.8 cm AA guns) deploy.

Riflemen and infantry: close combat is very important in this spread out way of warfare. Vision of Russian tanks is bad. All tanks have a big dead zone. The KV has an escape hatch on the bottom, the T-34 does not. To deal with the thick armour of Russian tanks, you must pick a large explosive charge (concentrated explosives, at least 3 kg).

Intelligence reports that Russians are now organizing tank battalions composed of one heavy tank company (KV), one medium (T-34) and 2 light (30 T-60 and 5 T-34). It is not known if these are formed in large numbers. The organization in this way seems likely, since it complements the way they have attacked so far in the Eastern campaign. Russian tank units have shown their strengths and weaknesses.

This material is intended for officers, not for the press. Any soldier considers the enemy's weapons better than his own, this has always been the case. At the shooting range, it is the gun's fault when the shooter misses, but the enemy on the battlefield always shoots perfectly from his weapons, this was always reported to exaggerate one's heroism. An officer must never do this and always teach his soldiers to not do this. Any such message, no matter how innocent, is dangerous. 

It is surprising that anyone who fought Russian tanks always insists that they were 52 ton tanks, if not 64, 80, or even 120 ton tanks. There are rumours that Russian tanks are armed with 3.7 or 5 cm guns. This is not true and will never be true. None of the old tanks have this armament, and the new T-60 tank does not have this armament. It is hard to believe that the T-34 and KV have it. An officer must know the enemy's tanks to ascertain their threat. Only he who knows the enemy well can overcome misinformation.

A large amount of Russian tanks is not the key to success. This was shown in the summer of 1941.

Thick armour is not the key to success. We did not lose faith and found countermeasures.

In the sense of leadership, from the tank commander to the gun commander, we have overwhelming superiority.

1942 will be the same as always. It is not the tank that will be decisive, but the men who drive it."

M4A2E8 at the Ontario Regiment Museum

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Canada received a large number of M4A2E8 Shermans that were originally meant for shipment to the USSR. These tanks were still used for training well into the 1970s, and a great many of them are still running today. The Ontario Regiment Museum takes out two of its four Shermans during the Aquino Tank Weekend reenactments.













Weaponized Carboard

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Scale model building as it is known today has its roots in something that is distant from the world of hobbies. Everything started with the Navy: special models of prospective ships, known as "admiralty models", were built since time immemorial. The British were the creators of this tradition. From them, the world inherited popular scales: 1:16, 1:32, 1:48 and 1:72 all have naval origins.

Scale modelling as a hobby began to evolve in the 20th century. Its popularity today can trace its origins to the boom during WWII. Back then, this was not a hobby, but a practical military solution. In addition to wood, a material commonly used to build models of prospective tanks or ships, cardboard was also used. It is largely because of the cardboard models that modern scale models exist.

Cardboard was used for scale models since the second half of the 19th century. It had a number of drawbacks compared to wood and metal used for "admiralty" models. The result was, as a rule, not as precise and not as long-lasting. However, it was commonly available and accessible.

A scale model of the T-26 tank produced by Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War.

Paper models were also common in many countries in the early 20th century. These models were also used for military purposes. For instance, cardboard soldiers served as an accessible illustration of domestic and foreign military uniforms.

Paper models began to gain popularity in the USSR in the second half of the 1920s. The "Murzilka" children's magazine was one of the first to offer them. Using pages from the magazine, one could build a diorama of a farming cooperative or Labour Day demonstration. More complicated models like airplanes appeared later. The military had no direct connection with these models, but they accurately conveyed such "adult" themes as rank insignia of the Red Army.

A new page in the history of cardboard models began in the second half of the 1930s, when it was clear that the global situation was heating up. Pocket references, posters, and other printed materials for readers with brass buttons were common. Spain became a "battlefield" for cardboard models during its civil war. Both sides built models from cardboard. Thanks to the work of Galves and his colleagues from Grenada, these models were very widespread. Kits for building cardboard models of tanks began to be printed en masse, including the T-26, the most numerous tank in the Spanish Civil War.

A German Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.F model produced by Dr. M. Matthiesen & Co. KG. The illustration is from a German wartime reference book.

The first German military paper model dates back to 1910. The pedantic Germans were also leaders in creating all manner of reference materials. Models gained popularity when the Treaty of Versailles prohibited the Germans from building their own tanks. The Germans build tank models on top of cars or even bicycles to use during exercises. In the late 1930, the German publisher Dr. M. Matthiesen & Co. KG became the center for "cardboard militarism". Cardboard models became one of the publisher's main products.

A model by Dr. M. Matthiesen & Co. KG: the Soviet KV-2 heavy tank. It was produced on June 1st, 1942, by which point the KV-2 had already departed from the battlefield. In addition to the pattern, the kit included information about the tank.

Unlike the Spanish, the Germans built their models in strict scales. For instance, aircraft were 1:33 scale, which remains popular with cardboard aircraft to this day. Tanks had a very large scale: 1:20. This allowed for a large and well detailed model that could be used as an educational aid. These models had a very high level of detail for their time.

Both land and air forces used these models. Here, Hans-Ulrich Rudel (white uniform) is examining an identification chart and model.

The best known paper tanks produced by the Germans were Soviet KV-1, KV-2, and T-34 tanks. They were very precise recreations of the tanks captured in the summer of 1941 and delivered to Kummersdorf. This was the secret of the high degree of detail: its creators had access to the vehicles that they put on paper. The company didn't limit itself to trophies: models of German tanks, armoured cars, and aircraft were also produced. The modelling career of Dr. M. Matthiesen & Co. KG ended in the spring of 1945, but cardboard models continued their development. In addition to the "German" 1:20 scale, the smaller 1:25 scale gained popularity. However, models in this scale are not particularly small.

A German paper model adapted for the 1:35 and 1:50 scales can be downloaded here. This is a paper model of a T-34 tank that was published in Germany in 1942.

On the other side of the Atlantic: a model of the Heavy Tank M6 from H.A. Framburg & Co.

The Americans also appreciated the uses of military models, but they didn't bother with paper. H.A. Framburg & Co received an order for a series of models. They mostly consisted of 1:1200 and 1:500 scale ships, but also some 1:35 scale items. The models were built from plastic, cellulose acetate, wood, and other materials. The level of detail varied. These models had their advantages, however: they didn't need to be assembled, and they lasted much longer.

Project 423

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Project 423 was an ersatz SPG designed by the artillery chief of the Kirov factory, Lev Izrailyevich Gorlitskiy. The SPG consisted of a 76 mm regimental gun on a cruciform mount, surrounded by an armoured shield, similar to the one used on the T-26-6 (more commonly known as SU-26). 




"August 5th, 1941

To the Chairman of the GAU UVNA
Senior Military Representative at the Kirov factory
Director of the Kirov factory

Report on the robustness trials of the automobile (ZIS-5) mounted 76 mm model 1927 regimental gun

Refer to letter #188 sent by the Kirov factory on August 2nd, 1941

Goal of the trials: robustness trials of the automobile SPG by means of firing with an increased power round. (Factory trials)

Trials by firing

The automobile SPG arrived at the ANIOP on August 2nd, 1941 at 20:30 along with ammunition. The SPG consists of a 76 mm model 1927 regimental gun on a special mount installed in a ZIS-5 truck.

The trials program was edited during the trials by the chief designer of department #4 of the Kirov factory, comrade Gorlitskiy.

Firing was done in three positions (see diagram).


In all positions, the SPG was tested by firing at an angle of 0 and 24 degrees. In each position, 10 shots were fired using an increased power round and or regular round with a wooden plug.

Inspection of the SPG before firing showed that at angles of elevation of 20 degrees or higher, the panoramic sight range from 15-00 to 45-00 is covered completely.

As a result of the robustness trials in the volume of 30 shots (28 were made while stationary, 2 while on the move), the following was recorded:
  • The rear window of the driver's cabin was broken, despite being protected by a metal shutter. The front window cracked. The side windows were broken. The separator wall of the two crates in the left front section of the vehicle was broken. The covers of both crates flew off. The left door to the cabin was broken. Perpendicular beams that held the roof of the cabin were broken.
  • The damage recorded was chiefly incurred by firing at a traverse angle of 315 degrees. Presumably, the same effect will occur at an angle of 45 degrees.
  • It is necessary to reduce the traverse of the gun mount to protect the cabin from damage.
  • When firing from standstill at a traverse angle of 180 degrees, the truck was shifted by 20-25 cm with every shot, despite the handbrake being engaged.
  • When firing at a traverse angle of 270 degrees, the left wheel of the truck jumped up noticeably, but the vehicle did not shift. The same happened when firing at a traverse angle of 315 degrees. 
  • When firing at an elevation angle of 24 degrees, the recoil was short by 15-40 mm. The pressure in the recuperator was 24 atm.
Deputy Chief of the ANIOP, Military Engineer 1st Class Serebryakov
Chief of the 6th Department, Lieutenant Colonel Galkin
Experiment coordinator, Military Engineer 3rd Class Aksel"


Photos from newsreels by sirjones.

Delivery

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"Operational summary
On completion of the ABTU's order for January 1941 by Comintern factory #183

Military Representative P.F. Rusakov

Item
Produced this year
Delivered this year
T-34 tank, L-11 gun
85                                          
30
Same, with radio
81
51
Spare parts for BT tanks
358.5 tons
358.5 tons
Spare parts for T-34 tanks
457.3 tons
457.3 tons
T-34 gearboxes
12
12




Notes:
  1. Out of a total of 166 tanks delivered in January, 135 1940 production vehicles and 31 tanks built in January of 1941 were accepted .
  2. Spare parts are accepted and paid for according to the factory price list, towards the agreement for 1941, and are shipped to military warehouse #304 on the BTU's directions.
  3. In addition to 30 tanks with no radio accepted in 1941, 6 tanks with no radio built in 1940 were accepted (№ 312-55, 0836-3, 811-84, 0836-9, 756-17 and 311-15-3). Their destinations are indicated in 10-day summaries for the first and second thirds of January.
  4. In addition to the 166 accepted tanks, the factory has 90 vehicles in the following stages:
    1. 19 are painted, but still not fully equipped.
    2. 29 have gone through acceptance trials and are being prepared for painting.
    3. 28 have been assembled and are being prepared for trials. A portion of them are undergoing trials.
    4. 14 are on the assembly line in various stages of completion.
  5. Of the 81 total tanks put through acceptance trials, 6 had to be trialled a second time, and 24 were put through extended trials. The main defects causing repeated and extended trials were:
    1. Breakage of the fuel pump regulator and resulting breakage of the V-2 engine. This issue is being investigated at factory #75.
    2. Chipping of the gearbox gears.
    3. Loosening of the final drive clutches. More thorough breaking in on a stand is being implemented. The issue of increasing the gap in the disengagement mechanism is being considered.
    4. Working loose and breakage of the outer roller bearing of the final drive. Workshop "700" is working on a process that would prevent tilting of the final drive casing.
  6. The main issue with the factory's work in January was poor shipment of turrets from workshop "700" as well as delayed and insufficient shipments of track links from the STZ factory.
  7. The factory plans to assemble and deliver 100 tanks in February, as well as make up the shortfall for 100 tanks expected in January.
Military Representative of the GABTU, Captain Rusakov
GABTU Regional Engineer, Military Engineer 2nd Class, Kozyrev"

Big Caliber

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"To the Commander of the 370th Order of the Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Rifle Division

I report that:
At [illegible] the enemy used 210 mm guns in the artillery barrage of [illegible], which resulted in a direct hit to the turret of IS tank #113 (serial number 41046), as a result of which internal equipment and the engine compartment burned up, and the turret was thrown to the side by the shockwave.
Out of the 6 men inside the tank at the time, the following casualties were taken:
  1. Mechanic-driver Sergeant Romanov: killed
  2. Gunner Starshina Golakhov and loader Private Panov: wounded
Company commander Guards Lieutenant Minulov, technical deputy commander Junior Lieutenant La[illegible] and tank commander Guards Lieutenant Bilanov were not injured.

The majority of the damage was caused by 3 near misses. As a result of fragments and shockwave, 4 men were killed, 4 wounded, and 2 contused.

Regiment commander, Lieutenant-Colonel [signature]
Chief of Staff, Major [signature] 
February 26th, 1945"

The handwritten text over the top of the report is hard to read, it but orders that all IS tanks must be carefully dug in and concealed to prevent this from happening again.

Universal Carrier in Action

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Like most Commonwealth forces, the Canadians used Universal Carriers extensively, and they were even produced in Canada. There are always a couple kicking around Aquino Tank Weekend.






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